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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
For decades, obtaining information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts in order for 
the U.S. tax authority to administer the domestic tax laws correctly and fairly has 
been difficult due to the obstacle that secrecy presents.  
The U.S. domestic tax system depends on both taxpayer and third-party reporting to 
verify accurate tax filings. However, when the taxpayer has foreign accounts this 
becomes more difficult for the U.S. government via the Internal Revenue Service to 
verify the accuracy of the filing and to have access to all of the information that should 
be part of the filing. The U.S. government has multiple measures that together create 
an anti-tax evasion framework that allows them to procure information on the foreign 
accounts held by U.S. taxpayers.  
This dissertation aims to examine four questions in relation the measures the U.S. 
government has taken to identify and procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts. First, what measures are being taken by the U.S. government to procure 
U.S. taxpayer information on foreign financial accounts despite bank secrecy laws 
that prohibit the IRS from administering the U.S. tax laws correctly and fairly? 
Second, how are these measures implemented in order to address the inability to 
procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts? Third, do the 
measures, when administered, enable the IRS to obtain formerly inaccessible taxpayer 
information so that the IRS has all the facts to administer the U.S. tax laws correctly 
and fairly? If the answer to the third question is found to be in the negative, then a 
fourth question presents itself. If the measures do not permit the IRS to procure the 
information they need on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts, what can be done 
to improve the measures, so it increases the IRS’ chances of obtaining the 
information? 
Based on a review of the literature that evaluates and discusses the U.S.’ anti-tax 
evasion measures, a review of all applicable U.S. legal resources that are connected 
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with these various anti-tax evasion measures - including but not limited to, statutes, 
case law, legislative history, and regulations - were analyzed. This analysis found 
that each of the anti-tax evasion measures had flaws that did not allow for the U.S. 
government to procure U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts.  
The results indicate that the anti-tax evasion measures as stand-alone efforts do not 
procure the information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts that is needed. 
However, using the measures in concert with each other as an overall anti-tax 
evasion framework – or coordinated federal attack – should be the strategy the U.S. 
continues to use to procure the information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts so 
that the IRS can administer the tax laws correctly and fairly.  
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DANSK RESUME 
I årtier har det været vanskeligt at få information om amerikanske skattebetalers 
udenlandske konti for at den amerikanske skattemyndighed kan administrere de 
nationale skattelovgivninger korrekt og retfærdigt på grund af den hindring, som 
hemmeligholdelse udgør. 
Det amerikanske indenlandske skattesystem afhænger af både skatteyderens og 
tredjeparts rapportering for at verificere nøjagtige skatteangivelser. Når skatteyderen 
har udenlandske konti, bliver dette imidlertid vanskeligere for den amerikanske 
regering via Internal Revenue Service at verificere indleveringens nøjagtighed og få 
adgang til alle de oplysninger, der skal være en del af indleveringen. Den amerikanske 
regering har flere foranstaltninger, der tilsammen skaber en ramme mod 
skatteunddragelse, der giver dem mulighed for at skaffe information om de 
udenlandske konti, som amerikanske skatteydere har. 
Denne afhandling har til formål at undersøge fire spørgsmål i relation til de 
foranstaltninger, den amerikanske regering har truffet for at identificere og skaffe 
information om amerikanske skatteyderes udenlandske konti. For det første, hvilke 
skridt der træffes af den amerikanske regering for at skaffe amerikanske 
skatteyderoplysninger om udenlandske finansielle konti til trods for 
bankhemmelighedslove, der forbyder IRS at administrere de amerikanske skattelove 
korrekt og retfærdigt? For det andet, hvordan gennemføres disse foranstaltninger for 
at tackle manglende evne til at skaffe information om amerikanske skattebetalers 
udenlandske finansielle konti? For det tredje, gør foranstaltningerne, når de 
administreres, IRS i stand til at indhente tidligere utilgængelige oplysninger om 
skatteyderne, så IRS har alle fakta til at administrere de amerikanske 
skattelovgivninger korrekt og retfærdigt? Hvis svaret på det tredje spørgsmål viser sig 
at være negativt, præsenterer et fjerde spørgsmål sig. Hvis foranstaltningerne ikke 
tillader IRS at skaffe de oplysninger, de har brug for på amerikanske skatteyders 
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udenlandske finansielle konti, hvad kan der gøres for at forbedre foranstaltningerne, 
så det øger IRS 'chancer for at indhente oplysningerne? 
Baseret på en gennemgang af litteraturen, der evaluerer og diskuterer USAs anti-
skatteunddragelsesforanstaltninger, en gennemgang af alle gældende amerikanske 
juridiske ressourcer, der er forbundet med disse forskellige 
skatteunddragelsesforanstaltninger - herunder, men ikke begrænset til, vedtægter, 
retspraksis , lovgivningsmæssig historie og reguleringer - blev analyseret. Denne 
analyse fandt, at hver af de anti-skatteunddragelsesforanstaltninger havde mangler, 
der ikke gjorde det muligt for den amerikanske regering at skaffe amerikanske 
skatteyderoplysninger om udenlandske konti. 
Resultaterne indikerer, at foranstaltningerne til bekæmpelse af skatteunddragelse som 
selvstændig indsats ikke skaffer de nødvendige oplysninger om amerikanske 
skattebetalers udenlandske finansielle konti. Imidlertid bør anvendelse af 
foranstaltningerne i samarbejde med hinanden som en samlet ramme mod 
skatteunddragelse - eller koordineret føderalt angreb - være den strategi, som USA 
fortsætter med at bruge til at skaffe oplysningerne om amerikanske skattebetalers 
udenlandske konti, så IRS kan administrere skatteregler korrekt og retfærdigt. 
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OVDP Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program 
P-FFI Participating FFI 
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RFI Reporting Financial Institution 
R.O.  Responsible Officer 
S. Senate  
TIEA Tax Exchange Information Agreement  
TIN Tax Information Number  
USC United States Code  
USWA United States Withholding Agent  
U.S.  United States 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. THE SUBJECT 
It has been said that the two things that are guaranteed in life are death and taxes. 
Instead, three things are certain in one’s life: “death, taxes and mankind’s unrelenting 
effort to evade taxes.”1 Tax evasion has been the focus of the United States 
(hereinafter U.S.) legislation, congressional hearings, academic research and scrutiny 
by the media (society) for over a century. Congressional hearings have provided 
legislators both evidence and confirmation that tax evasion is an immense problem.2  
In 2003, even before the 2007-2008 bank scandals, the estimate of assets held in U.S. 
taxpayer-owned accounts at UBS, a Swiss-based financial services company, was 
between $18-20 billion.3 The compliance numbers that have been reported for the 
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) alone demonstrate the 
problem: five to seven million U.S. resident taxpayers and tens of millions of non-
resident taxpayers are subject to the FBAR filing requirements yet in 2011 only 
741,000 of those subject to the FBAR complied.4 It was estimated in 2015 that 8.7 
million Americans live abroad and yet just over. 1.5 million file tax returns with the 
 
1 Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J. L. Econ.  & Org. 1 
(1989).  
2 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Tax Evasions: The Effort to 
Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts (2008); See also, U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, 19 (July 2008); 
United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, What is the U.S. Position on 
Offshore Tax Havens?, Senate Hearing No. 107-152 (July 18, 2001); U.S. House Committee 
on Ways and Means, Hearing on Banking Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American 
Taxpayers, No. 111-12 (March 31, 2009); U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax 
Compliance, No. 111-35 (November 5, 2009); U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Offshore 
Tax Evasion: Stashing Cash Overseas, S. Hrg. 110-677 (May 3, 2007).  
3 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 (2014). 
4 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 380 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
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Internal Revenue Service (IRS).5 The U.S. domestic tax system depends on both 
taxpayer and third-party reporting to authenticate whether tax filings are accurate or 
not. However, when the U.S. taxpayer has foreign accounts the ability to authenticate 
the information becomes more difficult for the U.S. government. The IRS only has 
the information that the taxpayer provides them which may or may not be all of the 
information that is pertinent to the foreign account. For the IRS to be able to 
administer the law correctly and fairly6 they need to have access to all of the 
information that should be part of the filing. The fact that foreign third parties are not 
required to report to the U.S. government on the U.S. taxpayers’ accounts only 
compounds the problem because then the IRS has no way to verify if the information 
the taxpayer is providing is reliable. This dissertation will analyze a very narrow part 
of a very broad topic with in tax law that is highly problematic7:  How the U.S. 
government procures U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts in order to 
administer the tax law correctly and fairly despite obstacles such as secrecy laws that 
allow U.S. taxpayers to conceal their foreign accounts. The U.S. government has 
multiple measures that when they work together create an anti-tax evasion framework 
that allows the government to procure information on the foreign accounts held by 
U.S. taxpayers. Despite having multiple measures that comprise the anti-tax evasion 
framework which would seem to lack coherence, it is not the framework itself that 
poses the issue but the evolving nature of secrecy and how it is used to conceal 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. The multiple measures examined in this thesis are the 
U.S. government’s coordinated (and sometimes uncoordinated) assault on secrecy 
which is an effective approach when the U.S. cannot obtain the information needed to 
 
5 Charles P. Rettig, Why the Ongoing Problem with FBAR Compliance, J. Tax & Proc. 37, 39 
(August/September 2016) 
6 The concepts of correctly and fairly simply means – within the context of this thesis – is that 
the IRS will apply the right tax laws to the taxpayer’s situation given that they have all the 
facts and that how they apply those tax laws is not different from one taxpayer to the next 
(again given they have all the facts regarding the taxpayer’s situation). 
7 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax 
Compliance, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, 19 
(July 2008); See also, United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, What is the 
U.S. Position on Offshore Tax Havens?, Senate Hearing No. 107-152 (July 18, 2001); U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore 
Banks and Companies, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983). 
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administer the laws correctly and fairly. This is particularly important when secrecy 
is constantly changing the rules of the game.  
Within the broad area of tax evasion are two almost equally broad topics and areas of 
academic research: tax transparency and tax havens.8  While this thesis may fall under 
the broader issue of tax transparency – for example, tax transparency between two 
governments and tax transparency from the taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) – that wider issue is not the focus of this dissertation. Tax havens is the second 
area that falls under tax evasion that is related to the topic of this thesis because it has 
been a distraction to both politicians and society at large. Tax havens have had 
 
8 Tracy Kaye, Tax Transparency: A Tale of Two Countries, 39 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1153 
(2016); See also, Anna-Marie Hambre, Tax Confidentiality: A Comparative Study and Impact 
Assessment of Global Interest, Örebro Studies in Law (2015); Joshua D. Blank, The Timing of 
Tax Transparency, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 449 (2017); See the list of National Reports on Tax 
Transparency from the 2018 European Association of Tax Law Professors (EATLP) 
Congress, found at http://www.eatlp.org/congresses/310-national-reports-2018; Joseph M. 
Erwin & Fred M. Murray, International Fiscal Association (IFA) Branch Report: United 
States (2013); Xavier Oberson, International Fiscal Association General Report (2013); 
International Fiscal Association, Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation 
Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779 (2013).  
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numerous studies and research articles written on it.9 While an important topic, there 
is a more pressing issue when trying to solve the problem of procuring U.S. taxpayer 
information on foreign accounts. That pressing issue is bank secrecy. Bank secrecy 
prohibits the IRS from obtaining taxpayer information so that it has all the relevant 
facts in order to administer the tax laws correctly and fairly.  
Take Taxpayer Maverick for example. Taxpayer Maverick, a U.S. taxpayer10, holds 
accounts in foreign jurisdiction X. Jurisdiction X has a reputation for and a history of 
bank secrecy. The IRS suspects that taxpayer Maverick has fraudulently filled out his 
tax return by not disclosing his foreign accounts. The U.S. tax system is based on 
voluntary disclosure by taxpayers of assets both domestic and foreign income and 
accounts with domestic third-party reporting as a fail-safe. Since Taxpayer Maverick 
 
9 Nicholas Shaxson, How to Crack Down on Tax Havens, Foreign Affairs, Feb. 13, 2018; See 
also, Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax 
Havens?, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 661 (Oct. 2008); Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What 
Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of International Standards Shows Why 
Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 402 (Autumn 2013); Jasmine M. 
Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 
B.U.L. Rev. 337, 343 (January 2014); Tulio Rosembuj, Harmful Tax Competition, 27 Intertax 
316, 328 (1999); Tyler J. Winkleman, Automatic Information Exchange as a Multilateral 
Solution to Tax Havens, 22 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 193,197 (2012); Timothy V. Addison, 
Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 Ind. J. Global & Legal Stud. 703, 705-706 
(Summer 2009); Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the 
World, 8 (Penguin Random House, 2016); Myla Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal 
Analysis, 32 Intertax 95 (2004); Dharmapala, D. and J. R. Hines, Jr. (2006) “Which Countries 
Become Tax Havens?” NBER Working Paper #12802; James R. Hines Jr., Do Tax Havens 
Flourish?, 19 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 65, 77 (2005); GAO, Large U.S. Corporations and Federal 
Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157 (December 2008); GAO, International Taxation: Tax Haven 
Companies Were More Likely to Have a Tax Cost Advantage in Federal Contracting, GAO-
04-856 (June 2004); Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective?: Stigma, Sanctions 
and Legitimacy: The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. 
Econ. 483 (2018); Clemens Fuest, Tax Havens: Shady Deals, 67 The World Today 16 (July 
2011); Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Havens, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 363 (2014); 
Jeffery Kraft, Changing Tides: Tax Haven Reform and the Changing Views of Transnational 
Capital Flow Regulation and the Role of States in a Globalized World, 21 Indiana J. Global 
Legal Stud. 599 (Summer 2014); Robert T. Kudrle and Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against 
Tax Havens: Will It Last? Will It Work?, 9 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 37 (Autumn 2003); Alan S. 
Lederman and Bobbe Hirsh, The American Assault on Tax Havens- Status Report, 44 Int’l 
Law 1141 (Winter 2010). 
10 U.S. taxpayers in this thesis is meant as any person that owes U.S. tax, whether a U.S. 
person, natural and legal, a foreigner who owes tax on a U.S.-source payment (also called a 
NRA, non-resident alien.) 
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has potentially not disclosed his foreign assets and foreign third parties have no duty 
to disclose what actions can the IRS take to procure information on Taxpayer 
Maverick’s foreign accounts? The IRS cannot administer the tax laws when it does 
not hold all the facts it needs so that it may do so fairly and correctly. The facts include 
all the taxpayer information (see subsection 1.4.2) that are relevant to the taxpayer’s 
case. If the taxpayer does not voluntarily disclose or a foreign third-party refuses to 
disclose due to bank secrecy (among other reasons), the IRS is blinded to a portion of 
the facts it needs to administer the tax law. This has been an ongoing problem for 
decades as illustrated by the statement of Commissioner of the IRS in a 1983 
congressional hearing on crime and secrecy. “By far the most pressing problem, 
however, is the lack of accessibility to information or perhaps I should say lack of 
accessibility. The problem here is not so much one of substantive tax law but of getting 
the information to carry out the enforcement activities.”11  In response to this inability 
to procure taxpayer information – either through the taxpayer himself or through 
foreign third-parties – the U.S. has multiple anti-tax evasion measures that are utilized 
in an attempt to pierce the veil of secrecy and obtain taxpayer information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts.  
The Panama and Paradise Papers12 have demonstrated that the problem of bank 
secrecy and lack of taxpayer compliance persists, grows even. This news has garnered 
attention from the U.S. government which has found that this problem is a global issue 
 
11 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Crime and Secrecy: The Use of 
Offshore Banks and Companies (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).  
12 The Panama and Paradise papers were two cases of millions of leaked documents that were 
published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (see www.icij.org). 
These leaked documents included confidential electronic documents that described offshore 
investments and contained personal financial information on wealthy people as well as public 
officials from numerous countries.  
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with billions of dollars of tax revenue at stake.13 Various estimates show that, globally, 
the annual tax revenue loss is, at the high end, $500 billion USD, and at the lower end, 
between $100 to 240 billion.14 In the United States, the amount of unreported 
international income was around $100 billion in tax revenue annually15, and the total 
 
13 International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Congress Members Call for Action in 
US After Paradise Papers, found at https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-
papers/congress-members-call-for-action-in-us-after-paradise-papers/; See also, NBC News, 
IRS Urges Americans to Come Clean Now, found at 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/panama-papers/irs-urges-americans-come-clean-now-we-
read-panama-papers-n557246 ; Foreign Policy, The White House Cracks Down on Offshore 
Accounts, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/white-house-cracks-down-on-offshore-
accounts/; United States House, White House, Doggett Call for Action on Tax Haven Bill in 
Wake of Paradise Papers, found at https://doggett.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/whitehouse-doggett-call-action-tax-haven-bill-wake-paradise-papers; Miami Herald, 
Senator Wants IRS to Show What It’s Done About Tax Fraud Since Panama Papers Reports, 
found at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article109259467.html; 
United States Department of Justice, Four Defendants Charged in Panama Papers 
Investigation for Their Roles in Panamanian-Based Global Law Firm’s Decades-Long 
Scheme to Defraud the United States, found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-
defendants-charged-panama-papers-investigation-their-roles-panamanian-based-global-law 
14 Tax Justice, Estimating Tax Avoidance Questions, 
https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/03/22/estimating-tax-avoidance-questions/; See also, OECD, 
Governments Rapidly Dismantling Harmful Tax Incentives Worldwide, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/governments-rapidly-dismantling-harmful-tax-incentives-
worldwide-beps-project-driving-major-changes-to-international-tax-rules.htm; Forbes, Tax 
Avoidance Costs the U.S. Nearly 200 Billion Every Year, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/03/23/tax-avoidance-costs-the-u-s-nearly-
200-billion-every-year-infographic/ 
15 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Tax Evasions: The Effort 
to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts, Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2008), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/offshore-tax-evasion-the-
effort-to-collect-unpaid-taxes-on-billions-in-hidden-offshore-accounts ; see also, Bruce W. 
Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal 
Imperialism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333 (Spring 2015); U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 17 (July 2008); Alfred 
Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John 
Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. 
Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013).   
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tax gap – the total amount of U.S. taxpayers’ tax liability not paid on time – is 
estimated to be $458 billion.16   
As discussed in Chapter 3, one method used by the U.S. and other nations to address 
the problem of secrecy and the inability to procure taxpayer information was assessing 
whether a jurisdiction was a tax haven either through drafting a blacklist of 
jurisdictions alleged to be tax havens or devising a substantive list of characteristics 
that defined what a tax haven looked like.17 These methods were used by multiple 
jurisdictions including supranational entities such as the European Union (EU) and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and even 
individual U.S. states.18 While the United States has had unofficial blacklists, a 
blacklist or definition has never been enacted into American legislation or used in any 
 
16 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 (2014); See also, Alfred Bender, Domination v. 
Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the 
United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 
291-292 (Spring 2013); Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History 
of the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for 
Increased Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014); James F. 
Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound 
International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 989 (2016-2017). 
17 Nicholas Shaxson, How to Crack Down on Tax Havens, Foreign Affairs, Feb. 13, 2018; See 
also, Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax 
Havens?, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 661 (Oct. 2008); Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What 
Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of International Standards Shows Why 
Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 402 (Autumn 2013); Jasmine M. 
Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 
B.U.L. Rev. 337, 343 (January 2014); Tulio Rosembuj, Harmful Tax Competition, 27 Intertax 
316, 328 (1999); Tyler J. Winkleman, Automatic Information Exchange as a Multilateral 
Solution to Tax Havens, 22 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 193,197 (2012); Timothy V. Addison, 
Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 Ind. J. Global & Legal Stud. 703, 705-706 
(Summer 2009); Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the 
World, 8 (Penguin Random House, 2016); Myla Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal 
Analysis, 32 Intertax 95 (2004); Dharmapala, D. and J. R. Hines, Jr. (2006) “Which Countries 
Become Tax Havens?” NBER Working Paper #12802; James R. Hines Jr., Do Tax Havens 
Flourish?, 19 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 65, 77 (2005). 
18 OECD, Tax Havens: Summary of the Findings of the First Study of International Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, 15 Intertax 122 (Paris 1987); See also, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Harmful Tax 
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, at 22, OECD Report (1998); Commission Staff 
Working Document Impact Assessment, at 117, COM (2012) SWD 404 final (2012) citing 
Janelle Gravelle’s article. 
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official capacity to identify tax havens within the taxation system.  These definition 
attempts by various jurisdictions have not been successful, and so the governments 
have had to find other measures to deal with tax evasion. The reason that the attempts 
have not been successful is because there are not real consequences, generally, for 
being listed and the listing of a jurisdiction on a blacklist is relative. For example, 
Switzerland has a solid reputation as a tax haven due to its secrecy laws, however, it 
rarely shows up on such lists. For example, the EU list never named Switzerland as a 
tax haven.  
This issue on drafting definitions and blacklists diverts attention from the real issue 
that presents obstacles in procuring taxpayer information: secrecy. When examining 
the problem of tax evasion from a big picture perspective, the root problem is not the 
alleged tax haven itself but the secrecy that the jurisdiction provides. The attempts at 
defining tax havens and drafting blacklists that have been used to address the issues 
of tax evasion and tax havens have missed the mark widely, and even now, some 
countries are considering or have recently passed a blacklist identifying tax havens. 
The U.S. government seems to have acknowledged that secrecy – the main obstacle 
to procuring U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts – cannot be solved 
through blacklists or definitions and, instead, chooses to use several anti-tax evasion 
measures which creates a larger anti-tax evasion framework that targets the secrecy.  
1.2. AIM OF THE STUDY 
The U.S. government has struggled to address the inability to obtain taxpayer 
information on foreign accounts so that the IRS can administer the laws fairly and 
correctly. While the U.S. has used general anti-avoidance (GAARs) and special anti-
avoidance rules (SAARs) to target companies and individuals that utilize tax haven 
jurisdictions, there are also measures that are used to address the problem of obtaining 
taxpayer information on foreign accounts that has confronted the IRS. There are 
multiple, legitimate reasons that a taxpayer may have for not disclosing to the tax 
authority – for example, they may not know they have to. However, many taxpayers 
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do know they are required to disclose their foreign accounts, and instead, choose to 
utilize the foreign jurisdiction’s secrecy to conceal their accounts.  
The issue of secrecy and how it was used to obscure American-held accounts 
culminated in 2007 when Bradley Birkenfeld blew the whistle on his former 
employer, UBS.19 This was followed by the subsequent 2009 deferred prosecution 
agreement between the U.S. government and UBS that contained a penalty of $780 
million fine.20 While the U.S. has the GAARs and SAARs to target tax evasion, the 
UBS case demonstrated that the laws and regulations failed, not only because they 
were flawed, but also because the IRS did not have access to the information they 
needed to administer the tax laws correctly and fairly which has allowed thousands of 
U.S. taxpayers to conceal foreign accounts and evade billions in tax revenue. As will 
be demonstrated throughout the thesis, the UBS scandal was a catalyst for much of 
the battle against secrecy post-2007 and it affected many of the anti-tax evasion 
measures either through tightening the existing measures or by creating a new 
measure to address the problems found in the other anti-tax evasion measures.  
The United States, domestically, has a system in place that allows for taxpayers and 
employers as well as financial institutions (in some situations) to report income and 
account information to the IRS. The problem that occurs is when the IRS cannot 
 
19 Matthew Beddingfield and Colleen Murphy, The UBS Whistle-Blower Who Won’t Back 
Down, Bloomberg News (April 3, 2017), found at,  https://www.bna.com/ubs-whistleblower-
wont-n57982086148/; Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the 
Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax 
Treaty with Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013); The U.S. 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal Imperialism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & 
Comp. Law 333, 357-358 (Spring 2015); James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By 
United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l 
L. J. 981, 985 (2016-2017). 
20 Matthew Beddingfield and Colleen Murphy, The UBS Whistle-Blower Who Won’t Back 
Down, Bloomberg News (April 3, 2017), found at,  https://www.bna.com/ubs-whistleblower-
wont-n57982086148/; Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the 
Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax 
Treaty with Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013); The U.S. 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal Imperialism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & 
Comp. Law 333, 357-358 (Spring 2015); James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By 
United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l 
L. J. 981, 985 (2016-2017). 
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procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts due to secrecy or strong 
privacy laws because foreign financial institutions and employers are not obligated to 
report to the IRS. The IRS cannot determine the correct amount of tax liability or 
administer any number of tax laws (benefits, withholding, etc.) because they do not 
have all the facts – the information on foreign accounts – in front of them.  
This dissertation fills a void concerning in-depth research on the U.S.’ response to the 
inability of the U.S. government to procure taxpayer information – mainly due to bank 
secrecy – so that the IRS can fairly and correctly administer the tax laws to each 
taxpayer’s situation. There are articles21 that have been written that address – not to 
the depth explored here - most of the measures discussed in this thesis. But those 
articles generally refer very briefly to several of the measures are used in tax 
compliance before moving on to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
which is the focus of those articles.  
Many of the articles, however, address only one or two of the measures individually 
instead of examining the measures together as the U.S. government’s anti-tax evasion 
framework that allows the government to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts.22 For instance, Megan Brackney and Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey focus 
 
21 Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333 (Spring 2015); See also, 
D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 101 
(October 2013); Joanna Heiberg, FATCA: Toward a Multilateral Automatic Information 
Reporting Regime, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1685 (2012).   
22 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 9 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Frederick Behrens, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a 
Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 205 (2013); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and 
Martin B. Tittle, The New United States Model Income Tax Convention, 61 Bulletin Int’l 
Tax’n 224 (2007); Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29 
(Fall 2017); Stephan Michael Brown, One Size Fits Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR 
Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased 
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014); William Byrnes & 
Robert J. Munro, Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-4 (March 1st, 2017); Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The 
Application of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the Dual-Purpose Investigatory 
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on the John Doe summons and its purpose and how it is carried out.23 Stephan Michael 
Brown’s article examines both the FBAR (Chapter 4) and voluntary disclosures 
(Chapter 5).24 A few articles, and even a book, address multiple measures, but these 
articles – like Bruce Bean and Abbey Wright’s article – focus on these measures as 
pre-FATCA measures instead of examining these measures as the IRS’ cumulative 
approach – or anti-tax evasion framework – to obtaining taxpayer information on 
foreign accounts.25 This thesis argues that while many of the measures were enacted 
before FATCA, they are certainly still valid and work in concert together with FATCA 
– as an anti-tax evasion framework –  to procure taxpayer information on foreign 
accounts via taxpayers and third parties such as foreign financial institutions and 
foreign governments. 
Ross K. McGill has written an insightful and comprehensible book that is focused on 
the U.S. tax withholding system which is comprised of two of the measures discussed 
in this thesis: the Qualified Intermediary Program (Chapter 7) and FATCA (Chapter 
 
Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574 (1984); Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729 (2014); Travis 
Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure World, 148 
Tax Notes 207 (July 13, 2015); Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes 
Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017); J.T. 
Manhire, What Does Voluntary Compliance Mean?: A Government Perspective, 164 U. Penn. 
L. Rev. 11 (2015); Yvonne Woldeab, “Americans: We Love You, But We Can’t Afford You”: 
How the Costly U.S.-Canada FATCA Agreement Permits Discrimination of Americans in 
Violation of International Law, 30 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 611 (2015); Samantha McKay, The 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Constitutional Analysis,   
23 Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29 (Fall 2017); See 
also, Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the 
Dual-Purpose Investigatory Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574 (1984). 
24 Stephan Michael Brown, One Size Fits Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR 
Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased 
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014). 
25 Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333 (Spring 2015); See also, 
D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 101 
(October 2013).  
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9).26  The book details both of these programs fairly extensively and both programs 
are highly technical.27 But again, this book only focuses on two of the measures and 
was written to explain these measures, not to examine the measures as pieces in the 
anti-tax evasion framework that allows the IRS to procures U.S. taxpayer information 
on foreign accounts.  
1.2.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS LINKED  
Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is to explore three questions. First, what 
measures are being taken by the government to procure taxpayer information on 
foreign accounts despite bank secrecy laws that prohibit the IRS from properly 
administering the tax laws? Second, how are these measures implemented in order to 
address the inability to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial 
accounts abroad? Third, do the measures, when implemented, enable the IRS to obtain 
formerly inaccessible taxpayer information so that the IRS has all the facts to 
administer the law fairly and correctly? If the answer to the third question is found to 
be in the negative, then a fourth question presents itself. If the measures do not permit 
the IRS to procure the information they need on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial 
accounts, what can be done to improve the measures, so it increases the IRS’ chances 
of obtaining taxpayer information on foreign financial accounts? 
The four research questions are linked in that the information that results from 
answering the prior question provides the groundwork to build a firm base for the next 
question. The first question provides an understanding of the anti-tax evasion 
measures the U.S. has enacted or developed in order to address the issue that is at the 
heart of the thesis: the inability to procure taxpayer information on foreign financial 
accounts so that the IRS has all the facts so that it can administer the tax laws correctly 
and fairly. Understanding which measures the U.S. has enacted to address this issue 
 
26 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of 
QI and FATCA (Palgrave Macmillan 2019). 
27 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of 
QI and FATCA (Palgrave Macmillan 2019). 
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is important because there are numerous and various anti-tax evasion measures – such 
as the SAARs and GAARs mentioned previously – found in U.S. law which may 
address tax evasion but that do not give the IRS the ability to obtain information when 
the taxpayer is not compliant and the information cannot be gotten through a foreign 
third-party.   
This information then leads to the second question which focuses on the specific rules, 
regulations and programs and how they are implemented so as to effectuate the 
purpose of obtaining U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts. This includes 
any penalty structure included in the law to encourage/enforce compliance. After 
coming to an understanding of how the measures are implemented, the third question 
asks if the measures and the implementation of said measures enable the IRS to obtain 
formerly inaccessible U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts so that the IRS 
has all the facts to apply the law fairly and accurately. This question asks, “Does it 
work?” and within that question “What works and what does not work?” If it does not 
work, then what is insufficient about it?  
The questions are applied to each chapter that covers one of the measures (Chapters 
4-9). Each chapter names the measure (question 1) and then describes the 
implementation (which includes penalty structures where appropriate) for how the 
measure is implemented (question 2). Each chapter includes an evaluation (question 
3) – after the knowledge gained through questions 1 and 2 – on whether the anti-tax 
evasion measure helps the IRS acquire all the facts by obtaining relevant taxpayer 
information on foreign accounts so that the tax laws can be administered fairly and 
correctly when previously the IRS had a hard time obtaining the facts (information). 
If the measures, when implemented, do not permit the IRS to obtain the information 
on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts, then a fourth question presents itself 
that must be answered at the end of each chapter. If the measure(s) does not permit 
the IRS to obtain the information needed, what can be done to improve the measure(s) 
so that it increases the IRS’ chances of obtaining the information needed on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts ?  
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1.3. METHOD  
To answer the research questions presented, both the legal dogmatics and socio-legal 
methods are employed. In the main part of the dissertation (Chapters 4-9) legal 
dogmatics is the main methodology applied to answer the first two questions while 
socio-legal methodology is utilized to answer the third question and fourth questions. 
The following subsections describe the two different methodologies that are utilized 
in this dissertation. 
The citation form used throughout the thesis is the Bluebook citation.28  
1.3.1. LEGAL DOGMATIC METHOD 
The first objective of the dissertation is to identify which measures the U.S. employs 
to procure taxpayer information in situations where the information might not be 
readily available (or given) and to then describe and analyze how these specific anti-
tax evasion measures are implemented in order to address this inaccessibility issue. 
In order fulfill this objective, legal dogmatics is the primary methodology that has 
been engaged. 
Legal dogmatics from an American perspective (more commonly known in the U.S. 
as Legal Doctrine29), and in the broadest sense, is the coherent, systematic analysis 
of the law through the interpretation of the statutes and case law.30 The purpose of it 
is to aid in the finding and analyzing of the law through the objective examination of 
 
28 The Bluebook, found at, https://www.legalbluebook.com/ 
29 A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Vol. 4: Scienta Juris, Legal 
Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law, 2 (E. Pattaro, Editor-in-Chief, 2005) 
30 Qunfang Jiang and Yifan Yuan, Legal Research in International and EU Taxation, 54 
European Taxation 470, 471 (October 2014) 
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the legal texts, legislative history, case law, any applicable governing principles, 
persuasive works and academic literature.31 
Legal dogmatics is defined as “research that aims to give a systematic exposition of 
the principles, rules and concepts governing a particular legal field or institution and 
analyses the relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with a view to 
solving unclarities and gaps in the existing law.”32  Jan Smits argues that the doctrinal 
approach has three important elements that can be seen in practice.33 The first is that 
the scholar that uses the legal dogmatic approach is working inside the structure of 
the legal system which allows the scholar to reflect on the law and suggest alternative 
measures.34 This inward looking perspective empowers the researcher to inquire into 
the law, taking all the facts into account and formalizing a conclusion.  It is when the 
legal dogmatic method turns to an external viewpoint that the legal approach is no 
longer an entirely sufficient approach to address the issue at hand.35 This dissertation 
moves beyond just a legal-dogmatic perspective when it addresses the third question 
and fourth questions presented so the subsequent section will discuss the socio-legal 
method. This internal element is reflected in the thesis’ selection of relevant legal 
sources and the explanation of the law that will help in answering the first two 
questions. It also allows for the suggestion for possible alternatives when answering 
the third question and fourth questions.  
 
31 Richard Langone, The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence as a Methodology for Legal 
Analysis, 17 Touro L. Rev. 769 (March 2016); See also, Jan M. Smits, What is Legal 
Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research, Maastricht European 
Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2015/06 (September 2015); Roger Cotterrell, Why 
Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?, 25 J. L. & Soc’y 171 (1998); Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research, 7 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., Hart Publishing, 
2005). 
32 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine?, in Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue 207-228 (Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017). 
33 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine?, in Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue 207-228 (Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017).  
34 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine?, in Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue 207-228 (Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017). 
35 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine?, in Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue 207-228 (Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017). 
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The second element is that the “law is seen as a system” through “rigorous analysis, 
creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate doctrinal 
strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass of 
primary materials” in order to resolve inconsistencies among the various materials 
and work it into one whole framework.36 The thesis demonstrates that these pieces are 
fitted together to present the Internal Revenue Services’ anti-tax evasion framework 
that procures taxpayer information while dealing with obstructions such as secrecy 
that prohibit it from obtaining said information.  
The third and final element is that legal dogmatics puts the present law in order.37 
However, this third element is more reflective of socio-legal methodology (discussed 
in next section) than true legal dogmatics. Smit argues that the legal-dogmatic 
approach is “that it is able to accommodate new developments such as recent case law 
and legislation against the background of societal change.”38 This thesis reflects on 
not only present legislation and case law but also past case law because the American 
version of legal dogmatics contains the principle of stare decisis (discussed in chapter 
2) which obligates courts to follow prior case law. So, while this thesis does meet the 
third element it is in a slightly different way in that it, at times, reflects on past 
legislation or case law to understand in its entirety the U.S.’ approach to obtaining 
U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts. 
Since this thesis researches and analyzes U.S. law based on the legal dogmatic 
method, one must understand both the nature of and how the U.S. federal system 
works. The United States has a unique, albeit, complicated system39 - a federalist 
 
36 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine?, in Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue 207-228 (Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz, & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017) 
(quoting the Council of Australian Law Deans)).  
37 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic 
Research, Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2015/06 
(September 2015). 
38 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic 
Research, Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2015/06 
(September 2015). 
39 Konrad Zweigert, An Introduction to Comparative Law, pg. 239 (Clarendon Press, 3rd 
edition, 1998). 
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government system that is a mix of common law and statutory code.40 The U.S. 
federalist system has two parallel governmental systems that function alongside one 
another: the central federal (national) government and the fifty different state 
governments. The American system has, after more than two hundred years, evolved 
into its own distinctive common-law system.41 The central federal government is 
inclusive of three equal but separate branches – the legislative, the executive and the 
judicial – each with different powers that act as a checks and balances system. The 
legislative branch enacts law while the executive branch enforces the law and the 
judicial branch interprets it.42 Within these parallel systems and even within each 
branch in each system, are multiple sources of law that are relevant to this dissertation 
in order to answer the questions presented. By working within the structure of the U.S. 
federal system, the thesis uses the appropriate sources to lay out the current law and 
regulations that target the inaccessibility problem that the government has in 
procuring taxpayer information on foreign accounts. The laws and regulations are 
analyzed throughout the thesis to examine whether they solve the inability to procure 
the information needed predicament. The subsequent chapter discusses the U.S. 
federal system and its legal sources in more detail. 
Based on the above and using the doctrinal method, the research was focused on the 
resources that are found within the taxation system in U.S. law. Federal law has been 
chosen because this thesis focuses on the U.S.’ national response – not the individual 
state response – and, thus, the resources that have been examined are the federal tax 
resources. Within the federal tax system, those resources are the U.S. tax code and the 
accompanying tax regulations, legislative history, tax treaties, Internal Revenue 
Service publications such as notes and press releases and court cases. The legislative 
history to the tax codes allows for the researcher to understand the purpose and 
background of the laws which deepens the analysis. The tax regulations also help to 
 
40 Konrad Zweigert, An Introduction to Comparative Law, pg. 239 (Clarendon Press, 3rd 
edition, 1998). 
41 Konrad Zweigert, An Introduction to Comparative Law, pg. 239 (Clarendon Press, 3rd 
edition, 1998). 
42 Portland State University Library, United States Government Information: Legislative 
Branch, http://guides.library.pdx.edu/c.php?g=271192&p=1811512  
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explain the legislation that has been enacted. Case law from the federal courts is used, 
where applicable, to explain the legislation or terms used with the legislation – for 
example, defining tax evasion.  
The dissertation uses these resources to explain what the U.S. has done within the 
taxation system to deal with the central issue of the dissertation – inability to procure 
taxpayer information on foreign financial accounts to administer the laws fairly and 
correctly. The legislation in the thesis has been enacted to address tax evasion in a 
broader arc and the inability to procure taxpayer information more narrowly. These 
laws are on the books to shape, hopefully, taxpayer behavior regarding compliance 
with the tax laws which includes reporting on their foreign accounts.  
For example, FATCA and the QI (Qualified Intermediary Program) are utilized to 
affect the behavior of financial institutions – but also with the objective of shaping the 
behavior of the taxpayer by encouraging compliance with the law.  
The starting point of this thesis is with the doctrinal method and what the law says to 
help in answering the first two questions. However, that leads to how to answer the 
third, and fourth questions. To do that, the dissertation turns to the socio-legal method.  
 
1.3.2. SOCIO-LEGAL METHOD 
The second objective of this dissertation is to evaluate whether the chosen anti-tax 
evasion measures allow the IRS to procure taxpayer information so that they can 
ascertain all the facts in a taxpayer’s case in order to administer the tax laws fairly 
and correctly. The first two thesis questions presented ask “What is the law?”43 and 
how is it implemented? To get to those answers is a strictly legal dogmatic process. 
 
43 Kim Economides, Socio-Legal Studies in Aoteatoa/New Zealand, 41 J. L. & Soc’y 257 
(2014); See also, See also, Simon Brooman, Creatures, the Academic Lawyer and a Socio-
Legal Approach: Introducing Animal Law into the Legal Education Curriculum, 38 Liverpool 
L. Rev. 243, 248 (2014) (quoting Kim Economides, Socio-Legal Studies in Aoteatoa/New 
Zealand, 41 J. L. & Soc’y 257 (2014)). 
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However, the last two questions asks whether or not the law works44 and how to 
improve it if it does not work which results in the analysis taking in broader societal 
problems, perspectives and concerns.45   Similarly, The Council for Australian Law 
Deans states “At the same time, once legal research broadens into the study of the 
institutions or processes of the law, the empirical observation of human behavior, or 
the use of historical methods to illuminate an understanding of the past, it has 
reached the familiar territory of the humanities and social sciences.”46  
Socio-legal methodology plays a functionalist role in that it emphasizes the effect of 
the law in action which is intended to regulate behavior – for this thesis regulating 
the behavior of the taxpayer and/or financial institutions into complying with tax 
laws – and “the efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was 
devised.”47 While legal dogmatics delves into not just the statute or case in the 
present but also the legislative history and prior precedents, socio-legal methodology 
does not investigate or analyze “what a legislator thought a century ago” only what 
that same legislator would think in present circumstances.48 It also investigates the 
impact that legislation has or it chooses to propose new legislation.49 A decision or 
statute is only as good as it informs and educates its citizens (in this dissertation, 
U.S. taxpayers) as to the appropriate social behavior – tax compliance by giving the 
 
44 Kim Economides, Socio-Legal Studies in Aoteatoa/New Zealand, 41 J. L. & Soc’y 257 
(2014); See also, See also, Simon Brooman, Creatures, the Academic Lawyer and a Socio-
Legal Approach: Introducing Animal Law into the Legal Education Curriculum, 38 Liverpool 
L. Rev. 243, 248 (2014) (quoting Kim Economides, Socio-Legal Studies in Aoteatoa/New 
Zealand, 41 J. L. & Soc’y 257 (2014)). 
45 H. Arthurs & A. Bunting, Socio-Legal Scholarship in Canada: A Review of the Field, 4 J. 
Law & Soc. 487 (2014).  
46 Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal Research, found at 
https://cald.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/cald-statement-on-the-nature-of-legal-
research-20051.pdf 
47 Richard Langone, The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence as a Methodology for Legal 
Analysis, 17 Touro L. Rev. 779 (2016). 
48 Richard Langone, The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence as a Methodology for Legal 
Analysis, 17 Touro L. Rev. 781 (2016). 
49 Kim Economides, Socio-Legal Studies in Aoteatoa/New Zealand, 41 J. L. & Soc’y 274 
(2014). 
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IRS the information needed to correctly and fairly apply the tax laws to the given 
fact pattern.50 
The issue of tax evasion and, more specifically, the central issue of this thesis are 
considered both a legal issue because it is a violation of tax law but it is also a social 
issue because the inability to procure taxpayer information does not allow for a fair 
tax system. Thomas S. Adams, the father of the modern U.S tax system, was 
concerned with U.S. taxpayers who have foreign accounts being doubly taxed while 
resident U.S. taxpayers were only taxed once because that did not lead to an 
equitable system.51 The same can be said of the reverse situation:  taxpayers who 
have foreign accounts can conceal some of their assets without reporting while those 
with domestic accounts cannot conceal them and are taxed does not equal a fair and 
equitable system either. Having measures to try to obtain the taxpayer information 
despite obstacles such as secrecy influences the behavior of the taxpayer and 
financial institutions as well as being a deterrent for future behavior by either the 
same taxpayers and financial institutions or others that have not yet chosen to violate 
the tax laws yet. According to Roger Cotterrell, legal ideas are a means of 
structuring the social world and translated to be relevant to this thesis, the legal ideas 
(or laws) structure how taxpayers should see tax evasion.52 This means that the 
measures discussed and analyzed in this thesis should influence the taxpayers’ views 
on tax evasion toward the negative and sway their behavior towards compliance. 
Another aspect to the socio-legal methodology is the moral perspective which 
focuses on social values.53 This perspective concentrates on identifying societal 
values – for example, courage, caring and respect. The issue at the center of the 
 
50 Richard Langone, The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence as a Methodology for Legal 
Analysis, 17 Touro L. Rev. 781 (2016). 
51 Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, Proceedings of 
the Annual Conference on Taxation under the Auspices of the National Tax Association, 22 
Nat’l Tax Assoc. 197 (1929).  
52 Roger Cotterrell, Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically, 25 J.L. & Soc’y 192 
(1998).  
53 Richard Langone, The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence as a Methodology for Legal 
Analysis, 17 Touro L. Rev. 769 (2016). 
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thesis – inability to obtain taxpayer information – concerns the societal values of 
honesty, trust and fairness. The U.S. taxation system trusts that U.S. taxpayers will 
be honest and comply with the tax rules and disclose to the IRS the correct 
information so that the IRS can fairly administer the tax rules to the case in front of 
them. However, the U.S. taxation system also uses the threat of being audited, third-
party reporting and penalties as coercion into complying in case a U.S taxpayer 
contemplates violating that trust. 
With all this in mind, Chapter 3 reflects upon what the conversation has been 
previously (tax havens) and what has been done to address the issue (blacklists and 
definitions) and acknowledging that this is not the real problem but instead is a 
distraction from the real issue – secrecy – which prevents the IRS from procuring 
the taxpayer information they need to administer the laws fairly and correctly. 
Chapters 4-9, while identifying and analyzing the legal sources, asks the question 
whether the measures, when implemented, address the inability to procure taxpayer 
information. This question will also reflect upon whether the measures motivates 
taxpayers and foreign third-parties (via the Qualified Intermediary Program and 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act in Chapter 7 and 9) to disclose the 
information needed.54 Do these measures have the desired effect on motivating 
taxpayers or foreign third-parties to disclose the information needed?  
The law (or legal dogmatics) does not explain the societal response to tax evasion 
and bank secrecy and the use of it. It also does not explain potential changes in 
behavior due to the law or the strengthening of laws. The Socio-Legal methodology 
will help answer the third question of this thesis by analyzing whether the measures 
taken will alter the behavior of the taxpayer and foreign third-parties and whether 
the IRS will be able to procure the information that they have not be able to obtain 
before.  
 
54 Richard Langone, The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence as a Methodology for Legal 
Analysis, 17 Touro L. Rev. 769 (2016). 
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1.4. CORE CONCEPTS 
1.4.1. TAX AVOIDANCE VERSUS TAX EVASION 
Considering this thesis’ topic revolves around tax evasion, a definition and 
explanation of what tax evasion is or is not and why tax avoidance is not considered 
within this thesis is warranted. Confusion with the two terms has long been an issue 
and many, including politicians themselves, conflate the two terms55 However, they 
should not be conflated because as this section shows tax evasion is an illegal act 
while tax avoidance, which is morally and ethically questionable, is a legal one.   
Generally speaking, tax avoidance is the legal arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs with 
the purpose of reducing his/her tax liability and while avoidance falls within the 
bounds of the law; it contradicts the true intent of the law.56 This thesis is focused on 
tax evasion or the illegal use of the law and not tax avoidance. 
A good place to start the discussion of why this thesis has chosen a tax evasion focus 
and not avoidance is to examine the basic definition of both. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines tax evasion as “the willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law in order 
to illegally reduce one’s tax liability” and notes that tax evasion is also referred to as 
tax fraud.57  The Oxford’s Dictionary of Law is a bit broader in its definition as it 
defines tax evasion as “any illegal action to avoid the lawful assessment of taxes.”58 
 
55 Montgomery B. Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 38 Columbia L. Rev. 80 (Jan. 
1938).  
56 William Cogger, Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518 (1937; See also, 
Lucius A. Buck, Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income, 23 Virginia 
L. Rev. 107 (Dec. 1936);  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome, A Primer on Tax Evasion, 40 
IMF Staff Papers 807, 808 (Dec. 1993) (Footnote #2); Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a 
Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 Nat’l Tax J. 13 (March 1986); Jane G. Gravelle, 
Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Congressional Research Service 
(January 15, 2015); Steven A. Bank, When Did Tax Avoidance Become Respectable?,71 Tax 
L. Rev. 123-177 (2017); Cihat Öner, Is Tax Avoidance the Theory of Everything in Tax Law? 
A Terminological Analysis of EU Legislation and Case Law, EC Tax Rev. 96 (2018); Doreen 
McBarnet, Legitimate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of Legality, 
3 J. Human Justice, 56, 58 (1992); Paulus Merks, Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Planning, 34 Intertax 272, 273 (2006). 
57 Black’s Law Dictionary, 1474 (7th ed. 1999). 
58 Oxford Dictionary of Law (8th ed. 2015). 
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The OECD’s glossary of terms also defines avoidance and evasion. The glossary notes 
that it is difficult to define avoidance but that it “is generally used to describe the 
arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs that is intended to reduce his tax liability……the 
arrangement could be strictly legal” however, as the definition points out is usually 
in contradiction with the spirit of the law.59 Tax evasion, on the other hand, is defined 
as “illegal arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored.”60 The definitions 
seem to denote two categories of action – it is either evasion or avoidance – by the 
simple use of the term illegal(ly). Other dictionaries define the concept similarly.61 
The next step is to look to the academics and how they define the distinction between 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. Scholarly definitions range from the two concepts 
meeting in a gray area while others argue that there are clear boundaries between the 
two.62 Overall, though, there is a consensus that tax avoidance is legal while tax 
evasion is not. 
In a paper published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an organization that 
works towards global monetary and financial cooperation63, the authors note that 
scholars typically differentiate between tax avoidance and tax evasion.64  Tax 
evasion, according to these authors, is a violation of the law and in contrast, tax 
 
59 OECD, Glossary of Tax Terms, found at https://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm 
60 OECD, Glossary of Tax Terms, found at https://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm 
61 See, Barron’s Legal Guides, 37, 483 (3rd ed. 1991); Oxford Dictionary of Law (8th ed. 
2015); Merriam-Webster.com Legal Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/tax%20evasion  
62 William Cogger, Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518 (1937; See also, 
Lucius A. Buck, Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income, 23 Virginia 
L. Rev. 107 (Dec. 1936);  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome, A Primer on Tax Evasion, 40 
IMF Staff Papers 807, 808 (Dec. 1993) (Footnote #2); Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a 
Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 Nat’l Tax J. 13 (March 1986); Jane G. Gravelle, 
Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Congressional Research Service 
(January 15, 2015); Steven A. Bank, When Did Tax Avoidance Become Respectable?,71 Tax 
L. Rev. 123-177 (2017); Cihat Öner, Is Tax Avoidance the Theory of Everything in Tax Law? 
A Terminological Analysis of EU Legislation and Case Law, EC Tax Rev. 96 (2018); Doreen 
McBarnet, Legitimate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of Legality, 
3 J. Human Justice, 56, 58 (1992); Paulus Merks, Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Planning, 34 Intertax 272, 273 (2006). 
63 International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/About 
64 Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome, A Primer on Tax Evasion, 40 IMF Staff Papers 807, 
808 (Dec. 1993) (Footnote #2). 
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avoidance is taxpayers using ambiguities within the law (key) in order to reduce 
taxes.65 It is important to note that tax evasion does not constitute a crime in all 
countries, unlike the United States, where it is a crime which can present conflict 
between the U.S. and a foreign country.66 Consequently, the definition of what 
qualifies as tax evasion will also vary country to country. For example, Switzerland 
does not consider tax evasion a crime, instead it is considered a civil matter67 and 
actions that qualify as tax evasion under Swiss law are considered as both fraudulent 
and tax evasion under U.S. law.68 This issue will be considered further in the chapter 
on Treaties (Chapter 8).  
Douglas J. Workman distinguished tax avoidance and tax evasion stating that tax 
avoidance happens when a taxpayer arranges his or her affairs within what the law 
allows.69 Tax evasion, according to this same scholar, “involves acts intended to 
misrepresent or to conceal facts in an effort to escape lawful tax liability.”70 Michael 
W. Spicer notes that tax evasion is the reduction of the taxpayer’s tax liability using 
illegal or fraudulent means and that tax avoidance is reducing a taxpayer’s tax 
liability within the provisions in the tax law.71  He asserts that there is a third 
 
65 Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome, A Primer on Tax Evasion, 40 IMF Staff Papers 807, 
808 (Dec. 1993) (Footnote #2).  
66 Ellen C. Auwarter, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in the Cayman Islands: Solution to 
International Tax Evasion or Threat to Sovereignty of Nations, 9 Fordham Int’l L. J. 680, 681 
(1985/1986); See also, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Obtaining the Names of 
U.S. Clients With Swiss Accounts: Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 5 (2009) (Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin); https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/-
private-sphere-_parliament--don-t-touch-banking-secrecy-for-swiss-clients/43748818; 
Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally Evading 
Income Taxes, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 675, 702 (Summer 1982).  
67 Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally 
Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 675, 702 (Summer 1982); See also, 
Paulus Merks, Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning, 34 Intertax 272, 273 (2006).  
68 Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally 
Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 675, 703 (Summer 1982). 
69 Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally 
Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 675, 677 (Summer 1982). 
70 Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally 
Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 675, 677 (Summer 1982). 
71 Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 Nat’l Tax J. 
13 (March 1986). 
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possibility that is termed “avoision” – which originated in 197972 – and that this is 
where the lines between tax avoidance and tax evasion are blurred.  The term 
avoision refers to the “questionable legality” of the tax avoidance transaction 
undertaken.73  However, this “avoision” seems to be the gray area that exists before 
the court finds whether or not it is within the bounds of the law.  
Interestingly, one scholar described tax avoidance as a “halfway house” of tax law 
because tax avoidance is not quite full compliance with the law but it is also not a 
direct abuse of the law.74  However, the same article notes that tax avoidance does 
not qualify as either a criminal or a regulatory offense75; it is a legal use of the law.  
Steven A. Bank, through the title of his article, seems astonished that tax avoidance 
has become respectable and he points to the United States in the 1930s and the 
attitude towards tax avoidance.76 “During the 1930s, even the use of perfectly legal 
provisions for reducing income taxes was attacked as morally suspect.”77 He goes 
on to argue that many believe that tax avoidance became respectable when Judge 
Learned Hand stated in an important case distinguishing tax evasion and avoidance 
that taxpayers may arrange their affairs so that their tax liability is as low as 
possible.78 However, avoidance, in this author’s opinion, has never been respectable 
among politicians or the authorities which is represented through their conflation of 
the tax evasion and avoidance terms as well as the closing of loopholes79 that allow 
 
72 Doreen McBarnet, Legitimate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of 
Legality, 3 J. Human Justice, 56, 58 (1992) (citing Arthur Seldon, Tax Avoision: The 
Economic, Legal and Moral Inter-Relationships between Avoidance and Evasion, Institute of 
Economic Affairs (1979)). 
73 Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 Nat’l Tax J. 
13 (March 1986). 
74Doreen McBarnet, Legitimate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of 
Legality, 3 J. Human Justice, 56, 58 (1992). 
75 Doreen McBarnet, Legitimate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of 
Legality, 3 J. Human Justice, 56, 58 (1992). 
76 Steven A. Bank, When Did Tax Avoidance Become Respectable?,71 Tax L. Rev. 123-177 
(2017). 
77 Steven A. Bank, When Did Tax Avoidance Become Respectable?,71 Tax L. Rev. 123-177 
(2017). 
78 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (1934); See also, Steven A. Bank, When Did Tax 
Avoidance Become Respectable?,71 Tax L. Rev. 123-177 (2017). 
79 William Cogger, Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518 (1937). 
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people to manage their taxes legally. U.S. taxpayers, on the other hand, have always 
tried to lower – or avoid – their tax liability even in America’s early years as a 
nation. Samuel Adams, the father of the American Revolution, argued that it was a 
natural, God-given right for a person to enjoy their property (including money) and 
have the sole disposal of it and he knew how much Americans hate paying taxes.80    
There is a distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance and case law and the 
statutes support that. When there is a question about whether it is one or the other 
(gray area), it becomes a question for the courts. One cannot designate tax avoidance 
as tax evasion until Congress decides to close the loopholes that they deem 
questionable and once the law is enacted, then that action, if it violates the law, 
qualifies as tax evasion.  
The term loopholes can be viewed as a pejorative term because loopholes 
(avoidance) are legal (law) until Congress enacts that law that closes those loopholes 
and makes it illegal. So, to use the term loophole in the negative and claim it is tax 
evasion before the law makes it evasion seems disingenuous. For example, anyone 
who takes a deduction is avoiding tax because it is allowed under the United States 
Tax Code. It becomes a problem and ventures into evasion when one begins to 
shade the interpretation of the law and use the law inappropriately to take the 
deduction. Although this example is an extreme one, it is illustrative.  
Despite knowing generally how tax evasion and tax avoidance are defined among 
the academic world, the question that is specific to this thesis becomes how does the 
U.S. define what tax evasion is versus tax avoidance? In 1954, Congress enacted a 
statute, the codification of case law, which made it a felony to willfully attempt to 
evade or defeat any tax imposed under the Revenue Code no matter how the attempt 
to evade was done.81 26 USC §7201 is the U.S. statute that makes a willful evasion 
of tax a felony.82 The statute itself states “Any person who willfully attempts in any 
 
80 Ira Stoll, Samuel Adams: A Life, 66 (Free Press, 2008). 
81 26 U.S.C. §7201  
82 26 U.S.C. §7201  
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manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, 
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony…”83 The statute 
provides three elements that are needed to prove that a taxpayer committed the 
felony offense of tax evasion: 1) willfulness (intent), 2) existing tax deficiency and 
3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion.84 The question for this section is what 
qualifies as evasion as opposed to avoidance since the statute does not mention 
avoidance as a crime?  
The statute is the starting point of course; however, it does not provide a definition 
of tax evasion other than to state that to do so is a felony. To provide clarification of 
what tax evasion is, U.S. case law and their holdings should be examined. How do 
the courts define tax evasion and differentiate between tax evasion and tax 
avoidance?  
The question of what is considered tax evasion and what is considered tax avoidance 
was being considered as early as 1873 by the Supreme Court and by a series of early 
20th century cases. United States v. Isham85 held that if avoiding a tax is done by 
legal means, then there is no “legal censure”.86 In other words, as long as the 
transaction/device used to avoid taxes is legal, then the action falls within the 
bounds of the law and does not qualify as tax evasion and is not a crime.  
In another U.S. Supreme Court case, Bullen v. Wisconsin, the Court outlines a pretty 
clear picture as to what constitutes avoidance versus evasion.87  The Court illustrated 
the difference by drawing an invisible line and noting that a case falls either on one 
side of the line or the other.88 When a party works within the law and what it permits 
he falls on the avoidance side of the line, however, when “an act is condemned as 
 
83 26 U.S.C. §7201. 
84 26 U.S.C. §7201; See also, Sansone v. U.S., 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Spies v. United States, 
317 U.S. 492 (1943).  
85 William Cogger, Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518 (1937).  
86 United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. 496 (1873) 
87 Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916). 
88 Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916); discussed in William Cogger, supra, 
note 2.  
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evasion what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by policy if 
not by the mere letter of the law.”89  
Judge Learned Hand in Gregory v. Helvering clearly stated the law when he said 
“Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible….”90 
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Hand when the case reached them and 
reiterated that a taxpayer has the legal right to reduce or avoid his or her taxes as 
long as it falls within the bounds of the law.91  
According to Spies v. United States, tax evasion as a crime only occurs when one 
willfully and blatantly attempts to disregard their tax liability.92 The court then 
creates a list (non-limiting) that provides examples of actions that would constitute 
tax evasion: creating and keeping a double set of books, entries that are either false 
or altered, creating false invoices or documents, destroying said books and records, 
etc.93 This list is an important example of tax evasion because tax evasion is not just 
one type of action but, instead, can take many forms and those who choose to evade 
(or help the evaders) are continually evolving.94 
A 1st Circuit Court of Appeals case, Wiggins v. Commissioner, states the test on how 
to determine whether a transaction qualifies as evasion or avoidance is simply 
determining whether or not the transaction was real or sham.95 The motive that one 
has to reduce taxes is irrelevant. “The motive or desire to reduce or escape taxes is 
almost universal, and, if not given play through sham or fraudulent transactions, 
entirely legitimate.” 
 
89 Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916). 
90 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (1934).  
91 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (1934), aff’d by 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
92 Spies v. U.S., 317 U.S. 492 (1943).  
93 Spies v. U.S., 317 U.S. 492 (1943). 
94 Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome, A Primer on Tax Evasion, 40 IMF Staff Papers 807, 
809 (Dec. 1993) 
95 Wiggins v. Comm’r, 46 F.2d 743 (1st Cir. 1931); William Cogger, Tax Avoidance versus 
Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518 (1937). 
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Following the logic of Bullen and the other cases, when the transaction has been 
found to fall within the bounds of the statute, then it is tax avoidance which is legal. 
The issue is then black and white: evasion or avoidance. While the politicians argue 
that tax avoidance is also bad for the country because of the loss of revenue, the 
Supreme Court has declared that it is legal so the way Congress has chosen to 
address tax avoidance is to close loopholes that exist within the law that allow 
taxpayers to legally avoid paying tax. Many of the scholars as discussed above have 
remarked that the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion is that one is 
legal, and one is illegal which is on par with the line-in-the-sand test stated in Bullen 
v. Wisconsin. Either its tax avoidance because it falls within the statute and is a legal 
action/transaction or it falls outside of the statute’s borders and is an illegal action, 
or tax evasion. The only gray area that presents itself is considering whether the act 
falls within the statute – in order to be considered legal – or not. Once that decision 
has been made by the court, it is either illegal or it is not.  
Using the phrase tax avoidance in reference to the multiple tax schemes – for 
example, financial institutions in tax havens that issue their account holders credit 
cards so that they have access to their funds which most like have not been reported 
to the IRS96 – offered through jurisdictions that offer secrecy is disingenuous and 
misleading. The schemes and programs that allow the taxpayer to conceal their 
accounts (including the use of credit cards linked with that account) without 
reporting them is not tax avoidance, it is tax evasion which is illegal. The only way 
it is not tax evasion is if the taxpayer reports the foreign accounts to the IRS. 
Another reason that this thesis is focused on evasion and not avoidance is because 
the legislative history and congressional reports indicate that tax evasion was the 
true goal of the legislation like the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (Chapter 
9) and the Bank Secrecy Act (Chapter 4). Despite the politicians conflating the terms 
 
96 See Chapter 6 on John Doe Summonses, specifically subsection 6.2.1.3, for reference to the 
OCCP (Offshore Credit Card Program) which addressed this type of scheme.   
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in these legal sources as they have done for one hundred years or more, their true 
goal is targeting illegal behavior – or tax evasion. 
This thesis is concerned about tax evasion only for a couple of reasons. First, 
according to the U.S. law there is a distinct line between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. Since tax evasion is the illegal act, this thesis is concerned with that act 
only – not the acts considered legal (avoidance) by law. Second, despite the 
politicians and authorities bemoaning the immorality and deceitfulness of both tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, the legislative history of the legislation examined in this 
thesis reflects the need to address tax evasion and actually meaning tax evasion 
despite using the two terms in conflation with one another.97  
 
1.4.2. ACCESS TO TAXPAYER INFORMATION 
The issue presented by this thesis is that the IRS cannot accurately examine the 
taxpayer’s case in order to adequately and fairly administer the tax laws without being 
able to fully procure the taxpayer’s information on foreign accounts so that the IRS 
has all the facts in front of them. One of the main concepts when analyzing the issue 
and the measures that the U.S. government has taken in response to the issue is the 
problem of accessing taxpayer information. Much of the literature presented also uses 
 
97 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Tax Evasions: The Effort 
to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts, Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2008); See also, U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax 
Compliance: Obtaining the Names of U.S. Clients with Swiss Accounts, Senate Hearing No. 
111-30 (March 4, 2009); U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, Foreign Bank Account 
Reporting and Tax Compliance, House Hearing, No. 111-35 (November 5, 2009); United 
States Senate Committee on Finance, Offshore Tax Evasion: Stashing Cash Overseas, Senate 
Hearing No. 110-677 (May 3, 2007); United States Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, What is the U.S. Position on Offshore Tax Havens, Senate Hearing No. 107-
152 (July 18, 2001); United States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Foreign 
Bank Secrecy and Bank Recordkeeping, Senate Hearing No. 91-1139 (August 24, 1970); 91 
Cong. Rec. 32627 (September 18, 1970); 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970);  
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that phrase to describe the problem that is confronting the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).98 But what exactly does the expression “accessing taxpayer information” 
mean? Since this thesis refers to and examines U.S. law and regulations, this thesis 
will look at those resources to discern what accessing taxpayer information means 
within U.S. law.  
Domestically, the IRS has access to taxpayer returns (if taxpayers file them99) as well 
as third-party information such as financial institutions reporting interest or dividends 
but when entering international tax waters the access that the IRS has to this type of 
information virtually vanishes. There is no law or regulation requiring another country 
or the country’s financial institutions to comply and provide information to the IRS 
regarding U.S. taxpayers’ accounts in that country as there is in the U.S. with U.S. 
financial institutions and employers.  
26 U.S.C. §6001 requires U.S. taxpayers to not only file returns but to keep records 
that relate to the tax returns.100 U.S. taxpayers, that are liable for tax, are required to 
file tax returns and provide the IRS with information on that return so that the IRS can 
equitably and correctly administer the tax laws101.  
The question becomes what qualifies as taxpayer information? 26 U.S.C. §6103, 
which is the statute covering confidentiality and disclosure of returns and return 
 
98 United States Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Foreign Bank Secrecy and 
Bank Recordkeeping, S. Rep. 91-1139 (August 24, 1970); See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. 
Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, (Palgrave MacMillan 
2016); U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Tax Evasions: The 
Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts, Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2008), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/offshore-tax-evasion-the-
effort-to-collect-unpaid-taxes-on-billions-in-hidden-offshore-accounts ; see also, Bruce W. 
Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal 
Imperialism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333 (Spring 2015); U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 17 (July 2008) 
99 If the taxpayer does not file, he is potentially subject to 26 U.S.C. §7203 which is a statute 
that covers failure, both willful and non-willful, to file. 
100 26 U.S.C. §6001; 26 U.S.C. §6011(a). 
101 26 U.S.C. §6011(a).  
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information, answers this question. §6103 defines the term taxpayer return 
information as return information. To discover what “return information” is defined 
as, one looks in the paragraph just prior to §6103(b)(3).102 Under this statute, the return 
information is defined as 
A) a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of 
his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, 
assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, 
overassessments, or tax payments, whether 
the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be examined or subject 
to other investigation or processing, or any other data, received by, 
recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by 
the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to 
the determination of the existence, or possible existence, 
of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for 
any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or 
offense, 
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file 
document relating to such written determination (as such terms are 
defined in section 6110(b)) which is not open to 
public inspection under section 6110, 
(C) any advance pricing agreement entered into by 
a taxpayer and the Secretary and any background information 
related to such agreement or any application for an advance pricing 
agreement, and 
(D) any agreement under section 7121, and any similar 
agreement, and any background information related to such an 
agreement or request for such an agreement, but such term does not 
 
102 26 U.S.C. §6103(b)(3).  
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include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or 
otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer. 
Nothing in the preceding sentence, or in any other provision of law, 
shall be construed to require the disclosure of standards used or to 
be used for the selection of returns for examination, or data used or 
to be used for determining such standards, if 
the Secretary determines that such disclosure will seriously impair 
assessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue 
laws.103 
 
Taxpayer identity is defined as not just the name of the person but also the mailing 
address and his taxpayer identification number which in the U.S. is usually the 
person’s social security number.104 But the IRS needs more than just a taxpayer return 
and what the taxpayer submits to know all the facts surrounding the taxpayer’s 
situation in order to equitably and fairly administer the tax laws. Under domestic law, 
third-party institutions such as employers and financial institutions are required to file 
various forms with the IRS to report income and assets of the taxpayer.105 
Another place to look to see what the IRS considers part of the taxpayer information 
is under the subpoena powers that the IRS has (which will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 6, John Doe Summons). The IRS has been given a “powerful tool” 
by Congress in order to exert their authority in making certain that returns are correct 
or ascertaining the liability of a taxpayer.106 Under 26 U.S.C. §7602, the IRS has the 
power to “examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant 
or material to such inquiry” as well as to summon witnesses (including the taxpayer, 
 
103 26 U.S.C. §6103(b)(2).  
104 26 U.S.C. §6103(b)(6). 
105 26 U.S.C. §3402; See also, IRS, Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-3 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2w3.pdf 
106 26 U.S.C. §7602. 
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employee of financial institutions, etc.) and to seek testimony.107 These statutes 
together give a bigger picture as to what qualifies as taxpayer information is and in 
order to administer the laws correctly to the taxpayer’s situation, the IRS needs access 
to this information from the various parties.  Another way to phrase “access to 
taxpayer information” is “information procurement”.108 
Domestically, the system described above (albeit briefly) works. This thesis, though, 
is concerned with the scenario where the IRS is evaluating a taxpayer who maintains 
accounts in a foreign jurisdiction and either the taxpayer is not providing the 
information they are required to under U.S. law, the IRS cannot get information from 
third parties because the U.S. cannot compel third parties to produce information on 
the U.S. taxpayer(s) in question or there is an obstacle such as bank secrecy 
prohibiting the IRS from doing so. Consequently, this thesis is focused on what 
measures the U.S. takes to gain that access that they might not have currently and how 
effective those measures are in gaining that access – or procuring taxpayer 
information.  
1.4.3. CORRECTLY AND FAIRLY 
When examining and discussing the answers to the research questions, the words 
“correctly” and “fairly” are used in reference to the IRS being able to have all the 
facts about a taxpayer’s filing (tax return and all information relevant to that return) 
in order to administer the tax law correctly and fairly.  
The word fair, according to Black’s Law dictionary, means impartial, just, equitable 
and free from bias.109 The word correct is defined as conforming to an approved or 
conventional standard.110 
 
107 26 U.S.C. §7602.  
108 Denmark National Report, Tax Transparency, EATLP 2018 Congress; See also, Japan’s 
National Report, Tax Transparency, EATLP 2018 Congress; United Kingdom National 
Report, Tax Transparency, EATLP 2018 Congress; Belgium National Report, Tax 
Transparency, EATLP 2018 Congress. 
109 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Editor Bryan A. Garner 1999).  
110 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, found at https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
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The concepts of correctly and fairly simply means – within the context of this thesis 
– is that the IRS will apply (administer) the right tax laws (correctly) to the taxpayer’s 
situation given that they have all the facts and that how they apply those tax laws is 
not different from one taxpayer to the next (again given they have all the facts 
regarding the taxpayer’s situation) (fairly).  
1.4.4. PENALTIES 
This section will discuss penalties and the distinction between civil and criminal 
penalties in U.S. law briefly as several measures discussed in this thesis have a penalty 
structure as part of the anti-tax evasion measure.111  
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides for both civil and criminal penalties.112 It 
also gives the authority to the IRS to assess both types of penalties.113 The purpose 
behind the use of penalties generally is to encourage compliance and to deter behavior 
that does not meet the standards required under the Internal Revenue Code – for 
example, accurate returns, timely filing and paying any tax liability.114 
There are several distinctions between these civil and criminal penalties. Civil 
penalties are remedial in nature and are in place to protect the revenue.115 These types 
of penalties are also used to defray the cost of the IRS investigation into tax matters. 
The burden of proof lies with the IRS to prove by clear and convincing evidence116 
 
111 26 U.S.C. §7201 
112 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
113 26 U.S.C. §7201; See also, Internal Revenue Manual 20.1 
114 Internal Revenue Manual 20.1.1.2; See also, Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax 
Compliance, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 111 (2009).  
115 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); See also, William H. Ise, The Relationship 
Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and its Effect on The Taxpayer’s Constitutional 
Rights, 12 B.C.L. Rev. 1176 (1971); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and 
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379 (1975). 
116 Clear and convincing evidence means that the evidence must be more than a 50% 
probability of being true.  
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that the taxpayer owes civil penalties.117 In contrast, criminal penalties are punitive in 
nature and the purpose behind utilizing this type of penalty is deterrence.118 The IRS 
is held to a beyond a reasonable doubt119 standard when proving criminal penalties 
which is the highest legal standard in the U.S. legal system.120  Even the statute of 
limitations is different between civil and criminal penalties. In a civil penalty case, 
there is no statute of limitations but in a criminal penalty case the statute of limitations 
is six years.121  
A taxpayer can be liable for civil penalties, criminal penalties or both. If a taxpayer is 
assessed both civil and criminal penalties, under U.S. law, this does not constitute 
double jeopardy.122 The reasoning behind this is that the burdens of proof that are 
applied and the nature of the penalties – remedial versus punitive – for civil and 
criminal penalties are different.123  
The discussion of penalties leads to a question about whether a taxpayer can appeal 
the penalties or is that the end for the taxpayer? Subsection 2.5.1 in Chapter 2 
discusses the different courts that have jurisdiction over tax matters and whether a 
case can be appealed to a higher court.  
 
117 William H. Ise, The Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and its Effect on 
The Taxpayer’s Constitutional Rights, 12 B.C.L. Rev. 1176 (1971); J. Morris Clark, Civil and 
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. 
Rev. 379 (1975). 
118 William H. Ise, The Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and its Effect on 
The Taxpayer’s Constitutional Rights, 12 B.C.L. Rev. 1176 (1971); J. Morris Clark, Civil and 
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. 
Rev. 379 (1975). 
119 The reasonable doubt standard means the proof is close to an absolute certainty that one is 
in this instance guilty of evading taxes and, thus, owes criminal penalties.  
120 William H. Ise, The Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and its Effect on 
The Taxpayer’s Constitutional Rights, 12 B.C.L. Rev. 1176 (1971); J. Morris Clark, Civil and 
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. 
Rev. 379 (1975). 
121 Internal Revenue Manual 20.1 
122 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
123 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); See also, William H. Ise, The Relationship 
Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and its Effect on The Taxpayer’s Constitutional 
Rights, 12 B.C.L. Rev. 1176 (1971); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and 
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379 (1975). 
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1.5. DELIMITATION  
Despite the work of this thesis within the U.S. federal system, the federal system 
itself provides limitations. This means that how the federal system is set up instructs 
the researcher on the exact sources to use for a specific legal issue or question. For 
example, if the problem surrounds an issue in family law, the legal sources will only 
be found at the state level since the Constitution did not grant the federal 
government power over family matters. Therefore, in that scenario, only state 
statutes, case law and regulations will be examined. However, if the question 
revolves around naturalization and immigration, then that falls within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government.124 Consequently, the sources to be used in 
researching an immigration issue would be all federal legal sources that pertain to 
the issue. For this thesis, when focusing on the federal response to the issue of the 
inability to procure taxpayer information on foreign accounts, then only federal 
sources of law are examined. The opposite would be true if examining the state level 
responses to the tax evasion/foreign accounts abroad issue and state legal sources are 
reviewed. The states’ responses to this issue are not covered in this thesis because 
that is an entire independent thesis question of its own.  
The pieces of legislation and programs researched and analyzed in Chapters Five 
through Nine have been chosen because they are the pieces of legislation or programs 
that address the IRS’ inability to obtain U.S. taxpayer information on foreign 
accounts. If this thesis was a wider thesis discussing tax transparency specifically or 
even the very broad topic of tax evasion, there would be other legislation and 
programs to study and analyze – for example, Special Anti-Avoidance Rules (SAARs) 
and General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs).  
The nature of the Foreign Tax Account Compliance Act (FATCA – Chapter 9) and 
the other legal statutes and regulations such as the Qualified Intermediary Program 
(Chapter 7) lend themselves to various perspectives that could lead to discussions on 
 
124 U.S. Const. Sec. 8, art. 4 
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the potential for human rights violations regarding taxpayers or the perspectives that 
the foreign financial institutions hold. Similarly, the burden placed on FFIs to comply 
with FATCA and how they would accomplish that, while also certainly an interesting 
discussion, is beyond the scope of this paper. Another potential human rights violation 
from a non-U.S. perspective could stem from the possibility of both civil and criminal 
penalties being pursued and applied to a taxpayer. The extra-territorial nature of 
FATCA presents multiple issues regarding whether FATCA violates international 
conventions. Most of these topics are thesis questions in and of themselves. However, 
in order, to maintain focus within the dissertation, this dissertation will only address 
the anti-tax evasion measures from the perspective of and the actions taken by the U.S 
federal government to procure U.S. taxpayers’ information on their foreign accounts.  
The FATCA and QI measures are extremely complicated pieces of law that include 
both statutes and regulations. Ross K. McGill’s U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA was an in-depth book written on the two measures.125 
This thesis covers the most central parts of FATCA and the QI which focuses on 
addressing the research questions presented. If this thesis were to include the entirety 
of FATCA and the QI a separate dissertation, or a book such a Ross K. McGill’s book, 
would be needed. Also, another issue that cannot be covered in this thesis due to the 
complexity of it is the convergence of FATCA and the QI in certain places such as 
KYC/AML due diligence or the use of certain tax forms. Therefore, for the sake of 
clarity and conciseness for the reader, each measure is dealt with on its own with only 
an occasional reference to the similarities found between the two. 
While the OECD and the EU both have measures that address this topic, such as the 
OECD’s Common Reporting Standards (CRS), these are not included in this 
dissertation since this dissertation is only concerned with U.S. law and the U.S. 
government’s perspective. The EU, the OECD and the FATF are only mentioned 
 
125 Ross K. McGill, US Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013).  
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briefly in Chapter 3 in the discussion of definitions and the blacklisting of tax haven 
jurisdictions. 
Another issue that presents itself is that of the concern of privacy issues regarding 
Article 26 in the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention relating to the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis so 
it will not be discussed. 
In Chapter 3, an interesting issue that presents itself is the two-prong attack taken 
against tax havens. The two-prong attack consists of first attacking the tax havens 
from a political standpoint and deciding what a tax haven is and what jurisdictions to 
attack. The second prong consists of relying on international remedies. This issue 
could lend itself its own thesis and is outside the scope of this thesis but needed to be 
acknowledged within the context of Chapter 3.  
In Chapter 7, the John Doe Summons Chapter, could give way to a 4th amendment 
discussion on search and seizures and how that relates to the John Doe summons but 
that is also beyond the scope of this thesis and could be a thesis question in and of 
itself.  
The nature of the dilemma of tax evasion and the inability to procure taxpayer 
information on foreign accounts is such a broad issue that envelopes many different 
facets this thesis cannot claim to have found all the appropriate materials that address 
the research questions of this thesis. As subsection 1.41 states this thesis is concerned 
only with tax evasion and not tax avoidance.  
The problem that prohibits the IRS from obtaining information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts is secrecy. The thesis is concerned with foreign jurisdictions’ secrecy 
and the effect it has on the ability to procure information so that the IRS has all of the 
facts to administer the tax laws correctly and fairly. There is not a focus on U.S. 
secrecy rules (or the argument that the U.S. is a tax haven) because the thesis is 
concerned with inbound information from other countries who have secrecy rules that 
effect the ability to procure the inbound information.  
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The research questions presented in this dissertation demonstrate that the viewpoint 
of this thesis is from the U.S. government’s perspective. Inaccessibility to taxpayer 
information can open discussions from multiple perspectives: the taxpayer and 
involuntary compliance, foreign third-party non-compliance or foreign governments 
and bank secrecy. Those identify just a few and even those topics present other issues 
such as human rights violations. However, this thesis’ focus is on how the U.S. 
government – through the IRS – can procure information on taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts that they normally cannot get access to due to bank secrecy or even strict 
privacy rules. So, the conceptual approach throughout the thesis is the viewpoint of 
the U.S. government.  
The research behind the thesis ended in May of 2019. There are a few areas where 
research was done to ensure information was up to date. For example, the section in 
Chapter 8 that deals with the 2009 Protocol to the 1996 U.S. – Swiss Treaty needed 
to be updated since ratification on the protocol occurred in July of 2019.  
 
1.6. OUTLINE 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. Since the thesis is focused 
on the United States and no other jurisdictions, the thesis uses the various legal sources 
found within the U.S. federal system, for instance, statutory law and case law. 
Therefore, Chapter 2, reviews the legal sources, both authoritative and persuasive, that 
are utilized in analyzing the issues outlined above. Chapter 2 also explains the U.S. 
federal system in some detail.  
Chapter 3 presents the prior attempts to address tax evasion, not through anti-tax 
evasion measures, but through drafting a blacklist or definitional criteria which 
“qualified” certain jurisdictions as a tax haven jurisdiction. First, the chapter looks 
briefly at the background on tax havens in general and delves into how there have 
been attempts to draft substantive criteria in order to have a tax haven definition. This 
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subsection discusses the blacklist concept and what that has looked like as well as the 
problems that it presents. Following the examination of definitions and blacklists, the 
chapter explores the United States’ unofficial exercise in identifying tax havens via a 
blacklist or definition. This section will look at past legislation, various IRS 
documents and GAO reports that include a blacklist or a definition. Finally, the 
chapter considers what the real issue is, and what it seems the U.S. has concluded 
which is that the true problem is the secrecy laws in foreign jurisdictions that allow 
U.S. taxpayers to conceal their foreign accounts which in turn frustrates the IRS’ 
attempts to administer the tax laws fairly and equitably among all taxpayers. 
Taking in consideration that Chapter 3 concludes that secrecy is the real dilemma 
that thwarts the IRS’ attempts at procuring information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts, Chapters 4 through 9 then describe the anti-tax evasion measures that the 
U.S. has taken to procure the taxpayers’ information on their foreign accounts 
abroad. In each chapter, and via legal dogmatics, the first two questions will be 
addressed through stating the measure that has been enacted or created to try to 
procure the taxpayer information on foreign accounts and then describing and 
analyzing the implementation (or how the measure is carried out) of said measure. 
The chapters will end by answering the third and fourth questions which ask 
respectively whether the measure itself allows the IRS to procure information on 
U.S. taxpayer accounts and if the measure does not, what can be done to increase the 
IRS’ chances  of procuring the information needed. The next few paragraphs will 
describe the subject of each chapter.  
Chapter 4 analyzes the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts which is an 
anti-tax evasion measure that requires a U.S. person to “voluntarily”, subject to 
penalties and possible jail time for non-compliance, disclose their foreign accounts 
to the U.S. government. The chapter establishes whether this anti-tax evasion 
measure fulfills the purpose of procuring information on taxpayers’ foreign accounts 
that the U.S government needs so the IRS can fairly administer the tax laws. 
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Chapter 5’s topic is the voluntary disclosure programs which are anti-tax evasion 
measures that also rely on voluntary compliance by the taxpayer. This chapter 
analyzes the various programs, its penalties and a couple of the alternatives to the 
program to determine if this specific measure operates in a way to procure 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. 
Chapter 6 moves past reliance on voluntary compliance and moves into utilizing the 
court system and third parties to try to obtain the information on taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts. This chapter analyzes the John Doe Summons – which is a procedure that 
the U.S government uses when there is an unknown person, in this case a taxpayer, 
that is suspected of tax evasion – and whether the Summons procedure allows the 
IRS to obtain the taxpayer information they need.  
Chapter 7 also utilizes third parties to help in procuring taxpayer information but 
this time this assistance comes from foreign financial institutions by way of the 
Qualified Intermediary regulations (or the QI Agreement if executed by the foreign 
financial institution).  
Chapter 8 analyzes the use of treaties and tax information exchange agreements and 
how they operate in order to obtain taxpayer information on foreign accounts. 
Instead of relying on the individual taxpayer or a third party, treaties and tax 
information exchange agreements rely on the relationships and agreements between 
the U.S. and foreign governments. A case study is presented in this chapter, the U.S. 
– Swiss Treaty, in order to demonstrate the difficulties in procuring the information 
needed through this avenue.  
Chapter 9 analyzes the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) which once 
again relies on foreign financial institutions to provide information on taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts, however, this time there is an enforcement mechanism attached 
that forces the foreign financial institution to choose between two options: either 
comply or face a 30% penalty on any income payments coming from the U.S.  To 
alleviate some of the issues this ultimatum posed, intergovernmental agreements 
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were created. This chapter also describes and analyzes these agreements to ascertain 
if they are effective in aiding FATCA in procuring information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts.  
Each chapter presents a part of the U.S. government’s overall response to the 
inability to procure U.S. taxpayers’ information on foreign accounts and encourage 
compliance with the tax laws.  
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CHAPTER 2. LEGAL SOURCES & THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM  
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 
In order to accomplish an examination and analysis of the anti-tax evasion measures 
that the U.S. takes in order to procure U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts 
and whether the measures, when implemented, can obtain the information sought, an 
explanation of the framework of legal sources is required. Considering the thesis is 
from an American legal perspective, legal sources from the United States are applied 
and, therefore, an introductory description of the American legal system is needed so 
that the reader may recognize the importance of the resources chosen and the 
hierarchy that structures the importance of those resources.   
The U.S. legal framework is a federal system which is designed to have two parallel 
governments - state and federal (national).126 Both the federal and state governments 
are based on constitutions and statutory law. The legal sources, therefore, consist of 
both case law from the federal and state levels as well as (but not limited to) statutes, 
restatements, legislation, legislative history and regulations. While historically 
 
126 Bureau of International Information Programs, United States Department of State, Outline 
of the U.S. Legal System (2004), available at 
https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/outlinelegalsystem.pdf; See also, Gretchen Feltes, A 
Guide to the U.S. Federal Legal System, found at  
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/United_States.html#_A._The_Structure_of%20the%2
0Federal%20Gov   
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considered a pure common law system, it can be argued that, today, the United States 
legal framework consists of a hybrid system of case law and statutory law.127  
The apportionment of power between the federal government and the states is an 
important part of the U.S. legal structure and it aids in the determination of which 
sources are mandatory versus those that are merely persuasive. When considering 
which legal sources to apply, another critical issue that presents itself is to be able to 
identify and analyze the correct resources from the applicable jurisdiction. Since it is 
the purpose of this dissertation to examine what anti-tax evasion measures the U.S. 
federal government has taken in order to address the inability to obtain taxpayer 
information on their foreign accounts and whether these anti-tax evasion measures, 
when implemented, obtain the information sought, it is necessary to only consider 
legal resources at the federal level.   
To understand how to utilize and analyze the legal resources in the U.S., one must 
have knowledge of the U.S. federal framework and the various sources of law found 
in that framework and the hierarchy of those sources. The United States’ highest 
source of law is the Constitution which lays out the legal foundation for the United 
States. While the Constitution is the legal framework, it is a structure of limited, 
delegated powers delineating the powers between not just the federal and the state 
level but also three branches of government.128 The Framers of the Constitution also 
chose to delineate federal powers into the three separate branches of government: 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial.129 The Legislative and Judicial branches will be 
discussed in more depth in the sections below with regard to the legal resources that 
each branch has while the Executive branch will be mentioned briefly in reference to 
 
127 E. Allan Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, Oxford 
University Press (2010).  
128 Advisory Commission on Intergovermental Relations, State Constitutions in the Federal 
System: Selected Issues and Opportunities for State Initiatives (July 1989); See also, Bureau 
of International Information Programs, United States Department of State, Outline of the U.S. 
Legal System (2004), available at https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/outlinelegalsystem.pdf.  
129 U.S. Const. art. I, II and III; See also, Bureau of International Information Programs, 
United States Department of State, Outline of the U.S. Legal System (2004), available at 
https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/outlinelegalsystem.pdf 
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the executive agency130, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Regulations and other 
IRS resources. The Framers also included the Supremacy Clause which states that the 
Constitution and the laws of the federal government “shall be the supreme law of the 
land”.131 This means if a state law conflicts with a federal law on the same issue, the 
federal law will always prevail (unless the federal law is unconstitutional).  
Although the Constitution gives priority to itself and the federal laws, the Bill of 
Rights limits the power of the federal government by stating that where the powers 
are not specifically delegated to the federal government those powers fall to the state 
governments – for example, family law.132  Knowledge of the two parallel systems 
and how they complement each other is important because when a legal issue is being 
researched in the United States, both the federal and the state level laws have to be 
considered in order to conclude whether a federal or state issue is present. Then based 
on that analysis it can be determined which resources should be applied.  
An example of the dichotomy between the states and federal government is taxing 
power because the taxing power is split between the federal government and the state 
governments. The federal government has no limit to the taxing power it contains 
except as limited by the Constitution.133   
Additionally, important in the American legal doctrine is the hierarchal nature of the 
laws and how they are ordered and applied which will be discussed throughout this 
chapter. To understand how the legal dogmatic method functions in the American 
common law system, it is important to consider the structure of the U.S. system and 
its hierarchal structure. Therefore, to assist with this goal, this chapter starts with the 
most authoritative sources of law and ends with the least authoritative sources of law 
- persuasive, non-mandatory sources.  
 
130 This thesis deals mainly with the Department of the Treasury, an executive agency, and its 
sub-agencies like the IRS and FinCEN.  
131 U.S. Const., art. VI §2 
132 U.S. Const. amend. X 
133 William Cogger, Tax Avoidance v. Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518 (1937). 
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2.2. TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS  
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor declared during her Senate Judiciary Committee 
confirmation hearing, “American law does not permit the use of foreign law or 
international law to interpret the Constitution.”134 Justice Sotomayor is, of course, 
correct that foreign or international laws cannot help interpret the Constitution, 
nonetheless, treaties and international agreements do have a place in the American 
legal system.  
The Constitution of the United States provides the President with the authority to 
make and negotiate treaties while giving Congress the authority to ratify any treaties 
made by the Executive branch in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1:  
“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided 
two thirds of the Senators present concur;”135 
The Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution gives treaties the same level of 
authority as the Constitution and the laws of the United States:  
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
 
134Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 Har. L. Rev. F. 93 (Winter 2014) found at 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/limits-on-the-treaty-power/  
135 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2; See also, Paul R. McDaniel, James R. Repetti and Diane M. 
Ring, Introduction to United States International Taxation, 187 (6th ed., 2014). 
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the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”136 
When a statute and a treaty come into conflict with one another, the question that 
arises is which one prevails, the treaty or the statute? The general rule is that a later 
law abrogates an earlier law and since treaties are on the same authority level as 
statutes, the same principle applies to treaties and statutes.137 Accordingly, a treaty 
that comes later than a statute would nullify that statute and vice versa.  
Since the issues that this thesis analyzes are within the area of tax law, this thesis 
analyzes and references various tax treaties. There are two categories of tax treaties: 
Self-executing and non-self-executing.138 A self-executing treaty is one that has 
automatic effect as domestic law.139 According to the holding in United States v. 
Percheman, a treaty is equal to an act of the legislature and, consequently, is self-
executing when it does not require any legislation provision to aid it and which can 
be enforced by the courts.140 In contrast, a non-self-executing treaty is defined as a 
treaty that is ratified with the agreement that the treaty does “not have domestic effect 
of its own force and cannot be judicially enforced without the implementing 
legislation.”141 These types of treaties are merely international law commitments but 
 
136 U.S. Const. art. VI, §2 
137 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: 
Cases and Materials, 528 (3rd ed. 2011); See also, Paul R. McDaniel, James R. Repetti and 
Diane M. Ring, Introduction to United States International Taxation, 187 (6th ed., 2014). 
138 Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 Har. L. Rev. F. 93 (Winter 2014) found at 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/limits-on-the-treaty-power/ 
139 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); See also, Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 
127 Har. L. Rev. F. 93 (Winter 2014) found at https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/limits-
on-the-treaty-power/ 
140 United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 8 L.Ed. 604 (1833) as quoted in Medellin v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008); See also, Cornell Legal Information Institute, Self-Executing 
Treaty, law.cornell.edu/wex/self_executing_treaty  
141 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); See also, Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 
127 Har. L. Rev. F. 93 (Winter 2014) found at https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/limits-
on-the-treaty-power/ 
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they do not create binding federal law unless Congress enacts an implementing statute 
or ratifies the treaty with a provision that provides for it to be self-executing.142  
There is a body of case law that provides interpretive guidelines to help in the 
interpretation of a treaty.143  As with a statute, the interpretation of a treaty starts with 
the text itself.144 The Supreme Court noted that considering a treaty is an agreement 
between sovereign nations, the negotiations, drafting history and the post-ratification 
understanding of signatory nations should be used as aids to the interpretation of the 
treaty in question.145 
When there is a potential conflict between an earlier treaty or statute and a later 
document the court will first explore whether there is an actual conflict.146 The Court 
initially presumes that both the earlier and later document are in harmony.147 Courts 
try to construe in order to give effect to both documents unless it violates the language 
of one or the other.148 If there was intent to abrogate or modify that intention should 
be clearly expressed.149 If there is an actual conflict between an earlier treaty or statute 
and a later one, the court will hold that the later one prevails.150 However, in the more 
recent past, to make its intent clear, Congress has specifically included in its 
 
142 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), quoting Igartua-De La Rosa V. United States, 417 
F.3d 145, 150 (C.A.1 2005) (en banc).  
143 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: 
Cases and Materials, 527 (3rd ed. 2011). 
144 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) as quoted by Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 
(2008). 
145 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996) as quoted by Medellin v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
146 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: 
Cases and Materials, 527 (3rd ed. 2011). 
147 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: 
Cases and Materials, 527 (3rd ed. 2011). 
148 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); See also, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. 
Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: Cases and Materials, 527 (3rd ed. 
2011). 
149 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); See also, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. 
Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: Cases and Materials, 528 (3rd ed. 
2011). 
150 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: 
Cases and Materials, 528 (3rd ed. 2011). 
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legislation that it intended the “later-in-time rule” to apply so that the statutes within 
the tax legislation would prevail over treaties.151 
Treaties will be discussed in more depth and specifically art. 26 of the U.S. Model 
Income Tax Treaty in relation to the thesis focus in Chapter 8.  
 
2.3. STATUTORY LAW  
While the U.S. has the three branches of government that share power equally, 
statutory law is one of the most authoritative sources of law, just below the 
Constitution and on par with treaties. When examining and analyzing statutory law, 
the source to refer to is the legislative branch and its legal sources. Within the U.S. 
federal system, the Constitution vested power to enact laws in Congress, which is a 
bicameral structure that has two chambers: the House and Senate.152 The legislative 
process starts with an introduction of a bill to either the House or the Senate (or there 
can be parallel bills introduced in both Chambers). The next step in the process is a 
referral to an appropriate committee such as the Senate Joint Committee on Taxation 
or the House Ways and Means Committee which oversees the specific policy area that 
is the focus of the bill that has been introduced.153 It is first examined in a 
subcommittee and if the committee members agree, it moves on to the full 
committee.154 If the full committee approves the bill, it then moves to the floor of the 
House or Senate where it is placed on the calendar for consideration. If the bill does 
 
151 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S. International Taxation: 
Cases and Materials, 528 (3rd ed. 2011). 
152 U.S. Const. art. I, §1; See also, Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles 
and Recent Trends, Congressional Research Service Report (September 24, 2014).  
153 White House, The Legislative Branch, found at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/legislative-branch; See also, Portland State University  
Library, United States Government Information: Congress: House and Senate, found at 
http://guides.library.pdx.edu/c.php?g=271192&p=1811800  
154 White House, The Legislative Branch, found at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/legislative-branch; See also, Portland State University  
Library, United States Government Information: Congress: House and Senate, found at 
http://guides.library.pdx.edu/c.php?g=271192&p=1811800 
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not move out of the committee onto the floor of either the House or Senate, then the 
bill is considered to have “died” in committee.155 When the bill has made its way to 
either the House or the Senate there is a floor debate156. A floor debate means the bill 
is presented back to the appropriate chamber of Congress and is opened up for 
amendments, alterations and statements from members of said chamber.157 If similar 
bills are introduced and passed in both chambers of Congress, then a committee - 
called a Conference Committee - is formed in order to reconcile the differences 
between the two bills. The amended bill is then reintroduced to both chambers and 
voted on.158 In order to enact a bill, a simple majority of votes is needed, but it must 
be ratified by both houses of Congress. The legislation then goes to the President who 
has the three choices: sign the bill into law, veto the bill or take no action on the bill. 
If the President chooses to take no action  - meaning it is not executed and returned 
within 10 days -  then it automatically becomes law (unless Congress has adjourned 
which makes it impossible for the signed bill to be returned).159 This last action is 
called a pocket veto.160 If the President elects to veto the legislation, Congress can 
override his decision by a two-thirds vote in each chamber of Congress. Once enacted, 
it becomes part of the United States Code (hereinafter referred to as USC). Based on 
the above process, it is necessary to consider in this thesis the legislative history, if 
any, and the political background that preceded the passage of the anti-tax evasion 
 
155 Duke University Libraries, Legislative Process: Committee Analysis, 
https://guides.library.duke.edu/c.php?g=289725&p=1930930  
156 Duke University Libraries, Legislative Process: Committee Analysis 
https://guides.library.duke.edu/c.php?g=289725&p=1930930 
157White House, The Legislative Branch, found at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/legislative-branch;See also, Portland State University  
Library, United States Government Information: Congress: House and Senate, found at 
http://guides.library.pdx.edu/c.php?g=271192&p=1811800; Duke University Libraries, 
Legislative Process: Committee Analysis, found at 
https://guides.library.duke.edu/c.php?g=289725&p=1930927  
158 Duke University Libraries, Legislative Process: Committee Analysis, found at 
https://guides.library.duke.edu/c.php?g=289725&p=1930927,  
159White House, The Legislative Branch, found at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/legislative-branch; See also, Portland State University  
Library, United States Government Information: Congress: House and Senate, found at 
http://guides.library.pdx.edu/c.php?g=271192&p=1811800  
160 U.S. Const. art. I, §7, cl. 5; See also, U.S. Senate, Pocket Veto,  
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/pocket_veto.htm 
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statutes that are discussed in this thesis as it may shed light on the form and phrasing 
of the statutes analyzed. 
For this dissertation the most important statutory source which is found in Chapter 26 
of the USC which is the U.S. tax code. The Code of Federal Regulations (hereinafter 
referred to as CFR), which is an executive legal resource (executive branch resources 
are discussed more in section 2.6) is the interpretative aide to the tax code which is 
also numbered chapter 26. The CFR, a form of administrative law, is the codification 
of the “general and permanent rules published in the Federal Register by the 
departments and agencies of the Federal government”161 such as the Department of 
the Treasury sub-agency, the IRS. The CFR is the regulatory agency’s guidelines on 
how the statutes should work in reality. When a statute and regulation conflict, courts 
have held that the statute prevails over the regulation.162 
There are multiple resources that aid in the interpretation of the statute in addition to 
the CFR (however, the other sources are merely persuasive). When the bill goes 
through the legislative process, unless it dies in committee, there is legislative history 
to help understand and interpret the statute.163 Legislative history will be discussed 
further in the next section.  
The natural question to ask at this juncture is how does one interpret U.S. statutes? 
Generally, the U.S. follows the plain meaning rule which essentially states that the 
meaning of the statute must be found in the language within the statute.164 “Where the 
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation 
 
161 Code of Federal Regulations, https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/code-federal-regulations-
cfrs-print; See also, Code of Federal Regulationshttps://www.govinfo.gov/help/cfr   
162 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 21 (2006) (citing Caldera v. J.S. Alberici Const. Co., 
Inc., 153 F.3d 1381, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
163 See more in section 2.4 immediately following  
164 U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820); See also, Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917), 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438 (2002); Larry M. Eig, Statutory 
Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, Congressional Research Service 
Report (September 24, 2014).   
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
74
 
does not arise…..”165 The words in the statute should be given their ordinary and usual 
meaning unless there is evidence to the contrary.166 So unless the language in the 
statute is somehow ambiguous or confusing, other information, including legislative 
intent, cannot be taken into consideration. Notwithstanding the plain meaning rule, 
there is some controversy that surrounds the issue of when to use legislative history 
to help interpret or when to allow the language used to speak for itself, however, that 
will not to be discussed in this thesis as it is not within the scope.167  
Despite the controversy, the plain meaning principle is the general rule that is used to 
help interpret statutory language and there are two exceptions to this principle. The 
first exception exists when the result of reading the plain meaning would result in an 
absurd result which would shock either the common or moral sense.168 The second 
exception occurs when the literal application of the statutory language generates an 
outcome that is in opposition to the legislative intent.169  Knowing this, it is relevant 
to consider the legislative intent with regard to the appropriate statutes (and Acts) and 
a discussion on legislative history follows in the next section.  
 
2.4. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Legislative history for statutes passed at the federal level, while not mandatory, is a 
persuasive source of law because it can present the purpose and the rationale behind 
the law and the words chosen. Some legislators, in introductory statements when 
presenting the bill, will specifically address the purpose and reasons behind the law 
 
165 U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820); See also, Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917); 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).   
166 U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820); See also, Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917); 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). 
167 Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, 
Congressional Research Service Report, 43 (September 24, 2014).  
168 In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004); See also, Sigmon Coal v. Apfel, 226 
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’d, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).  
169 In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004); See also, Sigmon Coal v. Apfel, 226 
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’d, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). 
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to help to guide the courts in interpretation. Legislative history plays an important part 
in understanding the statutes and acts that are enacted because legislative intent can 
help interpret the law so as to give meaning to vague and ambiguous terms as well as 
reveal the motivation and purpose behind the law. The history of a piece of legislation 
can affirm the legislative intent of Congress. As a result of the very political nature of 
the issue of tax evasion, tax havens and anti-tax evasion measures, drafting history 
(where it can be found) is important for this dissertation because the legislation can 
be affected by political opinions on both sides of the congressional aisle.  For example, 
at the federal level there is a definite demarcation between which party drafts and 
supports tax haven-focused legislation (democrats) and which party does not 
(republicans).170  
Transcripts of congressional hearings and introductory remarks are examined in this 
thesis as an important, persuasive source of pre-legislation information about the 
views on tax evasion and secrecy from the various congressional bodies (such as the 
congressional committees), individual Congressman and witnesses. While only 
persuasive in nature, the congressional hearings give insight into the motivations and 
purposes behind the passage of the anti-tax evasion measures discussed in this 
dissertation. The two committees within Congress that deal with legislative tax issues 
are the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee.171 The 
Constitution, under Article I, Section VII, gives the House of Representatives 
 
170 Most tax haven-specific legislation is authored and co-authored by the Democratic 
members of Congress such as Senator Levin. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of past legislation 
attempts on tax haven definition legislation.  
171 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-6 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
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jurisdiction over “all the Bills for raising revenue”.172 When the legislative history is 
in conflict with the statute, courts have held that the statute prevails.173 
Another legal source to consider for legislative material is the Joint Committee for 
Taxation (hereinafter referred to as the JCT). The JCT was established under the 
Revenue Act of 1926 in order to assist Congressional members on tax legislation.174 
This non-partisan committee is composed of five House members from the Ways and 
Means committee and five Senate members from the Senate Finance committee.175  
There are three members from the majority party and two members from the minority 
members from each committee.176 The staff of the JCT that support and assist 
members of Congress is comprised of economists, attorneys and accountants.177  
The tasks of the JCT, as statutorily prescribed, are multi-fold: “to investigate the 
operation and effects of internal revenue taxes and the administration of such taxes, 
to investigate measures and methods for the simplification of such taxes, to draft 
reports that are submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Committee on Finance on the results of such investigations and studies and to make 
recommendations and to review any proposed refund or credit of income or estates 
and gift taxes or certain other taxes set forth in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §6405 
in excess of $2 million USD”.178 The JCT is also given jurisdiction to “obtain and 
 
172 U.S. Const. art. I, §7, See also, House Ways and Means Committee, About Us, found at 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/about/  
173 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 37 (2006) (citing Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 
F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 1999), Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
Sharp v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 52, 61 (1992), aff’d, 14 F.3d 583 (1993)). 
174 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Overview, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/overview.html  
175The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Statutory Basis, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/statutory-basis.html; See also, Senate Finance Committee, Jurisdiction, found at 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction  
176 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Overview, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/overview.html 
177 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Current Staff, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/current-staff.html; See also, The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Overview, 
https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html  
178 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Statutory Basis, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/statutory-basis.html  
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inspect tax returns and return information, hold hearings, require attendance of 
witnesses and production of books, administer oaths and take testimony, procure 
printing and binding and make necessary expenditures.”179 They are also required by 
statute to provide revenue estimates for all tax legislation that is submitted to either 
congressional chamber.180  
The JCT also is also involved in the legislative process from beginning to end.181 The  
JCT staff helps congressional members throughout the legislative process in ways 
such as (but not limited to) preparation for introducing bills into either chamber, being 
involved in the markup process including describing legislative proposals to the 
committee and consulting with Treasury and the IRS.182 The JCT is also the only 
archive that contains the complete legislative history on Federal Taxation.183 
Government Accounting Office (hereinafter GAO) reports are another non-mandatory 
but persuasive legal source. These reports are usually initiated at the request of a 
member of Congress or sometimes a committee and are on various topics.184 The 
GAO, which is a part of the legislative branch, can also self-initiate reports.185 The 
mission of the GAO, as provided at the back of each report, is “to support Congress 
in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the 
use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, 
policy and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in 
 
179The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Statutory Basis, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/statutory-basis.html  
180 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Statutory Basis, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/statutory-basis.html 
181 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Role of JCT, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/role-of-jct.html  
182 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Role of JCT, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/role-of-jct.html  
183 The Joint Committee on Taxation, About Us: Other, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/other.html  
184 GAO, About GAO Reports, https://www.gao.gov/about/products/about-gao-reports.html  
185 GAO, About GAO Reports, https://www.gao.gov/about/products/about-gao-reports.html 
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its core values of accountability, integrity and reliability.”186 The GAO’s website 
asserts that the information it provides is non-partisan and fact-based.187   
A similar government service to that of the GAO’s is the CRS, or Congressional 
Research Service (hereinafter referred to as CRS), which is the legislative branch 
department of the Library of Congress.188 The Library of Congress is not only the 
world’s largest library but it also acts as the “main research arm of the U.S. 
Congress.”189 The CRS, according to the website, “works exclusively for the United 
States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of 
both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation”.190 The CRS also claims 
that the information they provide is non-partisan and objective.191 
 
2.5. CASE LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
STARE DECISIS 
The second branch, and second legal source, of the U.S. government is the judicial 
branch. The role of the judicial branch in the U.S. is multi-fold and is distinguished 
from civil law jurisdictions. Common law was originally known as “judge-made law” 
because there was no statutory law at the time. Today, however, the job of the courts 
is to interpret the law, decide constitutionality of the law, and resolve disputes by 
applying the law.192  
 
186 GAO, Taxpayer Information: Data Sharing and Analysis May Enhance Tax Compliance 
and Improve Immigration Eligibility Decisions, GAO-04-972T (July 2004).  
187 Government Accountability Office, What GAO Does, found at 
https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/  
188 Library of Congress, CRS Info, found at https://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/  
189 Library of Congress, found at https://www.loc.gov/about/  
190 Library of Congress, CRS Info, found at https://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/  
191 Library of Congress, CRS Info, found at https://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/  
192United States Courts, Court Role and Structure, found at https://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/court-role-and-structure  
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Over the young life of the United States, the important legal doctrine of stare decisis 
et non quieta movere193, a legal remnant leftover from the influence of English 
common law194, has emerged as a part of American judicial interpretation. Stare 
decisis et non quieta movere literally means to abide by the precedents and to not 
disturb settled points.195 Essentially, this means that courts are bound by earlier legal 
decisions and they are to interpret the law in the same way as higher courts have in 
past cases.196  Another way to say this is that earlier cases from higher courts have set 
a precedent that later judges are to follow.  Previous cases from the same court are 
also precedent as well. For example, a prior 2nd Court of Appeals decision would be 
considered precedent for a present 2nd Court of Appeals case.  
This is important depending on what jurisdiction one is in and which court they must 
follow. The U.S. Federal system contains 94 District Courts (trial courts), 13 Courts 
of Appeal (also called circuit or appellate courts) and the Supreme Court, which is the 
highest court in the United States.197 The U.S.’ 94 trial districts are broken up into 12 
regional circuits in which a court of appeals sits.198 Therefore, what case law one refers 
to as binding (mandatory) as opposed to persuasive depends on which circuit one is 
in. “The doctrine of stare decisis, or adherence to precedent, requires courts to decide 
cases consistently with their past decisions involving the same or similar facts and 
legal principles. Lower courts in a particular jurisdiction are bound not only by their 
own past decisions, but also by the precedents of higher courts in that jurisdiction.”199  
 
193 H. Campbell Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 U. Pa. L. Rev. 745 (Dec. 1886).  
194 Konrad Zweigert, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 260 (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed., 
1998). 
195 H. Campbell Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 U. Pa. L. Rev. 745 (Dec. 1886). 
196 Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, 
Congressional Research Service Report, 1 (September 24, 2014).  
197 U.S. Courts, Court Role and Structure, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure  
198 Allan E. Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, p. 60, 
Oxford University Press (2010).  
199 J. Paul Lomio, Henrik S. Spang-Hanssen and George D. Wilson, Legal Research Methods 
in a Modern World: A Coursebook, p 84 (Djøf Publishing, 2011).  
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For example, if a case being heard occurs in Dallas, Texas, the case would be heard 
in the Northern District of Texas (United States District Court) which is bound by any 
decision out of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, which sits in New Orleans, Louisiana 
and, of course, the Supreme Court.  Case law from other jurisdictions can be 
persuasive but never binding. Therefore, the case being heard in the Northern District 
of Texas is required to follow, based on the principle of stare decisis, prior case law 
from itself, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.  
The state court system has a similar structure. There are trial courts, appellate courts 
and supreme courts of each state, however, the trial courts and their jurisdictions vary 
widely in each state200. At least one state has a division at the Supreme Court level. 
Texas has a divided supreme court: one that has jurisdictions over civil cases and cases 
regarding juveniles and criminal cases on appeal are heard by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.201 Once a decision has been reached at the state supreme court level, the 
decision can be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on a Writ of Certiorari as long as 
there is a federal issue in question202 but the Supreme Court rarely hears these types 
of cases. The principle of stare decisis is also followed at the state level.  
Another crucial point to note is that in certain areas of law, both state and federal 
courts can share power (concurrent powers). This means the plaintiff can file suit in 
either a federal court or a state court. The courts at both levels then may have to, 
depending on the claim, apply the applicable state law in a federal court or federal law 
in a state court.  
2.5.1. COURT JURISDICTION OF TAX ISSUES 
This thesis’ focus falls under U.S. tax law, therefore, it is important to recognize which 
U.S. courts have jurisdiction over tax issues. When the commissioner of the IRS finds 
 
200 Comparing Federal and State Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-
role-and-structure/comparing-federal-state-courts  
201 Texas Courts, Court Structure Chart, http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1438758/court-
structure-chart-sept-2017.pdf  
202 Comparing Federal and State Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-
role-and-structure/comparing-federal-state-courts  
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that a U.S. taxpayer has a tax deficiency (or liability), the taxpayer can dispute this in 
court. Four courts have jurisdiction over tax disputes: U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims, U.S. District Courts and U.S. Tax Court. The U.S. 
Bankruptcy court only has jurisdiction over tax issues when they arise within a 
bankruptcy case.203 Both the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. District Courts 
hear a wide variety of cases including tax disputes.204 While the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims has more experience, than the U.S. District Court(s) in tax law, neither have 
the experience that the U.S. Tax Court has.205 These courts are all federal trial courts.  
The U.S. Tax Court is the most relevant court to this thesis because it is a specialized 
court that only hears federal tax cases.206 The U.S. Tax Court is a special court 
established by Congress under Art. I of the U.S. Constitution.207 It was established to 
hear disputes between U.S. taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).208  
When litigating a tax dispute in the U.S. Tax Court, a taxpayer does not have to pay 
the disputed amount before bringing the issue before the court and until all appeals 
are concluded. This is in contrast to the other courts who have jurisdiction to hear tax 
issues – the taxpayer who litigates issues in those courts has to pay the disputed 
 
203 Franklin County Law Library, Tax Law Research: Federal and Ohio: Court Jurisdiction of 
Tax Issues and Appellate Structure, found at 
https://fclawlib.libguides.com/taxlawresearch/jurisdiction; See also, LSU Law Library, Tax 
Policy and Procedure: Hierarchy of Tax Authorities, found at 
https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=191374&p=1264047 
204 Franklin County Law Library, Tax Law Research: Federal and Ohio: Court Jurisdiction of 
Tax Issues and Appellate Structure, found at 
https://fclawlib.libguides.com/taxlawresearch/jurisdiction; See also, LSU Law Library, Tax 
Policy and Procedure: Hierarchy of Tax Authorities, found at 
https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=191374&p=1264047 
205 Franklin County Law Library, Tax Law Research: Federal and Ohio: Court Jurisdiction of 
Tax Issues and Appellate Structure, found at 
https://fclawlib.libguides.com/taxlawresearch/jurisdiction; See also, LSU Law Library, Tax 
Policy and Procedure: Hierarchy of Tax Authorities, found at 
https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=191374&p=1264047 
206 LSU Law Library, Tax Policy and Procedure: Hierarchy of Tax Authorities, found at 
https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=191374&p=1264047 
207 U.S. Tax Court, About, found at https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm 
208 U.S. Tax Court, About, found at https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm 
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amount before bringing the litigation.209 The party that loses the case – whether it is 
the taxpayer and or the IRS – has a right, generally, to appeal the decision made by a 
trial court. A taxpayer can request two different case statuses at the beginning of the 
litigation which have significant importance for what can occur after the Tax Court’s 
decision. If a taxpayer requests a small tax case status210, otherwise known as S case 
status, neither party can appeal the decision as the Judge’s decision is final.211  
However, if the taxpayer chooses a regular case status, then the case can be appealed 
to one of the U.S. Appellate Courts.212 A decision from an Appellate Court can be 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, generally does 
not decide many tax cases unless there is a constitutional question at issue or the 
appellate court decisions are split.213 
2.6. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESOURCES 
The third branch of the government and thus, the third legal resource, is the Executive 
Branch which consists of the President, Vice-President, the President’s cabinet, the 
executive departments, such as the Department of the Treasury or the Department of 
Justice, the agencies that are underneath each Department and other various boards, 
commissions and committees.214 For this thesis, the resources from the Department of 
the Treasury as well as its sub-agency, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are 
 
209 U.S. Tax Court, About, found at https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm; See also, Franklin 
County Law Library, Tax Law Research: Federal and Ohio: Court Jurisdiction of Tax Issues 
and Appellate Structure, found at https://fclawlib.libguides.com/taxlawresearch/jurisdiction; 
LSU Law Library, Tax Policy and Procedure: Hierarchy of Tax Authorities, found at 
https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=191374&p=1264047 
210 The taxpayer can request either an small tax case status or a regular case status but the Tax 
Court grants that status.  
211 U.S. Tax Court, Taxpayer Information: After Trial, found at  
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/taxpayer_info_after.htm#AFTER6 
212 U.S. Tax Court, Taxpayer Information: After Trial, found at  
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/taxpayer_info_after.htm#AFTER6; U.S. Courts, About U.S. 
Court of Appeals, found at https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-
structure/about-us-courts-appeals 
213 LSU Law Library, Tax Policy and Procedure: Hierarchy of Tax Authorities, found at 
https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=191374&p=1264047 
214 U.S. Const., art. II, §1; See also, Branches of the U.S. Government, Executive Branch, 
https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government#item-214500 
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important Executive branch sources. The purpose of the Executive branch is to 
conduct and enforce the laws215 The Executive branch is given its authority under Art. 
II of the U.S. Constitution. It gives the President the power to, as noted previously, 
make treaties, and nominate various government roles like ambassadors and judges.  
The Executive branch resources that this thesis primarily utilizes are resources from 
the Department of the Treasury and its subagency, the IRS. The Department of 
Treasury resources that are referred to and referenced are reports and memos. The 
multiple resources that are published by the IRS that are utilized in this thesis are 
publications such as IRS press releases, revenue rulings, announcements, notices and 
the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). FinCEN216, another subagency under the 
Department of the Treasury, has been put in charge of the Reports of Foreign Bank 
and Financial Accounts (FBAR). Resources from that subagency are used in Chapter 
4 which focuses on the FBAR.  
Resources from the Department of Justice, another executive branch agency, are also 
used and analyzed. For example, DOJ press releases and documents from court cases 
dealing with John Doe summons (Chapter 6) such as proposed orders are referenced.  
Reports, memos, press releases and many of the other resources are not mandatory 
resources but are merely persuasive in nature.  
As noted in Section 2.4, an important executive branch resource is the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). It is published every year and it contains both the general and 
permanent rules established by the executive departments and their subagencies.  
 
215 Branches of the U.S. Government, Executive Branch, https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-
government#item-214500 
216 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a subagency if the Department of the Treasury 
whose focus is “to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money 
laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination 
of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.” See FinCEN, What We Do, 
https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
84
 
2.7. OTHER SOURCES 
One resource that this thesis examines is other scholarly research and books. While 
these articles and books are not authoritative and merely persuasive in nature, they 
provide background knowledge, historical information as well as interesting and 
thought-provoking ideas and viewpoints.  
The Tax Justice Network is an “independent international network”217 and advocacy 
group whose main goal is to sway political issues such financial globalization and tax 
havens and has been included as a source in this thesis. They claim to have no political 
association, despite that claim they have been identified as a left-leaning 
organization.218  But because the Tax Justice Network and its research is quoted and 
referred to often throughout the literature in reference to tax evasion, they are being 
utilized as a source of knowledge on the issues of tax evasion while acknowledging 
the possible left-leaning viewpoint. 
News sites, such as Forbes, Bloomberg and Time, are another non-authoritative, 
persuasive source that this thesis uses. As can be said for the scholarly articles and 
books, these websites can provide factual information and data that are applicable to 
the issues in this thesis. The news sites are used for up-to-date information as well as 
background information. Some of these news sites can also have a political bias either 
leaning conservative or liberal.   
 
217 Tax Justice Network, Who We Are: Goals, https://www.taxjustice.net/about/who-we-
are/goals/  
218Time, The Real Problem with Offshore Tax Havens, 
http://business.time.com/2012/07/26/the-real-problem-with-offshore-tax-havens/; See also, 
Today Online, Singapore: World’s Fifth Largest Tax Haven, 
https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/singapore-worlds-fifth-largest-tax-haven-behind-hk-
report,  Bloomberg, U.S. Seen as World’s Second Biggest Tax Haven After Switzerland, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-30/u-s-seen-as-world-s-second-biggest-
tax-haven-after-switzerland  
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        Hierarchy of Mandatory Tax Law 
Sources219   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
219 IRS, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich87.pdf; See also, IRS, Understanding IRS 
Guidance: A Brief Primer, https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-
primer;http://fclawlib.libguides.com/taxlawresearch/hierarchy;  
http://libguides.uwlax.edu/c.php?g=274077&p=1828557;  
United States Constitution 
Federal Tax Statutes 
(IRC) & Regulations 
(CFR) 
Treaties  
Judicial Authority  
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       Hierarchy of U.S. Federal Courts220  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
220 U.S. Courts, Court Role and Structure, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure;See also, Department of Justice, Federal Courts, 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts  
 
United States Supreme Court 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals    
(13 Federal Appellate Courts)  
United States District Courts 
(94 Federal Trial Courts) 
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2.8. QUICK WORD ON THE HISTORY OF 
THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 
Since the early days of America – a colonial part of the bigger British Empire - taxes 
have consistently been a point of contention that has resulted in both an ethical and 
moral question of whether tax evasion is acceptable. In the early 1700s, the colonists, 
in order to avoid paying taxes to the British Crown, shifted their trade to the Latin 
American countries.221 The British Parliament had passed several tax acts with the 
purpose of raising revenue which the colonists found unreasonable and, thus, they 
refused to pay the taxes.222 Samuel Adams argued at the time  that “It is an essential, 
natural right, that a man shall quietly enjoy, and have the sole disposal of his own 
property”223 which seemed to be the prevailing view of many American colonists at 
the time. This created, according to one scholar, a tax morality “which has been 
described as follows: The fact that the colonists were constantly evading the 
Navigation Acts, and made no pretense of paying the duties imposed by England must 
have had a demoralizing effect, and taught them to evade duties imposed by their own 
lawmakers…..”224 Although this description does not take into account that one of the 
main reasons that the colonists chose to resist the various tax acts was because they 
did not want the Crown to tax them without having fair representation in Parliament, 
it does show the early beginnings of Americans choosing to evade taxes whether the 
reasons behind the choice were considered legitimate grievances or not.  
Today, the United States is one of the only countries that taxes based on citizenship, 
not residency, but taxation has not always been citizenship-based. While the country 
was still in its infancy, it taxed its citizens based on residency and at one point relied 
 
221 Richard A. Gordon, Special Counsel for International Taxation, Tax Havens and Their Use 
by United States Taxpayers – An Overview, Department of the Treasury, Publication No. 1150 
(4-81) (1981). 
222 Ira Stoll, Samuel Adams: A Life, 54, 77 (Free Press 2008). 
223 Ira Stoll, Samuel Adams: A Life, 66 (Free Press 2008). 
224 Richard A. Gordon, Special Counsel for International Taxation, Tax Havens and Their Use 
by United States Taxpayers – An Overview, Department of the Treasury, Publication No. 
1150, 21 (4-81) (1981). 
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on tariffs as a source of revenue.225 However, less than a hundred years later the very 
violent and bloody Civil War would challenge the existing tax structure.  When 
Congress passed the first income tax to fund the Civil War226, it taxed its citizens only 
on their U.S. income, not on income that was earned abroad.227  
In 1864 (the Civil War would end the following year), the U.S. converted to a 
citizenship-based taxation structure so any income earned anywhere in the world 
would be taxed. Then, in 1894, Congress enacted a federal income tax which was 
quickly declared unconstitutional with the Supreme Court holding that the income tax 
was a direct tax that was not apportioned with each state’s population.228 The 16th 
Amendment, ratified in 1913, was in response to this Supreme Court decision229 and 
gave Congress the power to tax income from whatever source derived.230 This 
amendment allowed for the foundation of the modern U.S. tax system that is present 
today. The American system was no longer a residency-based taxation regime but was 
now based on citizenship which meant a U.S. citizen was taxed on his or her 
worldwide income. It mattered not where the income came from. All that mattered 
was that one was an U.S. citizen. The United States still, today, adheres to the notion 
that all worldwide income of U.S. citizens, whether a business or a private individual, 
results in U.S. tax liability simply for holding U.S. citizenship.231  
 
225 Randolph E. Paul, History of Taxation in the United States, William & Mary Annual Tax 
Conference, 6 (1955).  
226 Randolph E. Paul, History of Taxation in the United States, William & Mary Annual Tax 
Conference, 6 (1955); See also, History of the U.S. Income Tax, available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/hottopic/irs_history.html 
227 History of the U.S. Income Tax, https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/hottopic/irs_history.html  
228 Joel S. Newman, Federal Income Taxation: Cases, Problems and Materials, 11 (West 
Publishing, 5th edition, 2012); See also, History of the U.S. Income Tax, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/hottopic/irs_history.html;  Randolph E. Paul, History of 
Taxation in the United States, William & Mary Annual Tax Conference, 6 (1955). 
229 Joel S. Newman, Federal Income Taxation: Cases, Problems and Materials, 11 (West 
Publishing, 5th edition, 2012); See also, Randolph E. Paul, History of Taxation in the United 
States, William & Mary Annual Tax Conference, 7 (1955). 
230 U.S. Const. amend. XVI (Author’s emphasis). 
231 Robert T. Kudrle and Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will It Last? 
Will It Work? 9 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 37 (Autumn 2003).  
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The citizenship-based residency now presented the problem of double-taxation – one 
fundamental problem of international taxation232 – on American citizens by both their 
home country and the country of their residence. Americans sought relief from double 
taxation and in 1918, the U.S. responded by passing the Foreign Tax Credit which 
allowed American citizens to take a credit against U.S. income for taxes paid to a 
foreign government on income earned outside the United States in order to alleviate 
the burden.233 Thomas S. Adams, who is considered the founder of the modern U.S. 
international tax system, argued in favor of the tax credit stating “there is something 
in the legislative mind which recognizes that if one taxpayer is being taxed twice while 
the majority of men similarly situated are being taxed only once, by the same tax 
something wrong or inequitable is being done….”234 Adams recognized that tax 
evasion would become a problem if relief was not granted to the taxpayer and that a 
credit for foreign taxes paid would hopefully “prevent abuse of that privilege”235. 
Already by the early 1920s tax evasion was a concern not just to Adams but to 
Congress as well. In 1921, Congress, at the urging of Adams, passed a limitation on 
the Foreign Tax Credit (and source rules) in order to prevent abuse of the credit, for 
example, where a taxpayer who lived in a high tax country would utilize the credit in 
order to eliminate the entire tax owed to the United States. The concern was that the 
Foreign Tax Credit had created an atmosphere that allowed the taxpayer to potentially 
abuse the system.236 Adams considered tax evasion to be of grave concern and that 
not limiting the Foreign Tax Credit would allow significant abuse.237  
 
232 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.  International 
Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1027 (1997).  
233 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.  International 
Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1022 (1997).   
234 Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, Proceedings 
of the Annual Conference on Taxation under the Auspices of the National Tax Association, 
22 Nat’l Tax Assoc. 197 (1929).  
235 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.  International 
Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1039 (1997).  
236 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.  International 
Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1055 (1997).  
237 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.  International 
Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1055 (1997).  
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Even in the early part of the 20th century, there was concern about various tax 
avoidance strategies with regard to business income and corporations including 
schemes such as incorporating in foreign jurisdictions with low taxes and attempts by 
corporations to manipulate prices between themselves and their subsidiaries in order 
to reduce their overall tax liability.238  
While the legislative branch had passed the citizenship-based transaction, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue in a 1924 case, Cook v. Tait. This case questioned 
whether or not it was constitutional to impose tax on income from property located 
outside the territorial U.S. and owned by a U.S. citizen that resided permanently 
outside the U.S.239  The Court held that “….the basis of the power to tax was not and 
cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or 
out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile 
of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as a 
citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as a citizen. The 
consequences of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may have domicile 
and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country 
and the tax be legal – the government having the power to impose the tax.”240  
In between 1913 and 1937, there were thirteen Revenue Acts that were passed and 
with each Act there was an effort made to close the loopholes that allowed tax evasion, 
but as one scholar noted in 1937, the “legislative efforts appear to be still nebulous 
because evidently there are still loopholes to be plugged.”241  Since 1940, eighty-one 
pieces of tax legislation have been enacted and the years 1980-1989 (22) and 2000-
2009 (20) were the decades that saw the most legislation passed242 and yet today tax 
evasion remains a problem.   
 
238 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.  International 
Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1060 (1997). 
239 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).  
240 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 48 (1924). 
241 William Cogger, Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion, 15 Tax Mag. 518, 519 (1937).  
242 Tax Policy Center, Laws & Proposals, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/laws-proposals  
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Today the federal tax system that was initially set up beginning in the civil war era 
continues today - albeit more complicated, cumbersome and facing some of the same 
issues it has since the beginning. The rest of the thesis will discuss what anti-tax 
evasion measures the IRS has at its disposal to obtain taxpayer information on their 
foreign financial accounts in order to correctly and fairly administer the tax laws. 
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CHAPTER 3. U.S. EFFORTS TO DEFINE 
OR BLACKLIST TAX HAVEN 
JURISDICTIONS 
 
3.1. GENERALLY 
At first glance this chapter may seem out of context in light of the issue at the center 
of this thesis – that the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as IRS) is not 
able to procure taxpayer information on foreign accounts to administer the tax laws 
fairly and correctly – yet it is not.  
Why is this chapter applicable to this thesis? The answer is fairly simple – the anti-
tax evasion measures such as those discussed in this dissertation have been developed 
and enacted in response to jurisdictions that use secrecy to conceal taxpayers’ assets. 
The background behind the answer is not quite as simple and distracts away from the 
true impediment to procuring taxpayer information on foreign accounts – secrecy. In 
order to discuss the anti-tax evasion measures and why it is difficult for the IRS to 
obtain taxpayer information on foreign accounts, it is important to understand that the 
method of blacklisting and definition drafting, while potentially effective for other 
controversies related to jurisdictions that are alleged to be tax havens, are not effective 
when addressing the issue of secrecy.  
For many years, the response that governments and organizations had – including 
national, supranational and non-governmental organizations (hereinafter referred to 
as NGOs) – to the problem that secrecy presented was attempting to control those 
jurisdictions that were alleged to be tax havens by both identifying characteristics of 
tax havens and/or shaming the “bad apples” by placing them on a blacklist instead of 
addressing secrecy which prohibited them from procuring taxpayer information. This 
is a two-prong attack. The first prong is to attack the tax havens from a political 
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standpoint – deciding what a tax haven is and what jurisdiction to attack. In other 
words, naming and shaming a jurisdiction into cooperating. The second prong is 
relying on the international legal remedies. The blacklist and definitional approaches 
go after the jurisdiction specifically, but the measures in this thesis go after the 
taxpayer that is utilizing the secrecy to conceal accounts either directly or indirectly 
(via third parties). These approaches failed for multiple reasons including (but not 
limited to) lack of political will (at least within the U.S. and as seen via the multiple 
failures of bills that included definitions or blacklists), inconsistent or lack of 
methodology in drafting the lists or criteria, or the inability to back up the blacklist 
with sanctions or “hard power” as Katrin Eggenberger calls it.243  Tax havens are a 
disease that cannot be cured. Instead, the symptoms are treated of which secrecy is 
the greatest of the symptoms because it is not just the rich concealing money but also 
drug, weapons and human traffickers that use the secrecy to conceal their profits and 
activities.  
The U.S. can be included in the list of governments and NGOs such as Venezuela, the 
UK and the EU that have tried to pursue a definition that would nail down the specific 
characteristics of tax havens and/or trying to adopt blacklists of jurisdictions. They 
adopted this method in the hopes that this would keep taxpayers from utilizing these 
jurisdictions, but despite these attempts, non-compliance with U.S. tax laws continues 
to be a problem. This can partly be attributed to that some of the focus of the 
politicians was mostly on the jurisdiction itself and not the secrecy the jurisdiction 
offers.  
First, the chapter will delve into the blacklists and definitions that have been presented 
in the past (including the very recent past) in order to address the problems that tax 
 
243 Jason Sharman and Gregory Rawlings, Deconstructing National Tax Blacklists, presented 
at the “Beyond the Level Playing Field? Symposium (September 19, 2009), found at 
https://www.step.org/sites/default/files/Comms/Deconstructing NationalBlacklists.pdf; See 
also, Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective? Stigma, Sanctions and Legitimacy: 
The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 483, 497 
(2018). 
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havens have presented to the various governments and their taxing authorities. Next, 
the chapter will discuss the U.S.’ attempts at defining and blacklisting within a couple 
of the U.S. federal agencies. The same section will consider a few pieces of legislation 
that Congress tried to enact that included either a blacklist, definition or both. Finally, 
the chapter will examine the real issue that is at the heart of it all: secrecy. This section 
of the chapter will discuss, briefly, thoughts on why the blacklisting and definitions 
have not worked and what, if anything, the U.S. can do if it wants to incorporate a 
blacklist or definition within legislation. 
3.2. BACKGROUND ON ATTEMPTS AT 
SOLVING THE TAX HAVEN PROBLEM  
3.2.1. GENERALLY 
There are usually two approaches to identifying tax havens. The first is by employing 
a blacklist of jurisdictions. The second approach is by drafting a definition using 
substantive criteria, for example, no or low tax. The next few pages will describe, in 
broad terms, tax haven definitions and then blacklists to demonstrate that this has been 
one approach employed to deter tax evasion and to try to procure information on 
taxpayers’ accounts. 
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3.2.1.1 Defining Tax Havens 
There is generally no universal definition as to what qualifies as a tax haven.244 This 
conclusion can be seen across the academic literature through the research of the 
scholars, nevertheless, many scholars (as well as governments) have sought to define 
what qualifies as a tax haven despite the problematic nature of trying to pin down a 
subject that is complicated, diverse and ever-changing.245 
Most definitions of tax havens fall into one of two categories: classical or non-
classical definitions. Most scholarly articles endorse the classical definition of tax 
havens (low tax, bank secrecy, etc.) or some form of it, while a minority of scholars 
advocate for non-classical tax haven criteria.  
In discussing what can be referred to as the classical definition, Janelle Gravelle has 
suggested the restrictive definition versus a broad definition of tax havens.246 The 
restrictive criteria definitions contain additional criteria such as lack of transparency, 
bank secrecy and lack of economic activity that reaches beyond just the low-tax 
criteria of the broad definitions.247 An example of more restrictive criteria is the  
characteristics presented by the OECD in 1998.248 This list of four key characteristics, 
 
244 Nicholas Shaxson, How to Crack Down on Tax Havens, Foreign Affairs, Feb. 13, 2018; 
See also, Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax 
Havens?, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 661 (Oct. 2008); Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What 
Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of International Standards Shows Why 
Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 402 (Autumn 2013); Jasmine M. 
Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 
B.U.L. Rev. 337, 343 (January 2014); Tulio Rosembuj, Harmful Tax Competition, 27 Intertax 
316, 328 (1999); Tyler J. Winkleman, Automatic Information Exchange as a Multilateral 
Solution to Tax Havens, 22 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 193,197 (2012); Timothy V. Addison, 
Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 Ind. J. Global & Legal Stud. 703, 705-706 
(Summer 2009); Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the 
World, 8 (Penguin Random House, 2016); Myla Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal 
Analysis, 32 Intertax 95 (2004).  
245 Myla Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal Analysis, 32 Intertax 102 (2004). 
246 Janelle Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 62 Nat’l Tax 
Assoc. 727, 728 (December 2009); See also, Commission Staff Working Document Impact 
Assessment, at 117, COM (2012) SWD 404 final (2012) citing Janelle Gravelle’s article.  
247 Janelle Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 62 Nat’l Tax 
Assoc. 727, 728 (December 2009). 
248 OECD, Tax Havens: Summary of the Findings of the First Study of International Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, 15 Intertax 122 (Paris 1987). 
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is referred to by or is the basis of many scholars’ definitions249 for what qualifies as a 
tax haven. The four characteristics that the OECD listed were: 
a) No or only nominal taxes and offers itself, or is perceived to 
offer itself, as a place used by non-residents to escape tax in 
their country of residence; 
b) Laws or administrative practices which prevent the effective 
exchange of relevant information with other governments on 
taxpayers benefitting from the low or no tax jurisdiction; 
c) Lack of transparency; and  
d) The absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial.250 
 
As a 2012 EU working document notes, when the broad definition of tax havens is 
used the list of jurisdictions becomes excessive in length.251 Both the Tax Justice 
Network and author/journalist Nicholas Shaxson - as well as a number of academic 
scholars252 - have utilized the broad definition that declares that a “tax haven provides 
facilities that enable people or entities to escape the laws, rules and regulations of 
 
249For examples, George Pagano, The United States Went to War to Avoid the Red Coats’ 
Taxes – Now Corporations are Sprinting to the United Kingdom’s Tax Rate, 39 Suffolk 
Transnat’l L. Rev. 427,430 (Summer 2016); See also, Tulio Rosembuj, Harmful Tax 
Competition, 27 Intertax 316, 329 (1999); Tyler J. Winkleman, Automatic Information 
Exchange as a Multilateral Solution to Tax Havens, 22 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 193,197 
(2012); Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 Ind. J. Global & 
Legal Stud. 703, 705-706 (Summer 2009).  
250 OECD, Tax Havens: Summary of the Findings of the First Study of International Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, 15 Intertax 122 (Paris 1987); See also, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Harmful Tax 
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, at 22, OECD Report (1998). 
251 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, at 117, COM (2012) SWD 404 
final (2012) citing Janelle Gravelle’s article; See also as examples of broad definitions, 
Jasmine M. Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 94 B.U.L. Rev. 337, 343 (January 2014); Mykola Orlov, The Concept of Tax 
Haven: A Legal Analysis, 32 Intertax 95, 97 (2004).  
252 Jeffery Kraft, Changing Tides: Tax Haven Reform and the Changing Views of 
Transnational Capital Flow Regulation and the Role of States in a Globalized World, 21 
Indiana J. Global Legal Stud. 599, 600 (Summer 2014); See also, Timothy V. Addison, 
Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 Ind. J. Global & Legal Stud. 703, 705-706 
(Summer 2009). 
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other jurisdictions elsewhere, using secrecy as a prime tool.”253 Nicholas Shaxson 
also uses a broad definition of tax havens in his book Treasure Islands: Tax Havens 
and The Men Who Stole the World254 defining tax havens as “a place that seeks to 
attract business by offering politically stable facilities to help people or entities get 
around the rules, laws and regulations of jurisdictions elsewhere.” The EU has 
described a broad definition of tax havens as jurisdictions that “provide taxpayers, 
both legal and natural persons, with opportunities for tax avoidance, while their 
secrecy and opacity also serves to hide the origin of the proceeds of illegal and 
criminal activities.”255  
In the non-classical category of tax haven definitions, there is a minority of scholars 
that identify other criteria other than what has been listed within the classical 
definition. For example, Dharmapala and Hines256 while noting that tax havens 
generally are jurisdictions that have low or zero taxation and bank secrecy laws, they 
also favor characteristics that are atypical of the classic definition. They argue that tax 
havens are island countries with small populations, they are in close proximity to 
major capital exporters, affluent and have a sophisticated communications 
infrastructure. They also argue that tax havens are “poorly endowed with natural 
resources”257 while others draw attention to the connection many tax havens have 
with the United Kingdom as former and current territories or jurisdictions that have 
 
253 https://www.taxjustice.net/fag/tax-havens/ ; See also, Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: 
Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World, 8 (Penguin Random House, 2016). 
254 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World, 8-9 
(Penguin Random House, 2016).  
255 Cecile Remeur, Listing of Tax Havens By the EU, European Parliamentary Research 
Service (May 2018), found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/147404/7%20-
%2001%20EPRS-Briefing-621872-Listing-tax-havens-by-the-EU-FINAL.PDF  
256 Dharmapala, D. and J. R. Hines, Jr. (2006) “Which Countries Become Tax Havens?” 
NBER Working Paper #12802; See also, Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and 
Opportunities are Created by Tax Havens?, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 661, 664 (Oct. 
2008); James R. Hines Jr., Do Tax Havens Flourish?, 19 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 65, 77 (2005); 
Clemens Fuest, Tax Havens: Shady Deals, 67 The World Today 16 (July 2011).  
257 Dharmapala, D. and J. R. Hines, Jr. (2006) “Which Countries Become Tax Havens?” 
NBER Working Paper #12802. 
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strong ties to the UK.258 The minority definition, while more narrow, is a more 
inconsistent definition. Examining the various lists of countries considered tax 
havens, multiple countries do not fit within the non-classical definitions. For example, 
Switzerland, Panama and Belgium, among others, do not fit within the small country 
characteristic.259 The affluence characteristic is defied by alleged tax haven countries 
such as Vanuatu, Nauru and Samoa.260 This demonstrates that a broader tax haven 
definition, if utilized, allows for more accuracy when trying to define what 
jurisdictions qualify as tax havens especially if the definition looks to what the laws 
of the jurisdiction contains (i.e., secrecy, effective exchange of communication) 
instead of more descriptive characteristics such as size. The difference in broad versus 
narrow or majority versus minority definitions, also establishes the difficulty with 
trying to pin down what a tax haven is.  
The variety of definitions that are presented in the academic literature used to define  
tax havens – when viewed in light of the amount of academic research done on the 
topic of tax havens – demonstrates that trying to define a phenomenon that causes the 
very experts writing on these issues to struggle suggests that the true issue needs to be 
acknowledged and addressed. That issue is that it is not the jurisdictions themselves 
that the taxpayers’ go for, but the wall of secrecy that the jurisdictions’ rules and 
regulations provide. Another way to put it is that people do not seek out Vanuatu to 
hide their money because it is Vanuatu, instead they seek out the secrecy that 
Vanuatu’s rules and regulations provide. 
The next section will discuss briefly the attempts to use blacklists to achieve the same 
goals in the same manner as with the definitions.  
 
258 Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of 
International Standards Shows Why Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 
402 (Autumn 2013); See also, Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men 
Who Stole the World, 8-9 (Penguin Random House, 2016).  
259 CIA, The World Factbook: Country Comparison GDP – Per Capita, found at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html 
260 Asian Development Bank, Poverty in the Cook Islands, found at 
https://www.adb.org/countries/cook-islands/poverty 
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3.2.1.2 Blacklists 
A blacklist is a policy tool that is used for multiple reasons. Generally, a blacklist is a 
public roster of entities – or more specifically, for this thesis, jurisdictions – that are 
viewed in an adverse light. The blacklist is used to support policy objectives with the 
aim of changing the listed jurisdictions’ behavior.261 Blacklists present two potential 
consequences for suspected jurisdiction: reputational or financial costs.262 
The blacklist came into the international relations terminology during the First World 
War when the British enacted the Trading with Enemy Act of 1915 which listed 
companies that were aiding their enemies and prohibited their citizens from trading 
with these companies.263 Blacklisting has since become an avenue that governments 
and others are comfortable using as a policy tool. There fact that there are 400+ lists 
used worldwide proves that this is a popular path taken to deal with various aspects 
of tax havens.264 The general definition of a blacklist noted above is a broader 
definition that includes money laundering and non-proliferation as well as secrecy 
jurisdictions or tax havens.265 This section of the thesis is only concerned with 
blacklists that focus on the secrecy/aspects of tax havens and will, therefore, focus on 
those types of lists. 
Multiple countries, international organizations and the EU, a supranational 
governmental organization, have created blacklists that contain jurisdictions they 
 
261 Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective? Stigma, Sanctions and Legitimacy: 
The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 483, 497 
(2018). 
262 Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective? Stigma, Sanctions and Legitimacy: 
The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 483 
(2018). 
263 Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective? Stigma, Sanctions and Legitimacy: 
The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 485 
(2018). 
264 Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective? Stigma, Sanctions and Legitimacy: 
The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 485 
(2018). 
265 Katrin Eggenberger, When is Blacklisting Effective? Stigma, Sanctions and Legitimacy: 
The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 483 
(2018). 
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identify as tax havens. These jurisdictions or entities employ a tax haven blacklist so 
that they can try to “limit tax losses at home by limiting or barring transactions 
carried out by their citizens or corporations with certain specified foreign 
jurisdictions.”266  
The next natural question to ask is what, specifically, is a tax haven blacklist? A 
national tax haven blacklist is legislation or regulations that prescribe negative 
treatment such as reputational or financial consequences for certain specific listed 
foreign jurisdictions.267 This is differentiated from the lists of objective criteria, but 
the tax haven blacklists may be based on those lists of objective criteria. This 
distinction is important because, according to Sharman and Rawlings, the blacklists 
conflict with “widely-held principles at the heart of the international trade system” – 
for instance, discriminating on national grounds.268 
Can a blacklist be an effective tool against tax havens? The opinions are wide and 
varied.269 In her article, Katrin Eggenberger examines when blacklisting is effective 
and found that when a blacklist is viewed as legitimate, has a stigma attached to the 
act committed (tax evasion versus money laundering) and the sanctions are of a “hard 
power” nature, a blacklist can be very effective.270 For example, she compares the 
OECD blacklist and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. The article 
 
266 Jason Sharman and Gregory Rawlings, Deconstructing National Tax Blacklists, Presented 
at the “Beyond the Level Playing Field? Symposium (September 19, 2009), found at 
https://www.step.org/sites/default/files/Comms/Deconstructing NationalBlacklists.pdf 
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The Reputational and Financial Costs of Being Blacklisted, 25 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 483, 497 
(2018). 
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concluded that the FATF’s blacklist was much more effective because money 
laundering is seen (or has been seen) as a bigger violation than tax evasion (stigma) 
and that the FATF followed through and imposed sanctions.271 The OECD’s list was 
merely seen as a threat because it had no follow through to it and was viewed as a 
non-legitimate list by the identified jurisdictions.272 Eggenberger noted that it took 
five years for the FATF countries to come into compliance in conflict with the nine 
years for the countries reported on the OECD blacklist to comply.273 
While blacklists can exert hard power through sanctions as noted by Eggenberger, it 
can also destroy countries.274 Take the country Nauru, for example, which is a tiny 
Pacific island with a population of 11,000.275 Nauru’s only natural resource, 
phosphate, was depleted.276 As a result, Nauru then became known for selling 
“economic citizenship through passports as well as offshore banking licenses with 
secrecy provisions.”277 Following a money laundering scandal that revealed the 
Russian Federation was laundering money through Nauru, the jurisdiction was added 
to both the OECD and the FATF blacklists.278 The FATF eventually sanctioned Nauru 
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who, at the same time, was also being sanctioned under the U.S. Patriot Act. Nauru 
acquiesced and committed to the OECD standards and the jurisdiction was eventually 
removed from both the OECD and FATF blacklists.279 Unfortunately,  the reputational 
and financial costs were disastrous as they had undermined Nauru’s already fragile 
and vulnerable economy.280 As Eggenberger noted, Nauru is impoverished as a result 
of both the decline of their natural resource – production of phosphate – and the 
decline of the offshore banking business.281 “Many functions of the state have 
collapsed, it depends on foreign aid, has turned to maintaining detention camps for 
Australian immigrants for revenue, and has most of the characteristics of a failed 
state.”282  
Nauru is undoubtedly seen as a blacklist success story for those that are trying to put 
an end to money laundering and tax evasion, but is it appropriate that the result is a 
country that is forced into an impoverished state? This is one of the many criticisms 
that blacklists face and it is a compelling and accurate criticism.  
As noted above, the criticism against blacklists is wide and varied. Among the reasons 
listed is whether a blacklist is legitimate, that it affects political and human rights and 
that blacklisting has been challenged as “politically charged, biased and open to 
lobbying.”283  
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Another considerable criticism is that blacklists are arbitrary and discriminatory. This 
can be observed in how blacklists are constructed.284 What are the procedures for 
drafting a blacklist? Are there any? Are they transparent? These are all questions to 
consider when examining whether blacklists are arbitrary and discriminatory. 
According to Sharman and Rawlings, the answer to those questions is there are 
generally no procedures and when there are the procedures are not transparent.285 
They argue that there is no consistently applied method in identifying jurisdictions 
that belong on the blacklist.286 This is evidenced by tax haven lists that can vary widely 
with the countries that are placed on those lists. For example, the Netherlands and 
Ireland are on some tax haven blacklists287 yet other lists such as the current EU 
blacklist do not contain either country. This varying nature of tax haven lists lends 
itself to well-earned criticism288. One perspective suggests it is a bit of a David versus 
Goliath battle where the tax haven countries – viewed as the small guy – won out.289 
This is because the OECD blacklist was never viewed as effective in contradiction to 
the FATF’s list as discussed above. But one wonders if Nauru feels that the little guy 
won out. 
Another issue to contemplate when drafting a blacklist, and a problem that exists 
across established blacklists, is not just the inconsistencies that appear - such as 
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Venezuela including St. Christopher onto their blacklist but delisting St. Kitts despite 
being the exact same geographical entity (same island) - but also having no 
methodology for not only compiling the lists but updating them by listing or delisting 
countries.290  
The blacklists present, essentially, a circular issue: to have a blacklist one needs to 
have a substantive list of characteristics or elements to identify them with. If there is 
no qualifying characteristic, then it becomes an arbitrary selection with no valid 
reason for those jurisdictions to be included. In order to have criteria to identify 
jurisdictions one must have an idea of the jurisdictions they are targeting – for 
example, Bermuda, in order to develop the criteria.  
Based on the above discussion, it seems, that to have a solid, effective blacklist, there 
should be a consistent methodology that includes objective criteria that identifies and 
places jurisdictions on a list that will be viewed as legitimate. This method should also 
include an annual or biannual review of the list to update the jurisdictions. The method 
should also include hard sanctions and a stigma that those jurisdictions want to avoid. 
The sanctions and stigma should not be so severe though that it forces a country into 
an impoverished state that it cannot recover from.  
 
3.3. U.S. DEFINITION AND BLACKLIST 
ATTEMPTS 
3.3.1. PRIOR U.S. ATTEMPTS AT ADDRESSING TAX HAVENS 
In one of the first, and definitely the most definitive, attempts at defining what a tax 
haven is by the U.S. government came in the form of a report written in 1981 by 
Richard A. Gordon who, at the time, was Special Counsel for the International 
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Taxation Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).291 The Report (from 
hereinafter referred to as the “Gordon Report”) was requested due to concerns at the 
time of the increasing use of tax havens by U.S. taxpayers to both avoid and evade tax 
liability. It suggested seven principal characteristics of tax havens: 1) low tax, 2) 
secrecy, 3) relative importance of banking, 4) availability of modern communications, 
5) lack of currency controls, 6) self-promotion and tax aggression and 7) special 
situations. The Gordon Report, although not authoritative, is important because it has 
been the basis of many other definitions given by academic scholars, governments 
and organizations like the OECD, (for example, see the OECD criteria given in the 
above section 3.2.1.1). Although these definitions vary, most of them contain the first 
two criteria: low tax and secrecy. These two characteristics can be found in almost all 
the definitions and thus, can be considered the common core characteristics which 
will be discussed in more detail below. Not surprisingly, the Gordon Report did not 
call on the government to adopt the definition laid out in the report, but instead it 
“called for a coordinated federal attack on the use of tax havens, including better 
coordination and funding of administrative efforts and substantive changes in U.S. 
law and U.S. tax treaty policy which included anti-tax evasion measures”.292  This 
has been the strategy of the U.S. government for almost a century and should continue 
to be the federal government’s blueprint for how they procure taxpayer information 
on foreign accounts because this is an effective strategy when dealing with secrecy 
and its multifaceted nature.  
In 1984, the Secretary of the Treasury submitted an update to the Gordon Report 
called Tax Havens in The Caribbean Basin and it was linked to legislation titled 
 
291 Richard A. Gordon, Special Counsel for International Taxation, Tax Havens and Their Use 
by United States Taxpayers – An Overview, Department of the Treasury, Publication No. 1150 
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Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.293 The purpose behind the report was to 
present to the House and the Senate three items of information. First, the level at which 
the Caribbean Basin tax havens were being used at the time to evade U.S. tax and the 
effect that it had on Federal tax revenues.294 The second requirement was to provide 
information on the relationship between the tax use and non-tax use (i.e., criminal use, 
drug trafficking).295 Last, the report was to describe any anti-tax haven enforcement 
measures taken by the Treasury Department.296 According to the report, the request 
reflected the “strong and growing concern shared by the Administration and Congress 
that tax havens may provide opportunities for…..the avoidance and evasion of U.S. 
taxes.”297 However, the scope of the report was limited only to the tax havens found 
in the area of the Caribbean and not the tax havens in other geographic locations.  
The Caribbean Report cited the characteristics of tax havens that were fleshed out in 
the Gordon Report. It also cited the four ranges of use for tax havens that Gordon 
argued for. The purpose of the Caribbean Basin Initiative was to provide tax benefits 
to those suspected tax haven jurisdictions in the Caribbean in lieu of their piercing 
their veil of secrecy in order to provide information to the U.S. authorities to help with 
the enforcement of U.S. laws.298 
U.S. officials during the 1980s seemed to be resolute in their determination to identify 
tax havens by name publicly. Today, U.S. officials convey the impression that they 
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are a lot more reluctant to identify specific jurisdictions either through a definition or 
through a blacklist. The lack of enacted legislation that identifies tax havens (see 
subsection 3.3.2) is evidence of this. In one hearing in the early 1980s, an Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury, when asked how he would rate the haven jurisdictions on 
the secrecy characteristic, did not hesitate when he identified Panama, the Cayman 
Islands, the Netherland Antilles and the Bahamas as those jurisdictions which had 
secrecy laws that were the hardest to penetrate.299  However, that willingness to 
identify tax havens seems to have reversed itself. In a Government Accounting 
Office’s (GAO) report in 2013, one Assistant Secretary warned of the use of 
identifying specific jurisdictions by using a blacklist or by criteria as there was no 
agreed upon definition or blacklist.300 
Another example of the willingness to identify tax havens by name in the 1980s comes 
in the form of a handbook that was created so that IRS agents could use it as a resource 
when encountering a tax haven problem.301 The Tax Haven Information Book has a 
list of 28 jurisdictions identified as tax havens with detailed information on each 
identified jurisdiction. The book had at least two editions, one in 1982 and one in 
1984. These books were difficult to find copies of. The 1982 version can be found 
online, however, the author was not able to locate a copy of the 1984 edition. The 
purpose of these books was to provide the IRS agents working on tax haven issues in 
the 1980s with information on individual jurisdictions considered to be tax havens. 
These books, while informative, are only persuasive in nature and were meant as a 
resource guide and not, as noted at the front of the 1982 version, as a book that would 
be cited as authority. 
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The 1983 House of Representatives hearing titled Tax Evasion Through the 
Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries also points to the willingness to 
overtly identify tax havens by name through the singling out of the Netherland 
Antilles in the title of the hearing while noting that, of course, there are other tax haven 
countries.302 The purpose of this hearing was to obtain information on the nature and 
severity of the use of the Netherlands Antilles for tax evasion purposes and to examine 
whether or not the federal government’s response to the use of tax havens (including 
the Netherlands Antilles) by U.S. taxpayers to evade taxes was adequate or not. 
The Gordon Report and the subsequent examples are by no means the only example 
of attempts by the various agencies and departments in the U.S. federal government 
to define, unofficially, what a tax haven jurisdiction is. Some of these attempts to 
formulate definitions or blacklists sometimes reference other definitions such as the 
OECD’s. The next few sections will discuss the various definitions or blacklists found 
among the legal or government sources.  
It's obvious that the U.S. government was concerned in the 1980’s by the use of tax 
haven jurisdictions by U.S. taxpayers and were very willing to identify by name the 
jurisdictions they thought presented the biggest threats. But even then, the U.S. 
government was focused on the jurisdictions themselves instead of really being 
focused on what drew the taxpayers to those jurisdictions.  
 
3.3.2. PAST LEGISLATION ATTEMPTS 
Blacklists and tax haven definitions have also made their way into legislation that was 
introduced to Congress. None of those definitions or blacklists, however, have ever 
made it into enacted tax law. There have been multiple pieces of legislation that have 
included blacklists and definitions, but there are too many to account for here in this 
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thesis. Therefore, only a few will be used to demonstrate two things: 1) a few 
legislators have been interested in passing a blacklist and/or definitions into law to 
address tax evasion and 2) it does not seem to be the prevailing sentiment among the 
majority of politicians. This section will also examine what those lists and definitions 
looked like.  
The earliest demonstration of tax legislation that contained a definition or blacklist 
came in the 107th (2001-2003) and 108th (2003-2005) congressional sessions. In the 
107th Congress, Senator John Kerry introduced a bill called Tax Haven and Abusive 
Tax Shelter Reform Act.303 The catalyst for this piece of legislation was the downfall 
of Enron, an American energy trader and supplier. Enron’s undoing was identified as 
an example of corporations and individuals using tax havens to evade taxes.304 Enron, 
itself, had 800 subsidiaries in tax havens and 692 of them in the Cayman Islands 
alone.305 Kerry noted that this happened because it was “cloaked in a web of bank 
secrecy and taxpayer privacy.”306 The purpose of this bill was to curb tax abuses by 
disallowing tax benefits arising under transactions that did not have economic 
substance and to curb tax abuse that involved tax havens.307 The bill would have 
enacted multiple provisions to curb this tax abuse such as limiting the Foreign Tax 
Credit and deferral, requiring strict U.S. taxpayer outbound transfers reporting and 
requiring disclosure requirements on tax shelter participants as well as the reporting 
of interest in a foreign financial account.308 It would also have imposed penalties for 
those that participate in or promote abusive tax shelters in addition to an increase in a 
civil penalty from 20% to 40% when a taxpayer fails to report an interest in an offshore 
account.309 S. 2339 was drafted to discourage the use of identified tax havens but in 
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order to accomplish this goal, the term tax havens needed to be qualified.310 Under 
this bill, tax havens were defined through two criteria, low or no taxation and strict 
confidentiality rules or ineffective information exchange practices. These two criteria 
were to facilitate the formulation and maintenance of a list of foreign jurisdictions that 
would have been identified as tax havens.311 The criterion on ineffective information 
exchange practices was explained further in the bill by identifying that this occurs 
when the “Secretary determines that exchange of information between the United 
States and such jurisdiction is inadequate to prevent evasion or avoidance of the 
United States income tax by United States persons or to permit the effective 
enforcement of the taxes imposed by this title.”312 S. 2339 died in committee.  
In the 108th Congress, Senator Carl Levin, who had been the force behind most of the 
tax haven legislation from the early 2000s until his retirement, seemed to assume the 
mantle from John Kerry. He introduced S. 2210, the Tax Shelter and Tax Haven 
Reform Act, which focused on abusive tax shelters and uncooperative tax havens.313 
In order to define tax havens for the use in this legislation, the bill mirrored the 
definition found in John Kerry’s earlier bill. According to Levin, the bill gave 
authority for a list that was to be drafted and maintained by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. This list was inclusive of foreign jurisdictions that were considered to be an 
“uncooperative tax haven” as defined by two criteria, low or no tax and corporate, 
business, bank or tax secrecy or confidentiality rules.314 Two types of restrictions 
would have been applied to taxpayers doing business in the designated jurisdictions.315 
First, taxpayers would have had to provide greater disclosure on their activities within 
the designated jurisdictions on their tax returns.316 The second restriction would have 
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denied specific tax benefits such as the foreign tax credit for any income attributable 
to a jurisdiction designated as a tax haven.317 The bill itself did not define what is 
considered to be “low tax” nor did Levin’s statement on the bill. This bill also died in 
committee.  
Senator Levin’s bills were usually named Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act or something 
comparable.318 For example, in the 111th Congress (2009-2010), Senator Levin 
introduced the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. The purpose was to restrict the use of 
offshore tax havens and abusive tax shelters which allowed taxpayers to 
inappropriately avoid federal taxation through various mechanisms such as denial of 
tax benefits for foreign corporations managed and controlled in the U.S. or the 
creation of two disclosure procedures that would have required third parties to report 
transactions undertaken by U.S. persons.319 Senator Levin noted that the target of the 
bill is the “offshore tax abuses that rob the U.S. Treasury of an estimated $100 billion 
each year, reward tax dodgers using offshore secrecy laws to hide money from Uncle 
Sam….”320 In the introductory remarks, he defines what a tax haven is focusing on the 
secrecy aspect of the tax haven jurisdiction and he notes that the target is the abuses, 
not necessarily the jurisdictions themselves. What allows the abuses? It is not because 
Bermuda is specifically Bermuda but, instead, because Bermuda’s laws and 
regulations allow secrecy or allow financial organizations to operate without requiring 
the organizations to know the identities of the beneficial owners of the accounts. It is 
the secrecy that the taxpayers use to hide behind that allows the abuses to continue. In 
the actual bill presented to the Senate, the term “offshore secrecy jurisdiction” is 
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utilized denoting the importance of the secrecy despite the bill using “tax havens” in 
the title. According to Jeffery Kraft, the bill was to combat the veil of secrecy 
surrounding the tax haven jurisdictions via four rebuttable presumptions.321 These 
four rebuttable presumptions addressed the control of an entity by a U.S. person, 
transfers of income, beneficial ownership and foreign financial accounts.322  
S. 506 then provided an initial list of tax havens that included most of the familiar 
suspects, including, Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Panama and Switzerland. 
This list was to be used in legal proceedings – civil or criminal – where tax needed to 
be determined or collected.323 The initial list put forth by Senator Levin was compiled 
from Federal Court proceedings like the John Doe Summons (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 6) where offshore jurisdictions had been publicly identified as secrecy 
jurisdictions by the IRS.324 After the initial list had been compiled, the authority was 
given to the Secretary to list or delist foreign jurisdictions as offshore secrecy 
jurisdictions “if the Secretary determines that such jurisdiction has corporate, 
business, bank or tax secrecy rules and practices, which in the judgment of the 
Secretary, unreasonably restrict the ability of the United States to obtain information 
relevant to the enforcement of this title, unless the Secretary also determines that such 
country has effective information exchange practices.”325 After being introduced in 
the Senate, the bill died in the Senate’s Committee on Finance.326 H.R. 1265, the 
companion House bill, which was also called Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act was referred 
to three different committees to decide which committee had jurisdiction but 
 
321 Jeffery Kraft, Changing Tides: Tax Haven Reform and the Changing Views of 
Transnational Capital Flow Regulation and the Role of States in a Globalized World, 21 
Indiana J. Global Legal Stud. 599, 600 (Summer 2014).   
322Jeffery Kraft, Changing Tides: Tax Haven Reform and the Changing Views of 
Transnational Capital Flow Regulation and the Role of States in a Globalized World, 21 
Indiana J. Global Legal Stud. 599, 601 (Summer 2014).    
323 111th Congress, Stop the Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 (March 2, 2009). 
324 111th Congress, Stop the Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 (March 2, 2009). 
325 111th Congress, Stop the Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 (March 2, 2009). 
326 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation by United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 987 (2016-2017). 
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ultimately the House bill suffered the same fate and never made it out of any of the 
three committees.327  
In the same congressional session, the 111th, another bill was introduced under the 
name of Stop Outsourcing & Create American Jobs Acts of 2010.328 This bill’s 
purpose was to “provide for the identification of corporate tax haven countries and 
increased penalties for tax evasion practices in haven countries that ship United 
States jobs overseas.”329 H.R. 5622 was sent to two committees where no further 
action was taken. This bill directed the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and 
publish a list of countries that were determined to be corporate tax havens. This bill 
can be distinguished from the two bills immediately above because this bill does not 
deliver a tax haven list but suggests that in developing such a list that the Secretary 
should consider certain criteria.330 The criteria that the Secretary should have 
considered had the bill passed contained four of the classical criteria found in most 
tax haven definitions as noted in the sections above as well as two others: 1) tax rate 
in the country, 2) lack of effective exchange of information between governments, 3) 
lack of transparency in financial services sector, 4) lack of requirements of substantial 
economic activity, 5) incentives which may encourage a U.S. corporation to invest 
abroad rather than domestically and 6) other factors deemed necessary by the 
Secretary.331 The Secretary would have been required to update the list every three 
years.332 Despite the lack of success of these early bills, Carl Levin’s attempts created 
the environment that was conducive for the introduction of the Foreign Account Tax 
 
327 111th Cong., Stop the Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 1265 (March 3, 2009); See also, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/1265/all-
actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R.+1265%22%5D%7D&r=1;  James F. 
Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound 
International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 987 (2016-2017). 
328 111th Cong., Stop Outsourcing & Create American Jobs Act, H.R. 5622 (June 29, 2010). 
329 111th Cong., Stop Outsourcing & Create American Jobs Act, H.R. 5622 (June 29, 2010) 
330 111th Cong., Stop Outsourcing & Create American Jobs Act, H.R. 5622 (June 29, 2010) 
331 111th Cong., Stop Outsourcing & Create American Jobs Act, H.R. 5622 (June 29, 2010) 
332 111th Cong., Stop Outsourcing & Create American Jobs Act, H.R. 5622 (June 29, 2010) 
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Compliance Act (FATCA) which is one of the measures that address the ongoing 
problem of accessing U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts.333 
In the most recent Congressional session (as of the writing of this thesis), the bills of 
virtually the same names were introduced. Two in the House and one in the Senate. 
H.R. 1712334 and its Senate companion bill, S. 779, while both called Stop the Tax 
Haven Abuse Act, do not propose a blacklist of jurisdictions or a list of criteria any 
longer but, instead, attempt to strengthen various enacted bills such as the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (Chapter 9) or strengthening the IRS’ anti-tax evasion 
measures such as John Doe Summons (Chapter 6) for the purpose of ending offshore 
corporate tax avoidance.335 Both bills also address reporting on U.S. beneficial owners 
of foreign accounts (Qualified Intermediary Chapter 7 and FATCA). The third bill is 
S. 1609, referred to as the Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring Act336. This bill’s 
purpose was to amend the Securities Act of 1934 in order to require country-by-
country reporting for multinational enterprise groups who have business in foreign 
jurisdictions.337 This bill would have required the multinational enterprise group to 
disclose tax information about the group and the jurisdiction where they are 
resident.338 S. 1609, despite the name, similarly does not contain a blacklist identifying 
the tax havens or criteria for a definition, but it does require that the group detail the 
financial information regarding their revenues and income as well as other 
information for tax purposes.339 Unfortunately, there were no introductory remarks or 
any other type of information on these three bills other than the actual text of the bill. 
Once again, none of these three bills made it out of committee.  
 
333 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 987 (2016-2017). 
334 H.R. is short for House of Representatives so H.R. 1712 would be a bill that came out of 
the House.  
335 116th Congress, Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 779 (March 13, 2019); 116th Congress, Stop 
the Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 1712 (March 13, 2019). 
336 116th Congress, Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring Act, S. 1609 (May 22, 2019). 
337 116th Congress, Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring Act, S. 1609 (May 22, 2019). 
338 116th Congress, Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring Act, S. 1609 (May 22, 2019). 
339 116th Congress, Disclosure of Tax Havens and Offshoring Act, S. 1609 (May 22, 2019). 
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The various and multiple attempts at trying to define what a tax haven jurisdiction is 
through a blacklist or substantive criteria via legislation never made it out of any 
committee.340 While some pieces of introduced legislation had remarks explaining the 
purpose of the legislation and how it would have worked, there are no remarks or 
information regarding why these types of bills never made it out of committee. There 
could be multiple reasons for the failure, including lack of political will to identify tax 
havens specifically by name,  or it could simply be that none of them passed out of 
committee because some of them do not address the actual issue – the inability to 
obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts due to secrecy rules which 
prohibit the IRS from applying the tax laws correctly and fairly. 
 
3.3.3. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE  
The IRS, the taxing authority, has no official list of criteria, however, on their website 
the agency defines a tax haven by only one characteristic: low or no tax.341   The 
second core criterion, bank secrecy, is saved for the definition of “offshore financial 
centers”.342 The IRS distinguishes between an offshore financial jurisdiction and a tax 
haven, however, on another page on the website the information given contradicts the 
definitions given to these two terms. Instead, the IRS seems to say that the term 
offshore and tax haven are interchangeable. “Such offshore transactions generally 
involve foreign jurisdictions that offer financial secrecy laws…….These jurisdictions 
are commonly referred to as "tax havens" because, in addition to the financial secrecy 
they provide, they require little or no taxation of income from sources outside their 
jurisdiction.”343  This contradiction is indicative of the difficulty of defining what a 
 
340 International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border 
Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, (2013). 
341 IRS, Glossary of Offshore Terms, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/abusive-offshore-tax-avoidance-schemes-glossary-of-offshore-terms  
342 IRS, Glossary of Offshore Terms, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/abusive-offshore-tax-avoidance-schemes-glossary-of-offshore-terms 
343 IRS, Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance Schemes – Facts (Section I), 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/abusive-offshore-tax-
avoidance-schemes-facts-section-i  
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tax haven is presents and, is possibly, one reason the U.S. has chosen to use anti-tax 
evasion measures to address secrecy rather than utilizing a blacklist or a definition 
approach. 
As referenced earlier, the IRS, in the 1980s published at least two handbooks that were 
created so that IRS agents could use it as a resource when encountering a tax haven 
problem.344 The Tax Haven Information Book345 has a list of 28 jurisdictions identified 
as tax havens with detailed information on specific jurisdictions alleged to be tax 
havens – it was meant only as a guide. The book had at least two editions, one in 1982 
and one in 1984. However, as far as the research can confirm, those handbooks are no 
longer in use.  
The Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) at one time also had a list of tax havens 
according to Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh.346 The list is estimated to be from the 1980s 
which is the same timeline as the earlier discussed Tax Haven Information Books.347  
The IRM did not have a specific definition of a tax haven but it did present criteria 
that described a tax haven.348 However, a copy of this could not be found to examine 
the characteristics presented. 
 
 
344 IRS, Tax Haven Information Book, Doc. 6743(2-82) (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1982) 
found at https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/101663072; See also, IRS, Tax Haven 
Information Book, Doc. 6743 (4-84) (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1984).  
345 These books as mentioned earlier in this chapter are not mandatory law. They are only 
persuasive in nature and do not hold any legal authority.  
346 Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of 
International Standards Shows Why Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 
419 (Autumn 2013). 
347 Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of 
International Standards Shows Why Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 
419 (Autumn 2013). 
348 Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, What Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of 
International Standards Shows Why Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 
419-420 (Autumn 2013). 
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3.3.4. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE  
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (hereinafter referred to as “GAO”) 
provides non-partisan reports and testimonies to Congress in order to “improve 
government and save taxpayers billions of dollars.”349 The GAO has issued multiple 
reports or provided testimonies reaching back as early as 1979 that analyzes tax 
havens and the corresponding issues that takes into consideration the problems with 
tax evasion. Some of these reports contain lists of tax haven jurisdictions (or 
definitions) but reports that do refer to the OECD’s list of tax haven jurisdictions.350 
The GAO published a report in 1979 titled Problem of Tax Evasion and Tax 
Avoidance in Tax Haven Countries but despite the use of the term tax haven in the 
title there was no list or a reference to a list that would identify what this report would 
consider a tax haven. The report concerned tax treaties and the confidentiality clause 
contained within the tax treaties that restricted those who had access to the exchanged 
tax information.351 Tax havens were not specifically addressed via a blacklist or 
definition.352 
 
349 GAO, What GAO Does, https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/  
350 GAO, International Taxation: Tax Haven Companies Were More Likely to Have a Tax Cost 
Advantage in Federal Contracting, GAO-04-856 (June 2004); See also, GAO, Offshore Tax 
Evasion: IRS Has Collected Billions of Dollars but May Be Missing Continued Evasion, GAO-
13-318 (March 2013); GAO, Tax Compliance: Challenges in Ensuring Offshore Tax 
Compliance, GAO-07-823T (March 2007); GAO, Problem of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance 
in Tax Haven Countries, B-137762.42 (May 29, 1979); GAO, Federal Efforts to Define and 
Combat the Tax Haven Problem: Statement of William J. Anderson, Director, Before the 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs, Committee on Government 
Operations, House of Representatives (April 12, 1983).  
351 GAO, Problem of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance in Tax Haven Countries, B-137762.42 
(May 29, 1979). 
352 GAO, Problem of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance in Tax Haven Countries, B-137762.42 
(May 29, 1979). 
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In 1983, the GAO released the statement that the director of the GAO delivered to 
Congress regarding the federal efforts to define tax havens.353 The testimony he gave 
was based on work the IRS did in order to “detect and deter tax law abuses relating 
to tax havens.”354 The report contained a definition which had six elements — of 
which low or no tax rate and secrecy were the first two — that were reflective of the 
elements found in the Gordon Report.355  
A 2004 report, Tax Haven Companies Were More Likely to Have a Tax Cost 
Advantage in Federal Contracting, referenced the OECD’s tax haven list as did a 2007 
report but contained no reference to any other lists.356  
In a July 2008, a GAO report titled Cayman Islands: Business and Tax Advantages 
Attract U.S. Persons and Enforcement Challenges Exist studied the nature of U.S. 
persons’ and corporate business activities in the Cayman Islands.357 This report 
identified the Cayman Islands as an offshore financial center (OFC) instead of as a 
tax haven.  Following this identification as an OFC, the report noted that the 
jurisdiction has no direct taxes and a high volume of non-residential financial activity. 
The authors also attempt to define OFCs while acknowledging that those types of 
jurisdictions are not easily defined. This is the identical argument used when trying to 
 
353 GAO, Federal Efforts to Define and Combat the Tax Haven Problem: Statement of William 
J. Anderson, Director, Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary 
Affairs, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives (April 12, 1983). 
354 GAO, Federal Efforts to Define and Combat the Tax Haven Problem: Statement of 
William J. Anderson, Director, Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and 
Monetary Affairs, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives (April 
12, 1983). 
355 GAO, Federal Efforts to Define and Combat the Tax Haven Problem: Statement of 
William J. Anderson, Director, Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and 
Monetary Affairs, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives (April 
12, 1983). 
356 GAO, International Taxation: Tax Haven Companies Were More Likely to Have a Tax 
Cost Advantage in Federal Contracting, GAO-04-856 (June 2004); See also, GAO, Tax 
Compliance: Challenges in Ensuring Offshore Tax Compliance, GAO-07-823T (March 
2007). 
357 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cayman Islands: Business and Tax Advantages 
Attract U.S. Persons and Enforcement Challenges Exist, GAO-08-778 (July 2008).  
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define tax havens. Despite the difficulty defining the concept of an OFC, they define 
an OFC in very broad terms as a jurisdiction that has “a high level of non-resident 
financial activity, and may have characteristics including low or no taxes, light and 
flexible regulation, and a high level of client confidentiality.”358 The last part of that 
definition includes the classical criteria of tax haven definitions.   
Five months later another report by the GAO, which was given to members in 
Congress, reinforces the idea that the United States does not have an official definition 
of what a tax haven is nor can a consistent definition be drafted.359 They acknowledged 
that there is no “agreed-upon” definition or list and that they chose not to develop 
their own list or definition. Instead, the GAO chose to combine three different lists of 
tax havens for the purpose of identifying tax havens for the report.360  The purpose of 
the report was not to develop a list or a definition but because there is no official 
definition within the U.S. government, the GAO had to be creative and look 
elsewhere. The three lists selected were contained in the OECD list, a working paper 
by Dharmapala and Hines and a District Court order granting permission for the IRS 
to serve John Doe summons (Chapter 6) which identified a list of tax haven 
jurisdictions.361  It would have been impossible for the GAO to complete the report 
without a list of jurisdictions, however, the report cites concerns from the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.  The Assistant Secretary, while noting that tax 
evasion is taken very seriously by the Treasury Department, conveyed concern that 
 
358 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cayman Islands: Business and Tax Advantages 
Attract U.S. Persons and Enforcement Challenges Exist, GAO-08-778 (July 2008). 
359 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Large U.S. Corporations and Federal 
Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed As Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157 (December 2008); also discussed in Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, 
What Makes a Country a tax Haven? An Assessment of International Standards Shows Why 
Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 403 (Autumn 2013).  
360 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Large U.S. Corporations and Federal 
Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed As Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157 (December 2008); also discussed in Gary Tobin and Keith Walsh, 
What Makes a Country a tax Haven? An Assessment of International Standards Shows Why 
Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44 Econ. & Soc. Rev. 401, 403 (Autumn 2013). 
361 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Large U.S. Corporations and Federal 
Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed As Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157 (December 2008). 
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the GAO had used a blacklist when there is no agreed-upon definition of tax havens 
or lists of jurisdictions.362  
A 2013 GAO report referred to multiple sources for a list of jurisdictions when 
discussing tax havens. It referenced in the footnotes the report mentioned just above 
which lists the OECD list, the National Bureau of Economic Research list and a John 
Doe Summons.363 But again, this is not the U.S.’ list and there is no attempt at defining 
what a tax haven to justify using those lists.  
Despite all the various unofficial definitions and blacklists found in the legal 
sources364, the United States government’s various agencies and departments have not 
been able to find a strong solution in the use of blacklists or a precise definition 
through other legal resources in order to address the issue of tax havens.  
 
3.4. REAL ISSUE: SECRECY 
The real problem that tax havens present when dealing with the IRS’ inability to 
procure taxpayers’ information on their foreign accounts is not that a definition cannot 
be drafted or that blacklists are almost as equally difficult to draft – this is just a 
distraction diverting from the real issue. The genuine obstacle is that many 
jurisdictions – not all are identified as tax havens on the various lists365 - have laws 
and regulations that allow for the accounts to be concealed behind the veil of secrecy 
laws. This veil of secrecy, the symptom that needs to be treated, makes it almost 
impossible for the IRS to procure taxpayers’ accounts abroad so that tax laws can be 
 
362 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Large U.S. Corporations and Federal 
Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed As Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157 (December 2008). 
363 GAO, Offshore Tax Evasion: IRS Has Collected Billions of Dollars but May Be Missing 
Continued Evasion, GAO-13-318 (March 2013). 
364 International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border 
Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, 791 (2013). 
365 For reference, see the EU list published in December of 2017 and the past OECD list 
which can also be found in Appendix B in a comparative spreadsheet.  
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administered correctly and fairly. As Nicholas Shaxson states, secrecy is the main 
mechanism366 that allows for people to hide their financial assets. Senator Levin, too, 
noted that the target is offshore tax abuses that are facilitated by secrecy laws in 
foreign jurisdictions – not the actual jurisdiction alleged to be a tax haven - that allow 
taxpayers to avoid paying tax.367 The difficulty of and inability to come to a consistent 
definition of what a tax haven is or to draft a blacklist as well as knowing that secrecy 
is the real problem is evidence that another approach is necessary.   
Consequently, if governments cannot procure the information they need to administer 
tax laws correctly and fairly because of secrecy laws that exist in certain countries, 
what is the outcome? How does a government penetrate the secrecy, or can a 
government penetrate it? The following chapters demonstrate that the United States 
has attempted to do just that, and they detail what methods the U.S. government has 
employed to pierce the veil of secrecy to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts.  
Despite the above, the section dealing with attempted legislation shows that at least 
some members of the U.S. Congress would like to employ a tax haven blacklist or a 
set of criteria that defines what qualifies as a tax haven jurisdiction. The problem with 
that is that definitions and blacklists do not solve the inability to procure information 
on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. If the United States would like to use a list of 
jurisdictions, a more constructive way, perhaps, would be to draft a list of jurisdictions 
that have impenetrable secrecy laws where obtaining information in the past has been 
difficult. The list should not be used to punish foreign jurisdictions but should look to 
the taxpayer and where their accounts are located. The focus should not be about 
shaming or bankrupting a jurisdiction into cooperating but, instead, it should focus on 
changing the behavior of the taxpayer who utilizes the secrecy of the jurisdiction to 
evade their tax responsibilities. Although tax haven blacklists and definitions are 
typically employed to change the behavior of the alleged tax haven jurisdiction, the 
 
366 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World, 8-9 
(Penguin Random House, 2016).  
367 111th Cong. Rec., Vol. S.2624 (March 2, 2009). 
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U.S should use their list (should they employ one) to change the behavior of the 
taxpayer – to encourage compliance - because the U.S. government does not have 
control over foreign jurisdictions but it does have control and influence over their own 
taxpayers which should be used to their advantage in getting taxpayers to comply.  
Nor should the list be an arbitrary list, as Jason Sharman and Gregory Rawlings argue, 
but rather, a list should be backed up by solid criteria and formal procedures that are 
updated and changed as needed. For example, the list could be drafted and 
updated/reviewed and in between the updates the jurisdictions in question could have 
a right to appeal the designation as a tax haven. It does no good to have a blacklist 
that was created on a whim that has no solid evidence backing up why those countries 
were placed on the blacklist. This list – should the U.S. want to utilize a well-reasoned 
one – should be based on what countries they find present the biggest threat to 
procuring taxpayer information through the use of the current anti-tax evasion 
measures that are discussed in the rest of the thesis. Then U.S. taxpayers should be 
informed that any accounts that are held in those countries will be inspected more 
closely and non-disclosure will include greater penalties and prosecution beyond what 
exists in the anti-tax evasion measures currently. 
Two places the U.S. might consider using a well-reasoned tax haven definition or 
blacklist would be within the Qualified Intermediary program (See Chapter 7) and the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA – Chapter 9). The IRS – in creating 
the QI program – noted that the jurisdictions that refused to cooperate with the 
program and were considered tax haven jurisdictions (or bank secrecy jurisdictions) 
needed more stringent oversight over the FFIs or their branches located in those 
jurisdictions.368 For this scenario, a tax haven definition or a blacklist could help in 
identifying those jurisdictions where the FFIs need more oversight and also provide 
some incentive for the FFIs to fully cooperate with the program if they know they will 
 
368 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243; Marc 
D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent 
International Tax Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); Stephen Troiano, The 
U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and  the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 New Eng. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 317, 333 (2011). 
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be under more scrutiny because of the secrecy their jurisdiction provides to those 
looking for it.  
The anti-tax evasion measures discussed in the rest of the thesis are designed not to 
target tax havens but, instead, are devised to lift the veil of secrecy that many 
jurisdictions have so that the U.S. government can procure taxpayer information on 
foreign accounts to administer the tax laws correctly and fairly. The Gordon Report, 
as acknowledged earlier, called for a coordinated federal attack on the use of tax 
havens and that should continue to be the game plan, however, instead of tax havens, 
the coordinated attack should be on the secrecy. The following chapters will explore 
the U.S. measures that address the inability to procure taxpayer information due to the 
taxpayers’ use of secrecy laws so that IRS can administer the tax laws fairly and 
correctly, how those measures are implemented and whether the anti-tax evasion 
measures do in fact help the IRS procure the information needed from U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts so that the tax law can be administered fairly and correctly.  
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CHAPTER 4. REPORT OF FOREIGN 
BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS  
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ domestic federal tax system is a system that has two components. 
The first component is the U.S. taxpayers’ voluntary compliance and self-assessment 
of federal taxes owed to the IRS.369 The second is a federal withholding procedure 
that enforces the taxpayer’s self-assessment and compliance.370 Employers are 
required to withhold a certain portion of the taxpayer’s wages which are then sent to 
the IRS and are applied towards the taxpayer’s federal tax liability.371 This system, 
which has its shortcomings that can be seen in acts such as non-filing, underreporting 
and underpayment372, has shown that “withholding has proven to be the single most 
effective enforcement mechanism for collecting taxes on income from labor”.373 
While this withholding system has worked fairly well at the domestic level, there is 
no international withholding system374 that is similar.375 Therefore, in order to enforce 
 
369 Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign 
Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 155, 158 (2013);  
See also, McKay, Samantha, "The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Constitutional 
Analysis" 2 (2018). Law School Student Scholarship. 944.  
370 McKay, Samantha, "The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Constitutional Analysis" 
2 (2018). Law School Student Scholarship. 944.  
371 McKay, Samantha, "The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Constitutional Analysis" 
2 (2018). Law School Student Scholarship. 944.  
372 Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign 
Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 155, 158 (2013) 
373 Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign 
Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 155, 158 (2013) 
(quoting Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 
Fla. Tax Rev. 315, 323 (2011)).  
374 FATCA, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, discussed in Chapter 9 may change 
this. At the very least it would be a quasi-international withholding system. Following in its 
footsteps is the OECD’s CRS, Common Reporting System.  
375 Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign 
Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 155, 158 (2013) 
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compliance on foreign accounts and incomes offshore, the IRS and the Department of 
the Treasury have used their anti-tax evasion framework which is comprised of law, 
regulations and administrative programs aimed at reducing tax evasion and increasing 
tax compliance. Under U.S. tax law, it is legal for U.S. persons to hold money and 
assets offshore in financial accounts, but U.S persons are required to report any control 
over accounts that are valued (at any point during the year) in excess of $10,000 
USD.376 While it is legal to have offshore accounts, it is not legal to willfully evade 
taxes. 26 U.S.C. §7201 defines the attempt to evade or defeat tax as “any person who 
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the 
payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a 
felony…..”377 26 U.S.C. §7201 does not address the unintentional or inadvertent 
evasion of taxes; it only addresses the intentional evasion by taxpayers.  However, the 
FBAR, as shown in subsection 4.3.6, penalizes non-willful, unintentional non-
reporting.  
The problem of tax evasion occurs and is facilitated when a few factors come into 
play according to the Government Accountability Office. First, limited transparency 
(secrecy) of accounts and assets plays a part. The limited transparency makes it 
difficult to procure information needed in order to assess if taxes were properly paid 
and, therefore, makes tax evasion difficult to detect.378 This is the main issue when 
trying to administer the laws and regulations to taxpayers when they have foreign 
accounts but do not voluntarily comply.  
Second, U.S. taxpayers have an obligation to self-report any income or accounts from 
foreign jurisdictions, however, third parties in foreign jurisdictions do not have the 
 
376 31 C.F.R. §1010.306; See also, GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity 
Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009); Kyle Niewoehner, 
Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank Accounts 
Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 
Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
377 26 U.S.C. §7201.  
378 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009). 
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same obligation to report taxpayers income and accounts to the IRS.379 Interestingly, 
but unsurprisingly, the IRS found that when third parties are not required to report 
income, taxpayers include less than one-half of their income on tax returns.380 When 
a taxpayer does end up self-reporting, this information is not easily verifiable due to 
multiple reasons including the lack of transparency and the lack of obligation of third-
party reporting.381  
The third factor comes into play when financial advisors who facilitate tax evasion 
offer various types of schemes and abusive transactions.382 These various schemes are 
easy, quick and cheap to set up and typically result in super complex structures that 
allow income and assets to evade detection by the IRS.383  
All these issues establish, as the GAO found, both enforcement and oversight issues. 
So, how does a government solve these types of issues? Who do they target to help 
enforce compliance? The taxpayers? Third parties? Financial institutions? They all 
have a part to play in the enforcement as will be shown in the following chapters. To 
address the various moving parts, the federal government has an anti-tax evasion 
framework in place – as discussed in this chapter and the following chapters – to try 
to target tax evasion and bring taxpayers into compliance. 
This chapter, however, specifically focuses on the taxpayer and utilizing the FBAR to 
enforce compliance. The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (hereinafter 
referred to as FBAR) is one of the earliest pieces of the framework that the United 
States has enacted in order to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts. A 2011 estimate suggested that five to seven million U.S. resident taxpayers 
 
379 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009). 
380 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009). 
381 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009). 
382 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009). 
383 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 4 (March 2009). 
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(which includes U.S. citizens overseas) and tens of millions of non-resident taxpayers 
were subject to the FBAR requirements yet only 741,000 taxpayers actually filed an 
FBAR.384 
This chapter will first discuss the legislative history of the FBAR, an anti-tax evasion 
measure, to introduce the measure and discusses briefly the purpose of the act. The 
chapter then moves onto how the FBAR measure is implemented with the goal of 
procuring information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts in mind. This section also 
includes an explanation of the FBAR penalty scheme which is the enforcement 
mechanism that is in place to compel U.S. taxpayers to comply. The concluding 
section contemplates two questions. First, does the FBAR successfully procure U.S. 
taxpayer information on foreign accounts so that the IRS has the information it needs 
to correctly and fairly administer the tax law? The second question – only answered 
if the answer to the first question is no – is if the FBAR does not help in obtaining the 
information needed what can be done to improve the FBAR so that the chance to 
obtain information increases? 
 
4.2. FBAR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
One of the measures that the IRS uses to compel a taxpayer to self-report385 (as well 
as being as predecessor to FATCA) is the FBAR which is required under the Bank 
Records and Foreign Transactions Act, also known as the Bank Secrecy Act 
 
384 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 380 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
385 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 5 (March 2009). 
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(hereinafter referred to as “BSA”), which was enacted in 1970386 and amended the 
Federal Deposit and Insurance Act.387  This chapter is concerned with Title II, the 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, of the BSA under which the FBAR 
falls.  In 1982, this part of the Act was re-enacted with little change and is now called 
Records and Reports on Monetary Instruments Transactions which is found at 31 
U.S.C. § 5311 through 5322.388  The subsequent Treasury Regulations regulating and 
providing guidelines for the FBAR are found at 31 C.F.R. §1010.   
The purpose of the BSA was twofold but this thesis is only concerned with the second 
purpose which is found in Title II of the original bill.389 Title II addressed the use of 
foreign financial institutions located in jurisdictions that have secrecy laws by 
American citizens and residents in order to conceal assets.390  The BSA focused on 
two issues that interfered with the ability to investigate and prosecute financial crimes 
 
386 United States Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Foreign Bank Secrecy and 
Bank Recordkeeping, S. Rep. 91-1139 (August 24, 1970); See also, FinCEN, FinCEN’s 
Mandate from Congress, found at https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-
regulations/fincens-mandate-congress; Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal Imperalism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  
Comp. Law 333 (Spring 2015); Stephan Michael Brown, One Size Fits Small: A Look at the 
History of the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and 
Suggestions for Increased Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243, 
245 (2014); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 353, 362 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad 
FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2009-25, 3 (July 4, 2009); Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR 
PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 17 (January-February 2015). 
387 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970). 
388 Department of Justice, Overview of the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, found 
at https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2029-overview-bank-records-and-
foreign-transactions-act  
389 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970); See also, DSC Risk Management Manual of 
Examination Policies, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, 8.1-1 (2005) found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf  
390 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970); See also, DSC Risk Management Manual of 
Examination Policies, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, 8.1-1 (2005) found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf 
CHAPTER 4. REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
131 
 
such as tax evasion.391 The particular issue that this thesis is concerned with is the 
second issue: taxpayers’ use of foreign bank accounts in jurisdictions that have 
enacted strict secrecy laws392 which constrains the IRS’ ability to access the 
information needed to apply the tax laws correctly. 
Even in the 1970s, both law enforcement and the IRS were struggling to access 
information about foreign accounts that are held by U.S. taxpayers abroad and the 
process to gain the information that they were searching for was a long, drawn-out 
operation.393 Representative Wright Patman, who was behind the legislation, pointed 
out that the simplest device or structure was easiest when using a secret bank account 
because the “law enforcement people can’t find you anyway”.394   
The intent of the BSA, according to Rep. Patman, was neither to interfere with the 
rights, laws or sovereignty of the foreign nations nor to interfere with the flow of 
international commerce.395 This stance seems in stark opposition to the intent of the 
more current legislation targeting overseas accounts held by U.S. taxpayers, FATCA, 
which is discussed in chapter 9. This bill was only meant to target American citizens 
and residents and those doing business in the United States who utilized secret foreign 
accounts to commit criminal actions including, but not limited to, tax evasion and anti-
money laundering (also known as AML).396  One objective was to put a taxpayer who 
 
391 United States Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Foreign Bank Secrecy and 
Bank Recordkeeping, S. Rep. 91-1139 (August 24, 1970); See also, FDIC, The Bank Secrecy 
Act: A Supervisory Update, found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum17/si-summer-
2017-article02.pdf  
392 United States Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Foreign Bank Secrecy and 
Bank Recordkeeping, S. Rep. 91-1139 (August 24, 1970); See also,  FDIC, The Bank Secrecy 
Act: A Supervisory Update, found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum17/si-summer-
2017-article02.pdf  
393 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970); See also, Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: 
Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009).  
394 91 Cong. Rec. 16952 (May 25, 1970). 
395 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970).  
396 91 Cong. Rec. 16950-16952 (May 25, 1970).  
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utilized the secret foreign accounts on the same footing as he would be with his 
domestic U.S. account.397   
Originally, the intent was to draft a simple piece of legislation that would have made 
secret accounts illegal unless the taxpayer completely disclosed,398 however, 
lawmakers decided this was not the approach to take due to the possible effects on the 
other areas of the law.399 The bill was designed to target American taxpayers and their 
foreign accounts; it had no intention of targeting institutions and persons abroad.400  
The purpose of the specific requirement to file an FBAR was to require financial 
institutions to obtain certain information in order for the government to be able to 
utilize them in support of criminal and tax evasion investigations.401 The requirement 
of the bill obliged any U.S. citizen, resident or anyone doing business in the U.S. who 
engages in any transaction with a foreign financial institution to maintain records or 
to file reports detailing specific, required information.402  
Representative Wright Patman pointed out in his statement in front of House that the 
purpose was not to defame a specific nation, to interfere with other nations’ domestic 
 
397 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970). 
398 91 Cong. Rec. 16951 (May 25, 1970). 
399 91 Cong. Rec. 16951 (May 25, 1970). 
400 91 Cong. Rec. 16951 (May 25, 1970). 
401 United States Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Foreign Bank Secrecy and 
Bank Recordkeeping, S. Rep. 91-1139 (August 24, 1970); See also,  FDIC, The Bank Secrecy 
Act: A Supervisory Update, found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum17/si-summer-
2017-article02.pdf; See also, Stephan Michael Brown, One Size Fits Small: A Look at the 
History of the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and 
Suggestions for Increased Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243, 
245 (2014); Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Havens, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 363, 367 
(2014); See also, Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act: American Legal Imperalism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333, 337 
(Spring 2015); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 353, 362 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); See also, DSC Risk Management 
Manual of Examination Policies, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, 8.1-1 (2005) found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf;  Lawrence Lokken, The Big, 
Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 3 (July 4, 2009).  
402 91 Cong. Rec. 16950 (May 25, 1970).  
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policy or to interrupt the flow of international commerce but simply to prevent 
Americans from using the secret foreign accounts to break or avoid U.S. law.403 While 
the purpose was not defame any one nation, Swiss bank secrecy was a point of 
discussion on the House floor as one of the countries that was known for its secrecy 
laws noting that the Swiss have had a long history of secrecy laws.404 Patman also 
pointed out numerous cases illustrating the use of secret bank accounts that were used 
to violate U.S. law in order to highlight the need for the FBAR legislation.405  This is 
reflective of the circumstances surrounding the UBS (and others) bank scandal of 
2008 so it seems much had not changed between 1970 and 2008 despite the FBAR 
requirement and the other programs used to address this very issue which are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
Researching legislative history behind the FBAR reveals that there were not many 
changes until enactment of the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act.406 The 1980s 
produced relatively minor changes other than to re-enact the legislation and change 
the name of the Act. In 2001, after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Congress 
focused its attention on terrorism and the money laundering that funded the terrorism 
by expanding the purpose of the FBAR. The purpose was to include “the conduct of 
intelligence or counter-intelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against 
international terrorism”407 by passing the Patriot Act.408 While the focus of the Patriot 
Act was on money laundering and terrorism, it did change the FBAR by requiring 
improved FBAR enforcement since the illegal offshore banking services provided a 
haven to money launderers and terrorists and protected their assets.409  The change 
 
403 91 Cong. Rec. 16951-16952 (May 25, 1970). 
404 91 Cong. Rec. 16952 (May 25, 1970). 
40591 Cong. Rec. 16952 (May 25, 1970). 
406 http://sherayzenlaw.com/fbar-legislative-history-fbar-tax-attorney-minneapolis/  
407 Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax 
J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
408 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
http://sherayzenlaw.com/fbar-legislative-history-fbar-tax-attorney-minneapolis/; See also,  
Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 
18 (January-February 2015). 
409 http://sherayzenlaw.com/fbar-legislative-history-fbar-tax-attorney-minneapolis/  
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also required the Department of Treasury to recommend improvements to both the 
policies and procedures of the FBAR.410 
In between the 2001 Patriot Act change and the subsequent legislation in 2004, the 
Treasury issued three consecutive reports in response to Congress’ request.411 The 
first report that was given in April of 2002 showed, some 32 years after the passage 
of the BSA, that compliance with the FBAR was extremely low.412  The IRS estimated 
that roughly one million U.S. taxpayers had either control of or signatory authority 
over a foreign bank account and the percentage of those that were in compliance with 
the FBAR was below 20%.413 The reason stated was that enforcement efforts were 
insufficient due to multiple reasons not least of which was accessing information on 
accounts held abroad.414 The report identified goals that would improve the FBAR 
compliance and it delegated the enforcement of the FBAR to the IRS.415 The first 
report also discovered two groups to address: taxpayers who did not know about the 
requirement to file FBARs and those who did not file FBARs in order to hide 
 
410 http://sherayzenlaw.com/fbar-legislative-history-fbar-tax-attorney-minneapolis/  
411 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 12 (2006). 
412 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 12 (2006); See also, Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, 
FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
413 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 12 (2006) (quoting the 2002 Treasury Report, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, A Report to Congress In Accordance With §361(b) of the Uniting and 
Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) 12 (April 26, 2002). 
414 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 12 (2006) (quoting the 2002 Treasury Report, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, A Report to Congress In Accordance With §361(b) of the Uniting and 
Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) 12 (April 26, 2002); See also, Martin R. Press and 
Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-
February 2015); Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend 
the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be 
Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014). 
415 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 14 (2006); See also, Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning 
Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure 
Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 
251, 252 (Fall 2014). 
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income.416 The second report came a year later in April 2003 and described the 
progress in addressing the issues found in the first report.417 It indicated that 
improvement had been made with the IRS investigating FBAR violations and the DOJ 
and FinCEN enforcing it.418 The IRS was then granted the enforcement authority over 
the FBAR because “it has more resources than FinCEN that can be devoted to 
enforcement, the FBAR is more directed toward tax evasion….and most FBARs are 
filed by individuals, not financial institutions.”419 The third and final report (2005) 
described the mechanisms that the IRS had put into motion to administer and improve 
compliance with the FBAR including an educational campaign to help publicize the 
FBAR and the requirements taxpayers need to meet in order to be in compliance.420  
The report also reflected that the compliance rates had increased between 2000 and 
2003 by 17% but acknowledged that some of the increase had to do with voluntary 
programs such as the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative (discussed in the next 
chapter ) because taxpayers, under these programs, were required under these 
programs to file outstanding FBARs.421 
Originally, the penalty was a maximum of $1,000.00 dollars for failure to report a 
foreign account but this amount was changed in 1982 to reflect a maximum of 
$100,000 or 50% of the value in the account at the time of the violation whichever 
was less.422 The next major change to the FBAR occurred in the passing of the 
 
416 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 14 (2006). 
417 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 15 (2006). 
418 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 15 (2006). 
419 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 16 (2006); See also, Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning 
Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure 
Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 
251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
420 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 16-17 (2006). 
421 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 17 (2006). 
422 Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax 
J. 17 (January-February 2015). 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
136
 
American Jobs Creations Act in 2004423 and this was done in response to Congress’ 
indignation at the low compliance rates. The Jobs Act made several changes to the 
FBAR process.424  One change significantly increased civil penalties up to $10,000 
per non-willful violation425 and increased the civil penalty for willful violations to 
$100,000 or 50 percent of the amount of the transaction whichever is greater which 
could make the taxpayer accountable for three times the amount of account.426 The 
Treasury was given considerable discretion to determine the penalties and in turn 
delegated that authority to the IRS.427 Significantly, the Jobs Act also shifted the 
burden of proof from the IRS to the taxpayer to prove via the reasonable cause 
exception that they did not violate the law.428 The reason for these dramatic penalty 
increases was to dangle harsh penalties in front of the taxpayer to force the disclosure 
of their foreign financial accounts so that the IRS can apply the tax laws fairly and 
correctly.429 
The statute that directed the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt the FBAR was 31 
U.S.C. §5314 and was followed by the regulation 31 C.F.R. §1010.350 which 
describes and defines in more detail what is required. The other resource to examine 
 
423 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 18 (2006). 
424 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 18 (2006). 
425 31 U.S.C. §5321(a)(5)(i); See also, Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We 
Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 18 (2006); Martin R. 
Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 17 
(January-February 2015). 
426 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C); See also, Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We 
Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 18 (2006); Martin R. 
Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 
(January-February 2015). 
427 Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax 
J. 17 (January-February 2015). 
428 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 19 (2006); 31 U.S.C. §5321 (a)(5)(B()(ii).  
429 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 98 (2006). 
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when trying to understand the FBAR is the actual document and the instructions that 
accompany it.430 
 
4.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FBAR 
The next section will focus on how the FBAR measure is implemented in order to 
procure the information the IRS needs on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts so that 
they can administer the tax laws correctly and fairly? How does a U.S. taxpayer know 
if they are required to file an FBAR? 
A taxpayer has to meet four out of five elements in order for the requirement of filing 
an FBAR, FinCEN Report 114431, to kick in.432 The five elements are: a U.S. taxpayer, 
a financial interest or signatory authority, a foreign financial account and an aggregate 
amount of $10,000 USD or more.433 Among academic articles there is a discrepancy 
as to the number of criteria to be met by those who need to file an FBAR. The Internal 
Revenue Manual (IRM) itself lists four criteria but uses the word “or” to described 
one criterion where it should be two.434 The author of this thesis believes the five 
criteria listed below covers what is required by the FBAR because the other academics 
use descriptive words that describe the actual element instead of addressing just the 
 
430 Department of Treasury, FBAR, found at 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html; See specifically, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
431 Department of Treasury, FBAR FAQ, found at 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/docs/FBAR_EFILING_FAQ.pdf (formerly known as TD F. 
90-22.1) 
432 31 C.F.R. §1010.350; See also, Jeffery D. Moss, Foreign Bank Account Reports: Will 
There Be More Scrutiny of FBARS and Other Disclosure Returns?, 31 Foreign Bank Account 
Reports 29 (Spring 2018);  
433 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 5 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
http://sherayzenlaw.com/fbar-legislative-history-fbar-tax-attorney-minneapolis/ 
434 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3 (11-06-2015).  
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elements needed.435  The justification for the five criteria is that neither the descriptors, 
U.S. and foreign – describing the persons (element 1) and the types of financial 
accounts (element 3) that fall under the FBAR – are separate elements because they 
are just that – descriptors. The wording “or” used for the financial interest criterion 
suggests that it should be divided into two criteria – financial interest in OR signatory 
authority over one or more financial accounts – and not one. The final criterion, the 
aggregate amount, has been divided into different criteria but should not be separated 
as the $10,000 amount and phrasing “calendar year” simply describe the total dollar 
amount that the aggregate amount should be as well as the timing for when the 
aggregate amount occurs. The analysis of the FBAR in this thesis is based on the five 
elements because the other suggested criteria (from other scholars) are based on 
descriptors that simply describe the stated criteria.  
 
4.3.1. U.S. PERSON 
According to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350, a U.S. person who has a financial interest in, or 
signature or other authority over a foreign financial account that has an aggregate 
value of $10,000 at any time during the calendar year meets the first criterion.436 A. 
U.S. person is defined as a citizen or resident of the United States or an entity created, 
organized or formed under the laws of the United States.437  A U.S. citizen is a person 
 
435 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 5 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
http://sherayzenlaw.com/fbar-legislative-history-fbar-tax-attorney-minneapolis/; D.S. Kerzner 
and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 366-371 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
436 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306 (c); 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (a); See also, Charles P. Rettig, Why the 
Ongoing Problem with FBAR Compliance, J. Tax & Proc. 37, 39 (August/September 2016); 
Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign 
Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, 
Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
437 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (b)(1)-(3).; See also; Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.1 (11-06-
2015); Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. 
IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009);  
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
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that has either a U.S. birth certificate or naturalization papers.438 Residency does not 
define U.S. citizenship.439 A U.S. entity is a legal entity formed under the laws of the 
U.S. or its possessions and territories.440 An U.S. entity is defined (but not limited to) 
a corporation, partnership, trust or limited liability company.441 A person is defined in 
the FBAR instructions as an individual, including a minor, and legal entities including 
but not limited to, a LLC, corporation, partnership, trust, or estate.442 The definition 
of entities in the regulations leave open the ability to include new types of legal entities 
in the future.443  
Originally, the FBAR only applied to U.S. citizens and residents who permanently 
lived in the U.S. but the new regulations were expanded to include the new class 
identified under the United States Code – tax residents.444 The tax resident definition 
has extended the identification as a U.S person for - tax purposes - to include a resident 
of the U.S. who is either a green-card holder or one who meets the substantial presence 
test.445 The substantial presence test states that an individual is a U.S. resident for tax 
purposes if the individual is physically present in the U.S. for 31 days during the 
 
438 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.1.1 (11-06-2015).  
439 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.1.1 (11-06-2015). 
440 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.1.3 (11-06-2015). 
441 31 C.F.R. §1010.350(b)(3); See also, Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.1.3 (11-06-
2015). 
442FINCEN, Filing Instructions, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
443 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.1.3 (11-06-2015). 
444 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 367 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); See also, Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: 
Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2009-25, 5 (July 4, 2009).  
445 75 Fed. Reg. 8844 (2010); See also, 26 U.S.C. 7701(b); 31 C.F.R. 1010.350(b); D.S. 
Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 
367 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign 
Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-
25, 5 (July 4, 2009); IRS, Introduction to Residency Under U.S. Tax Law, available at, 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/introduction-to-residency-under-us-
tax-law  
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current year and 183 days total during a 3-year period that includes the current year 
and the two years immediately prior to that.446 
The purpose behind the additional persons included in the definition was that it 
provides uniformity among taxpayers but also “takes into account that individuals 
may seek to hide their residency in an effort to obscure the source of their income or 
location of their assets.”447 
 
4.3.2. FINANCIAL INTEREST  
The next element that needs to be met is the financial interest element. When does the 
taxpayer have a financial interest? The first issue is to ask is it an indirect or direct 
interest and how to distinguish between the two types of interest.448 A direct financial 
interest occurs when the person is an owner of record of or holds legal title to the 
account in question.449 It does not matter whether the account is maintained for 
personal benefit or for the benefit of a third party.450 If the account is jointly 
maintained or if multiple persons have an percentage of the interest, then each person 
 
446 IRS, Substantial Presence Test, found at https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/substantial-presence-test 
447 75 Fed. Reg. 8844 (2010), available at, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/02/26/2010-4042/financial-crimes-
enforcement-network-amendment-to-the-bank-secrecy-act-regulations-reports-of  
448 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009). 
449 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.3 (11-06-2015); See also, Lawrence Lokken, The Big, 
Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf     
450 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (e)(1); 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (b)(1)-(3); See also, Internal Revenue 
Manual, 4.26.16.3.3 (11-06-2015); Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting 
Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
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is considered to have a financial interest in the account and is required to file an 
FBAR.451 
The second type, an indirect interest, occurs when the titleholder or owner falls within 
one of four categories452:  
i) a person acting as an agent453, nominee454, attorney or in some other 
capacity on behalf of the U.S. person with respect to the account455  
ii) a person is also considered to have a financial interest if the owner of 
record is a corporation, partnership or any other entity in which the 
U.S. person owns directly or indirectly more than 50% of the interest 
in profits or capital 456,  
 
451 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.26.16.3.3 (11-06-2015). The entire account is reported for 
each separate owner; it is not prorated.  
452 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf   
453 An agent in this context is a person who is authorized to act for another person in regard to 
the financial account and who is under control of another (usually the person who authorized 
them to act).  
454 A nominee is one (either person or entity) that is acting on behalf of another person as a 
representative (can be an agent).  
455 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (e)(2)(i); See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International 
Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 369 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Lawrence 
Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of 
Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
456 31 C.F.R. 1010.350(e)(2)(ii); See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International 
Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 369 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Lawrence 
Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of 
Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf   
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iii) a trust457, if the U.S. person is the trust grantor and has an ownership 
interest in the trust458, or  
iv) is a trust in which the U.S. person has either a present beneficial 
interest in more than 50% of the assets or from which such person 
receives more than 50% of the current income.459 
 
4.3.3. SIGNATORY AUTHORITY 
Along with the direct and indirect interests, the FBAR is interested in the reporting of 
someone who has “signature authority” over a foreign account.460 A person is 
considered as having signature authority or other authority over a foreign account if 
the individual, alone or together with another, controls the disposition of money, funds 
or assets held in a financial account by the direct communication – in writing or 
otherwise – to the person with whom the account is maintained.461 For example, a 
company who designates authority – to the CEO, the CFO,  the treasurer or 
comptroller – to take action on the company’s bank accounts is an example of 
signatory authority.   
 
457 A trust is a legal construct where a trustee (a fiduciary) holds legal title to property for the 
benefit of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.  
458 31 C.F.R. 1010.350(e)(2)(iii); See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International 
Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 369 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Lawrence 
Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of 
Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
459 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (e)(2)(iv); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax 
Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 369 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Lawrence 
Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of 
Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
460 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf  
461 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (f)(1); See also, FinCen Form 114; Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad 
FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2009-25, 6 (July 4, 2009). 
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4.3.4. FOREIGN FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
The fourth criteria that must be met that would require a taxpayer to file an FBAR is 
for the U.S. taxpayer to have a financial interest in foreign financial account. The 
definition of a foreign financial account is required to identify which types of accounts 
fall under the FBAR. The types of foreign financial accounts that are reportable on 
the FBAR are bank accounts, security accounts and other financial accounts.462 
Financial accounts that qualify as “other financial accounts” are accounts with a 
person that is in the business of accepting cash deposits as a financial agency, 
insurance or annuity policies that have a cash value, an account with a  person that 
acts as a broker or dealer for futures or options transactions in any commodity on or 
subject to the rules of a commodity exchange or association or an account with a  
mutual fund (or similar pooled fund or an investment fund).463 The definition of 31 
C.F.R. § 1010.350 (c)(1)-(3) includes, but is not necessarily limited to bank accounts, 
securities accounts, deposit accounts, mutual funds and in some instances, a foreign 
credit card.464 
 
462 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (c)(1)-(3); Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign 
Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-
25, 2 (July 4, 2009).   
463 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (c)(3)(i)-(iv); See also, Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: 
Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2009-25, 7 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And 
Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 7 (2006). 
464 31 C.F.R. 1010.350 (c) (1)-(3); See also, Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: 
Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2009-25, 7 (July 4, 2009) (quoting Tax Analysts, Service Discusses 
Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts Report Penalty, Tax Notes Today, 14-14, Jan 23, 
2006).  
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Knowing what qualifies as a financial account, the next question is what qualifies as 
a foreign account.465 It is any type of account listed in the previous paragraph whose 
financial interest is located outside the United States.466 A foreign country is defined 
as all geographical areas located outside of the territory of the United States which 
includes its territories and insular possessions such as Guam and Puerto Rico.467 
According to the filing instructions, a branch of a foreign bank that is physically 
within the United States is not considered a foreign financial account.468 However, the 
opposite must then be true Lawrence Lokken suggests although this is not clarified in 
the instructions: an account held in a foreign branch of a U.S. financial institution 
would be considered a foreign account.469  
 
465 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And 
Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 7 (2006). 
466 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009); See also, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And 
Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 7 (2006). 
467 31 C.F.R. 1010.100 (hhh); See also, DSC Risk Management Manual of Examination 
Policies, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
8.1-6 (2005) found at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf ; 
Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf   
468 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And 
Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 7 (2006). 
469 Lawrence Lokken, The Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, 
University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 2 (July 4, 2009). 
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There are ten exceptions for those who are required to file FBARS. These exceptions 
can be found in the filing instructions.470 The ten exceptions for those not required to 
file an FBAR are: 
1) Consolidated FBAR which is if a United States person that is 
an entity is named in a consolidated FBAR filed by a greater 
than 50 percent owner, such entity is not required to file a 
separate FBAR.  
2) Certain foreign financial accounts jointly owned by spouses. 
3) Correspondent or Nostro accounts. 
4) A foreign financial account held by any governmental entity 
of the U.S.  
5) A foreign financial account held by any international financial 
institution if the U.S government is a member.  
6) Individual Retirement Account (IRA) owners or beneficiary 
whose IRA holds a foreign financial account. 
7) Participants in and Beneficiaries of Tax-Qualified Retirement 
Plans whose retirement plan holds a foreign financial account. 
8) In certain, limited instances, individuals who have signature 
authority over foreign financial account but who have no 
financial interest in the account. 
9) A trust beneficiary with a financial interest described in (2)(e) 
of the financial interest definition is not required to report the 
trust’s foreign financial accounts on an FBAR if the trust, 
trustee of the trust, or agent of the trust: (1) is a United States 
 
470FBAR Filing Instructions, found at 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; See also,  Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We 
Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 8 (2006); Lawrence Lokken, The Big, 
Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 7 (July 4, 2009); Report of Foreign Bank and Financial 
Accounts, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/report-of-foreign-
bank-and-financial-accounts-fbar  
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person and (2) files an FBAR disclosing the trust’s foreign 
financial accounts. 
10)  United States Military Banking Facility. 471  
A Nostro or correspondent account is an account that one bank holds for another.472 
When certain types of accounts are jointly owned by spouses, they are also an 
exception, as number 1 above denotes. More specifically, the FBAR electronic filing 
instructions states that a spouse of an individual who files an FBAR is not required to 
file a separate FBAR if all the financial accounts that the non-filing spouse is required 
to report are jointly owned with the filing spouse, the filing spouse files the FBAR 
correctly and on time and the filers have filled out and executed Form 114a which is 
the Record of Authorization to Electronically File FBARs.473 An IRA, as noted in 
number six, also known as an Individual Retirement Account, is a savings or 
brokerage account to which a person may contribute up to a specified amount of 
earned income each year and the contributions are not taxed until the money is 
withdrawn after the person turns 59½.474   
Many of the exceptions listed above are not required to file because they do not 
represent an elevated risk of tax evasion. For example, governmental entities and 
international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, IMF) are not 
required to file. Neither are U.S. Military Banking Facilities even if those banking 
institutions are located outside the United States. 
 
471 FBAR Filing Instructions, found at 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; See also, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/report-of-foreign-bank-and-
financial-accounts-fbar; Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where 
We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 8 (2006); Lawrence Lokken, The 
Big, Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25, 7 (July 4, 2009). 
472 See https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/correspondent-bank.asp 
473 FBAR Filing Instructions, found at 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf; 
474 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Editor Bryan A. Garner, 1999).  
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4.3.5. AGGREGATE BALANCE 
The fifth and final element is whether the U.S. person who has a financial interest in 
a foreign account holds an aggregate balance of a certain amount in the foreign 
account. A U.S. person is required to file an FBAR (separate from the IRS tax return) 
if the foreign financial account they have a financial interest in has an aggregate value 
that exceeds $10,000 at any time during the year.475 The tax code did not designate 
the aggregate amount in a statute instead the defined amount was established in the 
regulations and the FBAR instructions for filing.476  
 
4.3.6. THE FBAR PENALTY SCHEME477 
Once it has been determined that the taxpayer has an obligation to file an FBAR, how 
does the government enforce that obligation so that the taxpayer is more likely to 
comply by giving the IRS the information it needs to administer the law correctly and 
fairly? What are the consequences for non-compliance by the taxpayer? Congress 
wanted to make sure, especially after 9/11, that the consequences for not filing the 
 
475Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333, 337 (Spring 2015); See 
also, DSC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money 
Laundering and Office of Foreign Assets Control, 8.1-1 (2005) found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf; Lawrence Lokken, The Big, 
Bad FBAR: Reporting Foreign Bank Accounts to the U.S. IRS, University of Florida Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2009-25 (July 4, 2009); 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instr
uctions.pdf;  Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And 
Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 7 (2006). 
476 31 C.F.R. §1010.306(c); See also, FBAR Filing Instructions, found at, 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html; Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the 
FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 7 
(2006). 
477 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1 for a discussion on tax cases, court jurisdiction and appellate 
issues regarding federal tax issues.    
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FBAR were harsh hoping this would force taxpayers into a confession of their 
offshore accounts, and which would bring them into compliance with the tax laws.478 
The Bank Secrecy Act has created a financial penalty scheme which is considered 
“one of the most powerful anti-tax evasion tools”479 the IRS has at its disposal. 
Penalties can include civil or criminal penalties and prosecutions.480  Among the civil 
penalties at its fingertips, the IRS may assess a non-willful or a willful failure to file 
penalty.481 The civil penalties statute, 26 U.S.C. §5321(a), prior to the 2004 
amendment, only punished willful violations and the penalty was the amount that was 
in the account up to $100,000 or $25,000 USD, whichever was greater.482 This 
division between willful and non-willful is an important distinction which will be 
discussed in the immediate subsection below.  
 
478 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 17-18 (2006); 
479 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 371 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
480 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 369 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); See also, 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html; See also, Hale E. Sheppard, 
Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. 
& Tax J. 1, 10 (2006); Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. 
Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
481 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 371 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
482 Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign 
Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, 
Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014); See also, Stephen Michael Brown, One-Size-
Fits-Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Programs and Suggestions for Increased Participation in Future Compliance, 18 
Chapman L. Rev. 243, 245 (2014); Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We 
Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 10 (2006). 
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Civil penalties for failing to file the FBAR can carry a penalty of up to $10,000483 for 
a non-willful violation.484  An exception exists where reasonable cause is given for 
the violation.485 If reasonable cause is established, then no penalty will be imposed.486 
To establish reasonable cause, the taxpayer must prove that they meet two elements: 
that the violation was due to reasonable cause and the amount of the transaction or the 
balance in the account at the time of the transaction was properly reported.487 
For willful violations, the civil penalties that may be assessed are equal to the greater 
of $100,000488 or 50% of the highest balance in the U.S. person’s foreign account for 
each violation that occurred and for each year that was not filed up to the last six 
years.489 According to guidance that the IRS issued under no circumstances will the 
total amount of penalty surpass 100% of the highest combined of all foreign financial 
 
483 Penalties for non-willful violations can be up to $12,663 due to inflation according to 31 
C.F.R. 1010.821 (Penalty Adjustment and table) 
484 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (a)(5)(B)(i); See also, 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html; See also, Hale E. Sheppard, 
Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. 
& Tax J. 1, 11 (2006); Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. 
Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-February 2015); Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: 
How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness 
Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 
(Fall 2014).  
485 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (a)(5)(B)(ii); See also, 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html; See also, Hale E. Sheppard, 
Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. 
& Tax J. 1, 11 (2006); Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. 
Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
486 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (a)(5)(B)(ii); See also, 
https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html; See also, Hale E. Sheppard, 
Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It Matters, 7 Houston Bus. 
& Tax J. 1, 11 (2006); Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. 
Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
487 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, And Why It 
Matters, 7 Houston Bus. & Tax J. 1, 11 (2006). 
488 Penalties for non-willful violations can be up to $126,626 due to inflation according to 31 
C.F.R. 1010.821 (Penalty Adjustment and table) 
489 Robert W. Wood, FBAR Penalties: When Will IRS Let You Off With A Warning? Forbes, 
June 4th, 2012, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/04/fbar-
penalties-when-will-irs-let-you-off-with-a-warning/#6c87bec5363c; See also, Martin R. Press 
and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-
February 2015); Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend 
the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be 
Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
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accounts for the years that are examined (up to six years), nonetheless, a penalty rate 
higher or lower than 50% can be assessed.490 The Title 31 penalty scheme only 
establishes maximum penalty amounts so the IRS has the responsibility of 
determining the correct FBAR penalty based on the circumstances and facts of each 
individual case.491 If the IRS determines there was a willful violation, the burden is 
on the IRS to prove the willfulness.492 The taxpayer does not just face FBAR penalties, 
they can also face other types of civil penalties in conjunction with FBAR penalties.493 
For example, penalties for negligence or substantial understatement or fraud can be 
applied as well.494 
The civil penalties do not preclude the possibility of criminal prosecution or criminal 
penalties495 for violations such as tax evasion, committing fraud or making false 
statements.496 Those penalties include a fine of up to $250,000 and not more than five 
 
490 United States Department of Treasury, Memorandum for All LB&I, SB/SE, and TE/GE 
Employees: Interim Guidance for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
Penalties (May 13, 2015), found at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-04-0515-
0025[1].pdf ; See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the 
Global Information Age, 353, 372 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
491 United States Department of Treasury, Memorandum for All LB&I, SB/SE, and TE/GE 
Employees: Interim Guidance for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
Penalties (May 13, 2015), found at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-04-0515-
0025[1].pdf 
492 United States Department of Treasury, Memorandum for All LB&I, SB/SE, and TE/GE 
Employees: Interim Guidance for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
Penalties (May 13, 2015), found at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-04-0515-
0025[1].pdf 
493 United States Department of Treasury, Memorandum for All LB&I, SB/SE, and TE/GE 
Employees: Interim Guidance for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
Penalties (May 13, 2015), found at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-04-0515-
0025[1].pdf ; See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the 
Global Information Age, 353, 371 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
494 United States Department of Treasury, Memorandum for All LB&I, SB/SE, and TE/GE 
Employees: Interim Guidance for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
Penalties (May 13, 2015), found at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-04-0515-
0025[1].pdf ; See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the 
Global Information Age, 353, 372 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
495 See subsection 1.4.3 for a discussion on the distinction between civil and criminal 
penalties in the U.S. including an explanation of how both civil and criminal penalties can be 
brought against one taxpayer (citizen).  
496 31 U.S.C. §5322; 26 U.S.C. § 7201; 26 U.S.C. 7206: See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. 
Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 372 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2016). 
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years imprisonment (or both) unless the violation occurred with the abuse of another 
law or as part of a pattern of illegal activity – for example, weapons trafficking.497 
Those penalties increase to $500,000 and/or 10 years of imprisonment.498 This was a 
way for the U.S. government to try to force those U.S. taxpayers that hold foreign 
financial accounts into self-reporting and as a way to try to pierce the veil of bank 
secrecy that surrounds many foreign jurisdictions. 499 
The FBAR penalties, which should only be applied in order to promote compliance 
with FBAR reporting requirements,500 have been applied against foreign assets of U.S. 
citizens who have failed to file the FBAR form and have brought in $10 billion USD 
in as of October 16th, 2016.501 While the fines and penalties are severe, especially the 
penalties regarding the willful violations - and it would seem that the average person 
would respond to that steep of a consequence - it seems there is large sector of 
taxpayers who do not believe this is a great enough incentive to report their foreign 
accounts and income. This is reflected in the oft-quoted $458 billion annual tax gap 
that exists and that gap has continued to grow.502 The tax gap is defined as the 
 
497 Robert W. Wood, FBAR Penalties: When Will IRS Let You Off With A Warning? Forbes, 
June 4th, 2012, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/04/fbar-
penalties-when-will-irs-let-you-off-with-a-warning/#6c87bec5363c; See also, D.S. Kerzner 
and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 373 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2016); Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and 
U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
498 Robert W. Wood, FBAR Penalties: When Will IRS Let You Off With A Warning? Forbes, 
June 4th, 2012, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/04/fbar-
penalties-when-will-irs-let-you-off-with-a-warning/#6c87bec5363c; See also, D.S. Kerzner 
and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 373 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
499 Robert W. Wood, FBAR Penalties: When Will IRS Let You Off With A Warning? Forbes, 
June 4th, 2012, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/04/fbar-
penalties-when-will-irs-let-you-off-with-a-warning/#6c87bec5363c.  
500 Internal Revenue Manual, pt. 4.26.16.6 (11-06-2015); See also, Charles P. Rettig, Why the 
Ongoing Problem with FBAR Compliance, J. Tax & Proc. 37, 39 (August/September 2016). 
501 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-4 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
502 GAO, Tax Gap: IRS Needs Specific Goals and Strategies for Improving Compliance, 
Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, GAO-18-39, 3 (October 2017); See also, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-tax-gap, Charles P. Rettig, Why the Ongoing Problem with 
FBAR Compliance, J. Tax & Proc. 37, 39 (August/September 2016). 
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difference between the tax liability that is due and the amount actually received by the 
IRS via the voluntary compliance of taxpayers.503 
4.3.6.1 What Constitutes a Willful versus Non-Willful Violation? 
Initially, it was thought that the IRS would apply the maximum penalty infrequently 
and only for extreme cases, such as with an account that could be linked to terrorist 
or criminal activity, and this line of thinking was bolstered by published IRS guidance. 
Despite this line of thinking, the IRS, as well as the Department of Justice (DOJ) who 
prosecute the cases, have taken a drastic stance on criminal and civil FBAR cases by 
seeking the maximum penalties.504 One of the questions the civil cases turn on is 
whether or not the violation of the reporting requirement of the FBAR was willful. 
This section will explore what the courts say willful means, why the holdings of the 
majority of courts are flawed and how the term should be defined.  
The BSA does not define willfulness with regard to civil or criminal penalties.505 The 
question regarding FBAR penalties, then, is where is the definition of willfulness 
found? Since the legislation containing the law does not define willfulness, the next 
place to look for a definition is the courts and the courts have, in the context of tax 
law violations, defined what qualifies as willfulness.506 Why is it important to define 
willfulness? As one scholar so artfully stated, it is because willfulness “is the trigger 
of the IRS gun that can fire a bullet capable of decimating a taxpayer’s wealth.”507 
Under the Constitution, the federal government cannot deprive the taxpayer of their 
 
503 I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-4 (Jan. 6, 2012), found at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-
releases-new-tax-gap-estimates-compliance-rates-remain-statistically-unchanged-from-
previous-study See also, J.T. Manhire, What Does Voluntary Compliance Mean?: A 
Government Perspective, 164 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 11 (2015).  
504 Martin R. Press and Nathan W. Hill, FBAR PENALTIES and U.S. v. Zwerner, 41 Int’l Tax 
J. 18 (January-February 2015). 
505 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 372 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
506 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 373 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
507 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 373 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
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property without due process of law.508 Thus, a taxpayer and the IRS need to have a 
guideline as to what constitutes a willful violation.  
This is where the importance between a non-willful violation and a willful violation 
has an effect. The civil penalty statute, 26 U.S.C. §5231(a)(5) created a distinction 
between a non-willful and willful violation by providing for separate penalties in two 
different subsections.509 §5231(a)(5)(A) - (B) is the statute addressing non-willful 
violations and the subsequent subsection §5231(a)(5)(C) addresses willful violations. 
Congress apparently wanted to make this distinction by only addressing the 
willfulness part of the statute instead of creating two subsections. This distinction is 
crucial because many of the cases do not seem to distinguish between non-willful and 
willful violations; they hold only to a strict liability reading of the statute.510 There 
were no cases construing willfulness from a civil penalty standpoint until 2012, 
therefore, the cases that initially defined willfulness were from a criminal penalty 
viewpoint.511 
Since 2012, there have been a few cases that define willfulness512 and this is most 
likely due to the previous lack of enforcement.513 However, the cases that do exist 
have generally held that willfulness turns on whether it was a voluntary, deliberate 
 
508 U.S. Const. amend. V 
509 Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign 
Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, 
Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 257 (Fall 2014).  
510 Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign 
Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, 
Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 256 (Fall 2014).  
511 IRS C.C.A. 200603026, 2006 WL 148700, at 1 (Jan 20, 2006); See also, Kyle 
Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank 
Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 
68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251 (Fall 2014).  
512 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 373 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
513 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, A Report to Congress In Accordance With §361(b) of the 
Uniting and Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) 12 (April 26, 2002); See also, 
Bedrosian v. United States, 2017 WL 1361535 (E.D. Penn., April 13, 2017).  
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abuse of a known legal duty or a violation based on reckless conduct.514 Multiple 
courts have affirmed that a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty is 
considered willfulness.515 In fact, in one case, United States v. Williams, which was 
upheld by another court in United States v. McBride, the Williams court held that 
essentially all a taxpayer has to do in order to willfully violate the FBAR reporting 
requirement is to sign the tax return which gives them constructive knowledge of the 
FBAR filing requirements.516  
Despite the multiple courts that have held to the strict liability, at least one court has 
deviated from this holding. In United States v. Flume, the court declined to follow 
both Williams and McBride arguing that the constructive theory is unpersuasive.517 
One of the reasons that the court gives for this is that the holdings in Williams and 
McBride “ignores the distinction Congress drew between willful and non-willful 
violations of §5314. If every taxpayer, merely by signing a tax return, is presumed to 
 
514 Cheek v. United States, 498 US 192 (1991); See also, United States v. Kelley-Hunter, 281 
F.Supp.3d 121, 124 (D.D.C. 2017); United States v. Katwyk, 2017 WL 6021420, 4 (C.D. Cal., 
Oct. 23, 2017); United States v. Bohanec, 263 F.Supp.3d 881 (C.D. Cal 2016); United States 
v. Bussell, 2015 WL 9957826 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2015); United States v. Williams, 489 
Fed.Appx. 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d 1186 (D. Utah, 
2012); United States v. Garrity, 304 F.Supp.3d 267 (D. Conn 2018); United States v. 
Horowitz, 2019 WL 265107 (D. Maryland, Jan. 18, 2019); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 373 (Palgrave MacMillan 
2016). 
515 Cheek v. United States, 498 US 192 (1991); See also, United States v. Kelley-Hunter, 281 
F.Supp.3d 121, 124 (D.D.C. 2017); United States v. Katwyk, 2017 WL 6021420, 4 (C.D. Cal., 
Oct. 23, 2017); United States v. Bohanec, 263 F.Supp.3d 881 (C.D. Cal 2016); United States 
v. Bussell, 2015 WL 9957826 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2015); United States v. Williams, 489 
Fed.Appx. 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d 1186 (D. Utah, 
2012); United States v. Garrity, 304 F.Supp.3d 267 (D. Conn 2018); United States v. 
Horowitz, 2019 WL 265107 (D. Maryland, Jan. 18, 2019). 
516 United States v. Williams, 489 Fed.Appx. 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. McBride, 
908 F.Supp.2d 1186 (D. Utah, 2012); See also, Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How 
Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness 
Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 
(Fall 2014).  
517 United States v. Flume, 2018 WL 4378161 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2018).  
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know of the need to file an FBAR, “it is difficult to conceive how a violation could be 
non-willful””. 518  
Three Supreme Court cases are important to this discussion. The first case, Cheek v. 
United States, held that statutory willfulness is the voluntary, intentional violation of 
a known legal duty. The court also found that in order to prove willfulness the IRS 
has to prove actual knowledge of the legal duty owed, not just constructive 
knowledge.519 Three years later the court in Ratzlaff v. United States held that in order 
to prove willfulness the government has to prove that the taxpayer acted with 
knowledge. “Viewing…in light of the complex provisions in which they are embedded, 
it is significant that the omnibus “willfulness” requirement….has been read by the 
Court of Appeals to require both knowledge of the reporting requirement and a 
specific intent to commit the crime or to disobey the law.”520 This is an important point 
because there is an argument that these first two cases were criminal FBAR cases and 
that these cases do not apply to FBAR civil penalty cases. However, the court in 
Ratzlaff states that the willfulness requirement “must be construed the same way each 
time it is called into play.”521 That means when a taxpayer -  with actual knowledge 
and specific intent - violates the law the willfulness requirement will be applied 
equally in civil and criminal cases. Even in a Chief Counsel Advice memo from 2006, 
the IRS acknowledges that “willfulness” in a civil penalty case has the same definition 
and interpretation as in a criminal case.522  
The last Supreme Court case that is important is the Bryan case which carved out an 
exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The court said 
 
518 United States v. Flume, 2018 WL 4378161 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2018); See also, Kyle 
Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank 
Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 
68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
519 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).  
520 Ratzlaff v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135 (1994).  
521 Ratzlaff v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
522 IRS, C.C.A. 200603026, 2006 WL 148700 (January 20, 2006); See also, Kyle 
Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank 
Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 
68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
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that cases like Ratzlaff involved statutes that were highly technical and “presented the 
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” The 
exception, based on this reasoning, says that because of the highly technical nature of 
the law that the defendant is required to have knowledge of the law.523 The FBAR, 
itself, is a piece of highly technical legislation and should be viewed as such.524  
This evidence suggests that Williams and McBride are faulty law based on faulty logic 
that ignores relevant precedent as well as the distinction that Congress made in the 
statute itself between willful and non-willful.525 It also ignores the fact that the FBAR 
is a highly technical law that not all taxpayers understand or are aware that they have 
an obligation to file.  
Willful, based on the appropriate court precedent, the statute itself and the IRS’ own 
admission (although this is not authoritative but merely persuasive), should be defined 
just as Ratzlaff defined it: it requires both knowledge of the reporting requirement and 
specific intent to commit the crime or disobey the law.526 
However, it seems that the majority of courts are leaning towards the strict liability 
reading of the willfulness and will sweep even the most innocent of taxpayers into this 
spider web which does not help their goal: bringing taxpayers into compliance with 
the law and, as a result, through disclosure by the taxpayer procuring the information 
need to administer the tax laws correctly and fairly.  
The court in Ratzlaff is correct. If the courts are to proceed with the strict liability 
reading of willfulness it is hard to imagine what taxpayer would not be considered to 
 
523 Bryan v. U.S., 52 U.S. 184 (1998); See also, Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How 
Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness 
Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 
(Fall 2014).  
524 Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign 
Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, 
Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
525Kyle Niewoehner, Feigning Willfulness: How Williams and McBride Extend the Foreign 
Bank Accounts Disclosure Willfulness Requirement and Why They Should Not Be Followed, 
Vol. 68 No. 1 Tax Lawyer 251, 252 (Fall 2014).  
526 Ratzlaff v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
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be willful. The cases that have leaned toward strict liability have been more recent 
than the former Supreme Court cases that were discussed above. If the Supreme Court 
was to take up this specific issue, the Court would most likely fall on the side of a less 
strict reading of willfulness. This is based on a couple of things. Congress purposely 
made a distinction in 26 U.S.C. §7201 when it focused completely on willfulness. The 
Supreme Court generally does not ignore what Congress intended unless it is 
unconstitutional. There is no argument that Congress acted unconstitutionally. 
Another reason the Court would hold for a less strict reading of willfulness is based 
on their prior holdings in Cheek, Ratzlaff and Bryan. The court itself has said under 
those cases that willfulness under the statute is the voluntary intentional violation of 
a known legal duty and that it takes actual knowledge of the legal duty. It should also 
be argued that with this highly technical piece of law that taxpayers should be held to 
a reasonably prudent lawyer/businessperson standard since those are the persons most 
likely to understand the law and all its technicalities. If this standard held, everyday 
Joe taxpayer would not fall under the willfulness standard since many taxpayers are 
unaware that they fall under the requirements.  
 
4.4. FBAR: CONCLUSION  
The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) is an anti-tax evasion 
measure that the IRS uses to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. 
The FBAR requires that the taxpayer file annually a report that declares that they hold 
an interest in a foreign financial account. 
The FBAR is far from qualifying as a successful measure that obtains taxpayer 
information on their foreign accounts. The compliance numbers alone demonstrate 
that the FBAR, as a stand-alone measure, does not fully address the problem stated in 
this thesis – the inability of the U.S. government to obtain information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. The 2011 estimate that only 741,000 U.S. taxpayers out 
of millions of U.S. taxpayers (both resident and non-resident) filed an FBAR 
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establishes that this measure alone is inadequate to fulfill the IRS’ goal of receiving 
information on the foreign accounts so that they can administer the tax laws fairly and 
correctly. The FBAR filings, according to the IRS and FinCEN, increased 17% per 
year from 2012-2016 yet the tax gap remains527 and that number is still only a couple 
million taxpayers.  
The elements clarify who should file an FBAR – a U.S. person who has a financial 
interest in (or signatory authority over) a foreign financial account of which the 
aggregate value exceeds – at any time during the calendar year - $10,000.  
The IRS walks a fine line (or should) in applying penalties to U.S. taxpayers who are 
truly evading taxes while not crucifying those taxpayers who fall under the reasonable 
cause exception and those who may not know of their filing obligations. Applying 
harsh penalties to an expat who moved to a foreign country to be reunited with a 
spouse, for example, and who may not be aware of their filing obligations under the 
FBAR seems to be overkill. The whole purpose of the FBAR penalties is to promote 
compliance with FBAR reporting requirements but how can one comply if they are 
unaware of the filing obligations?  
On the other hand, U.S. taxpayers who are choosing to evade their filing obligations 
and paying their tax liability should be dealt with harshly. The penalties for willful 
violations, in this author’s opinion, are not enough. The Panama Papers and the 
Paradise Papers referred to in the introduction of this thesis demonstrate that tax 
evasion is popular among the wealthy, elite and powerful. The penalties, highlighted 
by these examples, demonstrate that wealthy taxpayers are willing to risk discovery 
of tax evasion and pay the penalties laid out.  
The FBAR’s downfall is that the U.S. government is hoping that the taxpayer will 
voluntarily comply and report their foreign accounts. While the FBAR has worked to 
 
527 Charles P. Rettig, Why the Ongoing Problem with FBAR Compliance, J. Tax & Proc. 37, 
38 (August/September 2016); See also, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/foreign-account-
filings-top-1-million-taxpayers-need-to-know-their-filing-requirements  
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encourage some to self-report, it is not encouraging all the taxpayers – or even a 
considerable number of taxpayers - who have accounts abroad to comply. Another 
part of the disconnect that seems to occur is that the IRS and DOJ are pursuing 
taxpayers under the broader definition of willfulness which is penalizing some of the 
taxpayers that are making innocent mistakes or had no knowledge of the reporting 
requirement. This strategy seems to still miss the group that is truly the target and that 
is the taxpayers who deliberately evade their tax obligations.  
To target the U.S. taxpayers that may not be aware of the FBAR filing obligations or 
for those who make innocent when filing a couple of suggestions could be done to 
ensure compliance with the FBAR – all without threatening penalties for those types 
of cases. The case and surrounding facts usually establish whether a taxpayer has 
made an innocent mistake (reasonable exception) or does not know of the filing 
requirements versus a taxpayer who is purposely, willfully evading their obligations.  
The first suggestion is to partner up with the Department of State (State Department) 
and send out emails at tax time to remind U.S. taxpayers in their country of their filing 
obligations for tax returns, FBAR filings and any Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) obligations they may have while reminding them these obligations may 
not be the only obligations they fall under and to seek advice from a tax professional. 
At the end of the email the State Department can link to the IRS website where 
guidance is given to those taxpayers that have interest in foreign financial accounts.  
A second suggestion would be for the IRS to wage an educational campaign that is 
targeted specifically for U.S. taxpayers who have foreign financial accounts. This 
education campaign can include hosting an IRS blog, Twitter account or YouTube 
channel specifically for these types of taxpayers so that when they are looking for 
guidance these social media accounts would pop up in the search. However, if 
incorrect guidance is given on an official IRS social media account the taxpayer 
should be held liable for that mistake unless it can be proven that they did not act on 
that advice but instead acted upon some other basis.  
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To target the U.S. taxpayers whose choice is to willfully evade taxes, then the 
suggestion would be to increase the stick portion of the carrot-stick scenario. For civil 
penalties when it has been a willful violation, increase the current $100,000 or 50% 
of the highest balance in the U.S. taxpayers foreign account for each violation amount 
to $500,000 or 60% of the highest balance for each violation and for each year. For 
the criminal penalties, those should be increased significantly as well to $750,000 and 
10 years of imprisonment. For those violations within a pattern of illegal activity, 
those penalties should be increased to $1,000,000 and up to 20 years of imprisonment. 
The justification for the increases in the penalties is found in the continued behavior 
of tax evader as demonstrated through the release of the Panama and Paradise papers 
as well as the low-compliance rates of the FBAR. Another justification for increasing 
the penalties is that those that can afford to weigh the risk and proactively choose to 
evade their obligations are usually the taxpayers that can afford the penalties because 
as they stand now the penalties are inconsequential. 
Again, those penalties should not be enforced against those that make innocent 
mistakes and can qualify for the reasonable cause exception or those who can 
demonstrate that they truly did not know about their filing obligations. The facts and 
circumstances should be construed in favor of the taxpayer if they do not fall within a 
professional realm that would have cause to know or should know about the 
obligations – for example, lawyers, business-savvy taxpayers or tax professionals.  
The FBAR as a stand-alone measure is generally only netting those that come forward 
voluntarily or on occasion the taxpayers they catch evading and, therefore, the IRS is 
not obtaining the information they need to administer the tax laws fairly and correctly. 
However, as said above, the taxpayers and accounts they really want are those that are 
truly, under the Ratzlaff definition of willfulness, evading their tax reporting and 
payment obligation. As part of the framework of anti-tax evasion measures and with 
an increase in penalties, the FBAR could be a stronger compliance tool. This would 
allow the IRS to fulfill the goal of procuring taxpayer information on foreign accounts.  
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In the next chapter, the next IRS measure – voluntary disclosure programs – that is 
used to try to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts is also 
dependent on the taxpayer’s voluntary compliance. The question for the next chapter 
is do the voluntary disclosure programs, when implemented, address the inability to 
procure U.S. taxpayers’ information on foreign accounts so that the IRS can 
administer the tax laws fairly and correctly? 
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CHAPTER 5. VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
is dependent upon the voluntary compliance of the taxpayer fulfilling their reporting 
requirements on their foreign accounts. The result is that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) is only able to obtain information on accounts abroad on those taxpayers that 
voluntarily comply with the FBAR filing requirements and, occasionally, those they 
“catch” concealing. 
Another measure that the IRS and Department of Treasury use in their multi-prong 
effort to procure taxpayer information on foreign accounts that is also dependent on 
taxpayer compliance is the utilization of voluntary disclosure programs. These 
programs are inextricably linked with the previous measure, the FBAR, since the 
programs required the taxpayer to file past FBARs and pay FBAR penalties.  
This chapter will discuss the multiple voluntary disclosure programs that the IRS 
offered to coerce taxpayers into disclosing their accounts abroad. The chapter then 
analyzes how the voluntary disclosures are implemented so that they help the IRS 
obtain the taxpayers information on their foreign accounts. The last section will focus 
on whether the voluntary disclosure programs, when administered, enable the IRS to 
procure the information needed on the taxpayers’ foreign accounts so that they have 
the whole picture (facts) to apply the tax laws fairly and correctly. If the voluntary 
disclosure programs do not permit the U.S. government to procure the information 
they need on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts, how can the voluntary disclosure 
programs be improved upon so that it increases the chances of obtaining the 
information needed?   
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5.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMS 
The IRS, in order to capture some of the missing tax revenue from abroad and obtain 
taxpayer information on their foreign accounts, has offered multiple, consecutive 
programs called Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs (OVDP). The purpose of 
these multiple tax amnesty programs was to bring taxpayers who concealed their 
money offshore through various means — including offshore payment cards — back 
into compliance with the law.528 The proffered tax amnesty programs allowed certain 
taxpayers who came forward voluntarily to avoid civil penalties as well as criminal 
prosecution while still having to pay back taxes, interest and certain types of 
penalties.529 This also allowed the IRS to gather information on not just the taxpayers 
— whose requirements will be discussed below — and their accounts but also the 
offshore promoters that solicited taxpayer business through offshore programs.530  
Amnesty programs are also a cost-effective way for the IRS to recover some of the 
money lost to offshore jurisdictions.531 Despite the friendliness of the term “amnesty” 
that the IRS uses in offering these programs, Stephan Michael Brown alleges that this 
 
528 IRS, IRS Unveils Offshore Vountary Compliance Initiative, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-unveils-offshore-voluntary-compliance-initiative-chance-
for-credit-card-abusers-to-clear-up-their-tax-liabilities; See also, IRS, Offshore Compliance 
Program Shows Strong Results, found at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-
compliance-program-shows-strong-results; Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Ending 
in September, 128 J. Tax’n 4 (May 2018); Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement 
Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 676 (2018). 
529 IRS, IRS Unveils Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-unveils-offshore-voluntary-compliance-initiative-chance-
for-credit-card-abusers-to-clear-up-their-tax-liabilities; See also, Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore 
Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655 (2018).  
530 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 2 (March 2009; See also, Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement 
Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655 (2018). 
531 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons With the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 290 (Spring 2013); See also, Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax 
Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655 (2018). 
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offer of amnesty is actually a false offer of amnesty.532  Amnesty means, as defined 
by Black’s Law, a pardon extended by the government to a group or class of 
persons.533 The allegation of false amnesty is a bit severe. While taxpayers who are 
admitted to these disclosure programs do not have their slates wiped completely clean, 
the penalties and consequences are not nearly as severe as they could (or should) be 
if the taxpayer did not voluntarily disclose and the IRS discovered the noncompliance 
on its own. The taxpayer still must pay penalties and can potentially face other 
consequences so the term “quasi-amnesty” is more appropriate. These programs are 
discussed more in depth in the following sections and how they are administered so 
that they IRS can hopefully procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. 
 
5.2.1. OPERATION OF THE PROGRAMS 
At the beginning of 2003, the IRS offered an extremely limited, three-month program 
called the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative which is also known as the 
OVCI534. This program targeted those taxpayers who utilized offshore payment cards 
to hide income and assets offshore.535 Through this program the IRS was able to 
 
532 Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR 
Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased 
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014). 
533 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Editor Bryan A. Garner 1999).  
534 Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783 (August 6, 2018); 
See also, Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes Increasing Revenue, 
or Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017); GAO, Tax Compliance: 
Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, GAO-09-478T, 2 (March 
2009); https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-compliance-program-shows-strong-results  
535 https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-unveils-offshore-voluntary-compliance-initiative-
chance-for-credit-card-abusers-to-clear-up-their-tax-liabilities; 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-compliance-program-shows-strong-results; See also, 
Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783 (August 6, 2018); See 
also, Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes Increasing Revenue, or 
Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017). 
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collect approximately $75 million from roughly 1300 individuals536 who came 
forward and identified themselves to the IRS. However, a year later, the Government 
Accountability Office (hereinafter GAO) reported that the program had 861 taxpayers 
use the program while this round of voluntary disclosures collected $200 million in 
unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. There is no reason given for the discrepancy in 
numbers. The IRS, in a 2003 press release, stated that they had drawn in $75 million 
with 1,299 taxpayers applying but that they were still processing applications. If most 
applicants were subsequently processed, that would explain the increase to $200 
million in collected back taxes and penalties, however it does not explain the decrease 
in the number of applicants. Based on the IRS press release as well as other articles 
that give the $75 million paid by roughly 1300 taxpayers figure, this thesis will assume 
these two figures are correct. 
During the OVCI, four hundred offshore promoters were identified as well during this 
time through the information received by the taxpayers.537 The IRS defines an 
offshore promoter as a “person or entity who markets offshore arrangements to the 
public.”538 These promoters can be anything from a financial institution to a lawyer to 
an accountant.539  
While some touted this program as a success, the $75 million tag is not remotely close 
to the prior alleged $100 billion a year estimation of tax revenue – which has been 
called “unsubstantiated” by at least one set of scholars – that has been lost to offshore 
 
536 IRS, Offshore Compliance Program Shows Strong Results, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-compliance-program-shows-strong-results ; See also, 
John Paul, The Future of FATCA: Concerns and Issues, 37 N. E. J. Legal Stud. 52 
(Spring/Fall 2018); Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783 
(August 6, 2018); See also, Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes 
Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017); 
537 IRS, Offshore Compliance Program Shows Strong Results, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-compliance-program-shows-strong-results; See also  ̧
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-unveils-offshore-voluntary-compliance-initiative-chance-
for-credit-card-abusers-to-clear-up-their-tax-liabilities;  
538 IRS, Glossary of Offshore Terms, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/abusive-offshore-tax-avoidance-schemes-glossary-of-offshore-terms  
539 IRS, Glossary of Offshore Terms, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/abusive-offshore-tax-avoidance-schemes-glossary-of-offshore-terms  
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tax evasion540 which means this program, while bringing some of the tax evaders to 
light, was not entirely successful.541 One reason for this might be that not all of the 
“tax evaders” were intentional tax evaders and, therefore, these programs are utilized 
by those taxpayers that mistakenly or unknowingly evaded taxes.542 The IRS, in a 
news release discussing the success of the program, noted that this program was part 
of a multi-pronged effort to track down tax evaders.543 This multi-pronged effort – or 
what Richard A. Gordon referred to in his 1981 report as a “coordinated federal 
attack”544 – includes not only multiple disclosure programs that followed but also the 
anti-tax evasion measures identified in this thesis. 
The next voluntary disclosure program did not occur until 2009. This longer-term 
voluntary disclosure program ran from March 26, 2009 through October 15, 2009.545 
The second program was conducted from February 8, 2011 through September 9, 
2011 and peaked at 18,000 taxpayers who disclosed.546 The third and final disclosure 
 
540 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 17 (July 
2008); See also,  William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of 
FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-4 (March 1st, 
2017) found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119; James F. Kelly, 
International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound 
International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 985 (2016-2017). 
541 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 291-292 (Spring 2013).  
542 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 2 (March 2009.) 
543 IRS, Offshore Compliance Program Shows Strong Results, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-compliance-program-shows-strong-results 
544 Richard A. Gordon, Special Counsel for International Taxation, Tax Havens and Their Use 
by United States Taxpayers – An Overview, Department of the Treasury, Publication No. 1150 
(4-81)(1981). 
545 Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783, 784 (August 6, 
2018); See also, Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes Increasing 
Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017); Travis A. 
Greaves & T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure World, 148 
Tax Notes 207, 208 (July 13, 2015); See also, Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement 
Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 676 (2018). 
546 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Ending in September, 128 J. Tax’n 4 (May 2018); 
See also, Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783, 784 (August 
6, 2018); See also, Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes Increasing 
Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017); See also, Shu-Yi 
Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 676-677 (2018). 
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program started in January of 2012. This disclosure program had some modifications 
which then became known as the 2014 OVDP.547 The third program was an open-
ended program which ended in September 2018 after the number of participants 
declined in 2017 resulting in only 600 disclosures.548 The IRS reported that since the 
first voluntary disclosure program was instituted more than 56,000 taxpayers have 
utilized the disclosure programs and a total of 11.1 billion USD in back taxes, interest 
and penalties was collected.549 
The third voluntary disclosure program was offered due to the high level of interest 
in the prior programs.550 These voluntary compliance programs - by June of 2012 - 
had 33,000 U.S. taxpayers who voluntarily disclosed their foreign assets which 
resulted in the government collecting more than $5 billion. Despite the fact that 
thousands of U.S. taxpayers utilized these programs to “come clean”, this is only a 
trivial amount compared to the estimated $100 billion USD in lost tax revenue that is 
 
547 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Ending in September, 128 J. Tax’n 4 (May 2018); 
See also, IRS, IRS to End Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-end-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers-
with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-come-forward-now; See also,  
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/2012-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program; Shu-Yi Oei, The 
Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 676-677 (2018). 
548 IR-2018-52 (March 13, 2018), found at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-end-offshore-
voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers-with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-come-
forward-now; See also, Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 
783, 784 (August 6, 2018); See also, Dominika Lagenmayr, Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded 
Taxes Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?, 151 J. Pub. Econ. 110 (2017); 
549 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Ending in September, 128 J. Tax’n 4 (May 2018); 
See also, IR-2018-52 (March 13, 2018), found at, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-end-
offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers-with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-
come-forward-now ; See also,  Jeffery D. Moss, Foreign Bank Account Reports: Will There 
Be More Scrutiny of FBARS and Other Disclosure Returns, 31 Foreign Bank Account Reports 
29, 31 (Spring 2018); Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783, 
784 (August 6, 2018). 
550 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 760 (2014); See also, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/2012-
offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program  
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held offshore.551 As Sean Deneault notes, these citizens have had multiple chances to 
bring their accounts into compliance and they continue to choose not to. The question 
is why? He posits that the reason so many leave their assets offshore is not due to 
ignorance but because it makes financial sense.552 He argues that they have examined 
their situations and decided that non-compliance is worth the risk of the U.S. 
government finding out and applying penalties.553 This is a reasonable assumption to 
make in light of the release of the Panama and Paradise papers. It is also possible that 
some of these citizens just simply do not want to pay taxes despite the fact that paying 
taxes is an obligation of being a U.S. citizen notwithstanding if the taxpayer thinks 
the taxes are unreasonable or not.  
A 2009 report by the GAO found that the taxpayers that utilized the voluntary 
disclosure programs were of a diverse group of incomes and occupations and based 
on this data, the IRS created a database that tracked taxpayer information such as 
income, use of promoters and taxes owed.554 They also found that there was a wide 
range of intention among the taxpayers that ranged from deliberate non-compliance 
with reporting to the unintentional.555 However, as pointed out in the report, it is 
important to keep in mind that these characteristics and data are from a small group 
of taxpayers that participated in the OVCI and does not account for the larger group 
 
551 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 (2014); See also, Alfred Bender, Domination v. 
Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the 
United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 
291-292 (Spring 2013); Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History 
of the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for 
Increased Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014).  
552 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 (2014). 
553 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 (2014). 
554GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 2 (March 2009. 
555 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 3 (March 2009. 
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of taxpayers that did not take part and may be illegally concealing their money 
offshore.556 
The report noted that a majority of the taxpayers that chose to use the OVCI had, in 
fact, filed a tax return reporting their income as well as paying the taxes due but failed 
to file an FBAR.557 That could be simply because those taxpayers were part of the 
group of taxpayers that did not realize they had an obligation to file the FBAR. While 
the non-filers in this report were a small minority, they did not file a tax return nor did 
they file an FBAR because, according to an IRS official, they were illegally evading 
taxes and hiding their assets offshore.558 This report’s findings is more evidence that 
those that use voluntary disclosure programs want to voluntarily comply and are not 
the taxpayers who choose to conceal foreign accounts and continue to decide that non-
compliance is worth the risk.  
The diversity of professions that were identified in the report were taxpayers that 
worked and those that were retired.559 Of those that worked, the professions ranged 
from executives to medical professionals to building trades.560 While the retired 
applicants accounted for the most applications, the professions that applied for the 
OVCI the most were the executives, business/self-employed individuals and the 
professionals involved in the banking, financial and insurance industries (which were 
grouped together).561 These are the taxpayers that would be considered professionals 
that are legally, financially and business savvy. They would more than likely be aware 
 
556 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 3 (March 2009. 
557 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 56 (March 2009. 
558 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 56 (March 2009. 
559 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 62 (March 2009. 
560 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 62 (March 2009. 
561 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 62 (March 2009. 
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of their tax filing obligation as opposed to those not employed in the business, legal 
or financial world.  
Another piece of data that the IRS tracked was the geographical location of the OVCI 
applicant by tax year.562 According to the tables provided in the report, Florida always 
had the largest number of applicants and half of all applicants were to be found (at 
least for the years represented in the report) in Florida, California, Connecticut, Texas 
and New York.563 Interestingly, U.S. taxpayers that were living outside of the U.S. are 
not mentioned.  
5.2.1.1 What Do the Disclosure Programs Require? 
The compliance programs, while being offered over multiple years, have several 
characteristics in common.564 All of the programs required the taxpayer to pay back 
taxes and interest owed for a certain number of years in order to avoid criminal 
prosecution along with paying an offshore penalty and a delinquency/accuracy 
penalty.565 Filing amended or late FBARs which includes identifying the taxpayer’s 
foreign bank accounts is also required when a taxpayer participated in one of the 
disclosure programs.  
The Internal Revenue Manual (hereinafter IRM) is a procedural guide for IRS agents 
and it covers everything from criminal tax to taxpayer education and assistance to 
organization and finance and management. The part of the manual that is of interest 
to this chapter is Part 9, Criminal Investigation, Chapter 5 Investigative Process and 
Section 11, Other Investigations. Under this section, there is a subsection for 
Voluntary Disclosure Practice. This section discusses how the voluntary disclosures 
should be managed and how to evaluate and transmit the disclosure.566 This part of 
 
562 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 58 (March 2009. 
563 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 58 (March 2009. 
564 Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 677 (2018). 
565 Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 677 (2018). 
566 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9.1 – 9.5.11.9.10 
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the manual is the roadmap for what the taxpayer must do to file a voluntary disclosure 
that the IRS will accept.  
An acceptable voluntary disclosure happens when the information is truthful, timely, 
complete and when the taxpayer fulfills two requirements: 1) the taxpayer shows a 
willingness to cooperate (and does in fact cooperate) with the IRS in determining 
his/her correct tax liability and 2) the taxpayer makes good faith arrangements with 
the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest and any penalties determined by the IRS to be 
applicable.567  In order to be considered a timely disclosure the taxpayer has to submit 
the disclosure to the IRS before the IRS has either initiated a civil or criminal 
investigation of the taxpayer, received information from a third party regarding the 
taxpayer’s noncompliance  or received information from a criminal enforcement 
action such as a search warrant.568 The IRM makes it clear that a voluntary disclosure 
does not guarantee automatic immunity from prosecution and that the voluntary 
disclosure is considered with all other relevant factors.569 Taxpayers cannot rely on 
the fact that other taxpayers are similarly situated in the hopes of avoiding criminal 
prosecution but filing a voluntary disclosure may result in the IRS not recommending 
prosecution.570 If the case involves illegal source income, then the practice of 
voluntary disclosure and the potential immunity from prosecution does not apply.571 
The voluntary disclosure can take any form as long as it meets elements of subsection 
9.5.11.9. This means that a letter from an attorney that includes amended returns that 
are correct and truthful, which offers to pay the tax, interest and any penalties due and 
which has also been done in a timely manner is acceptable considering it meets the 
elements listed in the paragraph.572 The IRM gives several examples of what qualifies 
 
567 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(3). 
568 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(4). 
569 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(1)-(2); See also, Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary 
Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783, 784 (August 6, 2018). 
 
570 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(1)-(2); See also, Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary 
Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783, 784 (August 6, 2018). 
571 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(2). 
572 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(5). 
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as a voluntary disclosure and what does not.573 The IRM notes that the question of 
whether a communication by the taxpayer qualifies as a voluntary disclosure is 
determined only by an examination of the facts and circumstances of each 
investigation.574 
After the taxpayer has gone through the process of voluntarily disclosing, the IRS can 
assess penalties and fines in relation to both late returns and applicable FBARs.  
 
5.2.2. PENALTIES  
The IRS has a penalty structure as part of the disclosure programs, similar to the 
FBAR, to strongly encourage tax compliance through voluntary disclosure. The IRS 
uses a penalty scheme although the penalties are not as severe as the FBAR. The IRS 
claims that the benefits to the taxpayer(s) includes, but are not necessarily limited to, 
being in compliance with the tax laws, avoiding potentially sizeable civil penalties 
which also, in turn, eliminates prosecution.575 It also provides the taxpayer a relative 
degree of certainty to the amount of penalties that they would owe.576  
What penalties do taxpayers face regarding the voluntary disclosure programs? Are 
they effective or does the potential of penalties discourage taxpayers from entering 
into the disclosure programs and consequently prohibit the IRS from obtaining the 
information they seek?  
The financial penalty that resulted from the OVDP program was originally set at 20% 
of the taxpayer’s highest aggregate value of foreign accounts and assets during the 
 
573 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9(6)-(7); See also, Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary 
Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783, 784 (August 6, 2018). 
574 Internal Revenue Manual, 9.5.11.9.1(2) 
575 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 382 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016);  
576 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 382 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); See also, IRS, 2012 Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/2012-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-
program  
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examined years for the first compliance program in 2009.577 Over the subsequent 
years of the programs, the penalty increased until the last program — which ended in 
September 2018 — was set at 27.5%.578 However, reduced penalties can be applied 
in certain situations – for example, a taxpayer who is unaware they are a U.S. citizen 
– for taxpayers who qualify for it.579  An illustration of this would be a child born in 
Denmark who is born to an American parent who conveys American citizenship to 
the child just because that parent is a citizen of the United States, and a parent of 
another nationality.  That child spends their life in Denmark and never steps foot in 
the U.S. probably would not realize they are a United States citizen. Another example 
would be a child born to foreign-born parents who are working in the United States 
on a visa and who are residents in the states short-term (few months to a few years). 
The child then spends the rest of their life living in the home country of their parents. 
While the parents are not citizens of the United States, the child is an automatic citizen 
as a result of being born in the America.  
In order to be accepted into the voluntary disclosure programs, the taxpayer has to 
agree to pay an FBAR penalty as part of the deal even if the taxpayer had no prior 
knowledge of his duty to file FBAR or if the taxpayer qualifies for a waiver of 
penalties based on the reasonable cause exception.580 This, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. 
Chodikoff argue, allows the IRS to impose the willfulness penalty on taxpayers 
without meeting the obligation of proving that the individual taxpayer’s actions were 
willful.581 The problem, from this viewpoint which is correct, is that the taxpayer who 
 
577 Jeffery D. Moss, Foreign Bank Account Reports: Will There Be More Scrutiny of FBARS 
and Other Disclosure Returns, 31 Foreign Bank Account Reports 29, 31 (Spring 2018); See 
also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 380 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); 
578 Jeffery D. Moss, Foreign Bank Account Reports: Will There Be More Scrutiny of FBARS 
and Other Disclosure Returns, 31 Foreign Bank Account Reports 29, 31 (Spring 2018); See 
also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 380 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016); 
579 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 382 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
580 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 382 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
581 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 382 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
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makes an innocent mistake and who would most likely be covered under the 
reasonable exception clause under §5321(a)(5)(B)(i) is not covered from this under 
the voluntary disclosure programs.582 The taxpayer was required as part of these 
programs to pay the FBAR penalty which under the last OVDP in 2009 was 20% of 
the amount in foreign accounts with the highest aggregate balance during the calendar 
year.583 The innocent taxpayer who could under the FBAR penalty scheme raise the 
reasonable exception defense and avoid any penalty, now instead has to pay a fairly 
substantial FBAR penalty. “The irony is that……in reality the IRS has thrown 
grandma and grandpa from the train by subjecting them to the costly professional fees 
related to entering a program and to its potentially eviscerating penalty structure 
when there would otherwise be no basis for the IRS to assess and collect these FBAR 
penalties.”584 In 2014, the IRS modified the terms to the third OVDP and stated that 
taxpayers that did not act willfully might be able to qualify for a reduced penalty of 
5% as well as only having to amend three years of tax returns instead of the eight that 
was required before.585  
 
5.3. ALTERNATIVES? 
What happens if the taxpayer does not want to enter into a voluntary disclosure 
program? Are there alternatives to voluntary disclosures that a taxpayer could pursue? 
 
582 Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR 
Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased 
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243, 252 (2014); See also, D.S. 
Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 
382 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
583 Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR 
Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased 
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014).   
584 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 383 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
585 Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR 
Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased 
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 Chapman L. Rev. 243 (2014).  
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Quiet disclosures and streamlined compliance are alternatives to voluntary disclosure 
programs and are discussed in the next two sections.  
 
5.3.1. QUIET DISCLOSURES 
A pure quiet disclosure occurs when a taxpayer amends a tax return to disclose 
offshore income and files past-due FBARS without addressing it directly with the 
IRS.586 The quiet disclosures have become popular due to the disclosure programs.587 
This is in opposition to  a “manual disclosure” which is a disclosure that occurs when 
a taxpayer has their tax advisor send the IRS a letter that explains the situation along 
with amended returns and other applicable forms with the end goal being the 
finalization of the returns and no criminal prosecution.588 The IRS approves of this 
method of disclosure because it follows the procedures laid out in the IRM and these 
procedures may not lead to criminal prosecution.589 
Quiet amendments drew little attention before 2008 and, when discovered, rarely drew 
harsh penalties from the IRS.590 This allowed those that truly abused the system (and 
those to which the system is really after) to not fear the possibility of civil and criminal 
penalties for the failure to disclose.591  The 2007 UBS case, once again, was the 
turning point for quiet disclosures as it was for the other initiatives such as FBAR and 
 
586 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207-208 (July 13, 2015); See also, 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-
program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers-2012-revised; 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/04/13/quiet-foreign-account-disclosure-not-
enough/#7fadb20c6649; https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2011/02/08/irs-offers-
new-amnesty-for-offshore-tax-cheats/#71a37677412b   
587 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207 (July 13, 2015). 
588 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207-208 (July 13, 2015). 
589 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207-208 (July 13, 2015); 
590 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 208 (July 13, 2015). 
591 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 208 (July 13, 2015). 
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the John Doe summons (subsequent chapter) because the U.S. government started 
using multiple avenues to procure taxpayer information on foreign accounts which 
then forced taxpayers into the position of needing to disclose their assets before they 
were discovered.592 
A quiet disclosure is strongly disliked by the IRS as an approach to disclosing offshore 
assets and it does not consider a quiet disclosure a disclosure at all because taxpayers 
would normally be subject to penalties under the formal programs. If they use a quiet 
disclosure they sidestep these penalties and it is not detected before the statute of 
limitations runs out.593 While utilizing one of the OVDPs protects a taxpayer from 
criminal prosecutions, filing a quiet disclosure does not provide the same protections 
which means the taxpayer opens themselves up to both criminal and civil prosecution 
as well as all penalties that would apply.594 However, if a quiet disclosure does, in 
fact, go unnoticed the taxpayer could pay no penalties.595 The taxpayer then has to 
decide whether the risk of choosing the quite disclosure route and possibly being 
detected by the IRS is worth it.  
 
 
592Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 208 (July 13, 2015). 
593Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 210 (July 13, 2015); See also,  
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-
program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers-2012-revised; Forbes, Quiet Foreign 
Account Disclosure Not Enough, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/04/13/quiet-
foreign-account-disclosure-not-enough/#7fadb20c6649;  Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax 
Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 676 (2018); Noam Noked, The Future of Voluntary 
Disclosure, 160 Tax Notes 783 (August 6, 2018). 
594 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 210 (July 13, 2015); See also, IRS, Offshore Voluntary Disclosure 
Program FAQs, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-
disclosure-program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers-2012-revised  
595 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 210 (July 13, 2015). 
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5.3.2. STREAMLINED COMPLIANCE  
The other alternative to the disclosure programs that a taxpayer can choose to use is 
the Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures. The purpose of this program is “to 
provide taxpayers who are able to certify that their failure to report foreign assets 
and pay all tax due in respect of those assets did not result from willful conduct on 
their part.”596 These procedures require several steps that the taxpayer has to navigate. 
The taxpayer must certify that the failure to file was non-willful, file three years of 
tax returns and six years of FBARs.597 There is a difference in penalties for this 
program depending on whether or not the taxpayer is a resident.598 If the taxpayer is 
not a resident, then there are no penalties that result unless the “examination 
determines that the original non-compliance was fraudulent and/or the FBAR 
violation was willful.”599 This may be because a non-resident may not be familiar with 
the tax laws and requirements of the U.S. so unless they met the fraudulent or willful 
bar, no penalty would be assessed. However, if they are a resident taxpayer (which 
includes U.S. citizens abroad) then the penalty ceiling is 5% of the foreign financial 
assets.600  
The streamlined procedures provide no protection from criminal prosecutions or IRS 
audits and once a taxpayer submits documents under the streamlined compliance 
program, the taxpayer cannot participate in the other voluntary disclosure programs.601 
The streamline compliance program has had 65,000 taxpayers utilize it in order to 
 
596 D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 353, 386 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016). 
597 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 209 (July 13, 2015); 
598 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 209 (July 13, 2015); 
599 IRS, U.S. Taxpayers Residing Outside the United States, 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/u-s-taxpayers-residing-outside-the-
united-states 
600 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 209 (July 13, 2015). 
601 Travis A. Greaves and T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure 
World, 148 Tax Notes 207, 209 (July 13, 2015); See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 353, 386 (Palgrave MacMillan 
2016). 
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come into compliance with U.S. tax law602— still a very small number compared to 
the estimated 9 million U.S. taxpayers living abroad and the potentially millions of 
non-resident taxpayers.603 
 
5.4. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES: 
CONCLUSION 
The voluntary disclosure programs are another measure that the IRS uses in the 
hopes that they can obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts so that 
they can apply the facts correctly and fairly. The purpose of the voluntary disclosure 
programs was to get the taxpayers to disclose their foreign accounts and pay the 
taxes owed.604 To do this the IRS outlined the procedures for disclosing and the 
potential penalties faced as discussed above. The voluntary disclosure programs 
were an opportunity that the IRS gave to the taxpayer –with some strong incentive in 
the form of penalties – to voluntarily disclose their foreign financial accounts.  
The question then is whether the programs, as implemented, allow the U.S. 
government to procure formerly inaccessible taxpayer information on foreign 
accounts so that the IRS can then correctly and fairly administer U.S. tax law? 
The answer to that question is partially no. The voluntary disclosure programs had 
very minor wins but not enough to really assert that these programs work overall. 
When a taxpayer voluntarily discloses, the disclosure fulfills two important goals the 
IRS has. First, it brings the taxpayer into compliance with tax laws. Second, the 
disclosure gives the IRS access to that taxpayer’s information on their foreign 
 
602IRS, IRS to End Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,  
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-end-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers-
with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-come-forward-now  
603 Americans Abroad, How We Are Counted, https://www.americansabroad.org/how-are-we-
counted/ 
604 IRS, Statement of IRS Commissioner John Koskinen, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/statement-of-irs-commissioner-john-koskinen 
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accounts which allows the IRS to administer the tax laws fairly and correctly. It also 
can help the IRS discover potential facilitators and financial institutions that are 
helping Americans evade their taxes by obscuring any information that identifies the 
accounts as being held by Americans. 
The programs work partially in that they do get some taxpayers to voluntarily 
disclose but not enough to say that the program is a total success and that it allows 
the IRS to obtain the information needed on foreign accounts of a large amount of 
taxpayers.  
While the voluntary disclosure programs have encouraged some taxpayers to come 
back into compliance with the law, the real target, intentional tax evaders, generally 
remain non-compliant and will continue to do so if the risk to evade outweighs the 
potential consequences.605 The 2009 GAO report discussed in subsection 5.2.1 
supports this since the report results demonstrate that a majority of the taxpayers that 
chose to use the OVCI filed a tax return that reported their income and paid taxes. 
Tax evaders do not generally take those actions but if they do, they are generally 
fraudulent actions in that they do not include all of their income, they do not declare 
foreign accounts or pay the taxes they owe. Despite the small group of taxpayers 
that was evaluated in the report, the results can most likely be extrapolated to the 
other disclosure programs and their results.  
The voluntary nature of the programs coupled with penalties that do not encourage 
taxpayers to comply is where the breakdown of this program occurs. As noted 
earlier in this chapter, many of the taxpayers have examined their situations and 
have chosen to risk non-compliance and the potential penalties that accompany that 
noncompliance. While the IRS had increased the penalties over the course of the 
various disclosure programs, the penalties are obviously not extreme enough to 
 
605 Alfred Bender, Domination and Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 291 (Spring 2013).  
CHAPTER 5. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS 
181 
 
warrant more taxpayers choosing compliance over the risk of being detected and the 
potential penalties that come with detection.  
As one scholar says, the carrot and stick method of amnesty “will only be successful 
if tax evaders believe that the IRS really has the stick to back up its talk, which 
seems increasingly less likely.”606 The penalties of both the FBAR program and the 
voluntary disclosure programs have not seemed to be the stick that the taxpayers 
need to be strongly encouraged to comply with U.S. tax laws. This is validated 
through the small numbers of taxpayers that use both programs compared to the 
millions of Americans that hold foreign accounts. While the IRS has ended most of 
the voluntary disclosure programs, if the IRS ever chooses to start up the voluntary 
disclosures again an increase in the amount of penalties should be considered.  
The penalties structure should be similar to the suggestions at the end of Chapter 4. 
Meaning that for those that truly were not aware of the obligations they were under a 
reasonable exception should apply. If a taxpayer has no idea of the obligation they 
are under to file or disclose accounts – as in the example of the child born in 
Denmark to a U.S. citizen – then what is the point of punishing behavior that was 
not done intentionally? For this reason, as a few academics also argue, a reasonable 
exception should exist for those that are unaware of their obligations or who make 
an innocent mistake. The burden should be on the IRS to prove that a reasonable 
exception did not exist and, therefore, the taxpayer should be subject to the penalty 
scheme. Conversely, for those cases where there is evidence that the taxpayer has 
been evading taxes then the penalty scheme should apply but it should be much 
higher - 60% as suggested in the FBAR chapter - than the 27.5% of the last 
disclosure program. The burden in this scenario should fall on the taxpayer to prove 
that they did not intentionally evade taxes or refuse to disclose foreign accounts.  
 
606 Alfred Bender, Domination and Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons With the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 291 (Spring 2013).  
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Another reason for the small number of those that chose to use the voluntary 
programs is possibly that some are not aware of the programs and the opportunities 
to voluntarily disclose their foreign accounts. Some might not even be aware that 
they have an obligation to report their accounts and continue filing tax returns. Since 
the population of the U.S. living abroad is almost 9 million, the IRS should spend 
some money in advertising and/or educating – as suggested for the FBAR in the 
previous chapter – this population on the requirements of the filing obligations while 
living abroad. This could be in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State. For 
example, around tax time an embassy could send a reminder out to the citizens it has 
record of living in that country reminding them of their general filing obligations 
such as tax returns, FBARs,  and any FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act – Chapter 9) obligations while also reminding it may not be all the obligations 
they fall under. At the end of the email, the State Department can link to the IRS 
website. As far as the U.S. taxpayers living in the U.S., it is much easier to advertise 
and educate those U.S. taxpayers who are resident in the U.S.  
Largely, though, the reason for the low participation is due to tax evasion. Even if 1 
million U.S. taxpayers participated in the programs, it would still be insignificant 
compared to the estimated 9 million Americans living abroad, the millions of 
resident Americans and the countless number of non-resident taxpayers who hold 
foreign accounts.  
Using these voluntary disclosure programs still bring some non-compliant taxpayers 
in and should not be completely discounted. But they do not overwhelmingly help 
the IRS obtain U.S. taxpayer information on foreign accounts. They are only a small 
piece of the larger puzzle of obtaining taxpayer information. The programs need be 
used in conjunction with the other measures. The IRS should think about reinstating 
the voluntary disclosure programs even for the small amount of information that 
they get from them. This information can lead to investigations on a wider scale that 
allow for the IRS to utilize the John Doe summons (See next chapter) to require 
third parties to hand over information on U.S. taxpayers that might have financial 
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accounts offshore. Without the voluntary compliance of U.S. taxpayers, however 
small, some of these tax schemes would go unnoticed.  
The last two chapters have considered the initiatives that the IRS uses to encourage 
voluntary compliance through the taxpayer themselves. Despite the small amount of 
success that the voluntary disclosure programs and the FBAR have seen, the IRS has 
another anti-tax evasion measure to procure taxpayers’ information abroad by means 
of third parties: the John Doe summons. This is the focus of the subsequent chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6. JOHN DOE SUMMONS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the chapters on FBAR (4) and Voluntary Disclosures (5) show thus far the U.S. 
government has two anti-tax evasion measures at their disposal that try to obtain 
taxpayer information on foreign accounts through the taxpayers’ compliance through 
voluntary disclosure. The resulting determination is that both the FBAR and the 
voluntary disclosure programs do not work efficiently because the two measures only 
bring in taxpayers who are not willfully evading their tax obligations.  
The subject of the present chapter – John Doe summons – is a legal process occurring 
through the judicial system that uses non-governmental third parties to attempt to 
procure U.S. taxpayers’ information on foreign accounts. This contrasts with the 
previous two chapters whose measures target the taxpayer themselves.  
As the chapter will show, the John Doe summons is an investigatory measure that is 
submitted to the courts for the purpose of procuring information on unknown 
taxpayers via non-governmental third parties. The chapter first examines the John Doe 
summons and how the summons, as an anti-tax evasion measure, gives the U.S. 
government access to information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts and how the 
summons procures that information. The chapter then gives a few examples of John 
Doe summons that have been issued. The concluding section addresses two issues. 
First, whether using the John Doe summons allows the U.S. government to obtain the 
information they are seeking on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts and, second, if using 
the summons does not allow for the government to obtain the information they are 
seeking, what can be done to ensure the ability of the John Doe summons in procuring 
that information.  
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6.2. JOHN DOE SUMMONS EXPLAINED  
To gain the information that is otherwise not attainable or difficult to obtain, the 
Internal Revenue Service sometimes uses a specific information gathering measure 
which is known as a “John Doe summons”.607 A general summons608 is a summons 
where the IRS seeks information on a taxpayer whose identity is known and for the 
purpose of determining the correctness of any return, making a return or determining 
the liability of any person for internal revenue tax.609 In furtherance of the goal of the 
summons, the Secretary of the Treasury has authorization to examine records and 
documents, to have witnesses, including the taxpayer, testify under oath and to order 
the production of said records and documents.610 What exactly is a John Doe611 
summons? In contrast to a general summons, a John Doe summons has unknown 
taxpayers that cannot be identified.612 
The John Doe summons, which has been somewhat successful in the battle against 
tax evasion and use of offshore financial institutions613, is used to obtain information 
and records from a third party – such as VISA or FedEx – about a class of taxpayers 
that are unknown since that information cannot be obtained through the financial 
institution or taxpayer themselves. This is allowed by the courts when the IRS has a 
 
607 26 U.S.C. 7609 (f) 
608 Summons issued by the IRS are administrative summons because the IRS (as well as the 
Department of the Treasury, the parent agency) are in the Executive branch of the U.S. federal 
system and those resources are known as administrative legal resources.  
609 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a).  
610 26 U.S.C. §7602 (a)(1)-(3).  
611 The term “John Doe”, “Jane Doe”, “Richard Roe” or “Jane Roe” is a fictional name used 
to either protect the identity of a person or to designate a person whose identity is unknown 
who is a party to legal proceedings. 
612 Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the 
Dual-Purpose Investigatory Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574 (1984); See also, Megan L. 
Brackney, Meet John Doe Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29 (Fall 2017); International 
Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between 
Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, (2013). 
613 Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29, 32 (Fall 2017) 
(See footnote #1).  
CHAPTER 6. JOHN DOE SUMMONS 
187 
 
reasonable suspicion that those taxpayers are engaged in (or are engaging in) illegal 
conduct – such as evading taxes - that violates U.S. law.614  
 
6.2.1. PROCEDURE/AUTHORITY FOR OBTAINING A JOHN DOE 
SUMMONS 
6.2.1.1 General Summons 
The IRS cannot just issue a summons without authority to do so, so where does the 
IRS get the authority to serve a summons? The authority for this summons is found 
under 26 U.S.C. §7601. This statute gives the IRS the authority to investigate and 
inquire after taxpayers who might be liable to pay taxes.615 In order to fulfill that 
responsibility, the IRS has been given a general summons power found under 26 
U.S.C. §7602 that expands upon that investigatory power616 and, generally, this type 
of summons identifies a known person. In order to investigate the “correctness of any 
return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any 
 
614 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Large U.S. Corporations and Federal 
Contractors with Subsidaries in Jurisdictions Listed As Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157, 11 (December 2008); Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: 
Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United 
Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 292 
(Spring 2013); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the 
Global Information Age, 174 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
615 26 U.S.C. §7601; Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe 
Summons and a Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International 
Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 194 (Fall, 2010); Megan L. Brackney, Meet 
John Doe Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29 (Fall 2017); Alfred Bender, Domination v. 
Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the 
United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 
292 (Spring 2013); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the 
Global Information Age, 174 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the 
IRS Should Foster Innovation In Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 441, 456 (2012).  
616 26 U.S.C. §7602; Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe 
Summons and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International 
Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 194 (Fall, 2010); Alfred Bender, Domination 
v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the 
United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 
292 (Spring 2013); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the 
Global Information Age, 153 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
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person for any internal tax revenue…..or collecting any liability”617 the IRS has the 
authority to examine “any books, papers, records, or other data, which may be 
relevant or material to such inquiry.”618 The IRS also has the authority to summon 
the taxpayer or any person that has possession, custody or care of books of account 
that pertain to the business of the taxpayer as well as to take the testimony of said 
persons or anyone who is relevant or material to the investigation.619 
In order to judicially enforce a §7602 summons, the IRS must establish four elements 
which provide a limitation to the general summons power.620 These four elements – 
established in United States v. Powell and colloquially known as the “Powell factors” 
– are:  
1) The investigation is being conducted for a legitimate 
purpose;  
2) The inquiry may be relevant to that purpose; 
3) The information is not already within the 
government’s possession; and 
4) The IRS has complied with the administrative 
requirements of the USC.621  
Once the IRS has established the above factors, the burden then shifts to the taxpayer 
to challenge the enforcement of the general summons.622 
 
617 26 U.S.C. §7602(a); See also, T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the IRS Should Foster 
Innovation in Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 441, 456 (2012).  
618 26 U.S.C. §7602(a)(1); See also, U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 144-145 (1975). 
619 26 U.S.C. §7602(a)(2)-(3); See also, T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the IRS Should Foster 
Innovation in Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 441, 456 (2012).  
620 International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border 
Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, (2013). 
621 United States v. Powell, 379 US 48 (1964); See also, Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe 
Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29, 30 (Fall 2017). 
622 United States v. Powell, 379 US 48 (1964); See also, Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe 
Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29, 30(Fall 2017). 
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6.2.1.2 John Doe Summons 
While both the known and unknown taxpayer scenarios are relevant to this thesis. The 
known taxpayer scenario does not present the same issues as the unknown taxpayer 
in that the known taxpayer can be brought before the court via the general summons 
power because the identity of the taxpayer is not in question. However, when the 
taxpayer is unknown to the IRS this presents a separate set of problems. For instance, 
the IRS may be aware of – through a voluntary disclosure program – that a certain 
bank in the Bahamas is providing their U.S. clients Visa debit cards to withdraw funds. 
But what they cannot know is the identity of all the U.S. clients based on the 
jurisdiction’s secrecy rules. How can the IRS ascertain whether these U.S. taxpayers 
– with the knowledge that the Bahamas is a jurisdiction that provides secrecy in their 
financial sector – are in compliance with their tax obligations? The answer to this 
question lies in the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Bisceglia.  
In United States v. Bisceglia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the IRS had authority 
to issue a “John Doe” summons in order to discover the identity of taxpayers when 
there is a possibility that those unknown taxpayers may have failed to comply with 
their legal tax obligations by compelling a bank to make available private individuals 
records for inspection.623 Congress, in order to protect taxpayers’ privacy and in 
response to the Bisceglia decision, enacted 26 U.S.C. §7609(f) as a limitation to the 
 
623 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975); See also, Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The Application 
of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the Dual-Purpose Investigatory Summons, 52 
Fordham L. Rev. 574 (1984); Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS 
John Doe Summons and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting 
International Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 194 (Fall, 2010); Nancy C. 
Staudt, Rene Lindstadt and Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation: 
Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1340, 
1362-1363 (Nov. 2007); Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax 
Law. 29, 31 (Fall 2017); Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the 
Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax 
Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 29 (Spring 2013).   
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IRS’ power by requiring judicial approval for the issuance of a John Doe Summons 
in which the Secretary of the Treasury (IRS) has to meet three elements.624  
When the taxpayers are unknown, the IRS must establish that three elements exist in 
addition to the Powell factors to issue a John Doe summons625:  
1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person 
or ascertainable group or class of persons who identity is unknown,  
2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or 
group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply 
with any provisions of any internal revenue law, and  
3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of 
the records or testimony and the identity of the John Doe(s) is not 
readily available from other sources.626  
The reasoning behind allowing John Doe summonses is that no investigation could 
occur if the IRS had to ascertain the identity of the taxpayer.627 This is especially true 
in situations where the money and information is inaccessible to the IRS due to being 
 
624 26 U.S.C. §7609(f); See also, Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe 
Summons Procedure to the Dual-Purpose Investigatory Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574, 
575 (1984); Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons 
and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and 
Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 195 (Fall, 2010). 
625 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 292-293 (Spring 2013); See also, Internal Revenue 
Manual, pt. 25.5.7.5 (2-18-16). 
626 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, (1975); 26 U.S.C. §7609(f); See also, Cecelia Kehoe 
Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the Dual-Purpose 
Investigatory Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574, 575 (1984); Megan L. Brackney, Meet 
John Doe Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax Law. 29, 30 (Fall 2017); Third-Party Summons For 
Unknown Taxpayer – John Doe Summons, Fed. Tax Coordinator, Chapter T – Audits, Tax 
Deficiencies, Refunds, Settlements, T-1276 (Nov. 2018); David Kerzner and David W. 
Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 175 (Palgrave 
MacMillian, 2016). 
627 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975).  
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offshore or because of the secrecy laws of another jurisdiction.628 The court explains 
that “it would seem elementary that no meaningful investigation of such events could 
be conducted if the identity of the persons involved must first be ascertained, and that 
is not always an easy task. Fiduciaries and other agents are understandably reluctant 
to disclose information regarding their principals…. Moreover, if criminal activity is 
afoot the persons involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures to 
cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is unable to issue a summons 
to determine the identity of such person, the broad inquiry authorized by §7601 will 
be frustrated in this class of cases.”629 As Robert W. Wood sums it up “…the IRS uses 
John Doe summonses to obtain information about possible violations of internal 
revenue laws by others, individuals whose identities are unknown.”630  
The IRS employs the John Doe summons power after collecting ample information 
that strongly implies that an identifiable group of taxpayers are non-compliant in a 
significant area of tax law but that the individuals members of the group are unknown 
or substantially unknown to the IRS.631 This scenario generally occurs due to bank 
secrecy in certain jurisdictions.632 It usually pursues John Doe summonses in 
situations where the IRS stumbles on individuals of a group in the auditing process or 
through another program like the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) 
(discussed in Chapter 5).633 The IRS realizes, through happening upon the information 
 
628 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975). 
629  U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975); See also, Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe 
Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax Law. 29, 31 (Fall 2017). 
630 Robert W. Wood, IRS Hunts Debit Cards For Tax Evasion, As Court Approves John Doe 
Summons, Forbes (January 25, 2017), found at 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2
017/01/25/irs-hunts-debit-cards-for-tax-evasion-as-court-approves-john-doe-
summons/&refURL=&referrer= 
631 T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the IRS Should Foster Innovation In Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. 
Rev. 441, 456-457 (2012). 
632 T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the IRS Should Foster Innovation In Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. 
Rev. 441, 456-457 (2012).  
633 T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the IRS Should Foster Innovation In Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. 
Rev. 441, 456-457 (2012). 
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that these programs provide, that many other taxpayers are likely in the same 
situation.634 
In another U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court outlined the good faith requirements 
that the IRS must establish in order to present a prima facie case for the enforcement 
of a summons.635 To establish that the IRS has met the good faith requirements, the 
IRS must show that the four factors of the Powell case (as listed above) has been 
met.636 
The IRS has the minimal burden of establishing the rebuttable presumption, but that 
presumption can be met by simply submitting to the court an affidavit637 by an IRS 
agent.638 This affidavit complies with the Congressional approach that favors 
disclosure of any and all information that is relevant to a valid IRS investigation.639 
This approach is also reflected in the heavier burden that the taxpayer has, once the 
burden shifts, of refuting any of the established elements from the Powell case.640 The 
taxpayer has the burden showing that the IRS is abusing the court’s process by 
 
634 T. Keith Fogg, Go West: How the IRS Should Foster Innovation In Its Agents, 57 Vill. L. 
Rev. 441, 456-457 (2012).  
635 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).  
636 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); See also, Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce 
or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax 
Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 195 
(Fall, 2010). 
637 An affidavit is a voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant 
before an officer authorized to administer oaths and can be used as evidence. (Black’s Law 
Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner, ed., 7th edition, 1999).  
638 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 195 (Fall, 2010) (citing United States. v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 
(1989) and United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984)).   
639 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 195 (Fall, 2010) (citing United States. v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 
(1989) and United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984)).   
640 U.S. v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); See also, Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to 
Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid 
Conflicting International Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 195 (Fall, 2010); 
Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ 
John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. 
Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 (Spring 2013). 
CHAPTER 6. JOHN DOE SUMMONS 
193 
 
establishing that the IRS either issued a summons in bad faith – for example, issuing 
a summons for an improper purpose – or that there was harassment of the taxpayer.641 
After the Supreme Court’s holding in Bisceglia, Congress became concerned that 
there was nothing to limit the IRS’ John Doe summons power and that the party 
summoned would not have an interest in protecting the records from disclosure and, 
therefore, the IRS would have no opponent that would question the summons.642 
Therefore, Congress enacted 26 U.S.C. §7609(f) in order to limit the IRS’ power to 
issue summonses. The purpose behind the enactment of the statute was to prohibit 
fishing expeditions643 into taxpayers’ records. This statute specifically applies to “any 
summons….which does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the 
summons is issued….”644 In the words of the Western District Court of Oklahoma, the 
John Doe summons is a statutory procedure that has “placed the federal courts 
between the government and the person summoned to protect against the abusive use 
of governmental powers.”645 The elements required to prove a John Doe summons 
provides some reassurance that the information that is sought through the summons is 
not a fishing expedition but is applicable and material to a valid IRS investigation 
despite not knowing the identity of the taxpayer(s).646  
 
641 U.S. v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).  
642 Matter of Oil Gas Producers, Etc., 500 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Okla. 1980); See also, Emily 
Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A Framework 
For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 
Temp. L. Rev. 185, 197 (Fall, 2010); Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summonses, 32 No. 
1 Prac. Tax L. 29-30 (Fall 2017). 
643 26 U.S.C. §7609(f); Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summonses, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax 
L. 29-30 (Fall 2017); See also, Matter of Oil Gas Producers, Etc., 500 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. 
Okla. 1980); Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons 
and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and 
Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 197 (Fall, 2010). 
644 26 U.S.C. §7609(f); See also, Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe 
Summons Procedure to the Dual-Purpose Investigatory Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574, 
576 (1984). 
645 Matter of Oil Gas Producers, Etc., 500 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Okla. 1980); See also, Cecelia 
Kehoe Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the Dual-Purpose 
Investigatory Summons, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 574, 580 (1984). 
646 Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., v. U.S., 469 U.S. 310 (1985); See also, Megan L. Brackney, Meet 
John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29 (Fall 2017).  
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6.2.1.3 Ability to Quash a John Doe Summons 
A U.S. taxpayer can go to court and pursue a motion to quash.647 The taxpayer has to 
demonstrate to the court that there are legitimate legal reasons to prohibit disclosure 
of the information being sought.648 If the taxpayer is successful in getting the John 
Doe summons quashed, the enforcement is denied and the third party does not have 
to relinquish the information.649 The third party that is being summoned does not have 
the ability to pursue a motion to quash which will be discussed in more detail further 
down.650  
There are multiple reasons a court may quash a summons, and in relation to this 
chapter, a John Doe Summons. The courts may quash a John Doe summons when it 
is overbroad, when it constitutes abuse of process or when it conflicts with a foreign 
law.651  
The courts may quash based upon an abuse of process.652 One court defined it this 
way: “Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an 
improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle 
a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of a 
 
647 26 U.S.C. §7609(b)(1)-(2). 
648 Harris Bonnette, Jr., The IRS and Their Pesky Summonses: A Primer on Enforcement and 
Common Defenses, 90 Florida Bar J. 36 (December 2016).  
649 Harris Bonnette, Jr., The IRS and Their Pesky Summonses: A Primer on Enforcement and 
Common Defenses, 90 Florida Bar J. 36 (December 2016); See also, Department of Justice, 
Tax Division, Summons Enforcement Manual, 27 (Frank P. Cihlar, et al. 2011). 
650 26 U.S.C. §7609(a)(1); See also, Department of Justice, Tax Division, Summons 
Enforcement Manual, 27 (Frank P. Cihlar, et al. 2011).  
651 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 196 (Fall, 2010); Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: 
Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United 
Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 
(Spring 2013). 
652 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 196 (Fall, 2010); Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: 
Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United 
Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 
(Spring 2013). 
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particular investigation”.653 In order to qualify as an abuse of process, the misconduct 
has to be egregious or done in bad faith.654  
Another justification for quashing a summons is when the summons is overbroad. The 
courts have differed in their opinions as to what qualifies as overbroad and these 
divisions seem to run along liberal versus conservative655 lines at the appellate level.656 
Some courts define an overbroad summons broadly as a summons that “is out of 
proportion to the ends sought”, while other courts define it more narrowly.657 The 
government will not be allowed to take a “rambling exploration” through third 
parties’ files nor will a fishing expedition be permitted in the hopes that it will reveal 
evidence of a crime.658 Conversely, the narrow definition of an overbroad summons 
is defined as a summons that “does not advise the summoned party what is required 
of him with sufficient specificity to permit him to respond adequately to the 
summons.”659  The Supreme Court has declined to restrict the breadth of the summons 
 
653 U.S. v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); See also, U.S. v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 535 (1989); Emily 
Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A Framework 
For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 
Temp. L. Rev. 185, 196 (Fall, 2010). 
654 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 196 (Fall, 2010) (citing Beaumont Key Servs., L.L.C. v. 
United States, 2005 WL 2007100, 2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2005).  
655 The 3rd, 4th, 9th and 11th circuit (appellate) courts are generally considered liberal while the 
1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th and 8th are considered conservative. See Andreas Broscheid, Comparing 
Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 L. & Soc. 
Rev. 171 (March 2011) for a discussion on circuit courts that are liberal versus conservative. 
656 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 196 (Fall, 2010) 
657 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 195 (Fall, 2010) (citing United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 
520, 523 (2d. Cir. 1968)(quoting McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377)(2d. Cir. 1937)); See also, 
Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 2018 WL 6791104 (D. Colo. August 6, 2018) (citing 
U.S. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).  
658 U.S. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); See also, United States v. 
Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d. Cir. 1968); U.S. v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 
1973). 
659 United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981); See also, U.S. v. Medllin, 986 F.2d 
463 (11th Cir. 1993); Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe 
Summons and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International 
Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 196-197 (Fall, 2010) 
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authority given to the IRS lacking any explicit directions from Congress itself and 
noted itself the inter-circuit conflict660 regarding this issue.661 This gives deference to 
the language in 26 U.S.C. 7602(a) which reflects the broad latitude that Congress gave 
to the IRS that favored disclosure of all information relevant or material to such 
inquiry.662  
Considering that the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of 
“overbroad” in the John Doe summons context, one way to predict what the Court 
might do would be to look at the analogous issue of a third-party subpoenas duces 
tecum. A third-party subpoena duces tecum is a written order by the court 
commanding a third party to appear in court and bring specified documents or 
records.663 This is analogous to the John Doe summons used for tax purposes as that 
is, likewise, a written order summoning a third party to provide information on a 
unknown taxpayer that has potential tax liability as noted above. Both the John Doe 
summons and the third-party subpoena duces tecum require the third party to provide 
documentation and both requests on the documentation can involve a question of 
whether the request for that documentation is too broad. Furthermore, the subpoena 
duces tecum has a couple tests that it must be evaluated against before it can be issued 
that are comparable to the tests that the John Doe summons must meet. In the first 
test, it has to be shown that the documents being requested under the subpoena are 
evidentiary and relevant, they are not otherwise procurable, trial cannot properly be 
prepared for without such production and the application for the subpoena is made in 
good faith and is not intended to be a fishing expedition.664 The second test, according 
to the Supreme Court, has three hurdles that the prosecutor has to clear to have the 
 
660 Meaning the division of opinions at the appellate (circuit) court level. 
661 U.S. v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has declined 
to restrict the broadness that the IRS has in its summons power).  
662 U.S v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997); See also, U.S. v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 
1988).   
663 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Editor Bryan A. Garner 1999).  
664 U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (quoting U.S. v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952)).  
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subpoena issued. Those hurdles are relevancy, admissibility and specificity which are 
also comparable to the John Doe requirements.665 
In the third-party subpoena cases that address the breadth issue, the courts have held 
that the subpoena should not be used as a “broad discovery device” in the hopes that 
asking for a broad array of documents will increase the change that some tidbit of 
illegal behavior will turn up that would be helpful.666 In fact, the Supreme Court has 
stated that it is “contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search667 through 
all the respondents’ records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will 
turn up.”668 A few of the district courts have held that in order to not be overbroad, 
“the time covered by the subpoena must be reasonably limited and the subject matter 
of the documents called for must be specified with reasonable particularity.”669 One 
court goes a bit further and states a request for a subpoena should relate to a specific 
time, place or person.670 The Supreme Court decisions back up this specificity 
requirement by stating that the subpoena should specify a reasonable period of time 
and be reasonably particular regarding the subjects to which the documents called for 
relate.671 However, at the same time, it cannot be so specific that the party requesting 
the subpoena has to detail each particular piece of documentation they desire.672  
 
665 U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
666 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); See also, U.S. 
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1980); Gilmore v. U.S., 265 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958); 
App. Of Certain Chinese Family Benevolent and District Assoc., 19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Calif. 
1956).  
667 This is also a 4th amendment issue but that is beyond the scope of this thesis and could 
have a dissertation written solely on that topic.  
668 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924). 
669 In Re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); See also, U.S. v. Maloney, 37 
F.R.D. 441, 446 (W.D. Penn. 1965) (quoting In Re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760 
(W.D.N.Y. 1947)).  
670 Application of Certain Chinese Family Benevolent and Dist. Assoc., 19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. 
Calif. 1956). 
671 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. State of Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908); See also, Brown v. 
U.S., 276 U.S. 134 (1928).  
672 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. State of Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908); See also, Brown v. 
U.S., 276 U.S. 134 (1928). 
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Another way to predict what the Court might do in the future should they choose to 
hear a case on the issue of broadness in a summons, is to examine a few cases that 
point to how the Supreme Court might decide. First, in U.S. v. Morton Salt Co. (1950), 
the Court stated that “the judicial subpoena power (which is analogous to the 
summons power given to the IRS673) not only is subject to specific constitutional 
limitations……but also is subject to those limitations inherent in the body that issues 
them because of the provisions of the Judiciary Article of the Constitution.”674 The 
Court further stated that the federal judicial power extends only to the adjudication of 
cases and controversies and, therefore, the investigative powers it holds “should be 
jealously confined to these ends.”675 The Powell court (1964) then set forth the four 
Powell criteria that was discussed above, followed a decade later by the Bisceglia 
court (1975) which held that a John Doe summons is appropriate where the person is 
unknown lest the purpose of the broad inquiry of 26 U.S.C. §7601 is frustrated.676 
Bisceglia qualified that, understanding that the summons power could be abused by 
conducting fishing expeditions, stated “….the solution is not restrict that authority so 
as to undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system….Substantial protection is 
afforded by the provision that an Internal Revenue Service summons can be enforced 
only by the courts.”677 Fishing expeditions are too broad, however, limiting the 
summonses to investigations that already have a focus – either on a particular return, 
person or potential tax liability – is too narrow because it contradicts the language in 
26 U.S.C. §7602 and has to include the possibility of a unknown person, or a John 
Doe.678 These decisions give the definition of broad as somewhere between a fishing 
expedition (too broad) and focusing on a particular person, return or tax liability (too 
narrow). These appellate cases seem to follow the third-party subpoena duces tecum 
holdings: cannot be a fishing expedition yet cannot be so specific as to detail out each 
document.  
 
673 Author’s emphasis  
674 U.S. v. Morten Salt. Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
675 U.S. v. Morten Salt. Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
676 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975). 
677 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975). 
678 U.S. v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 149 (1975). 
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In trying to predict what the Court might do in the future it could also be significant 
to consider the Court’s makeup between conservatives and liberal justices. With the 
most recent nomination and confirmation of Justice Kavanaugh, many Supreme Court 
experts believe the Court will shift to a slightly more conservative viewpoint.679 
Should the current presidential administration remain in power through the next 
election cycle, it is possible that another conservative justice — considering the age 
and health of Justice Ginsburg — would be appointed to the Court. Should that 
happen, a shift to the more conservative viewpoint would seem even more likely.  
Given the analysis of the third-party subpoena duces tecum cases, the summons cases 
and the above consideration of the composition of the Supreme Court, a decision on 
what is considered “overbroad” in order to give guidance to the lower courts, the 
Supreme Court would look to the cases described above as well as the language of the 
appropriate statutes. The Court, as it sits now, leans conservative and probably will 
for years to come and because conservatives generally favor limited government as 
noted above, the decisions the court makes will also probably be conservative.680  In 
light of this assessment – the view of limited government and the reasoning in the 
above cases – the Supreme Court, as it sits today, in considering what overbroad 
means within the John Doe context would most likely hold for a more narrow 
definition of overbroad which would possibly align with the holding that a summons 
(and a subpoena) should specify a reasonable time period and should describe the 
 
679 The Economist, If Donald Trump Gets Another Supreme Court Pick (May 16, 2019), 
found at  https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/05/18/if-donald-trump-gets-another-
supreme-court-pick; See also, Abigail Simon, The Era of the Swing Justice is Over. Here’s 
How Democrats May Adapt, Time (August 13, 2018), found at 
http://time.com/5363918/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-conservative-bloc/ 
680 Texas GOP, Conservative Principles, https://www.texasgop.org/conservative-principles/ ; 
See also, Indiana Republican Party, 2018 Platform, 
http://indiana.gop/sites/default/files/2018%20Platform%20Final.pdf 
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documents needed with reasonable detail so as to avoid a potential fishing expedition. 
681 
Another reason the courts may quash a summons is comity which is the legal principle 
that courts from different jurisdictions will mutually recognize and show deference to 
a foreign government’s legislative, executive and judicial acts.682 This principle and 
substantive issue is applicable to this chapter because countries like Switzerland and 
others have enacted banking secrecy into their legislation which does not allow their 
bankers to reveal information about their clients to foreign governments.683 This 
creates issues for the IRS when investigating taxpayers that have accounts overseas 
and being able to obtain the information needed to administer the laws.684 Therefore, 
when a summons conflicts with a foreign law, a U.S. court may quash the summons.685 
The Supreme Court has held that courts have wide discretion in deciding how to 
evaluate cases on international comity.686 This, in turn, has resulted in discrepancies 
 
681 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. State of Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908); See also, Brown v. 
U.S., 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the 
Effectiveness of the United States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax 
Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 (Spring 2013) (Also 
coming to the conclusion that the court would narrow the scope of the John Doe Summons). 
682 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity ; See also, Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not 
to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud 
Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 200 (Fall, 
2010). 
683 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 199 (Fall, 2010). 
684 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 199 (Fall, 2010). 
685 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 199 (Fall, 2010)(citing Societe Internationale Pour 
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958)); 
Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United States’ 
John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 Geo. 
Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 (Spring 2013). 
686 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 (Spring 2013) (citing Societe Internationale Pour 
Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958)). 
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in the decisions of the circuit courts.687 Alfred Bender, when looking at cases of 
international comity, found commonalities among the lower courts’ decisions which 
points to who the stronger supporters of the John Doe summons are.688 He found that 
courts were more likely to affirm the John Doe summons if “(1) the privacy interest 
the foreign state seeks to protect is that of an American citizen, (2) the venue was 
deliberately chosen to avoid following United States law and the conflict could have 
been avoided by following United States law from the onset; and (3) duress is a 
defense to the domestic law in conflict.”689 On the opposite side are the courts that are 
less likely to affirm a John Doe summons, like the 11th circuit, especially when certain 
conditions are met.690 Those conditions are “(1) the information being sought through 
the summons is available through means that do not require the breaking of a foreign 
jurisdictions’ law; (2) the foreign jurisdiction’s law’s protection arose naturally, as 
opposed to as a result of an attempt to evade United States law; and (3) the party 
being served acted in good faith.”691 
The move to quash a John Doe summons cannot come from the summoned party 
because of the designated ex-parte nature that the legislature intended for the 
 
687 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 293 (Spring 2013). 
688 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 294 (Spring 2013) (comparing In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984) with United 
States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983)).  
689 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 294 (Spring 2013). 
690 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 294 (Spring 2013). 
691 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty With Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Comp. L. 289, 294 (Spring 2013) (citing Emily Ann Busch, Note, To 
Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and a Framework for Policing U.S. 
Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Banking Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 
201-203 (2010)). 
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procedure.692 The remedy that the summoned party does have, for both general and 
John Doe summonses, is to challenge the summons after the enforcement action has 
been brought. Even then the summoned party is limited to only challenging the failure 
of the government – in a limited evidentiary hearing — to comply with the Powell 
factors or challenge on the basis of bad faith or abuse of process.693 The 2nd Circuit’s 
interpretation of the legislative history is that Congress never intended – based on the 
requirement of the ex parte application – for the allowance of a summoned party to 
challenge the elements proven in order to issue the summons.694  As Megan Brackey 
points out in her article and with sound logic, a John Doe summons target is highly 
unlikely to challenge the enforcement of the summons since doing so would identify 
the target as someone the IRS should be focusing on.695 This is the type of person that 
anti-tax evasion measures – especially those measures considered in this thesis – want 
to truly target: those that intentionally evade paying taxes by concealing assets in 
foreign accounts.  
In chapter 5, the voluntary disclosure programs were discussed. Those programs have 
relevance in this chapter because sometimes the information disclosed through one of 
those programs leads the IRS to suspect that there are more Americans that are 
concealing money in a similar manner to the disclosed case. Another related program 
the IRS has offered that works in tangent with the John Doe summons is the Offshore 
Credit Card Program (OCCP).696 Credit cards provide easy access to offshore funds 
 
692 26 U.S.C. §7609(h)(2); See also, 26 U.S.C. §7609(a)(1) and (b)(2); Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 
v. U.S., 469 U.S. 310, 317 (1985). 
693 Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29, 32 (Fall 2017); 
See also, Third-Party Summons for Unknown Taxpayer – John Doe Summons, Fed. Tax 
Coordinator, Chapter T – Audits, Tax Deficiencies, Refunds, Settlements, T-1276 (Nov. 
2018); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 175 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
694 In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 688 F.2d 144, 148-149 (2nd cir. 1982); 
See also, Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29, 32 (Fall 
2017). 
695 Megan L. Brackney, Meet John Doe Summons, 32 No. 1 Prac. Tax L. 29, 32 (Fall 2017). 
696 IRS, Offshore Compliance Program Shows Strong Results, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-compliance-program-shows-strong-results; See also, 
David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information 
Age, 174 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
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and accounts in tax haven countries that allow U.S. citizens to conceal their income.697  
One of the big methods used by tax evaders and promoted by offshore financial 
institutions (FI) is the use of the FI’s credit or debit card in order to access the 
taxpayers’ offshore assets but because these credit cards and debit cards are issued 
from FIs in secrecy jurisdictions, the IRS has not been able to identify the taxpayers 
that are using them. The OCCP has been used in conjunction with the John Doe 
summons in order to try to identify taxpayers that were concealing unreported assets 
in offshore banks.698 The IRS issued multiple John Doe summonses to major credit 
card companies like Visa and Mastercard.699 This was a move by the Treasury 
Department and the IRS to fight the credit card schemes used by banks and financial 
institutions in helping U.S. citizens hide income.700 From March 2002 through at least 
August of that year, federal judges in both Florida and California issued orders 
authorizing the IRS to serve John Doe summonses on Visa, Mastercard and American 
Express.701 The records obtained through at least one John Doe summons allowed the 
IRS to establish hundreds of cases for either a civil audit or potential criminal 
investigations.702 The IRS, as a next step, had to seek information from assorted 
businesses because the information gleaned from the John Doe Summonses did not 
always identify the individual.703 In order to identify or verify the identities of these 
individuals, the IRS contacted some of the merchants.704 These merchants included 
(but were not limited to) airlines, hotels, rental car companies and internet 
 
697 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
698 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 174 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
699 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 174 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); See also, IRS, Offshore Credit Card 
Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-program-occp 
700 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
701 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
702 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
703 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
704 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
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providers.705 Between August of 2002 and October of the same year, 110 businesses 
were served John Doe summonses that were approved by all 11 U.S. District 
Courts.706 The IRS made clear it was not the credit card companies nor the businesses 
that were in the wrong.707 Instead, the U.S. citizens using the credit cards to dodge 
their tax responsibilities were the targets.708 
 
6.3. EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF THE JOHN 
DOE SUMMONS 
This next section presents several cases to demonstrate how the summonses work 
when applied in actual situations.  
The IRS has requested a John Doe summons in multiple cases709 to obtain information 
on U.S. taxpayers who the IRS suspected of failing to declare financial accounts or 
for failing to report income earned abroad when that information is not available 
elsewhere. The summonses are directed at third-parties that are financial institutions 
such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or PayPal but also on non-financial 
institutions such as Fed Ex or UPS (United Parcel Service) because, as the IRS pointed 
out, “their (taxpayers) activities are often reflected in business records of legitimate 
 
705 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
706 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
707 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
708 IRS, Offshore Credit Card Program, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-credit-card-
program-occp 
709 In the Matters of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 02-cv-046 MISC. (N.D Cal. 2002); In 
the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 5:05-cv-04167 PVT (N.D. Cal. 2005); In the 
Matters of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 2002 WL 32153784 (N.D. Cal. 2002); In Re: 
Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 2002 WL 32672539 (N.D. Cal. 2002); In the 
Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 2004 WL 3661851 (S.D. Fla. 2004); In the Matter 
of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, 1:09-cv-00861 (District of Colorado, 2009).  
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entities.”710  There are multiple examples of cases – such as the case against UBS  
which is discussed throughout this thesis – where the financial institution hid U.S. 
taxpayer-held Swiss accounts711 and the U.S. government then filed a petition to serve 
a John Doe summons in order to procure information that the IRS could not reach due 
to bank secrecy rules. 712 For example, some successful John Doe summonses that 
have been issued were to UBS in 2008, to First Data Corp in 2009 and to HSBC Bank, 
USA in 2011.713 The John Doe summons is one anti-tax evasion measure that the U.S. 
government uses to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. But does 
this really solve the entire problem of inaccessibility? The following few pages will 
discuss and examine a couple of cases to analyze whether this anti-tax evasion 
measure, when implemented, enables the IRS to obtain the previously inaccessible 
information.  
The John Doe summons are sought because the information the IRS seeks cannot be 
acquired from the jurisdictions named in the summons (such as Antigua or the 
Cayman Islands) due to local secrecy laws. Instead, when the typical avenues – such 
as taxpayer voluntary disclosures or utilizing treaties - that are used to access 
information fail, another strategy for the IRS to take is to file a John Doe summons. 
This is an a move to try to obtain the taxpayer information through the third parties 
who have records of the use of the offshore accounts because the taxpayers have used 
the services of said third parties – for example, using a credit card to rent a car with a 
rental company. 
 
710 Proposed Order Granting Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summonses, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/Sovereign%20Management%20John%20Doe%20Summonses%20Or
der.pdf; See also, In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 5:05-cv-04167PVT 
(N.D. Cal. 2005);   
711 Department of Justice, Press Release, Federal Judge Approves IRS Summons for UBS 
Swiss Bank Account Records, https://www.justice.gov/archive/tax/txdv08584.htm.  
712 Department of Justice, Press Release, Federal Judge Approves IRS Summons for UBS 
Swiss Bank Account Records, https://www.justice.gov/archive/tax/txdv08584.htm. 
713 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 174 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
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The following John Doe summonses are obviously not the only summonses that have 
been issued but the cases examined here were chosen for specific reasons. The PayPal 
and UBS summonses were both chosen because they were fairly high-profile cases – 
especially the UBS case – which was alleged to be the turning point in the fight against 
secrecy. The final summons examined in this section was a more recent case which 
demonstrates that evasion is still an ongoing problem and that the John Doe summons 
is only part of the solution.  
 
6.3.1. PAYPAL SUMMONS 
In the first example, a John Doe summons was served upon PayPal, its affiliates and 
subsidiaries because the IRS had some suspicion that unknown U.S. taxpayers who 
had signature authority over bank accounts and certain types of credit cards that were 
“issued by, through or on behalf of banks or other institutions”  had not complied with 
their U.S. tax obligations.714 The accounts and credit cards in question were issued in 
thirty-four jurisdictions who were named in the summons and these actions occurred 
from 1999 to 2004.715 Most of the thirty-four jurisdictions named in the John Doe 
summons can be found on both the EU blacklist or their state of play document716 and 
the past OECD list.717 They are also widely recognized as “principal offshore tax 
haven or financial privacy jurisdictions” throughout the tax law industry.718 These 
 
714 In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 5:05-cv-04167PVT (N.D. Cal. 
2005); See also, David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 
(Thomson Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
715 In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 5:05-cv-04167PVT (N.D. Cal. 
2005); See also, David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 
(Thomson Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
716 Press Release, Council of the European Union, The EU List of Non-Cooperative 
Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, (December 5, 2017), found at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdictions/#; See 
also, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2018.403.01.0004.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2018:403:FULL  
717 See attached Appendix I with comparative list of tax haven lists, John Doe summons’ 
identified countries, FATCA IGA agreements and TIEAs.   
718 Declaration of Barbara Kallenberg, In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 
5:05-cv-04167-PVT (N.D. Cal. 2005).  
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offshore jurisdictions usually have strict privacy rules that allow the U.S. taxpayer to 
hide behind while not reporting income or financial accounts. The financial 
institutions do not report either simply because they do not have an obligation to. 
Therefore, to procure information on those U.S. accounts, in this scenario the IRS 
issued a summons to PayPal, a third party, to release their records because PayPal 
allows its users to avoid the traditional methods of banking such as wire transfers and, 
instead, allows them to make payments online through PayPal who serves as the agent 
for the payment.719 The PayPal summons alleged that PayPal facilitates users’ abilities 
to evade federal taxes on assets held in offshore accounts within the context of 
payments funded from foreign financial institutions.720 The district court granted leave 
to serve the summons because the IRS met the requirements that were set out in 
Bisceglia and codified in 26 U.S.C. 7609(f).721 The IRS alleged that the individuals 
that were the focus of the investigation may have failed (or would fail) to comply with 
one or more U.S. tax laws.722 The IRS provided the court with information on: 1) the 
possibility that certain U.S. taxpayers with foreign bank accounts failed to comply 
with U.S. federal tax laws and 2) that potential exploitations existed with respect to 
offshore accounts.723 The Northern District of California concluded that the John Doe 
Summons was not a fishing expedition and that this summons would produce results 
similar to other investigations that the IRS had.724 Balanced with the above was that 
even though the IRS did not know the names of those involved and the names could 
 
719 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
720 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
721 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
722 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
723 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
724 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
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not be obtained through the offshore banks due to secrecy laws, their identities could 
be discovered through the information PayPal could provide.725 
 
6.3.2. UBS SUMMONS 
The most prominent case where the IRS issued a John Doe Summons was the case 
against UBS in 2007. This John Doe summons was the largest John Doe summons 
issued by the IRS.726 After Bradley Birkenfeld provided information on UBS and its 
practices, the IRS moved to issue a John Doe summons against UBS instead of 
utilizing the tax information exchange provision that was in the U.S.-Swiss Treaty.727 
The purpose behind this was to try to force UBS to disclose all of their U.S. taxpayer-
held accounts.728 The court approved the summons, but UBS refused to comply citing 
that it would violate Swiss secrecy law.729 The DOJ then negotiated a deferred 
prosecution agreement with UBS that included the disclosure of U.S. taxpayer-held 
accounts and a $780 million fine.730 One of the requirements of the agreement was for 
UBS to identify roughly 200-300 clients who were U.S. account holders who failed 
to declare their accounts for U.S. taxation purposes but UBS refused to cooperate with 
 
725 David E. Hardesty, Electronic Commerce: Taxation and Planning ¶4.06 (Thomson 
Reuters/Tax & Accounting 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2019-1). 
726 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 209 (Fall, 2010). 
727 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
728 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
729 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
730 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
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this as well.731 The U.S. then immediately filed a motion to get the court to enforce 
the turning over of the names and UBS once again refused to cooperate.732 Eventually, 
the John Doe summons was dropped733 because the Swiss legislature agreed to 
releasing the information of 4,450 U.S. account holders as a treaty request, a vast 
difference from the original 52,000 accounts UBS was suspected of holding.734  
This case highlighted the difficulty in procuring information on U.S. taxpayer’s 
foreign accounts when two countries customs (banking secrecy) and laws come into 
conflict with one another. Switzerland has strict banking secrecy laws which would 
have subjected UBS to criminal prosecution had it disclosed account holders’ 
information in accordance with a John Doe summons.735 UBS could also have chosen 
to ignore the summons and refused disclosure but then it would have found itself in 
contempt of a U.S. federal court.736 This catch-22 situation that presents itself – either 
being held in contempt of a federal court or facing criminal prosecution in Switzerland 
 
731 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013); See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. 
Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
732 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013).; See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. 
Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-9 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
733 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013).   
734 Emily Ann Busch, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John Doe Summons and A 
Framework For Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting International Laws and Bank 
Secrecy, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 185, 288 (Fall, 2010) 
735 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013).   
736 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 287 (Spring 2013).   
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for violating bank secrecy – is one flaw that appears when using John Doe summonses 
as an anti-tax evasion measure.  
 
6.3.3. MICHAEL BEHR & SML SUMMONS 
The final example in this chapter is a 2017 case where the IRS was granted leave to 
serve a John Doe Summons on Michael Behr. Mr. Behr is the owner and manager of 
Sovereign Management & Legal LTD (SML) which is a Panamanian company that 
offers offshore entity formation and management services.737 The corporation utilizes 
Panamanian lawyers and other professionals in jurisdictions such as Belize and Hong 
Kong.738  
SML initially drew the attention of the IRS because it promoted itself on the internet 
as a business that would help its’ clients conceal their beneficial ownership of offshore 
assets.739 The IRS, after uncovering information on SML as a result of another John 
Doe summons that was issued through the Southern District court of New York740, 
sought information on U.S. taxpayers who had received Sovereign Gold debit cards 
from SML and used the cards as a way to evade their tax obligations from 2005 
 
737 Bruce Zagaris, Court Authorizes John Doe Summons On U.S. Owner of Panamanian Firm, 
33 No. 2 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 47 (Feb. 2017); See also,  Order Granting Ex Parte 
Petition, In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities, CR 17-02-BU-BMM (D. Montana Jan. 18, 
2017), found at, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/931226/download  
738 Bruce Zagaris, Court Authorizes John Doe Summons On U.S. Owner of Panamanian Firm, 
33 No. 2 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 47 (Feb. 2017); See also, Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition For Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, CR 
17-02-BU-BMM (D. Montana, Jan. 18, 2017).  
739 Bruce Zagaris, Court Authorizes John Doe Summons On U.S. Owner of Panamanian Firm, 
33 No. 2 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 47 (Feb. 2017); See also, Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition For Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, CR 
17-02-BU-BMM (D. Montana, Jan. 18, 2017).  
740 In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities, Proposed Order Granting Ex Parte Petition for Leave 
To Serve “John Doe” Summonses, found at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/Sovereign%20Management%20John%20Doe%20Summonses%20Or
der.pdf  
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through 2016.741 SML offered packages to their clients that allowed the taxpayers to 
conceal their assets in offshore accounts that were held in the names of nominee 
officers provided by SML. SML would then open bank accounts in the name of the 
corporations and issue debit cards in the name of the nominee to the U.S. taxpayer.742 
This allowed the U.S. taxpayer to access their offshore funds without identifying 
themselves.743  The John Doe summons was sought for the purpose of ensuring that 
U.S. citizens who were using certain pre-paid payment card users were meeting their 
tax responsibilities.744 The IRS noted in their memorandum of support that SML even 
boasted that “its services “[h]elp you avoid foreign account reporting requirements 
that many countries now have (such as the USA and Germany)” and that “it is unlikely, 
unless you are careless, that such information will ever reach the authorities.”745 
The order granting the petition for the John Doe summons was granted on January 18, 
2017.746 SML has continued to be listed as number eleven on the IRS’ list of Foreign 
Financial Institutions or Facilitators which also includes other foreign financial 
 
741 Department of Justice, Press Release, Court Authorizes Service of John Doe Summons 
Seeking the Identities of U.S. Taxpayers Who Have Used Debit Cards in Furtherance of Tax 
Evasion (January 25, 2017), found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-authorizes-service-
john-doe-summons-seeking-identities-us-taxpayers-who-have-used-debit; See also, Bruce 
Zagaris, Court Authorizes John Doe Summons On U.S. Owner of Panamanian Firm, 33 No. 2 
Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 47 (Feb. 2017); Robert W. Wood, IRS Hunts Debit Cards for Tax 
Evasion, As Court Approves John Doe Summons, Forbes (Jan. 25, 2017), found at, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2017/01/25/irs-hunts-debit-cards-for-tax-evasion-
as-court-approves-john-doe-summons/#4f8738c6738b  
742 Bruce Zagaris, Court Authorizes John Doe Summons On U.S. Owner of Panamanian Firm, 
33 No. 2 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 47 (Feb. 2017); See also, Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition For Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, CR 
17-02-BU-BMM (D. Montana, Jan. 18, 2017). 
743 Bruce Zagaris, Court Authorizes John Doe Summons On U.S. Owner of Panamanian Firm, 
33 No. 2 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 47 (Feb. 2017); See also, Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition For Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, CR 
17-02-BU-BMM (D. Montana, Jan. 18, 2017).  
744 Department of Justice, Press Release, Court Authorizes Service of John Doe Summons 
Seeking the Identities of U.S. Taxpayers Who Have Used Debit Cards in Furtherance of Tax 
Evasion (January 25, 2017), found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-authorizes-service-
john-doe-summons-seeking-identities-us-taxpayers-who-have-used-debit 
745 Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition For Leave to 
Serve John Doe Summons, CR 17-02-BU-BMM (D. Montana, Jan. 18, 2017). 
746 In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities, Order Granting Ex Parte Petition for Leave To Serve 
“John Doe” Summonses, found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/931226/download  
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institutions (FFIs) such as UBS AG and Liechtensteinische Landsbanke AG.747 
Michael Behr, owner of SML, himself has made the list at number 145.748 This list 
was originally linked to the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs discussed in 
Chapter 5 which have ended. The purpose of this list is to identify the foreign financial 
institutions or facilitators that are under scrutiny.749 The list also identifies those FFIs 
or facilitators where a public disclosure has been made regarding the FFIs and 
facilitators: 
1. Being under investigation by the IRS or the Department of the Treasury;  
2. Cooperating with an ongoing IRS or Department of Justice investigation(s) 
into accounts that are beneficially owned by U.S. persons; or  
3. Having been identified in a court-approved summons seeking information 
about U.S. taxpayers who potentially hold financial accounts at the foreign 
financial institution in question or who have had a facilitator establish or 
maintain an account(s).750 
A public disclosure could include (but not limited to) a court filing by any party or 
judicial officer that is considered a public filing or a deferred prosecution agreement 
that has been publicly disclose by the Department of Justice.751 
If a U.S. taxpayer is found to have an account with an institution or person listed on 
the Foreign Financial Institution and Facilitators list, they face a potential 50% penalty 
 
747 IRS, Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/foreign-financial-institutions-or-
facilitators 
748 IRS, Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/foreign-financial-institutions-or-
facilitators 
749 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
750 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
751 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
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for undeclared accounts instead of at the lower penalty. This applied towards the 
voluntary disclosure programs – which are not currently in use – and it also applies to 
programs such as the stream-lined compliance program (also discussed in chapter 
5).752 This penalty is considered an offshore penalty.753 
 
6.4. JOHN DOE SUMMONS: CONCLUSION 
 
The John Doe summons is an anti-tax evasion measure that the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) can use to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts so 
that it can administer tax laws based on all the information – not just on the facts 
that the taxpayer wants the IRS to know.  
This anti-tax evasion measure’s focal point is the taxpayers whose identities are 
unknown to the IRS at the time of filing but who the IRS suspects of having 
accounts at foreign financial institutions. These foreign financial institutions issue 
credit cards so that the taxpayers have access to their accounts. The IRS, who has 
based their suspicions either on information gleaned from voluntary disclosure 
programs or from other investigations, uses the John Doe summons to procure the 
information they cannot get from the foreign financial institutions themselves from 
third parties who have access to the information.  
 A John Doe summons is not tool that can just be handed out to the third parties by 
the IRS. Instead, the IRS has a process they must undergo before a court will grant 
leave to the IRS to serve the John Doe summons on a third party like FedEx.  
There is a bit of push and pull to the John Doe summons process. This means that 
while the IRS can get the authority to serve the John Doe summons so that the third 
 
752 Internal Revenue Manual 4.63.3.6 (01-24-2018). 
753 Internal Revenue Manual 4.63.3.6 (01-24-2018).  
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
214
 
party must hand over the information, there are some protections for the taxpayer. 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the IRS’ authority to issue the summons under 
Bisceglia but Congress moved to limit that authority by enacting 26 U.S.C. §7609(f) 
which requires judicial approval for the issuance of the summons. To obtain the 
judicial approval, the IRS must meet the Powell factors which requires that the 
summons is legitimate, relevant, the government does not already possess the 
information and that the IRS has complied with the United States Code (USC) 
administrative requirements. Proving the Powell factors allows the IRS to prove that 
the request for the summons has been done in good faith. On top of the Powell 
factors, the IRS has to prove that the summons relates to an investigations of a 
particular person or ascertainable class of persons, that the IRS has a reasonable 
basis for believing such person or persons have failed (or may fail) to comply with 
U.S. tax law and the information sought is not readily available from other sources. 
All of these requirements are in place to guarantee the IRS is not on a fishing 
expedition for potential violations. The taxpayer may pursue a motion to quash the 
John Doe summons, but the summoned third party cannot.  
The John Doe summons, like the other anti-tax evasion measures, is not wholly 
successful at obtaining taxpayer information on foreign accounts because it is 
limited by multiple issues.  
First, for the IRS to utilize a John Doe summons it is dependent on chance 
occurrences:  an IRS agent stumbling onto a questionable taxpayer return,  
information from a financial account regarding suspect activity, information that 
filters in through programs such as voluntary disclosure programs or through 
investigations the IRS itself has or from other agencies. This is demonstrated in the 
examples above of John Doe summons issued. The extent of the abuse by UBS of 
the U.S. tax system was not known until Bradley Birkenfeld blew the whistle on the 
financial institution. The John Doe summons that was granted in the Michael 
Behr/SML case was based on information uncovered after another John Doe 
summons was issued through a different district (federal) court.  
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Another limitation that restricts the success of the John Doe summons as a measure 
that obtains information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts is that it runs counter to 
many foreign jurisdictions’ bank secrecy laws and regulations. The UBS John Doe 
summons, if it had not been withdrawn, would have been difficult for UBS to 
comply with due to the Swiss’ banking secrecy laws.754 The IRS would also have 
had a hard time enforcing the summons across borders. When issuing a John Doe 
summons to third parties in the U.S. such as Fed Ex or VISA, this does not present 
the same issues because the courts have the authority to enforce the summons. 
However, utilizing the John Doe summons can bring the foreign nations to the table 
to negotiate as it did in the UBS case.755 As Alfred Bender stated, the John Doe 
summons “relies on using U.S. law as a means to coerce assistance from a foreign 
nation by exercising leverage over its citizens”.756  
An interesting point to consider within this chapter is that the judicial approval 
limitation placed on the summons limits the effectiveness of this measure in 
obtaining information on taxpayers’ foreign accounts. For example, if Congress had 
not passed the limitation in §7609(f), the IRS would have had almost limitless 
summons power. They would have been able to compel banks to disclose taxpayers’ 
records and the third party, itself, has no interest in protecting those records which 
would leave the door wide open for the IRS to search through records looking for 
violations. So, while a broad discovery, fishing expedition style investigation 
through a John Doe summons would allow the IRS to potentially gather more 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts, the first principles of justice757 — 
 
754 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 297 (Spring 2013).   
755 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 297 (Spring 2013).   
756 Alfred Bender, Domination v. Diplomacy: Comparing the Effectiveness of the United 
States’ John Doe Summons with the United Kingdom’s 2011 Tax Treaty with Switzerland, 4 
Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 286, 303 (Spring 2013).   
757 See footnote #614 
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as noted by the Supreme Court758 — do not allow this. Therefore, the importance of 
the judicial approval limitation of 26 U.S.C. §7609(f) through the first principles of 
justice outweighs any small chance that the government would discover something 
through a fishing expedition style search through a taxpayer’s records.  
One way to ensure that the John Doe summons can obtain information is to do what 
is already being done – using other programs – like the FBAR and the voluntary 
disclosure programs – in conjunction with the John Doe summons.759 Use those 
programs to procure the information and then target the groups of people identified 
using the information provided by complying taxpayers. But the nature of the John 
Doe summons – unknown taxpayers – makes it difficult to fill in the gaps because 
the IRS cannot know information that is not available to it unless they stumble onto 
it or it is discovered another way. If Congress provided for more funding for the IRS 
in the yearly appropriations bill, the IRS could (and should) hire more IRS agents to 
be able to enforce the tax laws. In the last decade, the IRS’ funding has continued to 
decline760 which is a strain on an already overburdened agency that is expected to 
reduce tax evasion among an American population of over 300 million people. 
There are already not enough agents to check each tax return which means that 
many returns that might be showing signs of tax evasion are being missed. Congress 
raises the issue of bringing home the tax revenue lost through tax evasion regularly, 
yet they are refusing to properly fund the agency that can ensure tax evaders are 
caught through evaluations of tax returns, tax audits and investigations. 
Understaffing and hindering the IRS will not help the U.S. government achieve their 
goal of procuring information on foreign accounts held by U.S. taxpayers.  
 
758 Federal Trade Commission vs. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); See also, 
United States Federal Communications Commission, Federal Communications Commission 
Reports: Decisions, Reports of the Federal Communication Commission of the United States, 
Vol. 43, p. 1851 (April 24, 1953 to Oct. 1, 1954).  
759 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
760 Robert A. Weinberger, Tax  Policy Center, Budget Blues for Tax Administration, found at 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/budget-blues-tax-administration 
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The John Doe summons, while it can be an effective tool in gathering information 
on U.S. taxpayers’ accounts foreign accounts, is also tricky because it is impossible 
to predict when information will be discovered that will allow a John Doe summons 
to be issued so that the IRS can gather information on those taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts. The John Doe summons as an anti-tax evasion, information gathering 
measure cannot be used alone – it must be used in concert with other anti-tax 
evasion measures.  
While this chapter was focused on using third parties to gather information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts, the next chapter highlights an anti-tax evasion measure 
that utilizes foreign financial institutions to report U.S. taxpayers’ information to the 
U.S. government through a program known as the Qualified Intermediary program. 
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CHAPTER 7. QUALIFIED 
INTERMEDIARY  
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Qualified Intermediary Program – another anti-tax evasion measure at the 
disposal of the Internal Revenue Service’s disposal – is the focus of this chapter. In 
contrast to the previous chapter which focused on a procedural measure that allows 
the U.S. to attempt to gather information on U.S. taxpayers accounts abroad via third 
parties, this chapter’s focus works with foreign financial institutions to procure 
information on U.S. taxpayer foreign accounts.  
The beginning of the chapter introduces the Qualified Intermediary (hereinafter QI or 
QI program) program by reviewing the purpose and scope of this anti-tax evasion 
measure. Next, the chapter explains and analyzes how the QI program is implemented 
in order to enable the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to obtain the information on 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. The chapter then reviews the problems that have 
presented themselves and how the U.S. government has attempted to solve these 
problems. Finally, the chapter then analyzes whether the QI program, as implemented, 
enables the IRS to procure the formerly inaccessible information. If the QI program 
does not allow the IRS to procure the information they seek, what can be done to 
improve this measure to increase the chances of obtaining the information?  
It needs to be stated here that this chapter is inextricably linked with this thesis’ 
Chapter 9, which covers Chapter 4 Withholding, which is a tax evasion deterrence 
system761 that contains enhanced reporting requirements, and is the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act or known colloquially as FATCA among the legal community 
in the U.S and worldwide.  As stated in the delimitation, while FATCA and the QI 
program are linked and work together in complement to each other, only Chapter 3 
 
761 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2019).  
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(QI) withholding (which covers Non-Resident Alien “NRA” withholding) will be 
discussed here. 
 
7.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE QI 
REGULATIONS 
The Qualified Intermediary program, created in 2000 through statutes and regulations, 
is another anti-tax evasion measure that the government created to force compliance 
by U.S. taxpayers who hold foreign accounts by enlisting the help of foreign financial 
institutions. This program allows the foreign financial institutions (hereinafter FFIs) 
to voluntarily report to the IRS any income earned and withholding taxes collected on 
U.S. source income on behalf of the United States.762 The IRS’ strategy in using the 
QI program was to enforce compliance with U.S. tax law – and more specifically – 
U.S. tax information reporting requirements by relying upon certain foreign 
 
762 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance (2009), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-111hhrg63014/CHRG-111hhrg63014/context ; 
See also, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
3 (July 2008); GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues 
for IRS, GAO-09-478T, 10 (March 2009); GAO, Tax Compliance: Qualified Intermediary 
Program Provides Some Assurance That Taxes on Foreign Investors Are Witheld and Reported, 
But Can Be Improved, GAO-08-99, 9 (December 2007); IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 
C.B. 1243; See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of 
FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-9 (March 1st, 
2017) found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119; Joint Committee 
on Taxation, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 
Budget Proposal, JCS-4-09, 153 (Sept. 2009); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 153 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Marc D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent 
International Tax Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); Mark R. Van Heukelom, 
The Foreign Tax Compliance Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to Comply Than 
to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 101, 105 (Oct. 2013); Stephen Troiano, The U.S. Assault on Swiss 
Bank Secrecy and  the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 317, 333 (2011) 
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intermediaries.763 Initially, when considering the QI program, the IRS only wanted to 
certify businesses as a QI that were operating in a jurisdiction that had a bilateral tax 
treaty or Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA), however, the taxpayers 
wanted the program to have as broad as scope as possible “so that financial institutions 
can operate as qualified intermediaries in all jurisdictions in which they do 
business.”764 From a business standpoint this makes sense to allow U.S. businesses to 
be able to compete internationally and be on equal footing with foreign corporations 
yet from the viewpoint of the IRS the ability for taxpayers to function in jurisdictions 
where there was no guarantee of the FFIs cooperation with the QI program was 
problematic as there would be no agreement with the government to enforce 
compliance with the QI.  
One of the main purposes of the QI program was to create a system that established 
self-regulation standards for the FFIs while at the same time reducing the reporting 
requirements. This would make things easier for the FFIs while at the same time 
 
763 Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the 
President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal, JCS-4-09, 153 (Sept. 2009); See also, Bruce 
W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American 
Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 333, 357-358 (Spring 2015); Steven 
Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or Stick?: The Balance of Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform, 
33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 357, 358 (2010); Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss 
Accounts?: The Impact of The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on 
Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 N.W. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687 (Fall 
2015); Marc D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to 
Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); Mark R. Van 
Heukelom, The Foreign Tax Compliance Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to 
Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. Corp. L. 101, 105 (Oct. 2013); Stephen Troiano, The U.S. 
Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and  the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. 
L. 317, 333 (2011). 
764 IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243.  
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strengthening enforcement of the U.S. withholding system.765 The IRS also noted that 
jurisdictions that refused to cooperate with the program and were considered tax 
havens or bank secrecy jurisdictions would have more stringent oversight over the FFI 
or branches of the FFI located in those jurisdictions.766 
 
7.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QI 
REGULATIONS  
This next section will explain and analyze how the QI program is administered in 
order to allow the IRS to procure U.S. taxpayers’ information on foreign accounts 
they hold. 
The Qualified Intermediary Program is different from the other measures addressed 
in previous chapters in that it enlists FFIs to help in ensuring that U.S. taxpayers are 
complying with the tax laws of the United States.767  
 
765 IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243; See also, David Kerzner and David W. 
Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 184 (Palgrave 
MacMillian, 2016); GAO, Tax Compliance: Qualified Intermediary Program Provides Some 
Assurance That Taxes on Foreign Investors Are Withheld and Reported, but Can Be 
Improved, GAO-08-99 (December 2007); Steven Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or Stick?: The 
Balance of Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform, 33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 357, 358 
(2010); Marc M. Levey, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Controlled Businesses, ¶ 17.04 (Thomson 
Reuters Tax and Accounting, Nov. 2018); Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: 
Withholding, ¶ 4.03 (Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting, September 2018); Laura 
Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States’ Settlement in the 
UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L.J. 409, 422-423 (2010). 
766 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243; Marc 
D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent 
International Tax Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); Stephen Troiano, The 
U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and  the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 New Eng. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 317, 333 (2011). 
767 Stephen Troiano, The U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Impact on Tax Havens, 
17 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 317, 333 (2011). 
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An income payment made outside the United States to a non-U.S. person (non-
resident alien) is taxed in two ways.768 First, if the income is considered business 
income and is connected with a U.S. business then this type of income is “subject to 
a graduated tax rate as if the taxpayer is a U.S. citizen”.769 Second, if it is not 
considered U.S. business income, then it is taxed at a 30% flat rate.770 This 30% tax 
rate can be reduced or eliminated via a tax treaty or another Internal Revenue Code 
exemption.771 However, the 30% tax rate does not apply if it is discovered that the 
beneficial owner is actually a U.S. citizen.772 This is because income paid to U.S. 
citizens abroad is subject to a separate reporting system entirely.773  
Chapter 3, known as the “QI regulations” or “1441 NRA”774, is the codification of the 
QI rules. The QI regulations are the tax withholding structure that gives relief at the 
source of taxation on U.S.-source income that is distributed minus the correctly 
withheld tax, paid to foreign persons and based on appropriate documentation of the 
beneficial owner.775 Chapter 3 (of the Internal Revenue Code) outlines the rules so 
that FFIs can accurately assess and communicate any tax entitlements to those that 
need to withhold tax.776 The subsequent sections examine and explain the Chapter 3 
rules and the QI agreement. It is important to note here that the Chapter 3 rules and 
 
768 Steven Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or Stick?: The Balance of Values in Qualified Intermediary 
Reform, 33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 357, 359 (2010); See also, David Kerzner and David 
W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 153 (Palgrave 
MacMillian, 2016). 
769 26 U.S.C. §871 (b); See also, Steven Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or Stick?: The Balance of 
Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform, 33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 357, 359 (2010). 
770 26 U.S.C. §1441 (a); See also, 26 U.S.C. §871 (a); Steven Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or 
Stick?: The Balance of Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform, 33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 357, 359 (2010). 
771 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-6 (a); See also, Steven Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or Stick?: The Balance of 
Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform, 33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 357, 3589(2010). 
772 26 U.S.C. §1441 (c); See also, Steven Nathaniel Zane, Carrot or Stick?: The Balance of 
Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform, 33 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 357,359 (2010). 
773 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441–1(c)(6); See also, 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441–1(b)(1) 
774 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 3 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). NRA = Non-Resident Alien 
775 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 8 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
776 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 8 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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the QI agreement are not one and the same. The QI agreement does not replace the 
requirements of Chapter 3 but, instead, adds additional obligations onto the QI FFI in 
exchange for additional benefits using the regulations as the starting point.777  This 
will be explained in more detail further below.  
 
7.3.1. CHAPTER 3 WITHHOLDING RESPONSIBILITY 
One of the most important aspects of Chapter 3 that FFIs need to be aware of is that 
the moment that they receive a fixed, determinable, annual or periodic income 
payment sourced in the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as FDAP income/payment) they 
fall under this Chapter of U.S. tax law.778  The FDAP income payment is the trigger 
and it is only the FDAP income that is the trigger and nothing else (i.e., trading in U.S. 
securities).779 FDAP income is all gross income - for example, dividends, alimony and 
sales commissions paid monthly - under Chapter 61 of the IRC with the exception of 
gains derived from the sale of property or any other income that the IRS may 
determine does not qualify as FDAP income.780  
There are two levels of intermediaries that this chapter is concerned with: the 
Qualified Intermediary and the Non-Qualified Intermediary (hereinafter referred to as 
QI and NQI, respectively).781 An intermediary is a person that receives a payment and 
“for that payment acts as a custodian, broker, nominee or otherwise as an agent for 
another person, regardless of whether such other person is the beneficial owner of 
 
777 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013). 
778 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 12 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
779 26 C.F.R. §1.1473-1(a)(2)(i)(A); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-2(b) & (c); Ross K. McGill, 
U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 12 (Palgrave MacMillan 
2013); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 153 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016).  
780 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 14 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
781 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 14 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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the amount paid, a flow-through entity or another intermediary”.782The default status 
of all FFIs is as a non-qualified intermediary status.783 A NQI is defined as “any 
intermediary that is not a U.S. person and not a qualified intermediary….”784 
Essentially, a NQI is a financial institution that is resident in a foreign country and has 
not signed a QI Agreement with the IRS.785 A NQI has a different set of rules to follow, 
does not have a contract with the IRS (QI Agreement) and does not directly withhold 
the tax on payments as another FI in the chain will withhold – usually a U.S. 
withholding agent (USWA).786 Despite not being required to withhold, the NQI still 
holds the responsibility and liability for correctly coordinating the withholding787. A 
NQI can apply for source relief, however, they will have to disclose and report on all 
of their customers to the IRS in addition to reporting to their upstream counterpart.788 
There are multiple reasons an FFI is not a QI: they make an affirmative choice not to 
be, they are not eligible because they are not located in a KYC-(Know-Your-
Customer) approved jurisdiction (see subsection 7.3.1.2.1) or they are not aware they 
are subject to Chapter 3 regulations when they receive FDAP income payments.789 
The NQI is a cause of concern for the IRS (see subsection 7.3.1.5) because they are 
assumed to be assisting in the tax evasion when they do not want to share their 
customers information with the IRS. Therefore, the NQIs are held to stricter 
requirements under the regulations and why – if they want source relief – they must 
disclose all their clients to the IRS. This in turn, gets the IRS the information on their 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts that they need to apply the laws fairly and correctly.  
 
782 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(13). 
783 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 14 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
784 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(14). 
785 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 15 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
786 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 15 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
787 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1 (e)(3)(iii)-(iv); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 15 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
788 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 14 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
789 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 15 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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In contrast, a FFI that signs a QI Agreement with the U.S. gets procedural leniency.790 
The Qualified Intermediary is subdivided into withholding QIs (WQIs) and non-
withholding QIs (NWQIs).791 A Withholding QI is responsible for both assessing and 
making a withholding on any gross income payment that they receive. This 
responsibility has been coined as “assuming the primary withholding responsibility” 
in the regulations.792 They are also responsible for making deposits with the U.S. 
Department of Treasury.793 A note to insert here is that there is a difference in the roles 
that the IRS and the U.S. Department of Treasury have despite the IRS being a sub-
agency under the Treasury. The U.S. Treasury receives the money, in this case, the 
deposits of withheld tax. The IRS drafts and communicates the regulations in addition 
to receiving reports from the QIs and NQIs.794  
The subsequent sections will delve into the QI Agreement and the requirements of 
Chapter 3 in more detail.  
 
7.3.1.1 QI Agreement 
The QI Agreement, as stated previously, is an agreement that dovetails with the QI 
regulations in that it outlines all the obligations that the QI has under Chapter 3 along 
with some additional obligations in exchange for certain benefits. 795 The Agreement, 
the most current version which can be found in Revenue Procedure 2017-15, is 
 
790 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 115 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
791 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 12 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
792 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 15 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
793 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 12 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
794 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 17 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
795 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5)-(6); See also, 26 U.S.C. §1441, §1442, §1471 and §1472; IRS 
Rev. Proc. 2017-15; Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 25 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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regulated by 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(5)(e)(iii).796 The QI agreement is a non-negotiable 
contract between the IRS and the FFI that runs over a six-year period and is 
unilaterally modifiable only by the IRS.797 The following subsections will examine 
the three areas of the QI Agreement that describe the main responsibilities and 
obligations of the QI under the Agreement. These three subsections are: 1) 
withholding, 2) documentation and disclosure and 3) tax return and information 
reporting. 
A foreign intermediary who wants to be a QI has to be eligible to qualify as a QI – not 
just any FFI that wants to be a QI can be.798  In order to be approved as a QI, the QI  
has to be an asset manager/servicer such as a bank or broker and is regulated by rules 
– particularly Know Your Customer (hereinafter KYC) rules – in their home 
country.799 Under the QI Agreement, there are two categories of QIs: withholding QIs 
(WQI) or non-withholding QIs (NWQI).800 The Agreement that the QI executes 
identifies the QI as a withholding agent under Chapter 3 as well as a payor under 
Chapter 61 and 26 U.S.C. §3406 of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the QI can 
elect to be a NWQI which means the tax will be withheld up the chain usually by a 
United States Withholding Agent (USWA). An NWQI that selects this option still has 
the same obligations under the agreement as a QI and it still retains the liability for 
tax withheld.801 Despite outsourcing its withholding responsibilities, it is still 
responsible for arranging for a third party to take on the withholding.802 If an under-
 
796 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15 (updates IRS Revenue Procedure 2000-12 (2000-4-IRB 387); See 
also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5)(iii); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 11-12 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
797 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 11.01; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding 
Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 25 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
798 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(6)(ii); See also, 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-1(e)(5)(ii); IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-
15, Section 2; Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 27 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
799 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5)(ii); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 27 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
800 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1. 
801 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
802 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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withholding occurs higher up the chain, the NWQI is required to withhold the balance 
of the correct withholding so that the beneficial owner of the account receives the 
payment less the amount of the withholding.803 
The QI that decides to assume primary withholding responsibility does not have to 
accept on behalf of all accounts.804 It can select the accounts that it wants to be a 
withholding agent for – it can be one, a few or all. This account designation is 
important and has important ramifications for the QI.805 The withholding section of 
the QI agreement also requires the QI to backup-withhold on undocumented U.S. 
accounts.806 This is to ensure that there is a withholding on these types of accounts.  
The Agreement requires, under Chapter 3, that the QI documents all their clients using 
their KYC rules and/or with U.S. withholding certificates such as the IRS W-8 and 
W-9 forms.807 The W-8BEN form is the Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial 
Owner for U.S. Tax Withholding and Reporting (Individual) but there are multiple 
versions of the W-8 form depending on what category the foreign person falls in (i.e., 
foreign entity, foreign government, etc.).808 For example, the W-8IMY form is the 
withholding certificate used by foreign intermediaries to identify themselves as 
foreign intermediaries (or foreign flow-through entities) to others in the chain 
including the USWA.809 The QI needs to verify that it is using the correct W-8 form. 
The W-9 form is titled Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification 
and is used for identifying and withholding on U.S. citizens.810  
 
803 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
804 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5)(iv); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 27 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
805 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
806 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15. 
807 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(vii); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 11-12 (Palgrave MacMillan 
2013). 
808 IRS, Form W-8, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-8 
809 IRS, Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-8-imy 
810 IRS, Form W-9, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-9  
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What happens if the QI has actual knowledge that documentation is incorrect, false or 
unreliable? If the QI has reason to know (or actual knowledge) that documentation 
that has been submitted to them is false, erroneous or inaccurate, then the QI cannot 
rely upon the documentation as proof of identity.811 This includes changes of 
circumstance.812  
The QI has various documentation obligations under the QI Agreement and these 
reflect the Chapter 3 regulations.813 One obligation the QI has is to document its 
customers and review and validate that documentation.814 The QI is required to use 
their best efforts to obtain all documents required under the QI Agreement using the 
forms under the KYC procedures or the documents discussed in the above 
paragraph.815  Once the QI has the appropriate forms, they are required to review, 
validate and track the validation of the documents they obtain.816 If the account holder 
is NOT an individual, then the QI has an obligation to inform the account holder of 
any Limitation on Benefits (LOB) clauses in the applicable treaty with the U.S. and 
obtain a treaty statement from the account holder.817 The treaty statement is just a 
statement that states that an entity client – including governmental entities – meets all 
the provisions of the applicable treaty and, therefore, qualifies for a  reduced rate of 
 
811 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3)(ix); See also¸ 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(1)-(2); IRS Rev. Proc. 
2017-15, Section 6, 5.10; Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI 
and FATCA, 26 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
812 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(1)-(2); IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.01-5.12; 
See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
813 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.01-5.12; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
814 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 5.01-5.12; Ross 
K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013). 
815 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.03; 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 35 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
816 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 
5.01(A); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 35 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
817 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.01(A); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 35 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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withholding (including limitation on benefits provisions).818 The QI Agreement 
provides the treaty statement under subsection 5.03(B).819 The documentation the QI 
is required to obtain helps in determining whether withholding (discussed in section 
7.3.1.4) applies or whether a payment is reportable under the QI Agreement.820 A 
reportable payment is defined as reportable amount which “means U.S. source FDAP 
income that is an amount subject to chapter 3 withholding, U.S. source deposit 
interest…”821  
This is where both the KYC rules (see subsection 7.3.1.2.1) and the “reason to know” 
standard apply (see subsection 7.3.1.2.4).822 If there is no documentation, then the QI 
is obligated to apply a set of presumption rules.823 The presumption rules, found in 
section 5.13 of the Agreement, are applied in order to determine if Chapters 3 and 4 
withholding or backup-withholding (in the case of a possible U.S. person) is 
required.824 The QI agreement identifies the KYC rules as the applicable laws, 
regulations, rules and administrative procedures that govern the QI (in their home 
jurisdiction) and requires the QI to obtain documentation that confirms the identity of 
the account holders that maintain accounts with the QI.825 This qualification does not 
apply to Non-Financial Foreign Entities (hereinafter referred to as NFFE’s) and their 
branches because they are required to document and identify their account holders by 
collecting withholding certificates.826  An NFFE is defined as a foreign entity that is 
not a financial institution.827 
 
818 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.03(B).  
819 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.03(B).  
820 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.01(A). 
821 IRS. Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 2.69 and 2.68.  
822 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
823 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
824 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.01(A). 
825 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 2.45. 
826 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 3. 
827 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(51); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5)(ii); 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-
1(b). 
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The point of requiring this documentation through the use of both the KYC and 
presumption rules is to ensure that U.S. taxpayers are being identified and properly 
withheld on correctly. If an accountholder is not correctly identified through 
documentation, then the proper tax cannot be withheld and paid to the Treasury. It 
also means that U.S. taxpayers are not being correctly identified so that the IRS can 
access the information they are seeking on any foreign accounts held by the U.S. 
taxpayers. 
Any taxes that are collected by the QI are to be deposited with the U.S. Treasury. They 
are also obligated to have two compliance reviews during the six-year contract period. 
This is part of the oversight of the QIs and is specific to only those FFIs that have 
signed a QI Agreement.  
The main difference between a financial institution that signs a QI and one that does 
not (NQI), is that the QI Agreement applies different rules to the QI and its activities. 
The most important benefits that the QI derives from the Agreement that the NQI does 
not qualify for are the ability to protect its foreign beneficial owners’ identities, the 
ability to provide source relief on U.S.-source FDAP income payments and the ability 
to pool its information returns that it sends to the IRS.828 
It is critical and necessary to reiterate here that a NQI who either chooses not to be a 
QI or who is not eligible still falls under the Chapter 3 requirements if they receive 
FDAP income.829 They are still subject to the reporting and enforcement components 
of the regulations but do not receive the special benefits that a QI does.830 The NQI 
can still receive relief at the source, but only if they are willing to disclose in its 
entirety the information on who their customers are to another QI or USWA up the 
 
828 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
829 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
830 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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chain.831 The reason for the distinction is that the NQIs have not signed a QI agreement 
with the IRS (so they are not under contract with the IRS) and, therefore, the IRS has 
no direct control over the NQIs compliance with the QI program rules. 832 The NQIs 
are suspected of being more susceptible to tax evasion and, thus, are required by the 
U.S. to divulge all accountholders to the U.S. individually.833 
 
7.3.1.2 Documentation  
This section focuses on the Chapter 3 regulations regarding documentation on the 
FFIs clients. Documentation is the core of the Chapter 3 regulations because it leads 
to the rest of the main requirements – reporting and withholding.834 The regulations, 
focused on deterring tax evasion (and treaty shopping) by U.S. taxpayers, require the 
FFIs to document all their customers - not just the U.S. customers - in order to fulfill 
deterrence purpose.835 Ross McGill notes that the Chapter 3 regulations are a 
cascade system meaning that “there are obligations at all levels and that non-
compliance at any level is automatically visible to the IRS through compliance at the 
higher level, usually through information reporting.”836 But documentation is 
important in another regard. Documentation (and identification), if done correctly, 
 
831; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
832; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 11 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
833 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 28-29 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 11 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
834 See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 33 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
835 See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
33 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
836 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 2 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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of U.S. taxpayers leads to the information that the U.S. government needs in order to 
administer the tax laws fairly and correctly.  
The FFIs have to provide self-certifications to the party upstream from them where 
they hold accounts that possibly receive U.S.-sourced FDAP income.837 Not only 
does each party self-certify, but they also must document all their customers. It is a 
page out of the small-town playbook – everyone knows everyone else and their 
business (meaning here the identification and obligations of each of the other 
parties). 
The purpose of the documentation procedure is to determine: 
1) the identity of the account holder;  
2) whether the account holder is a beneficial owner or 
intermediary;  
3) the country where it resides for tax purposes; 
4) whether it is U.S. person or a non-U.S. person; and  
5) whether the account holder is entitled to any favorable rate of 
tax on U.S.-sourced income.838 
 
If the FFI documents correctly, this allows the IRS to receive the information on 
U.S. taxpayers and their foreign accounts. Subsection 7.3.1.2.3 discusses 
documentation and documentary evidence in more detail.  
 
 
837 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 33 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
838 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 28-29 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2019). 
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7.3.1.2.1 Self-certification and KYC Rules 
 
There are two ways for FFIs to fulfill their documentation obligation: self-
certification and KYC rules.839 The documentation provided will give the FFIs (QIs 
and NQIs) the information needed in order for the FFIs to correctly withhold on 
U.S-sourced income payments.840 An FFI needs to know what qualifies as 
documentation to ensure that they meet the requirements. Documents other than the 
withholding certificates or written statements are considered documentary 
evidence.841 An example of documentary evidence would be the KYC documents.842 
Documentation includes documentary evidence and the W-8 withholding 
certificates.843  
The first type of documentation comes in the form of self-certifying documents such 
as the U.S. W-8 or W-9 tax forms. A self-certification is not the same as a residence 
certification which is issued by a tax or governmental agency at the request of a 
resident; in contrast, the self-certifications are filled out by the resident/account 
holder themselves.844 Starting from the bottom of the chain, the beneficial owner of 
the payment should submit either a W-8 or a W-9 depending on their U.S. status. If 
the beneficial owner is a U.S person they would file a W-9 which is also known as a 
Request for Taxpayer Identification Number845 and Certification.846 The FFIs 
 
839 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 34 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
840 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 33 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
841 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2019). 
842 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1; See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.6049-5(c)(1); Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
843 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
844 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 35 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
845 This is usually the taxpayer’s social security number but if it’s a foreign resident alien or 
non-resident alien, then it is ITIN (individual taxpayer identification number).  
846 IRS, About Form W-9, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-9; See also, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw9.pdf; Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 33 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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themselves, would provide a W-8IMY – which is the version of the W-8 for foreign 
intermediaries for U.S. tax withholding and reporting – to either another FFI 
upstream from them or a USWA.847 
FFIs are allowed to rely on these self-certifications unless they have actual 
knowledge or “reason to know” that the self-certification is incorrect or false.848 If 
there is no reason to know and then the FFI discovers later that the tax was withheld 
incorrectly, they will not be held strictly liable since they made the determination of 
the appropriate amount of tax to withhold based on the self-certification provided by 
the account holder.849 The FFI does have an obligation to verify that a self-
certification form is consistent with other documentation/information that the FFI 
received, for example, documents obtained under the KYC procedures.850 
The second way an FFI can certify the identity of a person or entity is through KYC 
rules.851 KYC procedures are domestically approved local rules that are used by the 
FFI to identify and “know” their customers. The IRS relies on the knowledge that if 
the FFI meets the KYC regulations that are in place in their own jurisdiction then 
they are also meeting them for Chapter 3 purposes. This is because the IRS believes 
that in order for a foreign financial institution to adequately self-regulate under the 
QI program appropriate KYC rules are needed.852 If the FFI has been accepted by 
the IRS as a QI, then the FFI is in a jurisdiction whose KYC rules have already been 
approved.853 The KYC approved list can be found on the IRS website.854 The IRS’ 
KYC list identifies the countries that have provided their KYC practices and 
 
847 IRS, About Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-8-imy; See also, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw8imy.pdf; Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 33 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
848 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(1)(i); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
849 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3)(ix). 
850 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(7).  
851 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 34 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
852 IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243. 
853 IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243. 
854 IRS, List of Approved KYC Rules, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-
businesses/list-of-approved-kyc-rules. 
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procedures to the IRS who then examines the rules to ensure they are acceptable.855 
Multiple EU countries are on the list including Denmark, Germany and the U.K.856 
Having the KYC rules in place ensures verification and documentation of beneficial 
owners857 and the target is to identify and withhold the correct amount of tax on the 
beneficial owner based on the verification and documentation. 
7.3.1.2.2 U.S. Indicia  
 
An issue with both the forms and KYC documents is whether there is any indication 
of taxpayer’s U.S. status. This is referred to as “indicia of U.S. status” which is “the 
presence of any information that might indicate U.S status for tax purposes”.858 The 
differences in Chapters 3 (QI) and 4 (FATCA) is that in Chapter 3, the indications 
are based on information from the KYC procedures and the W-8 forms and in 
Chapter 4, the indicia is more narrowly defined.859 If the account has a U.S. address 
attached to it, this is the main piece of identification that should alert the FFI to U.S. 
indicia.860 This means the FFI has to do more legwork to establish if the foreign 
person has a credible reason for the address or if the account holder is an actual U.S. 
person. While the FFI does the legwork to establish the actual status of the account 
holder, the status of the form in question will be on hold until the issue is resolved 
by more documentation.861 If the account holder is an individual, then the additional 
documentation must establish that the account holder’s residency is outside the 
 
855 IRS, List of Approved KYC Rules, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-
businesses/list-of-approved-kyc-rules; See also, IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 
1243. 
856 IRS, List of Approved KYC Rules, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-
businesses/list-of-approved-kyc-rules 
857 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 186 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
858 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 52 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
859 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
860 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
861 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 52 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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United States and that the documentation was valid when provided and is not older 
than three years.862 The additional documentation should also establish either that it 
does not contain a U.S. address or provide a reasonable explanation of why there is a 
U.S. address attached to the account.863 
If the account holder is an entity, then the additional documentation must establish 
that the entity is actually organized/created under the laws of a non-U.S. country.864 
The FFI has to obtain valid documentation from the downstream parties (including 
the beneficial owner) just as it has to provide documentation upstream to a financial 
institution where it maintains an account.865 Ross McGill points out that obtaining 
documents under the KYC procedures generally is not a problem because it is 
“generally culturally and linguistically aligned”.866 The same cannot be said, 
however, for U.S. forms.867 This is a problem because a high percentage of W-8BEN 
forms are invalid when received because those who obtain the forms are not tax 
experts or lawyers nor are they, many times, familiar with the U.S. tax language.868  
This problem presents an obstacle to the goal of the U.S. government in ensuring 
they are able to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. If the forms 
are filled out incorrectly then the withholding (law) is not withheld properly and the 
correct information on the taxpayer’s account – if they are a U.S. person – is not 
 
862 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(17); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.6049-5(c)(1); 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-
3(c)(5)(i)(A) – (B); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 52 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
863 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(17); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.6049-5(c)(1); 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-
3(c)(5)(i)(A) – (B); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 52 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
864 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(17); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.6049-5(c)(1); 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-
3(c)(5)(i)(D) & (ii)(A). 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 52 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
865 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
866 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
867 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
868 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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given to the IRS. “…important to realise that the documentation drives withholding 
and withholding must be correct.”869 
Another issue that is problematic is that many of the tax forms that are obtained are 
handwritten which presents the cultural and linguistic problems alluded to above and 
the FFIs have to validate these handwritten forms.870 These issues present a perfect 
storm, so to speak, regarding the documentation process.871  
There are two avenues to avoid this perfect storm872: substitute forms and systems to 
fill out forms electronically.873 Substitute forms and electronic systems are allowed 
under 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iv) through (vi).874 A withholding agent is allowed 
to establish an electronic system for a beneficial owner or a payee to be able fill out 
a W-8 form or a substitute form as long as it fulfills the criteria under the 
regulations875. The electronic system should be able to ensure that the information 
that is obtained is the information that is sent and be able to document every time a 
user accesses the system in order to modify the document or for submission 
renewal.876 The system also has to have a way to make it “reasonably certain” that 
the person using the system and submitting the W-8 form is the actual person named 
in the form. The electronic form should contain the exact same information as the 
paper form of the W-8.877 The regulations also allow for the withholding agent to be 
able to accept a substitute of its own instead of a W-8 form.878 The IRS will find that 
 
869 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
870 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
871 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
872 See subsection 7.6 for more discussion on the substitute forms and electronic systems 
being a solution to cultural and linguistic issues.  
873 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
874 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iv) - (vi); See also  ̧Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
875 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iv)(A)-(B). 
876 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iv)(A)-(B). 
877 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iv)(A)-(B). 
878 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(vi). 
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the substitute form is acceptable as long as the provisions are substantially similar to 
those provisions that are found on the official W-8 form.879  It should also contain 
“the same certifications relevant to the transactions as are contained on the official 
form and these certifications are clearly set forth, and the substitute form includes a 
signature-under-penalties-of-perjury statement identical to the one stated on the 
official form”.880 For example, providing a translation of the U.S. form into the 
account holder’s language so that the account holder has both the U.S. form and the 
translation side-by-side.881 Legally speaking, the English forms are always the form 
with legal force and this should be made clear to the account holder.882 
 
7.3.1.2.3 Documentation and Documentary Evidence883  
 
So, what documents does an FFI use to evidence whether an account holder is an 
American or a foreigner? There are two places to find the documentation and 
documentary evidence obligations: the regulations from Chapter 3 or the contractual 
obligation between the FFI and the IRS under the QI Agreement (for the discussion 
on the documentation obligations under the QI Agreement, see the immediate 
previous section).884 This means that despite not being a QI under the QI agreement, 
the NQIs are still held accountable to documentation obligations under Chapter 3 
and QIs are subject to both the regulations and the QI agreement.885 When the 
documentation is done correctly, compliance with the regulations and QI Agreement 
have been achieved and allows for correct withholding and reporting which also 
 
879 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(vi). 
880 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(vi). 
881 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(vi); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
882 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(vi); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
883 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(7)-(8). 
884 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 36 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
885 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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complies with U.S. laws.886 Compliance also allows the IRS to have information on 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts.  
What qualifies as documentation? For an individual, it is both the appropriate 
withholding certificate887 (W-9 versus W-8) and documentary evidence888 such as an 
official document that is issued by a non-U.S. government entity. This 
documentation should include the individual’s name, address and a photo and the 
document cannot be older than three years unless accompanied by additional 
documentation of residence – for example, a utility or phone bill.889  
A withholding certificate is a document that the QI has to furnish to a withholding 
agent that it receives a reportable amount from.890  The Qualified Intermediary 
Withholding Certificate is Form W-8IMY which certifies that the QI is acting as a 
QI.891 It also contains the QI’s QI-EIN (the employer identification number given to 
the QI by the IRS) and the other information that the form itself requires.892 The FFI 
is required to provide each withholding agent that receives a Form W-8IMY from 
the FFI the withholding statement.893 The FFI is not required to disclose on either 
Form W-8IMY or the withholding statement any identifying information about a 
foreign indirect or direct account holder.894 This also applies to a U.S- exempt 
recipient or holder of a U.S. account.895 The other forms that a FFI can give to the 
withholding agent to identify who the account holder is, is either a W-9896 which 
 
886 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
887 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii).  
888 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(7)-(8).  
889 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(7)-(8). 
890 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii). 
891 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii). 
892 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii). 
893 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii). 
894 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii). 
895 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(5)(i)-(ii). 
896 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(d)(1)-(3).  
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identifies them as a U.S. person or a version of the W-8 forms897 which identifies 
them as a non-U.S. person.898 
W-8 and W-9 forms are not included as documentary evidence (discussed below) to 
prove an account holder’s status.899 If the FFI cannot accurately associate a 
reportable payment with valid documentation from the account holder, then the FFI 
has to apply the presumption rules in order to determine if Chapters 3 and 4 
withholding or backup withholding (under 26 U.S.C. §3406) are required.900 The 
presumption rules are rules that “apply to determine the status of the person you pay 
as a U.S. or foreign person and other relevant characteristics, such as whether the 
payee is a beneficial owner or intermediary…..”901 
Documentary evidence and other appropriate documentation is documentation other 
than the withholding certificate as described in the last sentence.902 Supplementary 
documentation is a passport, certificate of residency provided by a government 
agency, national identity card or a voter registration card.903 For an entity, the 
documentation should be an official document that provides the name and main 
address of the entity that has been issued by a non-U.S. government agency.904 
Supplementary documentation for an entity can include the articles of incorporation, 
 
897 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)-  
898 IRS, Form W-8, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-8; IRS, Form W-9, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w-9  
899 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 2.20. 
900 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3); 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(2)(vii).  
901 IRS, Presumption Rules, found at https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/presumption-rules 
902 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(7)-(8); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(17) and (18); See also, 26. 
CF.R. §1.1471-3(c)(32) and (33).  
903 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(17) and (18); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-3(c)(32) and (33); Ross 
K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 52 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013). 
904 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 53 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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articles of association, or trust documents.905 Most of the above examples will have 
already been on file with the FFI due to their own jurisdiction’s KYC procedures.906 
After receiving the documentation, the next step for the FFI (QI and NQI) is to 
review the documentation and to validate it. The FFI has an obligation under 
Chapter 3, to review and validate the forms that they obtained from the account 
holder.907  
So, what does this review and validation part of the process look like? Once the 
recipient receives the documentation, it should be evaluated for four elements 
according to Ross McGill.908 The first element that the documentation should be 
evaluated for is that the documents are complete.909 All parts of the documents 
should be filled out910 and the form should be signed if there is a place for a 
signature. The next item to evaluate is whether the documentation itself is consistent 
internally. This means that any information contained within the form should be 
consistent with the other information in the same document. If something is found to 
inconsistent, clarification should be sought.911 Third, the documentation should also 
be externally consistent.912 The information that is within the documentation 
received should match any information that is at the disposal of the FFI – for 
 
905 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 53 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
906 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 53 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
907 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(2); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 
5.01(A); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 39 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
908 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
909 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
910 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
911 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
912 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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example, through KYC procedures.913 Finally, the documentation should be 
examined for any U.S. indicia.914  For instance, does the documentation provide a 
U.S. social security number or does it list a U.S. address? If so, a deeper look should 
be taken into why the account holder has a U.S. address or social security number. It 
should be determined if the account holder is a U.S. or foreign person. If any one of 
these elements is deemed insufficient, then the information that has been given 
should be clarified or if not able to be clarified, the documentation can be 
rejected.915 If the FFI takes a deeper dive into the information, any work that is done 
in order to clear up any questions should be clearly and carefully documented.916  
If the FFI cannot reasonably associate a payment with valid documentation from an 
account holder, then they have to apply the presumption rules .917 The presumption 
rules state that if the withholding agent cannot reliably associate a payment with 
documentation, the presumption will be made that the account holder is a U.S. 
person and the account will be treated as a U.S. account.918 When the presumption 
rules are required to be applied, the FFI cannot rely on its actual knowledge 
regarding an account holder’s Chapter 4 status or status as U.S. or foreign person to 
apply a reduced rate of withholding. If a FFI does not follow the presumption rules, 
the FFI may liable for under-withholding, penalties and interest.919 
 
913 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
914 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
915 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
916 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 40 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
917 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3)(i)-(iii); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 
5.13(A).  
918 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3)(iii); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 
5.13(A). 
919 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(7).  
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Until the documentation is clarified and complete, the beneficial owner should be 
treated as undocumented and taxed at 30% or the FFI can apply the presumption 
rules found in the regulations as stated above.920 
The FFI has a duty to maintain documentation by retaining the original 
documentation. The FFI may also retain a certified copy, photocopy, scanned copy, 
microfiche copy or other ways that allow reproduction but the FFI has to be able to 
produce a hard copy.921 Due to the nature of the direct relationship and the KYC 
rules that are supposed to be in place in regards to direct accounts, if the FFI is not 
required, under its KYC procedures, to retain copies of documentary evidence, the 
FFI may instead retain an notation of the type of document reviewed, the date it was 
reviewed, the documentation’s identification number and whether the 
documentation reviewed contained any U.S. indicators.922 The FFI is required to 
maintain a record of the account holder’s documentation for as long as the 
documentation is relevant to determining the FFI’s tax liability or reporting 
responsibilities.923 
A natural question to ask is how long is the documentation and documentary evidence 
valid? How long the documentation is valid depends on whether it is a W-9 form or 
not.924 If the documentation is any type of documentation other than a W-9, the FFI 
may rely on it in accordance with the KYC rules that are applicable as long as the 
documentary evidence remains valid under those rules or until the FFI has knowledge 
or reason to know that the information in the documentation is incorrect or 
unreliable.925 If the documentation is a W-9 form, then the FFI can rely on it as long 
 
920 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 40 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
921 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.12(A); See also, Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[6][b][i] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
922 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iii). 
923 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(4)(iii); See also, 26 U.SC. §871, 26 U.S.C. §881, 26 U.S.C. §1461, 
26 U.S.C. §1474(a) and 26 U.S.C. §3406.  
924 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(2)(ii)(A); See also, Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: 
Withholding, ¶4.03[6] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
925 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.11(A); See also, Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[6][b][ii] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
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as it has not been informed by either the IRS or another withholding agent that the 
information is incorrect or unreliable.926 
 
7.3.1.2.4 Reason to Know and Actual Knowledge927  
 
Two concepts that are important both with the QI Program and the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA, see subsection 9.3.1.1.4) are the standards of “reason 
to know” and “actual knowledge”.928 These concepts are particularly important for 
those in the position of relationship managers in the FFIs.929 Under the regulations, 
the withholding agent may rely on the information and certifications stated in the 
withholding certifications (discussed in the next section) unless the agent (or 
relationship manager) has reason to know or actual knowledge that the information 
is incorrect.930 Actual knowledge is defined as “direct and clear knowledge” or 
knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to inquire further.931 Reason to know 
is defined as “information from which an person of ordinary intelligence – or of the 
superior intelligence that the person may have – would infer that the fact in question 
exists or that there is substantial enough chance of its existence that, that if the 
person is exercising reasonable care, the person’s action would be based on the 
assumption of its possible existence.”932 For example, if the account holder, who is 
documented by the FFI as a non-US person, goes into the bank to talk with the 
relationship manager about the account and her U.S. passport falls out of her purse 
 
926 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 5.11(B); See also, Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[6][b][ii] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
927 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(1)-(2) & (4).  
928 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-7(b)(1)-(2) & (4); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.441-1(e)(4)(viii); See also, 26 
C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3)(ix)(B).  
929 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
930 26 C.F.R. §1.441-1(e)(4)(viii); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(3)(ix)(B). Ross K. 
McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 37 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013). 
931 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition, 876 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 1999). 
932 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., 1273 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 1999).  
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onto the desk, the relationship would have actual knowledge that the account holder 
is a U.S. citizen/taxpayer. However, if the account holder instead mentions an 
upcoming trip to the U.S to see her mother, the relationship manager has been given 
reason to know and should take a deeper look into the account holder’s status. 
The reason to know and actual knowledge concepts is one place where Chapter 3 
(QI) and Chapter 4 (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act/FATCA - Chapter 9) 
converge.  
As far as documentation goes – under Chapter 3 – the most important things to 
remember for both a QI and NQI are that everyone must document themselves to 
those FFIs (or USWAs) above them in the chain, that the documentation obligations 
can be found in the U.S Code of Regulations (Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 
26 for tax regs) and the QI Agreement for accepted QIs and that both the QIs and 
NQIs have the obligation to review and validate the forms that they receive.  
 
7.3.1.3 Withholding933 and Depositing Tax934 
The process of documentation and identification allows the FFIs to process the income 
payments which includes knowing if the payment is subject to withholding, and if so, 
how much.935 The FFI must have the information from the documentation stage, in 
order to help either themselves (if they have taken on primary withholding 
responsibility) or another withholding agent up the chain know how to process the 
income payment.936 At the top of the food chain is the U.S. withholding agent 
(USWA), but if the FFI assumes primary withholding responsibility  then it becomes 
the one to determine whether the payment is a U.S.-source payment because it 
 
933 26 U.S.C. §1441(a); 26 U.S.C. §1442(a).  
934 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1. 
935 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 39 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
936 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 56 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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receives the payment as a gross payment from the USWA.937 The degree of 
responsibility that the FFI is held to will vary depending on whether it chooses to 
assume primary liability for Chapters 3 and 4 withholding and backup withholding 
responsibility or whether it chooses to delegate certain tasks to a third party.
938 If an 
FFI chooses to assume primary withholding, the FFI is then in complete control over 
the process and can assess the documentation and tax consequences directly instead 
of relying on another intermediary up the chain to do it.939 
There are two questions a withholding agent should ask regarding income 
payments.940 The first is whether the income payment is U.S.-sourced. Is the income 
payment of a category that is subject to withholding is the second question.941 There 
are multiple, applicable tax rates942 so it is important for the FFI to know which one is 
applicable to the income payment they have in front of them.943  
When an FFI gets an income payment, the FFI itself has either elected to be the 
primary withholder or not. If it has not elected to primarily withhold, then the FFI still 
needs to be aware that it is still under an obligation to withhold directly when there is 
an incorrect withholding – the difference between what an upstream withholding 
agent withheld and what was actually supposed to be withheld.944 Basically, the non-
 
937 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 56 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
938 Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[3] (Thomson 
Reuters/WG&L).  
939 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
940 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
941 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1; See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-2(a); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding 
Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 56 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
942 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(4); For example, according to Ross K. McGill, 0% for portfolio 
interest payments, 10% for non-portfolio, 15% for treaty benefits, 24% for backup 
withholding on possible U.S. persons, 30% for default statutory rate and 35% and 39.6% for 
distribution payments from some types of U.S. issuers. 
943 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 57 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013).  
944 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.02(A) and (B); See also, Ross K. McGill, 
U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 57 (Palgrave MacMillan 
2013). 
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withholding QI (NWQI) can outsource withholding but it still retains the liability to 
make sure the correct amount is withheld and paid.945 The W-8IMY Form is the 
document in which the FFI establishes its intention to be a withholding or non-
withholding QI.946 This form is provided to the withholding agent along with the 
withholding certificate and documentary evidence for the accounts that it is choosing 
not to withhold on.947 If the amount withheld by the withholding agent is incorrect, 
the NWQI is required under the regulations – if the amount has been under-withheld 
on- to withhold the difference and then remit the payment to the IRS.948 However, in 
reality, the NWQI usually works with the United States Withholding Agent to correct 
the error.949 According to Ross K. McGill, this exact scenario is why all intermediaries 
that are in the chain, QI or NQI, are classified as withholding agents.950 
7.3.1.3.1 Non-Withholding QI – Withholding Procedures 
 
There are two ways for a QI who has not elected to withhold to provide withholding 
information to the withholding agent and this can be done in one of two ways.951 The 
first avenue is for the NWQI to set up several custody accounts952 at its USWA and 
each account is identified by the tax rate that should be applied to those assets within 
 
945 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(3)(iv)(D)(7); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15 
946 Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw8imy.pdf ; See also, Instructions for 
Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw8imy.pdf; Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 66 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
947 Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw8imy.pdf ; See also, Instructions for 
Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw8imy.pdf; Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 66 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
948 Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw8imy.pdf ; See also, Instructions for 
Form W-8IMY, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw8imy.pdf; Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 66 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
949 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
950 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
951 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-1(b)(2)(vii)(B); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
952 A custody account, according to Investopedia.com is an account that is maintained by a 
fiduciarily responsible party on behalf of a beneficiary.  Also  known as a custodial account 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/custodialaccount.asp 
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the specific account.953 This type of account is called a segregated rate pool account.954 
The NWQI will know as a result of its documentation and due diligence obligations 
which type of income the clients receive and which segregated rate pool account those 
income assets should go into.955 That way the withholding agent will know, based on 
the type of account, how to tax the payment.956 However, this type of rate pool can be 
problematic based on the information the NWQI gets or does not get from its account 
holders.957 If documentation is incorrect, then the NWQI does not know that the 
income payment needs to be moved to a different account.958 All of these moving parts 
need to be kept track of in order for the NWQI to stay in compliance. 
The second way a NWQI can provide withholding information to the withholding 
agent is the withholding rate pool statement.959 Here the NWQI only maintains an 
omnibus account960 but since all of the income payments go into the one account, the 
NWQI now has to instruct the withholding agent on how much to withhold from any 
payment received.961 In order to withhold correctly, the NWQI has to instruct the 
withholding agent on how much to withhold on any payment received.962 First, the 
 
953 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
954 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
955 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
956 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
957 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
958 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
959 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(e)(5)(v)(C)(1); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 6.03(C); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 59 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
960 An omnibus account is an account that holds the assets of more than one person and allows 
for anonymity of the persons included in the account. Any transactions that happened are 
done in the name of the broker. (Investopedia 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/omnibusaccount.asp) 
961 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-1(e)(5)(v)(C)(1); See also¸IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 6.03(C); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 58 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
962 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 59 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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withholding agent tells the NWQI that a payment is pending. Then the NWQI 
completes its due diligence and based on the information from the due diligence 
process the NWQI can tell the withholding agent what tax should be withheld in each 
of the tax categories.963 
If the FFI has not assumed Chapter 3 withholding responsibility, then it is not 
required to withhold on a U.S.-source FDAP income payment if it: 
1) Does not assume primary withholding responsibility; 
2) Provides the withholding agent that the QI receives the 
payment with a valid withholding certificate that states that 
the QI does not assume primary withholding responsibility 
under Chapters 3 and 4; and 
3) Provides correct withholding statements as described in 
subsection 6.02 of the QI Agreement.964  
 
7.3.1.3.2 Withholding QI – Procedures 
 
If the FFI has elected to primarily withhold, then the general rule is that they must 
withhold 30% of any payment of an amount that is subject to withholding made to a 
foreign payee unless it can reliably associate documentation with a payment to a U.S. 
person.965 This rate can be reduced based upon the documentation provided - for 
example, a non-U.S. person provides a treaty statement to their FFI that they should 
receive a reduced tax rate under a certain treaty.966 
 
963 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 59 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
964 26 U.S.C. § 1441(a); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(1).  
965 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(1); See also, 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-1(b)(2)(vii)(D)(1); David Kerzner 
and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 181 
(Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, 
¶4.03[3][a] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
966 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(1); 
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It is not required to assume primary withholding responsibility for all the accounts it 
holds with a withholding agent but if it does, it is required to assume Chapters 3 and 
4 withholding responsibility for all withholdable payments and amounts made by the 
withholding agent to the account for which the responsibility is assumed.967 
When a FFI makes the choice to not assume primary withholding responsibility then 
it has to furnish both a withholding certificate and withholding statement to the 
withholding agent that it receives a reportable amount from.968 The withholding 
statement has to contain enough information so that the withholding agent may 
apply the correct rate of withholding on payments made to the identified accounts 
and to report correctly on those payments on Forms 1042-S and 1099 (discussed 
further down in the chapter).969 The withholding statement should also include 
withholding rate pool information sufficient enough so that the withholding agent 
can meet the Chapters 3 reporting, backup withholding and Forms 1099 and 1042-S 
obligations.970 
 
7.3.1.3.3 Backup Withholding 
 
Somewhere in the chain, an intermediary needs to make the election to backup 
withhold on U.S. accounts (it only applies to U.S. accounts). It can either be the FFI 
that holds the account or another intermediary up the chain. If backup withholding 
occurs upstream, then the FFI who holds the account is responsible for disclosure of 
the appropriate information so that the upstream intermediary can meet its 
withholding obligation.971  
 
967 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.03(A). 
968 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(2)(vii)(C).  
969 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(2)(vii)(C). 
970 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(2)(vii)(C). 
971 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(b)(vi)(C)(i).  
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Backup withholding occurs when a reportable payment is made to an account, but the 
FFI is unable to ascertain the status of the account because:  
1) The payee fails to furnish his tax identification number to the 
payor in the manner required;  
2) The Secretary notifies the payor that the tax identification 
number furnished by the payee is incorrect;  
3) There has been a notified payee underreporting; or   
4) There has been a payee certification failure.972 
 
Under these situations, the FFI is required to withhold 24% from the reportable 
payment.973  
A FFI is required to backup withhold and disclose a reportable amount if the FFI has 
actual knowledge that a reportable amount is subject to backup withholding and that 
another payor failed to apply the backup withholding or backup withholding has not 
been applied by another payor because of a mistake made by the FFI.974 
The FFI is not required to backup withhold on:  
1) A reportable amount it makes to another QI that has assumed primary 
Form 1099 reporting and backup withholding responsibility with 
respect to that amount; or 
2) A reportable amount that the QI makes to an intermediary or flow-
through entity that is a participating FFI registered deemed-compliant 
FFI or another QI that does not assume primary Form 1099 reporting 
and backup withholding responsibility with respect to the payment 
 
972 26 U.S.C. §3406(a)(1); See also, 26 C.F.R. §31.3406(d)-5. 
973 26 U.S.C. §3406(a)(1); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 2.07 and 3.04. The QI 
Agreement quotes 28% as the backup withholding rate but Public Law 115-97 changed the 
backup withholding rate from 28% to 24%. 
974 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.06 (A) and (B).  
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provided that such intermediary or flow-through entity allocated the 
payment on its withholding statement to a Chapter 4 withholding rate 
pool of U.S: payees and the withholding statement is associated with a 
valid Form W-8IMY that provides the applicable certification(s) for 
allocating the payment to this pool or allocates the payment on its 
withholding statement to a Chapter 4 withholding rate pool of 
recalcitrant owners.975 
 
If a withholdable payment is also a reportable payment and is subject to backup 
withholding (discussed further in a later section below) under §3406, the FFI is not 
required to withhold under this section if it withheld under Chapter 4 (FACTA 
Withholding discussed in Chapter 9).976  
 
7.3.1.3.4 Depositing Tax Withheld977  
 
Only FFIs that withhold are responsible for depositing tax.978 Non-withholding QIs 
(NWQI) have their tax withheld by another upstream intermediary. According to Ross 
K. McGill, this section has three questions to answer979: Who does the QI/withholding 
agent send the tax to? How does the withholding agent deposit the tax withheld? When 
does the withholding agent have to deposit?  
The answer to the first question is simple. The U.S. Department of Treasury is who 
the deposit is sent to. The IRS only receives the documentation and reports from the 
FFIs, never the money.980 
 
975 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.07. 
976 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.04(B). 
977 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1.  
978 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1(a)(1).  
979 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
980 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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When the FFI has withheld tax, how do they deposit it with the Treasury 
Department? When the FFI assumes primary withholding responsibility under 
Chapters 3 and 4 or primary Form 1099 reporting and backup withholding 
responsibility, it is required to deposit the amounts withheld by electronic funds 
transfer.981  
Finally, there is a schedule of sorts that the FFI must follow to deposit the money 
with the Treasury. If the aggregate amount of the undeposited taxes is $200 or more, 
then the withholding agent is required to deposit the amount by the 15th day of the 
following month.982 However, if the amount is $2,000 or more, then the withholding 
agent is required to deposit the amount within 3 business days after the close of the 
quarterly month period.983 If by the end of the year, the aggregate amount is less 
than $200, then the withholding agent has until the 15th of March of the following 
calendar year to deposit the taxes.984 If the FFI is a non-U.S. payor that does not 
assume chapters 3 and 4 primary withholding responsibility, primary form 1099 
reporting or backup withholding responsibility, the FFI is required to deposit the 
amounts withheld by the 15th day following the month in which the withholding 
took place.985  
If the withholding agent fails to withhold, the withholding agent is then liable under 
26 U.S.C. §1463 for the tax due.986 But the payee also remains liable for the tax and 
is required to file a U.S. tax return.987 
 
 
981 26 U.S.C. §6302; See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.6302-2; 26 U.S.C. 6302; 31 C.F.R. §31.6302-
1(h); IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.08. 
982 26 U.S.C. §6302; See also¸ 26 C.F.R. §1.6302-2(a)(1)(i). 
983 26 U.S.C. §6302; See also¸ 26 C.F.R. §1.6302-2(a)(1)(ii). 
984 26 U.S.C. §6302; See also¸ 26 C.F.R. §1.6302-2(a)(1)(iv). 
985 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 3.08. 
986 26 U.S.C. §1463; See also, David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax 
Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
987 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
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7.3.1.3.5 Over- and Under-withholding 
 
There are procedures in both the regulations and the QI agreement for when over-and 
under-withholding occurs.988 When a withholding agent has over-withheld, a FFI may 
request that the withholding agent make an adjustment by repaying the FFI for the 
amount over-withheld by either reimbursing or through a set-off procedure.989 This 
situation applies when the FFI does not assume the primary withholding 
responsibility.990 However, when the FFI has the primary withholding responsibility, 
the FFI may make adjustments for amounts paid to its account holders when the FFI 
has over-withheld.991 This can also be accomplished through the reimbursement or 
set-off procedures.992 
There is also a provision in this section for when a FFI discovers or knows that an 
amount should have been withheld from a previous payment to an account holder or 
payee but was not withheld.993  The FFI may withhold from future payments to the 
account holder or payee in order to “satisfy the tax from property that it holds in 
custody for such person or property over which it has control.”994 If the FFI (or the 
reviewer or IRS) determines - after a Form 1042 has been filed - that the FFI under-
withheld, the FFI shall file an amended Form 1042 to report and pay the under-
withheld tax.995 
 
 
988 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-3 (b)(8); See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15 Section 6, 9.01-9.06. 
989 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 9.01s and 9.01(A). 
990 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsections 9.01 and 9.01(A). 
991 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 9.02(A). 
992 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 9.02(A) and (B). 
993 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 9.05. 
994 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 9.05. 
995 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 9.05. 
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7.3.1.4 Information Reporting and Tax Returns996 
Reporting is one of the most important aspects of the QI program’s control and 
oversight of QIs and NQIs.997 As this chapter has shown, all U.S.-sourced income paid 
to all recipients outside the U.S has to be reported – both Americans and foreigners. 
FFIs must file both information reports and tax returns – for example, Forms 1042 
and 1042-S - which are used for decidedly different purposes.998 Each legal entity 
acting as a QI under the QI Agreement has to file separate information forms.999 A 
statement explaining any over- or under-withholding and the amounts must be 
attached to the form.1000 Tax returns must also be filed detailing the tax withheld on 
certain types of income on non-U.S. persons and which was also reported on the 
information report.1001 The forms in this section are IRS Form 1042 which is the tax 
return and Form 1042-S which is the information report.  
 
7.3.1.4.1 Information Reporting 
 
If the U.S.-source income payment is to a U.S. person then that payment must be 
reported to the IRS via Form 1099.1002 The financial institution is required to file a 
Form 1099 for both a reportable amount and a reportable payment. There are 
multiple versions of the 1099 which are grouped based on the type of income that 
the account holder receives.1003 For example, the Form 1099-INT is filed when the 
 
996 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1(b) & (c)(1). 
997 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
998 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
999 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 7.01(A). 
1000 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 7.01(A). 
1001 IRS, Form 1042, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042  
1002 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 8.06; See also, Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[8][a][ii] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
1003 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 8.06; See also, IRS, Form 1099-
DIV,https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-div and IRS, Form 1099-INT, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-int  
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income paid is from interest and the Form 1099-Div is filed when the income comes 
from dividends or a distribution.1004 The financial institution must file the correct 
version of the 1099 depending on the type of income paid.1005 
When the U.S.-sourced income payment is made to a non-U.S. person then the 
QI/NQI files a different information report.1006 If the financial institution has a QI 
agreement with the IRS, under the Agreement, the financial institution (QI) can 
protect the identity of its non-U.S. direct customers by using pooled reporting.1007 The 
use of the term “direct customers” is a crucial distinction because even a QI cannot 
pool the reporting of their indirect customers.1008 Pooled reporting is where the QI 
classifies all its direct non-U.S. customers’ U.S.-sourced income by tax rate and 
income type.1009 This sorted information is put onto a separate Form 1042-S for each 
type of tax rate and income type.1010 This ability to pool the reporting of direct 
 
1004 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 8.06; See also, IRS, Form 1099-
DIV,https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-div and IRS, Form 1099-INT, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-int  
1005 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 8.06. 
1006 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1007 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6,8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1008 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1009 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1010 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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customers is one of the benefits of being under the QI Agreement.1011 If there is no QI 
Agreement between the financial institution and the IRS, then the financial institutions 
(NQIs) are expected to report all the beneficial owners to the IRS directly.1012  
The form used to report U.S.-source FDAP income paid to non-U.S. recipients – either 
individually or through pooling – is Form 1042-S and is titled Foreign Person’s U.S.-
Source Income Subject to Withholding.1013 A QI, as noted above, can pool direct 
customers and report them according to tax rate and income type on a single 1042-S. 
In contrast, with indirect customers a QI has to file a separate 1042-S form for amounts 
paid to each separate indirect customer.1014 A NQI has to file a Form 1042-S for each 
of its customers that receive U.S.-source income.1015 
The 1042-S is a break-down of all of the details about the foreign person’s income 
including the tax rate the income is subject to, the federal tax withheld, tax paid by 
withholding agents, etc.1016 The 1042-S requires the following information from the 
QI:  
1) The name, address, TIN of the withholding agent and the withholding agent’s 
status for chapter 3 purposes; 
 
1011 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1012 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1013 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6,Subsection8.01; See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042-s; David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 182 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1014 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 8.02. 
1015 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 60 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1016 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1(c)(3)(i)-(ix); See also, IRS, Form 1042-S, found at 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1042s.pdf 
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2) A description of each category of income paid based on the income codes  
provided on the form and the aggregate amount in each category expressed in 
U.S. dollars; 
3) For a payment not subject to withholding under chapter 4, the rate 
of withholding applied or the basis for exempting 
the payment from withholding under chapter 3, and the exemption applicable 
to the payment for chapter 4 purposes 
4) The name and address of the recipient; 
5) The name and address of any nonqualified intermediary, flow-through entity, 
or U.S. branch to which the payment was made; 
6) The taxpayer identifying number of the recipient if required under § 1.1441-
1(e)(4)(vii) or if actually known to the withholding agent making the return; 
7) The taxpayer identifying number of a nonqualified intermediary or flow-
through entity (to the extent it is not a recipient) or other flow-through 
entity to the extent it is known to the withholding agent; 
8) The country of the recipient and of any nonqualified intermediary or flow-
through entity the name of which appears on the form; and 
9) Such information as the form or the instructions may require in addition to, or 
in lieu of, information required under this paragraph (c)(3).1017 
 
 
 
1017 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1(c)(3)(i)-(ix).  
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7.3.1.4.2 Tax Returns1018 
 
In contrast to the informational reports that the FFIs have to file, they are required to 
file tax returns at the end of the year – for example, Form 1042 which is the Annual 
Withholding Tax Return for U.S. Source Income of Foreign Persons.1019 Whereas the 
informational report (1042-S) just gives information about the account and the 
payments the FFI received, this form reports the tax that the QI withheld under 
Chapter 3 regulations  as well as payments that get reported on the informational 
report.1020 
Another form that the FFI needs to file is the Form 945 known as the Annual Return 
of Withholding Federal Income Tax which is used to report non-payroll type 
payments including backup withholding.1021 
 
7.3.1.5 Control and Oversight 
From the above sections, it is obvious to see that the QI program regulations and QI 
agreement are complicated and to ensure that the QIs are complying with the 
regulations and the agreement, the QI agreement provides for compliance procedures 
to oversee that the QI system is being administered properly.1022 The compliance 
procedure for the reviewer to follow was originally laid out in IRS Revenue Procedure 
2002-55 but was updated in Revenue Procedure 2017-15 which contains the most 
updated QI Agreement.1023 
This compliance procedure only applies to those QIs that execute a QI agreement. 
Ross K. McGill suggests that NQIs are not subject to a compliance and oversight 
 
1018 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1(b)(1).  
1019 IRS, Form 1042, found at https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1042 
1020 26 C.F.R. §1.1461-1(b)(1).  
1021 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 7.02; See also, IRS, Form 945, 
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-945; 26 U.S.C. §3406. 
1022 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 10.01-10.08. 
1023 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15. 
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system in his book.1024 Research has not been able to confirm whether the IRS has 
addressed this flaw but this a significant flaw that should be addressed since “the 
estimated number of NQIs outstrips the number of QIs nearly ten to one”.1025 This 
means that the majority of financial institutions are not subject to the oversight and 
control that is needed to ensure compliance.1026 The U.S. government should address 
this flaw because this is a loophole that could be utilized by U.S. taxpayers to evade 
their taxes by putting their accounts with NQIs they know do not have the oversight 
that ensures compliance with the documentation, reporting of and withholding on their 
accounts. It also means the IRS cannot guarantee the information they are getting on 
U.S. taxpayers from NQIs is accurate. One way to address this flaw would be to 
subject the NQIs to the same compliance process that a QI must follow but place the 
compliance within the regulations. If an NQI receives a U.S.-sourced payment, they 
are subject to the U.S. tax statute and regulations and are considered a withholding 
agent and the only way around this is for the NQIs to not manage U.S.-sourced 
payments. This would be hard to do unless they closed accounts that receive those 
types of payments. As a result, if the U.S. created a compliance program within the 
regulations, then the NQI would be held accountable and the IRS would have 
oversight over them as well. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA 
Chapter 9) fills in some of this need. It penalizes a FFI 30% on incoming U.S.-source 
FDAP income that goes to a recalcitrant1027 account holder (individual or entity) or a 
non-participating FFI (more details in chapter 9). 
QIs, subject to their QI agreement with the IRS do have a compliance program that 
they have to adhere to. The compliance program is not an audit because the report that 
is handed over after the process is simply a factual report of the finding and the 
 
1024 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 77 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1025 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,77 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1026 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,77 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1027 A recalcitrant account holder is an account holder of a passive FFI  or registered deemed-
compliant FFI that has failed to provide the FFI maintaining U.S. account with information 
required under regulation 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5. 
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reviewer does not give an opinion.1028  The QI Agreement covers the scope, the 
sampling methodology and the actual procedure that is required to be performed. 
 
7.3.1.5.1 Scope 
 
The scope of the review includes reviewing the documentation, withholding rate 
pools, withholding responsibilities, return filing and information reporting.1029 The 
reviewer must also verify that no significant change was discovered in the course of 
the review.1030 
 
7.3.1.5.2 Sampling Methodology 
 
The QI procedures provide for the methodology of what accounts will be tested to 
ensure compliance during the review.1031 The review must test accounts related to the 
QI’s obligations with regard to documentation, withholding, reporting and other 
obligations under the QI Agreement and its Chapter 4 FATCA (discussed in Chapter 
9) requirements for which it is acting as a QI.1032 Through this testing of accounts, the 
reviewer should identify any deficiencies in meeting these obligations.1033 If a third 
party is used, the third party must provide the necessary information for the QI to test 
accounts and transactions.1034 If there are more than sixty account, then a sample of 
accounts must be reviewed. However, if there are less than sixty accounts then each 
 
1028 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,77 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1029 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.05(A)-(D). 
1030 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.05(E). 
1031 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 10.05.  
1032 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.05. 
1033 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.05. 
1034 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.05. 
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account needs to be reviewed.1035 This is a new adjustment to the most current QI 
Agreement. Previous to the 2017 QI Agreement, the QI had to review all accounts.1036 
 
7.3.1.5.3 Procedures 
 
Section 6, subsection 10 describes the compliance procedures that a QI has to follow 
in order to confirm its compliance with the QI Agreement which has two major pieces 
to it: a periodic certification of internal controls and a periodic review that enables the 
certification.1037  The QI is required to adopt a compliance program that includes 
policies, procedures, and processes that are sufficient for a QI to fulfill the 
documentation, reporting and withholding requirements of the QI Agreement as well 
as being sufficient for the Responsible Officer of the QI to certify that the QI is in 
compliance with the QI Agreement.1038 
The QI is required to appoint a Responsible Officer (hereinafter “R.O.”) to oversee 
the compliance program and to make periodic certifications that the QI is in 
compliance.1039 A Responsible Officer is defined as “an officer of the QI with 
sufficient authority to fulfill the duties of a responsible officer as described in Section 
10 of this Agreement, including the requirements to periodically certify and to respond 
to requests by the IRS for additional information to review the QI’s compliance.”1040 
The R.O. is responsible for establishing a compliance program that assists the QI in 
 
1035 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.05. 
1036 Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[10] (Thomson 
Reuters/WG&L).  
1037 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.01; See also, Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[10] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
1038 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.01(A); See also, Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[10] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
1039 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.02 and Subsection 10.06; See also, 
Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[19[a] (Thomson 
Reuters/WG&L).  
1040 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.02; See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, 
Section 6, Subsection 2.72; Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, 
¶4.03[10][a] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
CHAPTER 7. QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY 
263 
 
complying with the requirements of the Agreement as well as making certifications 
and providing the IRS certain information regarding the QI every three years.1041 
The R.O. has to make those certifications every three years to the IRS which includes 
certain information regarding the QI through either an independent internal or external 
reviewer.1042 In order to make those certifications, the R.O. has to ensure that the QI 
is compliant in multiple areas which include (but are not limited to):   
1) written policies and procedures for both Chapter 3 (QI) withholding 
and Chapter 4 (FATCA – Chapter 9) withholding;  
2) training for relevant staff who are affected by the QI program and 
FATCA;  
3) any systems that are required to be in place to ensure compliance in 
the fundamental areas – documentation, reporting and withholding - 
of the QI Agreement; and 
4) compliance with periodic review requirements (this part replaced the 
old external audit from the Agreed Upon Procedure).1043  
After ensuring these areas are in compliance, then the R.O. can certify to the IRS 
regarding compliance and disclose to the IRS any material failures that occurred.1044  
The conclusions from the periodic review must be provided in a written report that is 
addressed to the R.O. of the QI and must be available, upon request, to the IRS.1045 
If the report is in another language other than English, a certified translation must be 
provided.1046 The report must: 
1) Describe the scope of the report; 
 
1041 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.01-10.08  
1042 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 10.04(A)(1)-(2).  
1043 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 10.02(A)(1), 10.02(A)(2), 10.02(A)(3), 10.02(A)(6).  
1044 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, 10.03; See also, Marnin J. Michaels, International 
Taxation: Withholding, ¶4.03[10][b] (Thomson Reuters/WG&L).  
1045 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.06(A). 
1046 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.06(A). 
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2) Outline the actions taken to satisfy each of the requirements 
of subsection 10.05(A)-(E) (this includes a methodology for 
the sampling of accounts) of the QI Agreement; and 
3) Include details about the documentation and tax deposit and 
payment failures identified and cured before the review was 
finalized.1047 
 
The reports must be retained by the QI for as long as the QI Agreement is in 
effect.1048 
Part of the oversight is the ability of the IRS to request a copy of the results of the 
periodic review and the QI has 30 days to respond to the request.1049 The IRS can also 
conduct additional fact finding through a correspondence review if they find it to be 
necessary.1050 
7.3.1.6 Penalties 
Penalties apply to both QIs and NQIs and are a result of multiple reasons such as late 
filing of forms, inaccurate information, under-withholding on payments and 
perjury.1051  
There is a detailed penalty structure to the QI program.1052 For example, the penalty 
for filing late forms – such as a 1042-S – is dependent upon the total gross receipts of 
the U.S.-source FDAP income.1053 If gross receipts are more than $5 million then the 
 
1047 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.06(A). 
1048 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.06(D). 
1049 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.08(B). 
1050 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 10.08(C). 
1051 See 26 U.S.C. §1461, 26 U.S.C. §1462, 26 U.S.C. §6656, 26 U.S.C. §6721 and §6722; 
See also  ̧Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,84 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1052 The penalties can be found in Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 26 U.S.C. §3406, 26 U.S.C. §6721 and 
26 U.S.C. §6722. 
1053 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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penalty is $270 per form.1054 This penalty is capped at $3,282,500.1055 If the late filing 
is corrected within 30 days the penalty drops to $50 per form and capped at 
$547,000.1056 If corrected after 30 days, then the penalty is $100 per form and capped 
at $1,641,000.1057 
If the IRS believes that the QI/NQI has intentionally disregarded its obligations, they 
are then subject to a penalty of $540 per form and it is uncapped.1058  
The intentional disregard for the QI Program obligations either under the QI 
Agreement or the regulations should incur a steep penalty. Tax evasion is a serious 
and ongoing issue and if the IRS wants to receive the information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts, then a high penalty to enforce the compliance of the QIs and NQIs 
that choose to deliberately mislead is highly appropriate.  
While the intentional disregard of the QI program and regulations should be penalized 
steeply, the problem for many NQIs (and even QIs) is that the QI program is 
complicated law and not all NQIs understand the obligations that they are under or 
even that they are under obligations when they receive U.S.-source FDAP income 
payments. The answer to this problem is to have a reasonable cause exception similar 
to the one found in the FBAR penalty structure (Chapter 4). Situations such as limited 
English language skills or not being aware of the obligations could fall under this 
exception. This is in line with Ross McGill suggestion outlined in the following 
paragraph.  
 
1054 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1055 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1056 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1057 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1058 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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If a penalty is assessed the QI or NQI has two options: Pay the penalty or request 
mitigation.1059 Ross K. McGill suggests drafting (by a lawyer) a Reasonable Cause 
Defense letter where the QI or NQI gives a reasonable explanation for what 
occurred.1060 He also suggests that the QI/NQI should outline what steps they will take 
to ensure the failure never happens again.1061 Ignorance is not bliss where the IRS is 
concerned – in fact, it is risky and potentially very expensive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1059 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,86 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1060 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,86 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1061 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,86 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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7.4. DIAGRAM OF CHAPTER 3 
RELATIONSHIPS1062 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1062 This diagram is presented to try to show the relationships and in which direction the 
various pieces of the QI program flows. The down arrows demonstrate that the FDAP Income 
payments flow downward and the up arrows represent the information that flows upward to 
the USWA which tells the other QIs in the chain what has to be withheld and how much. The 
purple arrows represent the money that is deposited with the U.S. Treasury and the 
aquamarine arrows represent the information reporting that is given to the IRS. The U.S. 
Treasury only gets the payments of taxes withheld while the IRS only receives the reports 
containing the information on the various parties in the chain. It is a overly simplistic 
diagram.  For more detailed diagrams, see Ross K. McGill’s book: Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA. 
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7.5. PROBLEMS WITH THE QI  
Before the 2017 QI Agreement, significant flaws were found in the information that 
was furnished to the IRS by the FFIs that identified the beneficial owners of the 
foreign accounts.1063 Congress held hearings to address these flaws and found multiple 
issues.1064 These flaws were manipulated by U.S. taxpayers and their financial 
advisors to evade U.S. tax and avoid reporting U.S.-source income.1065 A 2007 GAO 
report found that the FFIs were manipulating their QI reporting duties in order to avoid 
reporting client accounts.1066 One flaw that presented itself was that the QI program 
did not require a “look-through” of foreign shell companies to determine if the 
beneficial owner was a U.S. taxpayer.1067 Another fault was that in the original draft 
of the QI there was not a provision that covered whether an external auditor was 
required to follow up on indications of fraud or illegal activity by the qualified 
intermediary.1068 The Qualified Intermediaries were required to verify the account 
 
1063 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 10 (March 2009; Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 
333, 357-358 (Spring 2015). 
1064 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of The U.S. Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 N.W. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687 (Fall 2015); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, Buying 
FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 
36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013). 
1065 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-10 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
1066 GAO, Tax Compliance: Qualified Intermediary Program Provides Some Assurance That 
Taxes on Foreign Investors Are Witheld and Reported, But Can Be Improved, GAO-08-99 
(December 2007); See also, David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax 
Evasion in the Global Information Age, 187 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1067 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of The U.S. Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 N.W. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687 (Fall 2015); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, Buying 
FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 
36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, 
International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 187 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1068 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of The U.S. Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 N.W. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687 (Fall 2015); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, Buying 
FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 
36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013). 
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holder’s identity – in other words, complete due diligence to make sure the account 
owner is who they say they are and whether that person is a U.S. citizen – but the QI 
program also allowed for the withholding agent to accept self-certification.1069 Self-
certification seems to have presented the same problems that voluntary compliance 
has with individual taxpayers in not complying.  
The hope was that the program would improve compliance regarding tax withholding 
and reporting on U.S. source income that gets funneled to offshore accounts1070, 
however, in light of the complications and the flaws and examples like UBS as 
discussed below, this purpose was not fully realized. Between the abuse of provisions 
and the fact that not all FFIs are participants in the QI program, the ability of U.S. 
citizens to hide assets from the U.S. government continued.1071 This also reflects, 
partially, the problem of NQIs not having oversight as discussed in subsection 
7.3.1.5.1072  In fact, a GAO report noted that the QI program was “insufficient to 
address all offshore tax evasion.”1073 This is not surprising considering it mostly 
addresses non-resident aliens’ U.S.-source income payments and not the foreign 
accounts or U.S.-source payments to Americans which is covered in Chapter 4 
withholding (FATCA, Chapter 9).  
Another notable issue that Congress found was that the QI program only applied to 
banks and not to other types of financial institutions.1074 Based on the obvious gaps in 
 
1069 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 10 (March 2009. 
1070 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance (2009), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-111hhrg63014/CHRG-111hhrg63014/context  
1071 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance (2009), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-111hhrg63014/CHRG-111hhrg63014/context 
1072 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance (2009), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-111hhrg63014/CHRG-111hhrg63014/context 
1073 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T (March 2009).  
1074 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-10 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
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the law at the time, legislators needed to fill in those holes and they saw FATCA as 
the golden opportunity to fulfill this need.1075  They also addressed some of the flaws 
by updating the QI Agreement.  
The UBS case was an excellent illustration that demonstrated the vulnerabilities of 
the QI program that the FFIs took advantage of aby not disclosing U.S. accounts with 
billions in assets.1076 UBS, taking advantage of the flaws of the QI program, helped 
their U.S. clients by setting up foreign entities in tax haven jurisdictions and then 
identified the accounts as being owned by foreign corporations or other types of 
foreign entities which allowed the QI to claim those accounts were not subject to the 
QI Agreement’s reporting requirements.1077 UBS, who was a QI, did not file Form 
1099 form to report U.S. owned accounts to the IRS like they were required to do 
under the QI Agreement.1078 The estimation is that UBS held 20,000 accounts and 
19,000 of those account were undisclosed.1079 The total assets of the undisclosed 
accounts equaled roughly $20 billion.1080 The old version of the QI program allowed 
both banks and U.S. taxpayers to evade the rules through various schemes but it also 
 
1075 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance at 10 (2009), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-111hhrg63014/CHRG-111hhrg63014/context 
1076 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 11 (March 2009; See also, Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. 
Law 333, 357-358 (Spring 2015); Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? 
Assessing the United States’ Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L.J. 409, 422-423 
(2010); David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 153 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016).  
1077 Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 333, 357-358 (Spring 2015); See 
also, Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States’ 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L.J. 409, 422-423 (2010); Marc D. Shepsman, 
Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax 
Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013).  
1078 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 188 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, Buying 
FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 
36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1789 (2013). 
1079 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 187-188 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1080 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 187-188 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
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allowed financial institutions to block information reporting on income earned by 
foreign taxpayers whose identities were not revealed to the U.S. government or to the 
foreign taxpayer’s government.1081 The combination of both bank secrecy and the 
nominee foreign corporations that the U.S. owners hid behind played an important 
role in the abuse of the QI program by foreign financial institutions like UBS.1082 
A 2008 report on tax havens presented suggestions for strengthening the QI program 
and analyzing the present QI agreement.1083 Those suggestions have been 
implemented in the 2017 QI Agreement.1084 One suggestion that was implemented 
was to require the FFIs that participate in the QI program to utilize KYC rules and 
identify the beneficial owners of the accounts.1085  This is reinforced by the list of 
approved KYC jurisdictions that the IRS maintains. Another implementation was 
requiring domestic FIs and FFIs to file Form 1099 for all U.S. taxpayer clients and 
accounts that are beneficially owned by U.S. persons even if the account is titled in 
the name of a foreign corporation, trust or other foreign entity and regardless of 
whether the account holds U.S. securities.1086 The presumption rules, if no 
documentation is found or if the documentation is not reliable, presumes the status of 
an account holder to be that of a U.S. person until reliable documentation is provided. 
This has allowed that the U.S.-source payment be taxed at 30% until its proven that, 
through solid evidence, the recipient of the payment is entitled to a lower rate.1087 
 
1081 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 180 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1082 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 179, (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1083 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 179, (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1084 U.S. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance (2008); See also, David 
Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 
189 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1085 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsections 5.01, 5.08 and 5.09; See also, U.S. 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance (2008).  
1086 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsections 5.08, 5.09, and 8.06; See also, U.S. 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance (2008).  
1087 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,3 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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Another implementation was to revoke the status of a QI for FFIs that fail to disclose 
accounts or impede U.S. investigations.1088 
The QI Agreement detailed in the previous pages is not the same QI Agreement that 
UBS and other FFIs were able to abuse. The QI agreement above was redrafted in 
2017 with the focus on looking beyond the shell corporations (or “look through”) to 
the beneficial owners to see if they are U.S. owners who should have tax withheld in 
order to be in compliance with the law or if they are non-U.S. persons that should be 
taxed at different amounts depending on various circumstances (i.e., treaty benefits). 
That has been the main purpose behind the QI program. The QI was implemented so 
that the Department of the Treasury had reliable information to correctly apply the 
proper withholding of income while also allowing acceptable reductions to qualifying 
taxpayers under a treaty or a domestic legal regime.1089 This most recent QI 
Agreement still allows the acceptable reductions but at the same time  requires the QI 
to make sure that the beneficial owner, whether a foreign person or a U.S. person is 
identified, reported, and taxed accordingly. This fits squarely within the QI program 
being a measure which allows the U.S. government to access information on a U.S. 
taxpayer’s foreign accounts.  
Another critical flaw with the QI program is the issue brought up briefly subsection 
7.3.1.2.2 that pertains to cultural and linguistic differences. According to Ross K. 
McGill “if you draw a line from Washington D.C. eastwards, the level of knowledge, 
understanding and compliance to Chapter 3 falls rapidly with distance.”1090 There are 
multiple reasons for this: culture, language, English is not the corporate language of 
choice like it is in some countries, English is not a second or even a third language 
 
1088 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15, Section 6, Subsection 11.06(A)-(S); See also, U.S. Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance (2008).  
1089 David Kerzner and David W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 179-180 (Palgrave MacMillian, 2016). 
1090 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,3 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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etc.1091 In McGill’s 2019 update to his book, 1092he notes that the failure rate for the 
validation of W-8BEN forms has not improved since the first edition published in 
2013.  Legal language (in any language) is complex and perplexing unless one has 
been trained as a lawyer – and even then, it can still be difficult. Asking a second-
language English learner who may not be a lawyer to fully understand and comply 
with a law in American Legal English is a flaw that should be addressed.  
 
7.6. QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM: 
CONCLUSION 
The Qualified Intermediary program is an anti-tax evasion measure that uses third-
party foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to document, withholding, deposit tax and 
report on U.S.-sourced FDAP income payments made to non-U.S. persons.  
 
The QI Program is a complicated set of laws and regulations that require the FFIs in 
the chain to document their customers and themselves when a U.S.-source payment 
is received through Know Your Customer or self-certification procedures. Based on 
the information received, through the documentation process, the information flows 
upward and the withholding on the payment occurs either at the FFI’s level or with 
another withholding agent up the chain. The FFIs are required to file both 
informational reports and tax returns with the IRS and Treasury, respectively. A 
penalty structure exists to punish any violations of the program such as late filing or 
under-withholding on payments.  
 
Similar to the other anti-tax evasion measures utilized by the IRS to try to obtain 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts, the QI program is not a perfect 
 
1091 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,3 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1092 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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program. The QI program relies on the FFIs to not only accurately and honestly 
withhold and to report the information on account holders received through the 
documentation process. While the 2017 update to the QI Agreement as well as the 
regulations closed the beneficial owner loophole by requiring the use of due 
diligence in the KYC procedures to ascertain the beneficial owner, there are still 
problems with the QI program.  
 
As stated earlier in the chapter, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA 
Chapter 9) has helped in addressing some of the problems of the QI through the use 
of 30% penalty on U.S.-source payments to the FFI if the recipient of those 
payments are made to non-participating FFIs or recalcitrant account holders – either 
individuals or entities.  Also, the due diligence requirement of both the QI program 
and FATCA to ascertain the beneficial owner and whether they are a U.S. person or 
not has solved one of the major loopholes. The due diligence requirement allows the 
IRS, if the QI/NQI is in compliance, to receive information on the U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts.  
 
Despite FATCA filling in some of the gaps, the QI has a few key issues that should 
be addressed. For instance, one of the main problems is that it is an extremely 
complicated and onerous measure that is complicated enough for U.S. legal and 
financial professionals, but then to expect second language English learners to 
understand all that they need to understand to comply is alarming considering that 
they will be subject strict penalties especially if the IRS believes that the FFI has 
acted intentionally in being non-compliant. This issue leads back to the earlier 
discussion of cultural and linguistic problems with complying with the QI program. 
Ross McGill estimates that between 30% and 75% of W-8BEN forms are invalid 
and that the failure rates become higher the farther east one moves (Europe to 
Asia).1093 If the documentation is invalid due to language and the ability to 
understand the QI program and its obligations, then the IRS is not acquiring the 
 
1093 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2019). 
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taxpayer information they are seeking – at least not the correct information – to help 
them. For both QIs and NQIs, it is crucial for them to understand that if the 
documentation is not correct then the withholding will not be correct, and both are 
important to the IRS.  
 
The language problem is not an issue that can be solved overnight, however, the U.S. 
government (namely the IRS) can and should do a few things to help the FFIs (both 
QIs and NQIs) be able to understand the program so that they can be in compliance 
and the IRS can get the information they are seeking along with the correct tax being 
withheld. It is important to get the idea across to the FFIs – especially those that are 
NQIs – that the minute they get a U.S.-source FDAP income payment, they fall under 
U.S. law (Chapter 3 requirements). The IRS should, as much as possible, publish 
guides that help second-language English learners understand the rules and 
regulations of the QI program. Using plain language – not technical language or 
legalese – will help those who are not American lawyers understand what their 
obligations are under the QI Agreement, United States Code and the regulations. 
Other ways the IRS government could help to ensure compliance from FFIs is to 
provide diagrams similar to the examples they give in the regulations. The IRS could 
also provide online courses via online video conferencing, Youtube.com videos, blogs 
and podcasts that are specifically targeted towards those that work in FFIs to help 
them understand and comply. These avenues, though, should always contain plain, 
concise English so that a non-native speaker can understand it and be able to truly 
comply. The ability of the IRS to educate and help those FFIs understand and comply 
with the QI program will only help the IRS to obtain the information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. These types of solutions can help to solve many of the 
non-compliance issues. However, these suggestions also raise a concern that should 
be considered. For example, if the advice that is found on a YouTube channel or 
podcast that the IRS chooses to start to help FFIs understand the QI program is wrong 
and the FFI acts on the incorrect advice, would the IRS hold the FFIs be liable for that 
mistake. The answer to that dilemma should not be an outright no. The FFI should be 
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able to prove that the podcast or video was the reason for them acting and not for 
another reason such as bad judgment.  
The issue presented in subsection 7.3.1.2.2 regarding the issue of tax forms that are 
handwritten presents another cultural and linguistic dilemma. The identification and 
documentation of U.S. taxpayers is one of the most important purposes of the QI 
program. When identification and documentation are done correctly, then the U.S. 
receives the information that it is looking for and can administer the tax laws correctly 
and fairly. Allowing substitute forms and electronic systems – which the regulations 
allow – solves some of the issues that are cultural and linguistic in nature. For 
example, substitute forms that are in the native language of the client and that comply 
with the regulations enable the client to provide more accurate information to the FFI. 
This in turn provides the IRS with more accurate information to administer the tax 
laws correctly. Electronic systems are an alternative to handwritten forms that is 
allowed in the regulations and allow either a scanned image or a pdf. of the W-8 or 
substitute form. Electronic systems where the client can fill out a W-8 form (or 
substitute form) online without having to handwrite the information is the better route 
because it solves the issue of the FFI being able to comprehend a person’s 
handwriting. Of course, as McGill notes, the effort must outweigh the risks including 
the cost to create the electronic system and it is usually only the larger institutions like 
J.P. Chase Morgan that would be able to have such a system. However, the online 
form should allow for room to completely answer the question as the paper form does 
not always have that room which presents the problem of shortened answers and 
abbreviations the FFI might not understand. Both the substitute forms and electronic 
systems provide the client the opportunity to provide the FFI with more accurate 
information so that on the back end the IRS is provided with the most up-to-date, 
accurate information. No system is perfect. There are a couple of issues that present 
themselves with the electronic systems. For instance, ensuring that the person who 
enters the information and executes (signs) the electronic form and submits it is the 
same person named in the form. If the FFI has the capability of giving their clients 
code cards similar to the NemID cards that Denmark has for its citizens, then the client 
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could be required to input their username and password to get a code that allows them 
to both verify that it is the client themselves and to execute the document. This could 
be a requirement that the IRS has of the FFI. Another issue to consider is that the 
regulations say that the form(s) should include a penalty of perjury statement where 
the person executes the form under penalty of perjury, however this legal concept of 
“perjury” probably does not translate to all other cultures. Many U.S. legal concepts 
do not translate into a legal concept for other cultures – for example, trusts are not a 
legal concept that has a substantially similar concept in other countries. The U.S. 
would be hard pressed to enforce a penalty of perjury charge in another jurisdiction 
of a non-U.S. citizen. Despite the issues, the substitute forms and electronic systems 
allowed in the regulations are good alternatives that help to solve some of the cultural 
and linguistic issues.  
Another major issue that is not as easy to solve is the oversight and control – or lack 
thereof – of the NQIs. The IRS believes NQIs are instigators of tax evasion because 
they are believed to be assisting in tax evasion when they refuse to share their 
customers’ information with the IRS. Much of that, the author believes, results from 
the lack of understanding of their obligations and the simple fact that they are 
subject to the U.S. Chapter 3 when they receive the U.S.-source income payment. It 
is doubtful that thousands of NQIs would deliberately not comply with U.S. law if 
they knew of the obligations of Chapter 3. However, it is naïve to think that there are 
not some NQIs out there that are deliberately refusing to comply and participate in 
assisting U.S. taxpayers evade U.S. law. This is a loophole that can be easily 
manipulated by those U.S. taxpayers wanting to evade taxes by simply choosing an 
NQI that refuses to disclose. The QIs agree to the control and oversight in the QI 
Agreement, but the NQI does not subject itself to the same since it is not under a QI 
Agreement. The IRS could attempt to encourage those NQIs that are in jurisdictions 
that have approved KYC rules to become Qualified Intermediaries. That would 
bring some of the NQIs under the control and oversight portion of the QI 
Agreement. The U.S. could attempt to create a more rigid compliance program 
within the regulations specifically directed at the NQIs that would also be connected 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
278
 
to the penalty structure. Harsher penalties could be instituted for those that are NQIS 
if they are not in compliance. However, a bit of caution here since some NQIs do not 
understand what their obligations are under Chapter 3. Earlier it was noted that 
intentional disregard of the obligations should be harshly penalized, however, a 
reasonable cause exception should be instituted. If a compliance program is drafted 
in the regulations aimed at the NQIs, then a reasonable cause exception should be 
included. This should be considered for the NQIs even more so than the QIs, 
because the QIs executed an agreement and that signals they are well aware of their 
obligations (or should be).  
 
Chapter 3 discussed blacklists and tax haven definitions and how they are not an 
effective approach to secrecy. One place, however, the U.S. might consider using a 
well-reasoned tax haven definition or blacklist would be within the Qualified 
Intermediary program (See Chapter 7). The IRS – in creating the QI program – noted 
that the jurisdictions that refused to cooperate with the program and were considered 
tax haven jurisdictions (or bank secrecy jurisdictions) needed more stringent oversight 
over the FFIs or their branches located in those jurisdictions.1094 For this scenario, a 
tax haven definition or a blacklist could help in identifying those jurisdictions where 
the FFIs need more oversight and also provide some incentive for the FFIs to fully 
cooperate with the program if they know they will be under more scrutiny because of 
the secrecy their jurisdiction provides to those looking for it. 
The next chapter, Chapter 8, discusses the utilization of article 26 in U.S. tax treaties 
along with Tax Information Exchange Agreements as an anti-tax evasion measure as 
another way, through governmental means, to access information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts.  
 
 
1094 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243; Marc 
D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent 
International Tax Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); Stephen Troiano, The 
U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and  the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 New Eng. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 317, 333 (2011). 
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CHAPTER 8. ART. 26 OF THE U.S. 
MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY & TAX 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENTS 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters analyzed and examined anti-tax evasion measures that the 
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) uses to obtain information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. These anti-tax evasion measures use the taxpayers 
themselves (chapters 4 and 5), third parties (chapter 6) and foreign financial 
institutions (chapter 7) to procure the information they are seeking. These measures 
alone are not successful for several reasons least of which are non-compliance by the 
taxpayers and foreign financial institutions. Another avenue to obtaining the 
information needed to administer U.S. tax law correctly is via U.S. tax treaties with 
foreign governments. A tax treaty covers multiple issues, but this chapter is focused 
on article 26 of U.S. tax treaties as anti-tax evasion.  
The chapter begins with a discussion of general information of U.S. tax treaties before 
focusing on article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention (hereinafter U.S. 
Tax Convention) which is the relevant article for this thesis. Article 26 is the section 
of the U.S. Tax Convention that addresses the exchange of information between the 
U.S. government and a foreign government. Next, the chapter presents a case study 
on the U.S. – Switzerland treaty which examines the treaty to determine whether 
treaties can allow the U.S. government to get the information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts or whether there are issues that exist to impede this exchange of 
information. The chapter then moves into a quick examination of Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (hereinafter TIEAs) that the U.S. utilizes when it does not have 
a tax treaty with a foreign government. This section also questions whether these 
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TIEAs allow the IRS to procure the information they seek on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts. Finally, the chapter looks at two questions. First, when a request for 
information is made under art. 26, does the U.S. receive the information needed so 
that all the facts are known so that the U.S. tax authorities can apply the law correctly 
and fairly? Second, if art. 26 in the tax treaties cannot provide the U.S. government 
the information the IRS seeks, what can be done to ensure that requesting information 
under art. 26 is effective in getting the information needed? 
This chapter will not discuss the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(MACM) because although this treaty was an attempt at sharing information this 
treaty does not allow disclosure of tax information in relation to tax evasion unless 
there is an unrelated offense such as drug trafficking that accompanies it.  
 
8.2. BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 
One anti-tax evasion measure that the U.S. in its arsenal to obtain information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts are tax treaties, the cornerstone of international tax 
information exchange1095, and Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) that 
the US is a party to.1096 Generally, as described in the literature, income tax treaties 
have four purposes: 1) avoiding double taxation, 2) avoiding discriminatory tax 
treatment of residents of the contracting states, 3) establishing taxing rights ( or 
limiting them) among the contracting states, and 4) reducing tax evasion through 
 
1095 International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border 
Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, (2013). 
1096 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010).  
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allowing the contracting states to enforce their domestic tax laws more effectively.1097 
Both tax treaties and TIEAs are used to further tax enforcement via official 
agreements with foreign governments.1098 Considering, this thesis is concerned with 
using anti-tax evasion measures to obtain information on U.S. foreign accounts of 
U.S. taxpayers in order to enforce the U.S. domestic tax law, the fourth purpose noted 
above is relevant. Based on this, the chapter will focus on the information exchange 
provision found in art. 26 of the U. S. Tax Convention and the TIEAs  
The United States needed (and still needs) a way to obtain information from other 
countries regarding U.S. taxpayers’ financial activities to prevent abuse of the 
taxpayer system which relies heavily on voluntary compliance. When other avenues 
have failed, the U.S. government can utilize the tax treaties via art. 26 to request 
information from foreign governments on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts abroad. 
Art. 26, the exchange provision, in the income tax treaty is considered the quickest 
and most effective way to access that information but it is also not without 
limitations.1099 
The U.S. Tax Convention1100 presents the official stance of U.S. treaty policy and 
introduces the U.S.’ standard position given when it negotiates income tax treaties 
with foreign jurisdictions.1101 The purpose of the U.S. Tax Convention is to avoid 
 
1097 Richard E. Andersen, Analysis of United States Income Tax Treaties, ¶1.01 (September 
2010, Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA 
Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 36 
Fordham Int’l L. J. 1768 (2013); Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? 
Assessing the United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 
(2010); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 44 (Palgrave MacMillian 2016); U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax 
Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 17 (July 2008). 
1098 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
1099 Richard E. Andersen, Analysis of United States Income Tax Treaties, ¶1.01[2] (September 
2010, Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting).  
1100 The latest Model Income Tax Convention was updated in 2016 but article 26 was not 
updated from the 2006 Model Income Tax Convention.  
1101 Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation, 224-225 (Foundation Press 3rd ed., 2010); See 
also, Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
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double taxation for the citizens of the Contracting States while reducing tax 
evasion.1102  The U.S. Tax Convention is also the starting point when the U.S. 
negotiates treaties with foreign jurisdictions.1103 It has been developed based on 
previous U.S. models, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(hereinafter OECD) Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital as 
well as other various sources.1104 The technical explanation that accompanies the U.S. 
Tax Convention is “an official guide to the convention….reflects policies behind 
particular Convention provisions as well as understandings reached with respect to 
the application and interpretation of the Convention”.1105 Other interpretative devices 
used to construe U.S. tax treaties include examining the plain language of the treaties, 
the intention of the parties and using the OECD Model Draft Conventions and 
Commentaries.1106 
While the U.S. has the Model Tax Convention as the standard, its necessary to 
remember no one treaty is exactly like the Model treaty – each treaty is unique.1107 
Although the U.S. tax treaty goes over multiple topics – such as limitation on benefits 
– this chapter is only concerned with art. 26 of the U.S. Tax Convention.  
 
1102 Technical Explanations to the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention; See also, 
Stephen J. Dunn, Foreign Accounts Compliance §6.2 (August 2018). 
1103 Stephen J. Dunn, Foreign Accounts Compliance §6.2 (August 2018); See also, Laura 
Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in the 
UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
1104 Technical Explanations to the 1996 U.S. Model Tax Income Tax Convention; See also 
Technical Explanations to the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention; International Fiscal 
Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax 
Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, 781 (2013). 
1105 Technical Explanations to the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention. 
1106 U.S. v. A.L. Burbank and Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9 (2nd Cir. 1975); See also, Nat’l 
Westminster Bank, PLC v. U.S., 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999), aff’d in Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC 
v. U.S., 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008); McManus v. U.S., 130 Fed. Cl. 613, 620 (2017) 
(quoting Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. U.S., 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Joel D. Kuntz, 
Robert J. Peroni and John A. Bogdanski, U.S. International Taxation, ¶C4.01 (March 2019 
Thomsen Reuters Tax and Accounting); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax 
Evasion in the Global Information Age, 46 (Palgrave MacMillian 2016). 
1107 Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation, 225 (Foundation Press 3rd ed., 2010); See also, 
Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.3 (Dec. 21, 2010); See also, International Fiscal 
Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax 
Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779 (2013). 
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8.2.1. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 26  
The purpose of art. 26 is to allow the authorization of the exchange of information 
between the U.S. and a foreign government and to “prevent or curb tax evasion”.1108 
This provision outlines the process of the exchange of information between the United 
States government and its treaty partner. It is reflective of the OECD’s Model and it 
also relies on the statutory language found in U.S. domestic tax law. This section will 
describe and analyze the article. It is important to reiterate here that each treaty is 
unique and will specify procedures that are necessary to obtain information documents 
which reflects the unique relationship the U.S. has with each country that it has a 
treaty with.1109 This section addresses only the U.S. Tax Convention’s Article 26. 
Individual treaties between the U.S. and foreign countries should be examined on their 
own.  
Paragraph 1 of the provision is the authorization paragraph that obligates the U.S. and 
its treaty partner to obtain and provide information relevant to the Convention or 
domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes of every kind unless they 
contravene the Convention.1110 The U.S. Tax Convention’s art. 26 contains much 
broader language than some specific treaty language — such as in the U.S.-Swiss 
treaty — which will be discussed in the next section. The language used says “….the 
Contracting States shall exchange such information as is foreseeably relevant for 
carrying out the provisions of the present Convention or the domestic laws of the 
Contracting States concerning taxes of every kind….”1111 This language incorporates 
 
1108 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010); See also, Ernest R. 
Larkins, U.S. Income Tax Tax Treaties In Research and Planning: A Primer, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 
133, 204 (Summer 1998). 
1109 Internal Revenue Manual, 4.60.1.2 (Jan. 1, 2002).  
1110 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 1 (2016); See also, Cym H. Lowell and 
Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][a] (2019).  
1111 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 1 (2016); See also, Laura Szarmach, 
Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 
43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
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the language of 26 U.S.C. §7602 which gives the authorities the legal basis to examine 
documents, persons or to take testimony in the course of an investigation.1112 The 
“relevant for carrying out…” language has been interpreted to include even “items 
of potential relevance.”1113 However, the Treasury clarified that the request must be 
relatively definitive because a request where information regarding all bank accounts 
maintained by residents (American) in the requesting Contracting State that are held 
in the non-requesting Contracting State would not be allowed for being too broad.1114 
This broad type of request is analogous to the fishing expeditions discussed in the 
John Doe summons (chapter 6) and procedural discovery in civil litigation where 
discovery has to be relevant to the claim and proportional to the needs of the case.1115 
The obligation to keep the information that is exchanged confidential is found in 
paragraph 2.1116 This obligation requires that the information be kept confidential in 
keeping with the treaty partner’s domestic laws and that the information can only be 
disclosed to relevant persons and authorities involved in the “assessment, collection, 
or administration of, enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination 
of appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1 of the Article.”1117 This 
confidentiality also reflects U.S. domestic policy on confidentiality of tax returns and 
is found in 26 U.S.C.§6103 and §6105. 26 U.S.C. §6103 addresses the U.S.’ domestic 
policy of keeping both the disclosure of and the information contained in U.S. tax 
 
1112 26 U.S.C. §7602; See also, Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing 
the United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
1113 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010) (quoting United States v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).  
1114 Technical Explanations to the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Art. 26, para.1; 
See also, Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 421 (2010). 
1115 Fed. Rules. Civ. Pro. Rule 26 (b)(1)  
1116 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 2 (2016); See also, Internal Revenue 
Manual, 35.4.5.2.3 (Dec. 21, 2010); See also, Cym H. Lowell and Jack P. Governale, US 
International Taxation: Practice and Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][a] (2019); Laura Szarmach, 
Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 
43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 421 (2010); International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of 
Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l 
Fiscal L. 779, 799 (2013). 
1117 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 2 (2016). 
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returns confidential.1118 26 U.S.C. §6105 reflects the U.S.’ policy on the 
confidentiality under treaties and that policy is pretty definitive: tax convention 
information shall not be disclosed.1119 §6105, does however, contain exceptions 
similar to those found in paragraph 2 of art. 261120.  For example, tax convention 
information can be disclosed to persons or authorities that are entitled to disclosure 
under the applicable tax convention.1121  
Paragraph 3 states that the two previous paragraphs of the article are not to be 
understood to impose an obligation on a Contracting State that contravenes or is not 
obtainable under the laws of the Contracting State.1122 It is also not required to 
exchange information that would disclose “any trade, business, industrial, 
commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of 
which would be contrary to public policy.”1123  The policy of the U.S reflects this. 
“….the USA has a policy of not carrying out administrative measures at variance with 
the laws and administrative practice of either contracting state, not supplying 
information that contracting states would not be able to obtain under their own laws, 
and not providing information that would disclose trade, business, industrial, 
commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information that would be 
contrary to public policy of either contracting state.”1124 Paragraph 3 places 
limitations on art. 26 and is where the biggest weakness lies. This weakness is found 
in the potential for a Contracting State (like Switzerland) to assert that they cannot 
provide the information due to the bank secrecy laws in the Contracting State.1125 This 
 
1118 26 U.S.C. §6103  
1119 26 U.S.C. §6105 (a). 
1120 26 U.S.C.  §6103 (b). 
1121 26 U.S.C.  §6103 (b).  
1122 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 3 (2016); See also, Laura Szarmach, 
Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 
43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
1123 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 3 (2016). 
1124 International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border 
Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, 800 (2013). 
1125 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 3 (2016); See also, Cym H. Lowell and 
Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][a] (2019); 
Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in 
the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 420 (2010). 
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would then prohibit the U.S. government from obtaining the information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. 
The non-requesting Contracting State cannot refuse to supply information to a 
requesting Contracting State simply because the non-requesting Contracting State has 
no domestic interest in the information being requested.1126 The Contracting State has 
an obligation under paragraph 4 to gather information to obtain the requested 
information despite not needing the information for itself.1127 The obligation to gather 
information is subject to the paragraph 3 limitations.  
Paragraph 5 states that a Contracting State cannot refuse to deny exchanging 
information requested based on the fact that the information is held by “a bank, other 
financial institution, nominee or person acting in agency or a fiduciary capacity or 
because it related to ownership interests in a person”.1128 The last part of paragraph 
5 addresses the beneficial ownership of the information. This paragraph’s purpose is 
to prevent a Contracting State from relying on paragraph 3 by invoking bank secrecy 
laws that would cancel out the paragraph 1 obligation to provide information.1129 
Art. 26 also addresses in what form the information should be provided.1130 The 
information requested should be given to the requesting Contracting State in the form 
of depositions of witnesses and authenticated copies of unedited, original documents 
which includes books, papers, statements, records, accounts, and writings.1131 This 
aligns with 26 U.S.C. §7602 which allows the IRS to review books, papers, etc., in 
order to assess the correctness of a return or to make a return.1132 
 
1126 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 4 (2016). 
1127 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 4 (2016). 
1128 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 5 (2016). 
1129 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 5 (2016); See also, Technical 
Explanations to the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Art. 26, para 5. 
1130 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 6 (2016); See also, Cym H. Lowell and 
Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][a] (2019). 
1131 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 6 (2016). 
1132 26 U.S.C. §7602(A)(1).  
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Paragraph 7 obligates the Contracting State to “endeavor to collect on behalf of the 
other Contracting State such amounts as been necessary to ensure that relief granted 
by the Convention from taxation imposed by that other Contracting State does not 
inure to the benefit of persons not entitled thereto.”1133 The technical comments 
explain that the non-requesting Contracting State is obligated to tax collection 
assistance in the case of third parties that are not obligated to receive benefits under 
the treaty.1134 This is to ensure that only persons entitled to treaty benefits receive 
them under the Tax Convention terms.1135 
Paragraph 8 is the provision that obligates the non-requesting Contracting State to 
allow representatives of the Contracting State to enter the requested State and 
interview persons and examine books and records in the jurisdiction of the non-
requesting Contracting State.1136 The persons involved must consent to the interviews 
and examinations.1137 
The final paragraph under art. 26, paragraph 9, addresses how the competent 
authorities of each Contracting State may draft an agreement on the mode of 
application of art. 26 which includes an agreement that would ensure that both 
Contracting States provide comparable levels of assistance to each other.1138 If the 
parties do not have such an agreement, that does not relieve a Contracting State from 
their obligations under art. 26.1139 
 
1133 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 7 (2016); See also, Cym H. Lowell and 
Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][a] (2019). 
1134 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 7 (2016); See also, Technical 
Explanations to the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and 
Martin B. Tittle, The New United States Model Income Tax Convention, 61 Bulletin Int’l 
Tax’n 224, 232 (2007) 
1135 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 7 (2016). 
1136 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 8 (2016). 
1137 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 8 (2016). 
1138 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 9 (2016); See also, International Fiscal 
Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax 
Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, 797 (2013). 
1139 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 26, para. 9 (2016). 
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The U.S. Tax Convention states throughout the treaty that the Contracting States’ 
Competent Authorities oversee the exchange of information and following procedures 
put in place by the treaty.1140 Art. 3 of the U.S. Tax Convention contains the definitions 
for the treaty and the Competent Authority definition defines the Competent Authority 
for the U.S. as the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate (usually the IRS) and the 
Competent Authority for the foreign jurisdiction is left blank to be filled in with the 
corresponding foreign authority.1141  
 
8.3. U.S. – SWISS TAX TREATY: CASE 
STUDY  
This next section examines the treaty relationship between the U.S. and Switzerland 
and analyzes how this treaty example demonstrates that treaties have shortcomings 
that prevent the U.S. government from procuring information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts.  
 
8.3.1. BACKGROUND ON SWISS SECRECY  
The starting point is the very differing views of bank secrecy by the United States and 
Switzerland. The Swiss view secrecy as a vital protection of the individual and the 
individual’s privacy and this privacy encompasses financial affairs.1142 This view on 
privacy (or confidentiality) saved thousands from the threat of execution by the Nazis 
prior to and during WWII which is discussed in more detail below.1143 The U.S., on 
 
1140 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.3 (Dec. 21, 2010). 
1141 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 3 (g); See also, International Fiscal Association 
(IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 
Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, 798 (2013). 
1142 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 
2011); See also,  Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion 
with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1827 (2010). 
1143 Niels Jensenn, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a 
Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1827 (2010).  
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the other hand, views bank secrecy as a threat to the tax revenue and the tax system. 
“….. the U.S. legal system generally views foreign bank secrecy laws as promoting 
and facilitating illegal activity….”1144 The main difference lies in who bankers can 
disclose to without breaking the confidentiality between banker and client. U.S. law 
agrees that bankers have a duty to not disclose customer information to third parties 
unless that third party is the government.1145 The Swiss government, in contrast, does 
not differentiate unless there is a substantial reason to disclose to a government entity. 
An example of a substantial reason would be tax fraud which under Swiss law is a 
criminal offense.1146 But tax evasion would not qualify as a substantial reason because 
tax evasion is not considered a crime.1147 This is discussed further below.  
 
The reputation the Swiss have for bank secrecy has existed since the 16th century but 
really developed over the last century.1148 Bank secrecy in Switzerland really took 
flight in the 1930s when the Nazi government enacted legislation requiring their 
 
1144 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687 (Fall 2015).  
1145 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687 (Fall 2015). 
1146 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 691 (Fall 2015); See also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is 
Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 359 (2010). 
1147 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 691 (Fall 2015); See also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is 
Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 359 (2010). 
1148 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 691 (Fall 2015); See also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is 
Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 356 (2010). 
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citizens to disclose all foreign assets.1149 The penalty of not disclosing those assets 
was a capital offense and the Germans executed those that did not disclose.1150 
 
In reaction to this, the Swiss enacted the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks 
(Swiss Banking Act) which included article 47 which “established a code of secrecy 
for banking and account information”.1151 Art. 47’s duty extends to officers, directors, 
employees and agents of a bank and requires them to protect the confidentiality or 
face criminal sanctions.1152 That statute in combination with penal code art. 273 
created the almost impenetrable wall that protects the customer’s privacy.1153 The 
purpose of this was to prevent the divulging of a private individual’s banking 
information to foreign governments and to create a lawyer-client like privilege which 
 
1149 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 691 (Fall 2015); See also, 91 Cong. Rec. 16952 
(May 25th, 1970); Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong 
Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 736 (2014); Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank 
Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 357 (2010); Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has 
the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 817 (Summer 2011).  
1150 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 736 (2014); See also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the 
Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1823, 1827 (2010). 
1151 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 691 (Fall 2015); See also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is 
Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 357 (2010); Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has 
the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 817 (Summer 2011); Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: 
Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 
1827 (2010).   
1152 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 823 (Summer 
2011).  
1153 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 823 (Summer 
2011).  
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made the breaking of that privilege a crime.1154  The most important aspect of this 
legislation – and the biggest problem from the perspective of the U.S. – is that taxing 
authorities such as the IRS have not been able to procure information about a customer 
and his financial affairs from the financial institution for tax purposes.1155 The 
legislative history demonstrates that the Swiss government decided that the “bankers 
professional duty to secrecy outweighs any financial disadvantage to the exchequer1156 
which may arise” and this includes both intentional and negligent disclosures.1157 
 
Swiss law distinguishes between two different types of tax offenses: tax infringement 
and tax fraud.1158 In the first type of offense, tax infringement, a person purposefully 
or negligently files an incomplete tax return.1159 In the second, tax fraud,  a person has 
fraudulently manipulated documents with the intent to mislead tax authorities which 
can lead to a fine or imprisonment.1160 An easier way to state this is that, according to 
the Swiss, tax evasion is obtaining an unjustified tax advantage via an action or 
omission and not through the use of false documents and tax fraud is when a taxpayer 
uses false documents to evade taxes.1161 Tax evasion, under Swiss law, falls into the 
 
1154 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 691 (Fall 2015); See also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is 
Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351 (2010); Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the 
United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l 
& Comp. L. 815, 822 (Summer 2011).  
1155 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 823 (Summer 
2011).  
1156 Exchequer is a national (or royal) treasury. 
1157 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 823 (Summer 
2011). 
1158 Leopoldo Parada, Lessons Learned from the Swiss Julius Baer Case, 74 Tax Notes Int’l. 
1217, 1220 (June 30, 2014).  
1159 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 827 (Summer 
2011). 
1160 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 827 (Summer 
2011). 
1161 Leopoldo Parada, Lessons Learned from the Swiss Julius Baer Case, 74 Tax Notes Int’l. 
1217, 1220 (June 30, 2014). 
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first category of tax infringement and, therefore, only involves administrative hearings 
and not criminal hearings.1162 Secrecy is not lifted for “mere” tax evasion.1163 In 
contrast to this is the U.S. who views tax evasion as a crime. The Swiss’ differentiation 
between the two frustrates the IRS’ ability to collect taxes or information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts.1164 
 
International treaties supersede Swiss domestic law so if the IRS can show that the 
banks have a duty to testify under the terms of the treaty then the bank may be 
compelled to disclose the requested information.1165 
 
Although highly valued, Swiss bank secrecy is not absolute.1166 It can be lifted for 
multiple reasons including dealing with foreign authorities but this is a question of 
law that only Swiss courts can decide.1167 Bank secrecy in Switzerland is set aside for 
criminal matters – not civil matters – and since tax evasion is considered an 
administrative matter the secrecy remains intact, even today.1168  
 
1162 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 827 (Summer 
2011). 
1163 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 827 (Summer 
2011). 
1164 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 828 (Summer 
2011). 
1165 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 828 (Summer 
2011). 
1166 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 828 (Summer 
2011). 
1167 Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank 
Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 361 (2010); See also, Eric 
M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault 
to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 826 (Summer 2011); Niels 
Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to 
Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1827 (2010). 
1168 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 8236(Summer 
2011). 
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8.3.2. U.S. – SWISS TREATY  
The first U.S.-Swiss treaty was drafted and ratified in 1951.1169 The purpose of the 
treaty was to provide administrative assistance in the task of eliminating double 
taxation for both American and Swiss citizens.1170 There was little to no focus on tax 
evasion because Switzerland only agreed to exchange information in the event of tax 
fraud.1171 It was carefully worded so that it would only prevent fraud or for the 
fulfilling of the treaty provisions.1172 There was no definition of what fraud was or a 
detailed explanation of the exchange of information process.1173 The Swiss also did 
not have to provide evidence to the U.S. in order to help further the U.S.’ 
investigation and subsequent prosecution.1174 
It has been amended or updated three times since 1951 and all three amendments 
were focused on fixing the failure of the Swiss in refusing to disclose American 
accounts.1175 Of all the amendments, the 2003 amendment was supposed to be a 
 
1169 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 737 (2014); See also, Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss 
Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on 
Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 693 
(Fall 2015). 
1170 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 737 (2014); See also, Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss 
Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on 
Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 693 
(Fall 2015). 
1171 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 693 (Fall 2015). 
1172 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 737 (2014). 
1173 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 737 (2014). 
1174 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 693 (Fall 2015). 
1175 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 738 (2014). 
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“gamechanger”1176 regarding the almost 100-year-old Swiss tradition of secrecy.1177  
The 2003 amendment is discussed further below.  
8.3.2.1 1996 U.S. – Swiss Treaty 
The first major update to the 1951 tax treaty took almost fifty years.1178 It came in 
the form of the 1996 Treaty and its accompanying protocol.1179 Art. 26 in the 1996 
tax treaty set out the legal basis for an exchange of information as well as allowing 
the sharing of tax matters that are not wholly dependent on related crimes which is 
in contrast to other international agreements (such as the MACM) where an 
exchange of tax information is connected to another criminal offense such as money 
laundering. This treaty also strengthened the tax information exchange provision by 
broadening the definition of tax fraud using the language to prevent “tax fraud or the 
 
1176 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 738 (2014). 
1177 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 693 (Fall 2015). 
1178 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997); See 
also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a 
Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1832 (2010). 
1179 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997); See 
also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a 
Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1832 (2010). 
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like”.1180  Initially, the wording “or the like” seemed to address tax evasion.1181 
However, a 1970 Swiss court interpreted the “tax fraud or the like” phrase did not 
include a duty for the Swiss government to exchange information regarding tax 
evasion cases and said that it encompassed deception – such as fraudulent or 
falsified documents – intended to mislead tax authorities.1182 The parties under the 
1996 U.S. – Swiss treaty are “required to exchange information only when the facts 
of the alleged tax fraud or evasion would be sufficient to establish fraud or evasion 
under the laws of both countries”1183  which means it has to be considered a crime 
(such as tax fraud) as defined by Swiss law.  
Contemporaneous to the 1996 treaty, the U.S. and Switzerland executed both an 
MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) and a Protocol.1184 The Protocol (and the 
accompanying technical explanation) tried to clarify that “tax fraud” included “acts 
 
1180 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol paragraph 10); See also, Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The 
Impact of the U.S: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as 
a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 694 (Fall 2015); See also, 
Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, 
Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 382-383 (2010); Eric M. Victorson, 
United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss 
Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 829 (Summer 2011). 
 
1181 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol paragraph 10); See also, Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The 
Impact of the U.S: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as 
a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 694 (Fall 2015); See also, 
Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, 
Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 382-383 (2010); Eric M. Victorson, 
United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss 
Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 829 (Summer 2011). 
1182 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 831 (Summer 
2011). 
1183 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 831 (Summer 
2011). 
1184 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997); See 
also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank 
Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 383 (2010). 
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that…..constitute fraudulent conduct with respect to which the requested 
Contracting State may obtain information under its laws or practices”.1185 
According to the 1996 Protocol, tax fraud is defined as “situations when a taxpayer 
uses, or has the intention to use, a forged or falsified document”.1186 It then lists 
examples that are considered to fall under that definition such as a false invoice, an 
incorrect balance sheet or profit and loss statement or in a situation known to the 
Swiss as “Lügengebӓude” which is a situation where the taxpayer uses or has the 
intent to use a scheme of lies to defraud the tax authority.1187 The 1996 Protocol also 
has a non-exhaustive list of examples that constitute tax fraud and these were 
included in order to “clarify for purposes of the Convention the Swiss concept of tax 
fraud.”1188 However, this explanation does not exactly help because, as Niels Jensen 
points out, tax fraud is defined very narrowly in Swiss law.1189 Without evidence of 
falsified documents (not including tax returns) that demonstrate a willful intent to 
deceive, the bank secrecy will not be lifted.1190 Art. 26 of the treaty also requires that 
any information that is requested should be in the form of “authenticated copies of 
 
1185 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol para. 10); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the 
Convention Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation For the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998); Niels Jensen, How to 
Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 
Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1832 (2010). 
1186 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol para. 10). 
1187 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol para. 10).  
1188 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol para. 10); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the 
Convention Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation For the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998); Niels Jensen, How to 
Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 
Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1832 (2010). 
1189 Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special 
View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1833 (2010). 
1190 Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special 
View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1833 (2010). 
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unedited, original records or documents.”1191  In paragraph 8 of the 1996 MOU, 
records and documents are defined as all forms of recorded information held by 
either public or private individuals or entities.1192 This broad cover of all documents 
was included because the previous treaty did not include in what form the 
information could be exchanged.1193 Based on this, the Swiss Supreme Court limited 
the form of information the Swiss government could provide to the U.S. to only 
reports and summaries of information.1194 This form of information obviously limits 
the U.S. government’s ability to detect or discover tax evasion, including tax fraud, 
so the information element was broadened to cover all types of information to avoid 
the result of the Swiss not being able to comply.  
Paragraph 3 of Article 26 clarifies that the exchange of information obligations do 
not require the Contracting States to utilize administrative measures that contravene 
either the regulations and practice or its sovereignty, security or public policy of the 
either of the Contracting States. The MOU to the 1996 Treaty clarifies, to secure the 
 
1191 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) 
(Protocol para. 10); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the 
Convention Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998).  
11921996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) (MOU 
para. 8 ); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the Convention 
Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation For the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998); Niels Jensen, How to Kill the 
Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1823, 1832 (2010). 
1193 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) (MOU 
para. 8); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the Convention Between 
the United States and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998). 
1194 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) (MOU 
para. 8); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the Convention Between 
the United States and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998). 
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forwarding of documentary evidence from Swiss banks, that Swiss bank secrecy 
laws will not hinder this in cases of tax fraud.1195  
For the Swiss, the strength of the secrecy is not an issue because they do not regard 
tax evasion as a crime1196, simply an administrative matter that receives a fine but, as 
stated earlier, this is stark contrast to the U.S., who considers tax evasion a crime 
under 26 U.S.C. §7201. The U. S. would then have to meet the “double 
incrimination standard” in order for the Swiss to share information.1197  This 
frustrated the purpose of preventing tax evasion and procuring information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts so that the IRS could apply all the facts to administer the 
tax law correctly. The limitations of the 1996 Treaty’s art. 26 – namely, the 
narrowly defined tax fraud  
8.3.2.2 2003 Mutual Agreement on Exchange of Information  
Due to the limitations and inadequacies contained in the 1996 tax treaty to prevent 
tax evasion – since the focus was only on tax fraud – in 2003 an information 
exchange agreement was signed to further the understanding between the U.S and 
the Swiss of the 1996 art. 26 and paragraph 10 of the 1996 Protocol.1198 The 2003 
agreement was signed in order to clarify that art. 26 and paragraph 10 of the 
Protocol will be interpreted to assist in the tax administration and enforcement 
efforts of each Contracting State, to expand upon the 1996 version of art. 26 and to 
“exchange information necessary to properly implement the provisions of the 
 
1195 1996 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (May 29, 1997) (MOU 
para. 8); See also, Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the Convention Between 
the United States and the Swiss Confederation For the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income (January 1, 1998).  
1196 Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank 
Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 383 (2010). 
1197 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United Cracked the Vault to Swiss 
Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 831 (Summer 2011); See also, 26 
U.S.C. §7201. 
1198 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996 
(Jan. 23, 2003), See also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax 
Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1833 (2010). 
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Convention or to prevent tax fraud.”1199 In paragraph 4 of the 2003 Agreement, it 
broadened the definition of tax fraud by defining the type of conduct that would 
qualify. This includes (but does not limit):  
1) Conduct that is established to defraud individuals or companies, even 
though the aim of the behavior may not be to commit tax fraud; 
2) Conduct that involves the destruction or non-production of records, or 
the failure to prepare or maintain correct and complete records, that a 
person is under a legal duty (tax or otherwise) to prepare and keep as 
sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, 
or other matters required to be shown by such person in any tax return, 
if the person has not properly reported such amounts in any such tax 
return; or 
3) Conduct by a person subject to tax in the requesting State that involves 
the failure to file a tax return that such a person is under a legal duty to 
file and an affirmative act that has an effect of deceiving the tax 
authorities making it difficult to uncover or pursue the failure to file, 
including the concealment of assets or covering up of sources of 
income or the handling of one’s affairs to avoid making the records 
that are usual in transactions of the kind.1200 
 
It also expanded the definition of tax fraud to include cases where the individual was 
suspected of committing tax fraud by evading taxes using offshore accounts. In this 
situation, the Swiss agreed to turn over account information on the individual in 
 
1199 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996 
(Jan. 23, 2003); See also, Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the 
U.S: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for 
Offshore Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 694 (Fall 2015); Niels Jensen, How to Kill 
the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 
Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1833 (2010). 
1200 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, 
para. 4 (Jan. 23, 2003). 
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question.1201 However, this was on an individual basis and this assumed that the IRS 
knew the identity of the individual that was using Swiss accounts to evade tax. 
The 2003 Agreement also clarified the understanding that when one of the 
Contracting States has a reasonable suspicion that the conduct would be considered 
tax fraud or the like that the other Contracting State shall exchange the information 
requested.1202 Reasonable suspicion may be based on the following (but the 
following examples are also not a limitation): 
1) Documents, whether authenticated or not, and including, but not 
limited to, business records, books of accounts or bank account 
information;  
2) Testimonial information from the taxpayer; 
3) Information obtained from an informant or other third person that has 
been independently corroborated or otherwise is likely to be credible; 
or 
4) Circumstantial evidence.1203 
 
 
1201 Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 695 (Fall 2015); Niels Jensen, How to Kill the 
Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1823, 1833 (2010). 
1202 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, 
paragraph 5 (Jan. 23, 2003). 
1203 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, 
paragraph 5 (Jan. 23, 2003). 
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Paragraph 6 refers to fourteen hypothetical situations found in the Appendix of the 
agreement that illustrate what tax fraud looks like.1204 The agreement made clear that 
the hypotheticals were not to be interpreted as limitations on tax fraud.1205 
Unfortunately, the “gamechanger” moniker noted above regarding the 2003 
Agreement turned out to be wrong when, in 2007, Bradley Birkenfeld, a UBS 
employee, blew the whistle on UBS and its schemes.1206  UBS had gotten around 
former reporting requirements (such as the QI) by opening accounts for Americans 
under nominees.1207 This move no longer identified the American as the beneficiary 
of the account.1208 The American client would then file false returns with the IRS 
and intentionally leave out the information regarding the UBS accounts.1209 In 2008, 
the DOJ issued a John Doe Summons to UBS and alleged that UBS assisted 
 
1204 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, 
paragraph 6 (Jan. 23, 2003) 
1205 Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, 
Appendix (Jan. 23, 2003) 
1206 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the 
Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 739 (2014); Jane G. Song, The End of 
Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 
687, 696 (Fall 2015); Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax 
Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1828 (2010). 
1207 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax 
Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1828 (2010). 
1208 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax 
Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1828 (2010). 
1209 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax 
Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1828 (2010). 
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American clients in evading taxes in order to defraud the U.S.1210 UBS, citing the 
Swiss bank secrecy laws, refused to cooperate with the summons and also argued 
that the IRS was supposed to go through the treaty procedure and not directly 
address UBS itself.1211 In February of 2009, DOJ sued UBS which was a move 
designed to force UBS to disclose the identities of 52,000 American account holders 
who hid $14.8 billion from the IRS.1212 The DOJ settled the case in the summer of 
2009 and in the agreement UBS agreed to disclose up to 10,000 American account 
holders who were suspected of evading taxes, pay a $780 million fine and end the 
offshore banking schemes.1213 The culmination of this case resulted in two things: 
information on U.S. account holders and a revised tax treaty (2009) that 
strengthened tax information sharing.1214 This case was the turning point in the fight 
against tax evasion and it helped pierce the veil of the Swiss’ long history of bank 
secrecy.1215  What allowed UBS to refuse disclosure to the IRS? The answer to this 
question is that because Switzerland does not consider tax evasion as a crime which 
was the focus of the UBS case, the secrecy would not be lifted by Switzerland.1216  
However, had tax fraud been at issue then the IRS could have gotten Switzerland to 
 
1210 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States 
Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
815, 832 (Summer 2011). 
1211 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 832 (Summer 
2011). 
1212 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 817 (Summer 
2011).  
1213 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 817 (Summer 
2011); See also, Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion 
with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1823, 1828 (2010). 
1214 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 817 (Summer 
2011).  
1215 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 
2011).  
1216 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 826 (Summer 
2011). 
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lift the secrecy. The UBS case was a perfect illustration of how treaties as well as 
other anti-tax evasion measures’ loopholes can be taken advantage of. The UBS 
scandal, while setting the stage for FATCA and the strengthening of the QI program, 
also set the stage for the drafting of the 2009 Protocol that would amend the 1996 
Treaty. 
In 2010, two Swiss courts ruled that when the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory 
Authority (FINMA) facilitated the UBS agreement as well as ordering UBS to hand 
over information on 300 clients to US authorities FINMA broke Swiss law.1217 One 
of the two courts considered that tax evasion was the issue before the court, not tax 
fraud, which meant, according to the court, that bank secrecy could not be lifted.1218 
An Swiss appeals court later overturned this decision and that FINMA had acted 
within the law and with guidance from the Swiss government.1219 
8.3.2.3  2009 Protocol 
After the 2008 bank fiasco, the U.S. negotiated an amendment in 2009, the Protocol 
Amending The Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on 
Income (also called Double Taxation Amendment or DTA).1220 This amended the 
1996 Treaty that resulted from the UBS settlement with the Swiss in hopes of 
addressing the obvious inadequacies of the previous amendments to address to tax 
 
1217 Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank 
Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 389 (2010). 
1218 Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank 
Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 351, 389 (2010). 
1219 Court Rules Transfer of UBS Data Legal, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/court-rules-
transfer-of-ubs-bank-data-legal/30695554  
1220 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income 
(September 23, 2009); See also, Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step 
in the Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 740 (2014); Eric M. Victorson, 
United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss 
Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 2011).  
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evasion.1221  The part of the DTA that is relevant to the focus of this thesis is the 
amendment of art. 26. This amendment changed the language of information 
exchange from “tax fraud or the like” to broader language that called for the 
information exchange to exchange “such information as may be relevant” in order to 
enforce and administer the domestic laws of the U.S. and Switzerland.1222 The DTA 
also calls for the  execution of the provisions of the 1996 treaty, however, fishing 
expeditions are still not permissible under the 2009 Protocol.1223 This new provision 
includes tax evasion and since the treaties supersede the domestic laws of 
Switzerland, this protocol supersedes bank secrecy.1224 However, in order to assuage 
the Swiss’ concerns and to avoid a fishing expedition, an information request has to 
fulfill five elements:  
1) Information on the person allegedly violating the U.S. tax laws; 
2) A time frame for which the information is requested; 
3) A statement about what kind of information is sought; 
 
1221 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income 
(September 23, 2009); See also, Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step 
in the Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 740 (2014); Eric M. Victorson, 
United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss 
Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 2011).  
1222 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 3 
(September 23, 2009);See also, Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United 
States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 815, 833-834 (Summer 2011); Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still 
Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. 
L. J. 351, 384 (2010). 
1223Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 3 
(September 23, 2009);See also, Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United 
States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 815, 833-834 (Summer 2011); Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy Still 
Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. 
L. J. 351, 384 (2010). 
1224 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 4 
(September 23, 2009); See also, Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United 
States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 815, 833-834 (Summer 2011). 
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4) The tax reason as to why the information is sought; and 
5) The name and address of anyone who the U.S. believes possesses such 
information.1225 
 
Eric Victorson argues that the broader scope of information sharing under the 2009 
Protocol “bodes well for both the United States, which seeks information about 
Americans with assets in Switzerland, and the Swiss Confederation, which is 
concerned with preserving the integrity of its law from over intrusive, unilateral 
practices to discover information without the participation or consent of Swiss 
officials.”1226 He is correct that it will not allow fishing expeditions which conforms 
with U.S. domestic law. It also allows the Swiss to protect the privacy of its clients 
because the procedural requirements for the request of information exchange are 
very narrow. The Protocol, itself, notes that the procedural requirements are in place 
to avoid fishing expeditions by one party.1227 However, this still limits the U.S.’ 
ability to procure information on U.S. taxpayers because the first procedural 
requirement obligates the United States to know enough information that the IRS 
could give to the Swiss Competent Authority the name of the individual, and even 
possibly address, account number or similar information.1228 The very problem in the 
past with treaties and TIEAs has been that the IRS needs to give a foreign 
government information that would identify an individual which is information the 
 
1225 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 4 
(September 23, 2009); See also, Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United 
States Successfully Cracked the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 815, 833-834 (Summer 2011); See also, Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, Is Bank Secrecy 
Still Bankable?: A Critical Review of Bank Secrecy, Tax Evasion and UBS, 5 Entrepreneurial 
Bus. L. J. 351, 384 (2010). 
1226 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 
2011).  
1227 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 4 
(September 23, 2009). 
1228 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 4 
(September 23, 2009). 
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IRS does not always have. Sometimes all the IRS has is the knowledge through a 
voluntary disclosure program that a scheme or facilitator in a foreign country 
potentially has multiple American clients.  
8.3.2.4 Current Status 
This revised treaty still contains limitations that limit the ability of the U.S. 
government to procure information regarding U.S. taxpayer information abroad. One 
limitation, specifically, is that there are no provisions that covers automatic 
information exchange.1229 The problem that is present with this version of the treaty 
is that the U.S. still had to go through the formal channels of requesting tax 
information from the Swiss  government instead of it just being automatic.1230 Eric 
M. Victorson has argued that it did not “enhance tax information sharing as 
effectively as it could” but it was step in the right direction.1231  
The 2009 DTA had not been ratified until 20191232 as a result of opposition from 
Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky. He voiced concerns that the provisions of the 
revised DTA (2009 Protocol) would possibly violate both the 4th amendment right to 
privacy and the 5th amendment right to due process.1233 Senator Paul has a valid 
concern. Both the right to privacy and the right to due process are fundamental 
 
1229 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 
2011).  
1230 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 
2011).  
1231 Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked 
the Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 815, 818 (Summer 
2011).  
1232 Jim Tankersley, Senate Approves Tax Treaties For First Time in Decade, New York 
Times (July 17, 2019); See also, U.S. Senate Approves the Protocol Amending the DTA, found 
at https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/dokumentation/fokus/us-senat-gibt-gruenes-licht-
zum-aenderungsprotokoll.html; U.S. Ratifies Double-Taxation Deal with Switzerland, found 
at https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/stalemate-ends_us-ratifies-double-taxation-deal-with-
switzerland/45103988 
1233 Diane M. Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S. Example, 41 
Brooks J. Int’l L. 1185 (Fall 2016); See also, Jim Tankersley, Senate Approves Tax Treaties 
For First Time in Decade, New York Times (July 17, 2019). 
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rights under the U.S. Constitution. However, the 2009 DTA provides the taxpayer 
with a certain amount of protection. The first way it provides protection, although 
criticized in the last section, is by ensuring that the requesting Contracting State has 
sufficient information to protect against a fishing expedition.1234 Another way is by 
preserving the right of the taxpayer (to appeal/be notified) to administrative 
procedural rules in the non-requesting Contracting State. A third way, although it is 
a negative from the U.S. government’s perspective, is the refusal to require a 
Contracting State to commit to automatic exchange of information. The procedural 
request for information and the protection of the taxpayer’s rights to certain 
procedural protections (notify/appeal) limits the ability of the Contracting States to 
automatically exchange the information. The DTA also protects the taxpayer’s 
confidentiality (or privacy) under art. 3 paragraph 2 by requiring the information 
“shall be treated as secret” and by limiting the disclosure to “persons or authorities 
involved in the administration, assessment or collection of, the enforcement or 
prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes 
referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of such functions.”1235 
The U.S., after the 2008 bank scandals, took another look at its exchange of 
information provisions within their treaties and for the treaties.1236 The U.S. is 
looking to strengthen treaties that contain weaker exchange of information 
provisions through revision of art. 26.1237 If the U.S. does not have a bilateral income 
 
1234 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 3 
(September 23, 2009).  
1235 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 3 
(September 23, 2009). 
1236 Paul R. McDaniel, James R. Repetti and Diane M. Ring, Introduction to United States 
International Taxation, 187-206 (6th ed., 2014). 
1237 Paul R. McDaniel, James R. Repetti and Diane M. Ring, Introduction to United States 
International Taxation, 187-206 (6th ed., 2014). 
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tax treaty with jurisdictions, it has been pursuing tax information exchange 
agreements (TIEAs).1238 
Effective treaties are treaties where both partner countries have aligned interests1239, 
– for example, defeating tax evasion – which is demonstrated in the relationship 
between the U.S. and the United Kingdom. The opposite situation is reflected in the 
treaty between the U.S. and Switzerland.1240Although it is a treaty between allies, it 
has not been effective in the exchange of information regarding U.S. citizens’ 
foreign accounts as demonstrated by the discussion above. Although the recent 
ratification of the 2009 DTA demonstrates that the U.S. and Switzerland may be 
moving onto the same page regarding exchange of information and tax evasion.  
 
8.4. TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENTS (TIEAS) 
When the U.S. does not have a bilateral tax treaty with a foreign jurisdiction, it pursues 
a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “TIEA”) which 
helps close the information gap that is left open by the U.S.’ dependence on tax treaties 
with jurisdictions that are not considered tax havens.1241 A TIEA is separate from a 
tax treaty, but does not supersede it.1242 That is a result of the TIEAs being an executive 
agreement pursued through the executive branch as opposed to the tax treaties which 
 
1238 Paul R. McDaniel, James R. Repetti and Diane M. Ring, Introduction to United States 
International Taxation, 187-206 (6th ed., 2014). 
1239 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 735 (2014). 
1240 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 736 (2014). 
1241 Paul R. McDaniel, James R. Repetti and Diane M. Ring, Introduction to United States 
International Taxation, 187-206 (6th ed., 2014); See also, Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of 
Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 
409, 421 (2010). 
1242 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (Dec. 21, 2010); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, 
Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax 
Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1781 (2013). 
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have to be ratified by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate (legislative branch).1243 The 
purpose of a TIEA is to “assist each country to assure the accurate assessment and 
collection of taxes, to prevent fiscal fraud and evasion, and to develop improved 
information sources for tax matters.”1244 A TIEA is specific agreement only for the 
exchanging of tax information and is found between the U.S. and countries who 
typically are considered “tax havens” because they have no or low taxes.1245 There are 
multiple differences between tax treaties and TIEAs. For example, a tax treaty has 
legal status on par with a statute and which has to be ratified by the Senate whereas a 
TIEA is an executive agreement authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.1246 
Another difference is that tax treaties cover various articles designed to reduce double 
taxation whereas a TIEA is a very specific agreement designed specifically for the 
exchange of information between the U.S. and foreign jurisdictions.1247 
 
The Competent Authority for the United States regarding TIEAs is the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Large Business and International Division (LB&I).1248  
 
Despite the differences, the TIEA also has many characteristics in common with tax 
treaties. For example, there is a confidentiality duty as well as a duty not to disclose 
information obtained under a TIEA except to those that are involved with the 
 
1243 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (Dec. 21, 2010); See also, Marc D. Shepsman, 
Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent International Tax 
Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1781 (2013). 
1244 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (Dec. 21, 2010).  
1245 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the 
United States Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 421 (2010). 
1246 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (Dec. 21, 2010).  
1247U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 
17 (July 2008); See also, Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (Dec. 21, 2010).  
1248 International Fiscal Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border 
Cooperation Between Tax Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L.  779 (2013); See also, 
Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (2) (Dec. 21, 2010).  
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country’s tax administration.1249 The tax treaty’s art. 26 Exchange of Information and 
the TIEA are reflective of each other. The TIEA is a more detailed1250, longer version 
of art. 26 and it also includes more topics than art. 26, for instance, spontaneous 
exchanges of information.  
 
The TIEA provides for several types of requests for information exchanges: specific, 
routine (also known as automatic) and spontaneous.1251 A specific exchange of 
information is an exchange that is a systematic and recurring conveyance of taxpayer 
information by the source country to the residence country.1252 A specific request of 
information is a request that one treaty partner makes requesting information such as 
ownership of property, financial information or control of corporations (etc.).1253 
These types of requests are handled on a case-by-case basis.1254 A simultaneous 
exchange of information occurs when the treaty countries coordinate a separate yet 
simultaneous examination of information relating to specific taxpayers.1255 The 
spontaneous exchange happens when information is willingly given concerning a 
specific taxpayer or transaction and when there is no specific request of information 
that has been undertaken.1256  
 
1249 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (2) (Dec. 21, 2010); See also, International Fiscal 
Association (IFA), Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax 
Authorities, 98 Studies on Int’l Fiscal L. 779, 799 (2013). 
1250 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (3) (Dec. 21, 2010). 
1251 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (3) (Dec. 21, 2010); See also, Cym H. Lowell and 
Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][c] (2019). 
1252 Cym H. Lowell and Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and 
Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][c] (2019); See also, OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange 
of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes, Committee on Fiscal Affairs (January 23, 2006).  
1253 Cym H. Lowell and Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and 
Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][d] (2019); See also, OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange 
of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes, Committee on Fiscal Affairs (January 23, 2006). 
1254 Cym H. Lowell and Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and 
Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][d] (2019); See also, OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange 
of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes, Committee on Fiscal Affairs (January 23, 2006). 
1255 Cym H. Lowell and Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and 
Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][e] (2019); See also, OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange 
of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes, Committee on Fiscal Affairs (January 23, 2006). 
1256 Cym H. Lowell and Jack P. Governale, US International Taxation: Practice and 
Procedure, ¶ 9.03[1][g] (2019); See also, OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange 
of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes, Committee on Fiscal Affairs (January 23, 2006). 
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The information included is necessary to carry out and enforce the tax laws of the U.S. 
and the partner country.1257 Much of the reason the TIEA is more detailed than the tax 
treaties with regard to information exchanges is due to the TIEA partner not having 
“comprehensive procedures in their local law for obtaining information in tax 
matters.”1258 
 
In the course of gathering information under the TIEA, the requested party may:  
1) Examine any books, papers, records or other tangible property which 
may be relevant or material to such inquiry; 
2) Question any person having knowledge or in possession, custody or 
control of information which may be relevant or material to such 
inquiry; 
3) Compel any person having knowledge or in possession, custody or 
control of information which may be relevant or material to such 
inquiry to appear at a stated time and place and testify under oath and 
produce books, papers, records, or other tangible property; or 
4) Take such testimony of any individual under oath1259 
The information gathering process in the TIEA is reflective of art. 26 under the U.S. 
Model Income Tax Convention. 
 
While the TIEA is an alternative to a tax treaty, this type of agreement has several 
limitations where enforcement of U.S. tax law is concerned.1260 For instance, many of 
the agreements only apply to criminal matters, and even more limiting, is that an added 
requirement that sometimes shows up in the TIEA is that the violation has to be a 
 
1257 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (3) (Dec. 21, 2010). 
1258 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (3) (Dec. 21, 2010). 
1259 Internal Revenue Manual, 35.4.5.2.4 (4) (Dec. 21, 2010).  
1260 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 421 (2010). 
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crime in both countries, not just one. This is similar to the issue found with the U.S.-
Swiss treaty and the different views on tax evasion being a crime. Another limitation 
to the TIEAs is that these agreements do not override bank secrecy laws.1261  A 
significant limitation and the source of some frustration for the IRS is that the TIEAs 
usually require an information exchange upon request only which means the IRS has 
to identify potential tax evaders through other anti-tax evasion measures like the John 
Doe Summons.1262 That generally means that any information the U.S. receives only 
corroborates the evidence the IRS has in its possession – it does not discover new 
evidence or the tax evaders themselves.1263 Another hurdle that limits the TIEAs 
effectiveness is when a foreign jurisdiction has corporate laws that require little to no 
identification of shareholders or directors combined with a lack of recordkeeping, 
there is most likely little information to be handed over.1264 Sometimes the limitations 
simply is that the partnering country might not have an adequate administration to 
exchange information or the banks just might not have the information to give. 
 
 
8.5. ART. 26 & TIEAS: CONCLUSION  
Art. 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty and the Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs) are two more anti-tax evasion measures that the IRS can use to 
obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts.  
Art. 26 of the U.S. tax treaty is the mechanism by which the U.S. and a foreign 
government can exchange information regarding taxation and the assessment, 
collection, administration of, enforcement of, or prosecution of matters regarding 
 
1261 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 422 (2010). 
1262 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 422 (2010). 
1263 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 421 (2010). 
1264 Laura Szarmach, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States 
Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 409, 421 (2010). 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
314
 
taxes. Art. 26 obligates that the treaty partners obtain and provide information 
foreseeably relevant to taxes and the issues surrounding taxation such as enforcement 
and prosecution. It also requires that any information exchanged be kept secret and 
that it be disclosed only to relevant persons. A treaty partner cannot refuse to supply 
or exchange information based on the reasoning that the treaty partner has no domestic 
interest in the information or that the information is held by a financial institutions 
such as banks or other similarly situated persons or institutions. There is a limitation 
on art. 26 by not obligating the treaty partners to exchanging information that 
contravenes or is not obtainable under domestic laws. Art. 26 requires a certain form 
in which the information must be given in and this requirement aligns with U.S. 
domestic law. The information should be in the form of depositions and authenticated 
copies of original documents. The treaty partners are obligated to provide collection 
assistance and to allow the other treaty partner to enter the jurisdiction to interview 
witnesses and examine records. All of these provisions under art. 26 are there to 
facilitate the exchange of information between the U.S. and foreign governments. 
The U.S. also uses tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) to try to obtain 
information from jurisdictions that the U.S. does not have treaties with. A TIEA is 
more limited than a tax treaty as it is only used for the exchange of information.  
While art. 26 can be an effective tool to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts, it too, like the other measures, has limitations that keep it from being 100% 
successful.  
How art. 26 of tax treaties and TIEAs are negotiated will either limit or enable the IRS 
to procure the information they need. If the Model Tax Convention that the U.S. uses 
as a starting pointing were, in fact, the final treaty between the U.S. and foreign 
governments, the U.S. would more than likely get the information it seeks regarding 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. However, foreign governments have their own 
interests, including bank secrecy (privacy) and, as the example of the U.S.-Swiss 
Treaty shows, relying on art. 26 of any given tax treaty does not necessarily mean the 
U.S. will be able to get the information it needs to administer its tax laws correctly 
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and fairly. Treaties work effectively when the treaty partners are two countries who 
have the same goals and same interests, but as seen above in the example of the U.S. 
– Swiss treaty, when two countries interests are not aligned there is bound to be failure 
because of the loopholes created in the treaty due to the imbalance of goals, interests 
and cultural differences. The imbalance is found when one country highly values the 
secrecy that protects the client’s financial information from anyone, including the 
financial institution’s government, but yet the information is needed to ensure that the 
citizen is not breaking the laws of their home country. 
Another limitation that restricts art. 26’s effectiveness to procure information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts is the ability of the U.S. government to negotiate broad 
language that encompasses the definition of tax evasion as it is defined in the U.S. tax 
code. If broad language cannot be negotiated, then the IRS could potentially face a 
brick wall when it comes to trying to procure the information from its treaty partner 
regarding U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. Cultural differences in definitions of tax 
evasion and whether qualifies as a crime complicates the ability of the IRS to procure 
that information. The U.S.-Swiss Tax Treaty prior to the 2009 Protocol demonstrates 
this. While the ratification of the Protocol seems to have resolved the issues between 
the U.S. and Switzerland – whether the Protocol succeeds in allowing the U.S. to 
procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts remains to be seen – the U.S. 
will face similar issues with other countries who value bank secrecy and where the 
current treaty’s art. 26 is weak and does not allow for exchange of information on tax 
evasion.  
Particular to the U.S.-Swiss Tax Treaty – through the 2009 Protocol update – is the 
compromise that was made regarding the broader language encompassing tax evasion 
and the request for information requirement. If the U.S. wants information on possible 
tax evasion going on in Switzerland by U.S. taxpayers, the U.S. is required to submit 
an information request. The first element of the requirement requires the U.S. to have 
information on a person but this has been a problem in the past either through art. 26 
provisions or through TIEAs. When the IRS is confronted with information from a 
voluntary disclosure, for example, that a U.S. taxpayer has utilized the services of a 
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Swiss facilitator, there is some suspicion that this U.S. taxpayer is probably not the 
only taxpayer using these services. If the U.S. government wants to utilize art. 26 to 
procure information, they will have a potential problem because the IRS does not 
always have information on a person to give to fulfill this request so that Switzerland 
will turn over the information the IRS is seeking. However, the 2009 Protocol to the 
U.S. – Swiss Tax Treaty also demonstrates that even if the countries can agree to 
exchange information it does not mean there are not multiple procedural requirements 
to work through including the taxpayer right to appeal. The end result could still be 
that, despite fulfilling the obligations of art. 26, the IRS does not procure the 
information that it needs to administer the tax laws correctly and fairly.  
The use of art. 26 (and the TIEAs) have limitations that do not allow the U.S. to obtain 
the information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts every time. Obviously careful 
negotiation with attention being paid to the defining of tax evasion will resolve some 
of the issue. As was discussed in the body of this chapter, the U.S. is, and should, 
continue to try to strengthen its existing treaties and focus on art. 26 and well as 
strengthening its TIEAs with the countries it does not have a tax treaty with.  
One issue that the U.S. government can resolve by itself is its willingness to trade 
information at the same level they expect of their treaty partners. They cannot expect 
the treaty partner to handover information on U.S. taxpayers’ financial accounts if the 
U.S. is not willing to do likewise with the treaty partner’s taxpayers. One criticism of 
the U.S. has been this very issue and it is exhibited in FATCA’s (Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act, Chapter 9) Inter-governmental Agreements (IGA) that the U.S. 
does not exchange information equally with the IGA partner as the IGA partner is 
expected to disclose more information (See Chapter 9). This is some of the reason the 
U.S. has earned the designation of a tax haven.  
The next chapter moves from using treaties and foreign governments to procure 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts back to utilizing foreign financial 
institutions like it does with the Qualified Intermediary in Chapter 7. It also puts the 
focus back on the individual taxpayer as well. Chapter 9 will discuss and analyze the 
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Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FACTA) which is a tax regime that 
Congress passed to address the loopholes that exist in the previously discussed anti-
tax evasion measures. 
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CHAPTER 9. FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX 
COMPLIANCE ACT  
9.1. INTRODUCTION  
The previous five chapters have examined other anti-tax evasion measures that form 
the anti-tax evasion framework that is in place to allow the Internal Revenue Service 
(hereinafter referred to as IRS) to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts when secrecy laws prohibit the accessibility of this information. These 
measures use various methods to enforce compliance by U.S. taxpayers including 
summonses through the courts, voluntary compliance measures enforced through 
penalties, treaties with foreign governments and through foreign financial institutions. 
The chapters on those measures have demonstrated that none of the measures alone 
are successful in obtaining the information the IRS needs to administer the tax laws 
fairly and correctly. This is where the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA) comes in.  
FATCA is considered as the anti-tax evasion measure that will solve the ability for 
the U.S. government to obtain information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. But 
is FATCA the answer to the issue of obtaining that information?  
To discover the answer to that question, this chapter will first look to the legislative 
history to examine the purpose behind the enactment of FATCA and what led to the 
implementation of FATCA. Following the legislative section, the chapter will then 
examine the legal framework of FATCA and how it is implemented. Next, the chapter 
focuses on the Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) that were negotiated with 
foreign jurisdictions to assist in the implementation of FATCA due to FACTA’s 
extraterritorial nature. Finally, the chapter considers two questions. First, does 
FATCA, when implemented, allow the U.S. government to obtain information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts so that the IRS can administer the tax laws correctly and 
fairly? Second, if the answer to the first question is no, then what can be done to 
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improve FATCA so that it increases the likelihood of the IRS in obtaining the 
information needed to apply the tax laws correctly and fairly? 
A quick note: FATCA contains many detailed definitions for terms found in the law 
and regulations. It distracts from the flow of the chapter and the explanation of how 
FATCA operates, therefore, in Appendix B there is a list of definitions applicable to 
this chapter so that the reader may refer to them.  
 
9.2. INTRODUCTION TO FATCA 
9.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This first section will consider FATCA, an anti-tax evasion framework, and what led 
to the implementation of FATCA. Tax evasion has been a century long problem – a 
problem that has existed almost as long as the U.S. tax system itself. One of the main 
problems of tax evasion from the U.S. government’s perspective is the inability to 
procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts so that the tax authority – the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) – can administer the law fairly and correctly with all 
the facts in front of them. Multiple factors – including the public outcry after the 2008 
financial crisis and bank scandals – were the main motivators behind Congress 
ultimately enacting FATCA.1265  
The UBS scandal, as noted throughout the thesis, seemed to be the tipping point in a 
decades-long battle against secrecy and tax evasion. Senator Carl Levin stated in his 
 
1265 John Paul, The Future of FATCA: Concerns and Issues, 37 N.E.J. Legal Stud. 52 
(Spring/Fall 2018); See also, Melissa A. Dizdarevic, The FACTA Provisions of the Hire Act: 
Boldly Going Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2967, 2969 (May 
2011); Joshua D. Odintz et al., FATCA and Nonfinancial Entities: Practical Questions with 
Practical Answers, 119 J. Tax’n 252 (December 2013); Martye Somare and Viktoria 
Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable?, 
Bulletin for Int’l Tax’n 395, 396 (IBFD, August 2014); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding 
Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 157-158 (Palgrave MacMillan 2nd ed., 2019); 
Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 103 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013).  
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Senate floor remarks that the provisions in FATCA were part of the effort to stop 
offshore banks from utilizing the secrecy laws of their jurisdiction to assist in 
concealing U.S. taxpayers’ assets which was a  huge stumbling block that prohibited 
the correct and fair administration of the tax laws.1266   
In 2003, the estimate of assets held in U.S. taxpayer-owned accounts at UBS was 
between $18-20 billion.1267 UBS, as a financial institution incorporated in 
Switzerland, was subject to the U.S.-Swiss Treaty – including the 2003 agreement – 
and the Qualified Intermediary Program.1268 The UBS scandal demonstrates that 
despite the other measures being in place, UBS was still able to help conceal U.S. 
accounts from the U.S. government. Congress realized some other legal measure 
needed to be in place to enforce compliance by the taxpayers and the foreign financial 
institutions.  
Sean Deneault argues that prior to FATCA, the U.S. had attempted several times, 
successfully, at reigning in the banks that facilitated tax evasion.1269 However, if they 
were wholly successful, FATCA would not have been enacted in order to address the 
shortcomings of prior attempts like the Qualified Intermediary because financial 
institutions like UBS would not have had blatantly ignored their responsibilities to 
report U.S. accounts. In fact, Deneault argues in the same article that the IRS 
“historically had little success” in locating offshore income and notes that the primary 
reason is because the FFIs failed to report the information.1270 While this is true, the 
blame cannot be placed solely on the shoulders of the FFIs – the U.S. taxpayers’ own 
some of the blame for not voluntarily disclosing. FATCA addresses both the FFI and 
 
1266 111th Cong., S. Rep. No. 111-156 at 3806 (March 18th, 2010). 
1267 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 739 (2014). 
1268 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 739 (2014). 
1269 John Paul, The Future of FATCA: Concerns and Issues, 37 N. E. J. Legal Stud. 52, 53-54 
(Spring/Fall 2018). 
1270 John Paul, The Future of FATCA: Concerns and Issues, 37 N. E. J. Legal Stud. 52, 53-54 
(Spring/Fall 2018); See also, Joshua D. Odintz, Michelle R. Phillips, Rodney W. Read & 
Mireille R. Zuckerman, FATCA and Nonfinancial Entities: Practical Questions with Practical 
Answers, 119 J. Tax’n 252 (December 2013). 
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the U.S. taxpayer and both have consequences under FATCA for not reporting. 
Another scholar, James F. Kelly, supported this as well, stating that “Absent the role 
of UBS in the deferred prosecution agreement, it is plausible there would not have 
been the political will to upset what seemed like an impenetrable foreign banking 
system.”1271 Essentially, FATCA exists because of the political pressure received from 
fed-up U.S. voters after the financial crisis and the banks scandals – this is what fired 
up the “political will” for Congress to enact FATCA.1272 
The measures that were examined in Chapters 4-8 did not provide the amount of 
information, knowledge or compliance that the U.S. government had hoped for.1273 
The U.S. government needed a measure that would be effective in forcing both the 
foreign financial institutions and taxpayers to comply. But this measure, unlike a few 
of the other anti-tax evasion measures, needed to a big stick to “encourage” the FFIs 
and taxpayers to comply.  
 
9.2.2. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY  
This section will examine the legislative history behind the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act and the reasons behind its enactment.  
The history of U.S. tax law demonstrates that since the inception of the 16th 
amendment (and possibly well before that) U.S. taxpayers have utilized jurisdictions 
with secrecy or strong privacy laws to conceal their accounts from the U.S. 
government. Despite having numerous other measures (Chapters 4-8) whose purpose 
is to help the U.S. government procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
 
1271 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 989 (2016-2017).  
1272 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 103 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1273 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 734-735 (2014). 
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accounts, U.S. taxpayers were still able to conceal their foreign accounts. UBS and 
the other bank scandals were proof of that.  
Multiple investigations and hearings were held and reports issued on the problem of 
secrecy and the inability to obtain taxpayer information on foreign accounts.1274 
Congress, based on the evidence that was illustrated in the investigations, hearings 
and reports, was concerned with both the estimated $100 billion annual loss in tax 
revenue1275 and frustrated with the lack of success of the prior measures in increasing 
compliance among U.S. taxpayers with foreign accounts.1276 
Congress – confronted with the compliance issue – realized that where the domestic 
third-party reporting regime encouraged compliance at home, the same could not be 
said regarding U.S. taxpayer compliance abroad.1277 There was no international third-
party reporting regime in place to elicit that compliance.1278 Legislative history 
confirms that for at least some legislators, FATCA was about “cracking down on 
 
1274 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal 
Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-6 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
1275 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Tax Evasions: The 
Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts, Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2008), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/offshore-tax-evasion-the-
effort-to-collect-unpaid-taxes-on-billions-in-hidden-offshore-accounts ; see also, Bruce W. 
Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal 
Imperalism,  21 ILSA J. Int’l &  Comp. Law 333 (Spring 2015); U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcomittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Staff Report, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, 17 (July 2008);  James F. Kelly, 
International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound 
International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 989 (2016-2017). 
1276 Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 333, 337 (Spring 2015); See also, 
James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation by United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents 
Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 985 (2016-2017). 
1277 Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 333, 337 (Spring 2015). 
1278 Bruce W. Bean and Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperalism, 21 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 333, 337 (Spring 2015). 
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overseas tax havens”1279 and stopping “offshore banks from using secrecy laws to help 
U.S. taxpayers evade their taxes”1280.  
The enactment of FATCA was not an expeditious triumph that some Congressmen 
were hoping for considering it took multiple attempts over numerous years.1281 
FATCA was originally a stand-alone bill that was introduced into both the House and 
the Senate in 2009.1282  The bill under the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment 
Act (HIRE act) was a bilateral collaboration between the House and the Senate and 
supported by both the President and the Treasury Department.1283 When FATCA was 
finally passed, FATCA was not its own bill but, instead, was part of the HIRE Act 
that added Chapter 4 – sections §1471 – 1474 – to the Internal Revenue Code. The 
HIRE Act’s goal was to improve the state of the economy within the U.S by 
functioning as an additional tax revenue source.1284  FACTA is not an official name 
of an act found in the United States Code (USC).1285 That bill died in committee and 
was never voted on. The portion of the Hire Act that added Chapter 4 to the USC has 
is now known colloquially as FATCA among the legal community worldwide and 
even the IRS themselves.1286 The purpose of the HIRE bill – as stated in both the text 
of the dual bills introduced as well as introductory remarks in front of the Senate – is 
 
1279 111th Cong., H.R. Rep. No. 111-156 at 1152 (2010).  
1280 111th Cong., S. Rep. No. 111-156 at 1745 (2010).  
1281 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 985 (2016-2017). 
1282 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. (2009); See also, James F. 
Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound 
International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 988 (2016-2017). 
1283 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 988 (2016-2017). 
1284 Scott D. Michel & H. David Rosenbloom, FATCA and Foreign Bank Accounts: Has the 
U.S. Overreached?, Viewpoints, Tax Analysts, 709 (May 30, 2011); See also William Byrnes 
& Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies 
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-4 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119;  Sean Deneault, Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
729, 735 (2014); Alicja Brodzka, FATCA From the European Union Perspective, 2 J. Gov. & 
Reg. Issue 3, 7 (2013).  
1285 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 103 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1286 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 103 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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to prevent the avoidance of income tax on assets that are held in foreign accounts.1287 
Hearings that proceeded the passage of FATCA and that discussed the legislation 
confirm that the purpose behind the bill was to address deliberately undisclosed 
foreign financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers and, further, that FATCA focuses 
on the financial institutions instead of specific countries.1288  
William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel of the IRS at the time, testified that the overall goal 
of FATCA was to compel U.S. taxpayers to report global income in order to curtail 
both intentional tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion.1289  The concern was that U.S. 
taxpayers were able to intentionally avoid reporting worldwide income made on their 
indirect foreign investments held in foreign entities because foreign financial 
institutions did not have an “obligation to report the non-U.S. source income of a U.S. 
customer that is not paid within the United States” which is how UBS helped many 
U.S. taxpayer avoid detection – hiding behind foreign entities.1290 Another concern 
was that a foreign corporation had no obligation to file a Form 1099, backup-withhold 
or comply with withholding rules that applied to U.S. persons generally even if the 
 
1287 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, H.R. 3933,111th Cong. (2009); Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act, S. 1934, 111th Cong. (2009).  
1288 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance at 20 (2009) (Statement of 
William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, IRS)available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-111hhrg63014/CHRG-111hhrg63014/context; 
See also, D.S. Kerzner and D.W. Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global 
Information Age, 314 (Palgrave MacMillan 2016).  
1289 Alicja Brodzka, FATCA From the European Union Perspective, 2 J. Gov. & Reg. Issue 3, 
7 (2013); See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and Current Status of 
FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 1-6 (March 1st, 
2017) found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119  
1290 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance, 16 (2009) (Statement of 
William J. Wilkins), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-
111hhrg63014/context; See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and 
Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 
1-6 & 1-7 (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
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foreign entity was owned by a U.S. taxpayer because the beneficial owner was 
identified as a foreign entity, not the U.S. person – also a strategy of UBS.1291  
According to the U.S. Treasury, the policy goal of FATCA is not to collect the 
withholding tax - the enforcement mechanism for FATCA but is to achieve 
reporting of foreign accounts that are held by U.S. taxpayers.1292  This confirms the 
assertion that the purpose for FATCA was to circumvent the secrecy laws of other 
countries to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts.  
 
9.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF FATCA 
9.3.1. HOW DOES FATCA OPERATE? 
This section examines and analyzes how FATCA is implemented as a measure to 
procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts despite the hindrance that 
secrecy laws provide. It discusses in detail the inner workings of FATCA and what is 
required now of both FFIs and U.S. taxpayers themselves.  
As discussed above, FATCA was designed to peel back the veil of bank secrecy and 
procure information on U.S. taxpayer foreign accounts by extending the IRS’ 
influence beyond the U.S.’ own borders through the enforcement of a withholding 
penalty. This set of statutes and regulations that make up Chapter 4 withholding is a 
 
1291 U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance,16 (2009) (Statement of 
William J. Wilkins), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-
111hhrg63014/context; See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro,  Background and 
Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-31, p. 
1-7 (March 1st, 2017) found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119 
1292 U.S. Treasury Department, Joint Statement From The United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving 
International Tax Compliance and Implementing FATCA, 1 (2012), available at, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-
Statement-US-Fr-Ger-It-Sp-UK-02-07-2012.pdf; See also,  D.S. Kerzner and D.W. 
Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 315 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2016).  
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more complex framework than the QI statutes and regulations despite some 
simplifications that have taken place over the years.1293 Fulfilling the multiple 
objectives of FATCA is accomplished in one of three ways: 1) identifying and 
documenting U.S. taxpayer-held accounts, 2) reporting on those accounts and 3) 
requiring the individual taxpayer to report on their foreign-held accounts.  These 
objectives are backed up by an 30% penalty – or enforcement mechanism as the IRS 
likes to describe it. This anti-tax evasion measure comes at solving the issue – 
procuring information – on two fronts: FFIs and U.S. taxpayers. 
An important distinction to remember in this chapter is that FATCA is Chapter 4 
withholding while the QI regulations (Chapter 7) refer to Chapter 3 withholding.1294 
What is the difference exactly? The Chapter 4 withholding framework deals with 
ANY income – from either a U.S. or foreign source – paid to a U.S. person in an 
account held outside the U.S.1295 In contrast, the Chapter 3 withholding framework 
deals with U.S.-sourced FDAP (fixed, determinable, annual and periodic) income that 
is paid to foreign recipients. But there are places where the two converge: reliance on 
KYC and AML procedures for the due diligence requirement, the use of the W-8/W-
9 forms to identify account holders and the use of forms 1042, 1042S and 1099 to 
report income.1296 FATCA’s, or Chapter 4 withholding, system is reflective of the 
system in Chapter 3, or QI regulations, in that the intermediaries in the chain have to 
identify themselves and their FATCA status to their counterparties using Form W-
8IMY to report it.1297  
 
1293 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 122 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1294 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1295 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 101 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1296 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 122 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1297 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 142 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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There are three main objectives that make up FATCA’s foundation: Documentation, 
Reporting and Withholding.1298 These principles work in concert together in the 
following way: 1) the foreign financial institution has to document and identify any 
U.S. owners in their customer base using due diligence, 2) after identifying and 
documenting, the FFI has an obligation to annually report on U.S.-owned accounts 
held at the FFI and 3) the 30% withholding is applied to address either recalcitrant1299 
owners who refuse to identify themselves or against U.S.-source payments made to 
the FFIs who are non-compliant. These prongs create the basic structure of FATCA 
which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
Before the chapter gets down in the weeds to really explain how FATCA operates, the 
big picture needs to be filled in. Under the statutes and regulations that are now known 
as FATCA, FFIs were required to enter into a cooperative agreement with the IRS 
known as the FFI Agreement (26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4) so that the FFIs could identify 
any Americans among its client base and to disclose certain information about those 
American clients.1300 The FFI agreement allows the FFIs to avoid Chapter 4 
withholdable payments and pass-thru payments as long as they undertake due 
diligence in their documentation and identification, information reporting and 
withholding obligations.1301 The problem began when the FFIs found that there were 
multiple reasons that they could not comply with FATCA - the chief reason was that 
 
1298 26 U.S.C. §1471 and §1472; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 114 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1299 A recalcitrant owner is an account holder that has not provided the FFI with the 
information that it requested so that the FFI can determine the owner’s Chapter 4 (FATCA) 
status – U.S. Person or not. 
1300 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1301 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-16; See also, Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, 
¶6.06 (September 2018).  
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complying with FATCA might violate their own country’s laws.1302 The Department 
of the Treasury, in order to address these concerns, worked together with multiple 
governments and from this effort, the Intergovernmental Agreements were born 
(hereinafter referred to as IGAs).1303 (The IGAs will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 9.4).  
So how does an FFI comply with FATCA? It depends upon the IGA that their nation 
has adopted.1304 The choice of IGA provides the means by which the FFIs can comply 
with FATCA without contravening their own nations’ laws.1305 Nations choose either 
Model 1 or Model 2 (which has significance which will be discussed in Section 
 
1302 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1303 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1304 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1305 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
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9.4).1306 So, for example, Switzerland executed a Model 2 IGA so their banks would 
follow the procedures and practices set forth under the U.S.-Switzerland Model 2 
IGA, but Denmark executed a Model 1 IGA so Danish financial institutions would 
follow the U.S.-Denmark Model 1 IGA procedures and practices. Model 1 FFIs have 
to register with the IRS but do not have an FFI Agreement. They follow the practices 
set out in the Model 1 IGA and are not subject to withholding and reporting 
requirements as long as they are in compliance.1307 Model 2 FFIs follow an FFI 
Agreement that is modified by the Model 2 IGA that their government executed.1308 
Based on the above information, the next few sections will describe the FATCA 
procedures followed in the Model 1 and 2 IGAs considering these are the predominant 
procedures and practices as well the FFI regulations (FFI Agreement). The key 
difference in Model 1 and Model 2 is that after the information is gathered by the FFI, 
in Model 1 the FFIs relay the information to their government which then relays the 
information to the IRS.1309 In contrast to Model 1, Model 2 FFIs, directly relay their 
information to the IRS.1310 Any other differences will be noted where applicable.  
 
1306 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1307 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1308 Alexander Szwakob, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The Most Revolutionary 
Piece of Tax Legislation Since the Introduction of the Income Tax, UConn Theses, 12 (Fall 
2015), found at 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=srhonors_theses; 
John Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of 
Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 585 (2017); Marin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6 (September 2018). 
1309 Model 1 and 2 Intergovernmental Agreements 
1310 Model 1 and 2 Intergovernmental Agreements 
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9.3.1.1 Documentation, Identification and Due Diligence1311 
Chapter 4’s (FATCA) reporting system reflects that of Chapter 3’s reporting system 
in that all intermediaries in the chain have a duty to identify themselves and their 
FATCA status to the other links in the chain.1312 This first prong of FATCA is the 
most complex of the law but the information obtained directs the reporting and 
withholding prongs. All FFIs, including Model 1 and Model 2 FFIs, are required to 
document, identify and employ due diligence to complete the documentation and 
identification process. 
The first question this section is what is an intermediary? An intermediary is “with 
respect to a payment that it receives, a person that, for that payment, acts a custodian, 
broker, nominee, or otherwise as an agent for another person, regardless of whether 
such other person is the beneficial owner of the amount paid, a flow-through entity, 
or another intermediary.”1313 A foreign financial institution (hereinafter FFI) is 
considered an intermediary because it acts as the custodian for the beneficial owner 
and would have the documentation and knowledge on said owner.1314 The QI chapter 
(7) alluded to the idea that Chapter 4 FFIs, while similar to those of Chapter 3, involve 
a much broader category of FFIs. Therefore, the more correct question is what is an 
FFI under Chapter 4 reporting? A simple definition is that an FFI engages in accepting 
deposits, holds financial assets for the account of others which makes up a substantial 
part of its business or it is in the business of investing.1315 But the FFI, under 
FATCA, is not only the definition above but includes a new concept that encompasses 
both traditional financial service intermediaries such as bankers and brokers as well 
 
1311 26 U.S.C. §1471; See also, Model 1 and 2 Intergovernmental Agreements 
1312 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 142 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1313 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(13) 
1314 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 142 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1315 See Appendix B for a more detailed definition. 
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as, according to Ross McGill, collective investment vehicles.1316 This is an accurate 
description because understanding what qualifies as an FFI under FATCA is crucial 
because it identifies the FFIs that have Chapter 4 documenting, reporting and 
withholding obligations. The definition under FATCA was kept purposefully broad 
to include “almost all institutions that could aid a U.S. citizen in evading taxes.”1317 
Sean Deneault calls the definition of an FFI the “gatekeeper” definition.1318. 
9.3.1.1.1 U.S. Indicia  
 
One of the most important purposes that FFIs have under FATCA is in the 
identification of any account that contains U.S. indicia that indicates that the account 
under review is owned by a U.S. person. This determines both the reporting and 
withholding responsibilities of the FFI. This purpose is also important in relation to 
the thesis issue. When a FFI discovers U.S. indicia on an account and if through due 
diligence they prove it is, in fact, a U.S.-held account, then the reporting objective 
should lead to the IRS receiving the information needed to ensure the tax laws 
(withholding for example) are being carried correctly and fairly. First, the FFI needs 
to identify the beneficial owner of a payment and the status of the payee of that 
payment – are they a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person?1319 This determination comes 
from the reliable information that the withholding agent can reasonably associate with 
the payment.1320  
A U.S. person can include a U.S. citizen, a U.S. resident (based on a residency test), 
corporations and partnerships created or organized under the laws of the U.S., estates 
subject to U.S. income tax and certain types of trusts.1321  When the FFI is identifying 
 
1316 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 142 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1317 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 (2014). 
1318 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 744 (2014). 
1319 Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.05 (September 2018).  
1320 Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.05 (September 2018).  
1321 26 U.S.C. §7701; See also, Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.01 
(September 2018).  
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U.S. persons that are in their client database, they are required to look for U.S. indicia. 
This could be anything from a U.S. telephone number to a U.S. passport. However, a 
FFI would do well to remember that U.S. indicia are not always obvious – a U.S. 
person is not always a passport-carrying or birth certificate-holding American.1322 A 
U.S. person, for U.S. tax purposes, can include a foreign person who once held a U.S. 
green card but never revoked it or a child born in a foreign jurisdiction who has at 
least one U.S.-born parent.1323 Some of these persons are not even aware that they are 
U.S persons under U.S tax law, and more specifically, FATCA.1324  
Any person that does not fall under the definition of a U.S. person is a non-U.S. 
person.1325 This is an important distinction because it tells the FFI (and others) whether 
the person is subject to Chapter 3 or 4 withholding.1326 As explained in Chapter 7 
(Chapter 3 Withholding/QI), non-U.S. persons are only subject to U.S. federal income 
tax on U.S.-source FDAP income or income related to business dealings in the U.S.1327  
Identifying exactly who is a U.S. person is important because the FFIs are required to 
document and identify U.S. persons in order to be able to correctly withhold and report 
on U.S.-held accounts.1328 If all done correctly, then the IRS should receive the 
information on U.S.-held accounts they need to apply the tax laws correctly and fairly.   
 
1322 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 147 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1323 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 147 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1324 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 147 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1325 26 U.S.C. §7701; See also, Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.01 
(September 2018); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 142 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1326 26 U.S.C. §7701; See also, Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.01 
(September 2018); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 142 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1327 26 U.S.C. §7701; See also, Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.01 
(September 2018). 
1328 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 147 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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The regulations lay out the U.S. indicia for individual and entity accounts.1329  Just 
because U.S. indicia are found does not equate to the account being a U.S.-held 
account. It means the FFI has to dig deeper using due diligence to decide if their client 
is a U.S. person.1330 This is discussed further in subsection 9.3.1.2. 
9.3.1.1.2 Documentation and Identification Process  
 
Once the FFI has completed its search for U.S. indicia, the next few steps are to 
document what is found and identifying the U.S. person if indicators are found. What 
does Chapter 4 documentation and identification look like? As noted above, the FFI 
needs to search their database of customers for any indication of U.S. ownership of 
an account. In order to identify U.S. account holders, FFIs are required to use due 
diligence procedures1331 mapped out in the applicable IGA annex.1332   
The identification and documentation procedures for U.S. accounts depends on 
whether it is held by an individual or an entity and whether it is a pre-existing or new 
account.1333  This is broken down even further into the difference between the value 
of the account – low value versus high value accounts.1334 Low value accounts 
represent less risk for tax evasion than do high risk accounts for obvious reasons.  
For pre-existing accounts that have a balance of at least $50,000 but less than $1 
million (“lower value accounts”), the FFIs are only required to search only their 
electronic records for U.S. indicia. Accounts that are less than $50,000 USD, they 
 
1329 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(5)(iv)(B); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(3); 26 C.F.R. 
§1.1471-3 (b) – (d); Intergovernmental Agreements Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 2, para. B, 
subsection 1 and art. 4, para. D 
1330 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1331 Further discussion on due diligence found in subsection 9.3.1.1.5 
1332 26 U.S.C. §1471 (b)(1)(B); See also, Models 1 and 2 IGA, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx 
1333 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-3. 
1334 Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, art. 2. 
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are not required to be reviewed as a U.S reportable account because the risk of tax 
evasion is low.1335 
The indicators of U.S. ownership that the FFI is to scan for are:  
a) Identification of the account holder as U.S. citizen or resident; 
b) Unambiguous indication of a U.S. place of birth;  
c) Current U.S. mailing or residence address (including a U.S. post office 
box);  
d) Current U.S. telephone number;  
e) Standing instructions to transfer funds to an account maintained in the 
United States;  
f) Currently effective power of attorney or signatory authority granted to 
a person with a U.S. address; or  
g) An “in-care-of” or “hold mail” address that is the sole address the 
Reporting Financial Institution has on file for the Account Holder.1336  
 
If any of the indicia are found in the electronic files, then the account will be treated 
as a U.S. account and no further examination will be needed.1337 There are 
exceptions to this where the FFI is not required to treat the account holder as a U.S. 
person, for example, where an account holder gives the U.S. as the unambiguous 
place of birth but has given the FFI a self-certification that the account holder is not 
a U.S. citizen, a copy of a non-U.S. passport and a copy of the certificate of loss of 
U.S. nationality.1338 An example of this would be a former U.S. citizen who gave up 
their U.S. citizenship and is a citizen of a foreign country and holds an account in a 
financial institution in that foreign country.  
 
 
1335 Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, art. 2, para A.  
1336 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (C)(5)(iv)(A); See also, Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 
2, Annex I, art. 2, para B, subsection 1.  
1337 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 2, para B, subsection 1 & 2.  
1338 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (B)(2)(ii); See also, Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 2, para. B, subsection 4(a).  
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Pre-existing accounts that are in excess of $1 million USD (“high value”), require 
enhanced review procedures because these are the accounts that the IRS believes is 
where tax evasion is more likely to occur.1339 These high value accounts require both 
electronic and paper searches for U.S. indicia (enhanced review) using the same 
indicia as the lower value accounts.1340 The limitation, where an enhanced review of 
a high value account is not needed, is that an electronic search may be relied on if 
the search includes the following:  
 
a) The account holder’s nationality or residence status; 
b) The account holder’s residence address and mailing address currently 
on file with the RFI;  
c) The account holder’s telephone number(s) currently on file, if any, 
with the RFI; 
d) Whether there are standing instructions to transfer funds in the account 
to another account;  
e) Whether there is a current “in-care-of” or “hold mail” address for the 
account holder; and 
f) Whether there is any power of attorney or signatory authority for the 
account.1341  
 
How are new accounts for individuals managed when looking for U.S. indicia? New 
accounts are accounts that are opened after the determination date and are to be 
reviewed at the time of opening.1342 The FFI must obtain a self-certification that allows 
the FFI to determine whether the account holder is a U.S. resident (for tax 
purposes).1343 The FFI is to confirm the reasonableness of the self-certification based 
 
1339 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(5)(iv)(D)(2); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 2, para D. 
1340 Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 2, para D, subsection 1 and 2.  
1341 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(5)(iv)(D)(4)(i)-(vi); See also, Inter-governmental Agreement 
Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 2, para D, subsection 3(a)-(f).  
1342 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(c)(4); See also, Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex 
I, art. 3, para. B. 
1343 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(c)(4); See also, Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex 
I, art. 3, para. B.  
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on the information obtained by the FFI.1344 This includes any information that has been 
gained and collected pursuant to the FFI’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML) or Know-
Your-Customer (KYC) initiatives.1345  The new account exceptions are depository 
accounts and cash value insurance contracts1346 under $50,000 which do not need to 
be reported.1347  The determination date is defined as “the date on which the Treasury 
Department determines not to apply withholding under section 1471 of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code to [FATCA Partner] Financial Institutions.”1348 That date is 
determined, according to the definition found in both annexes, based on either June 
30, 2014 when an agreement was reached on or before that date, November 30, 2014 
when an agreement was reached between July 1, 2014 and November 30, 2014, or the 
date of signature of the agreement in the case of any other jurisdiction.1349 
The other type of accounts that are to be examined for U.S. indicia are accounts held 
by entities – both pre-existing and new accounts.1350 In order to ascertain whether a 
pre-existing account that is held by an entity should be reviewed or not,1351 art. 4 in 
the annexes lays out the procedure. If a pre-existing entity account does not exceed 
$250,000 (as of June 30, 2014), the FFI is not required to review, identify, or report 
the account as a U.S. reportable account.1352 This does not happen until the value of 
the account is over $1,000,000 (once again, high value account, more risk for tax 
evasion).1353  
An entity account that should be reviewed are accounts whose balance 1) “exceeds 
$250,000 as of June 30, 2014, and 2) a Preexisting Entity Account that does not 
 
1344 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 3, para. B. 
1345 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 3, para. B. 
1346 This is a type of insurance that allows the insured to build up savings because the 
premium is more than just the mortality cost. It is a type of permanent or whole life insurance 
that combines a savings (or investment) feature and a insurance.  
1347 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 3, para. A.  
1348 Intergovernmental Agreement, Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para. B, subsection 6.  
1349 Intergovernmental Agreement, Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para. B, subsection 6.  
1350 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(3)(i)-(c)(4). 
1351Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para A. 
1352 Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para A. 
1353 Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para A. 
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exceed $250,000 as of June 30th, 2014 but the account balance or value of which 
exceeds $1,000,000 as of the last day of 2015 or any subsequent calendar year” is 
required to be reviewed with the procedure laid out in paragraph D.1354 Preexisting 
entity accounts that are required to be reported are accounts that are held by one or 
more entities that are specified-U.S. persons or passive Non-Financial Foreign 
Entities (NFFEs) with one or more controlling persons who are U.S. citizens or 
residents. 
When the FFI is trying to determine which preexisting entity accounts should be 
identified and reported, art. 4, paragraph D lays out the procedure.1355 The FFI has 
four categories to examine in order to make the determination:  
1) Determine Whether the Entity is a Specified U.S. Person. 
2) Determine Whether a Non-U.S. Entity is a Financial 
Institution. 
3) Determine Whether a Financial Institution is a Non-
Participating Financial Institution Payments to Which are 
Subject to Aggregate Reporting Under Subparagraph 1(b) of 
Article 4 of this Agreement.  
4) Determine Whether an Account Held by an NFFE is a U.S. 
Reportable Account.1356  
 
If any U.S. indicia is found in any of the accounts, individual or entity, then the 
accounts should be treated as a U.S. reportable accounts unless an exception 
applies.1357 
 
1354 Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para B. 
1355 Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para D. 
1356 Inter-governmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 4, para D. 
1357 Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, Annex I, art. 2. 
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The next section briefly discusses the documentary evidence that a withholding agent 
is allowed to rely upon in order to determine a person’s Chapter 4 status (U.S. person 
versus non-U.S.).1358 
 
 
 
 
9.3.1.1.3 Documentary Evidence 
 
What documentary evidence can a withholding agent rely on that will establish a 
person’s Chapter 4 status? Under both models of the IGAs, acceptable documentary 
evidence is any of the following:  
a) A certificate of residence that has been issued by an authorized 
governmental body (for example, tax authority) of the 
jurisdiction in which the payee claims to be a resident; 
b) Individuals: Any valid ID issued by an authorized government 
body that includes the individual’s name and is used for ID 
purposes; 
c) Entities: Any official documentation issued by an authorized 
government body that includes the name of the entity and either 
the address of its principal office in the jurisdiction in which it 
claims to be a resident or the jurisdiction in which the entity was 
incorporated or organized;  
d) Financial Account that are in approved AML jurisdictions: any 
documents, other than a Form W-8 or W-9, referenced in the 
jurisdiction’s attachment to the QI agreement for identifying 
individuals or entities; or 
 
1358 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-1(b)(32) 
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e) Any financial statement, third-party credit report, bankruptcy 
filing or U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.1359  
Documentary evidence does not include a withholding certificate or a written 
statement (that provides the persons Chapter 4 status).1360 
9.3.1.1.4 Standards of Knowledge 
 
The FFI is held to a certain standard of knowledge when it relies on documentation 
that is collected in the process of due diligence. The standards of knowledge are the 
“reason to know” and the “actual knowledge” standards also found in the Chapter 3 
regulations (QI).1361 Once the FFI has reason to know that the documentation that it 
has in its possession is unreliable or incorrect, it cannot rely on the documentation and 
new valid documentation from the client has to be obtained.1362 Reason to know is 
defined as “information indicating that a claim is unreliable or incorrect if all relevant 
facts or statements in the withholding certificates or the documentation are such that 
a reasonably prudent person in the position of a withholding agent would question 
the claims made.”1363 
If new valid, authenticating documentation cannot be obtained identifying whether 
the account holder is a U.S. person, then the account should be treated as a non-
consenting U.S. Account (or recalcitrant).1364 The actual knowledge standard applies 
when the account has a relationship manager (usually a high value account) and that 
 
1359 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-3 (c)(5)(i)-(ii); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements Models 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 6, para D.  
1360 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-3 (c)(5)(i)-(ii); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements Models 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 6, para D. 
1361 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(c)(2)(ii); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements Models 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 5, para A; Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.05 
(September 2018).  
1362 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(2)(ii); See also, Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 5, para. A. 
1363 Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.05 (September 2018).  
1364 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(c)(2)(iii)(C); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements Models 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 3, para. B, subsection 2.  
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relationship manager has actual knowledge that the account is a U.S. account.1365  
Actual knowledge is defined as “direct and clear cognizance of a circumstance or a 
fact, resulting from information that would lead a reasonable, prudent person to 
investigate further.”1366 
If there are changes to the circumstances of the account, there must be procedures 
implemented so that the account manager that maintains the relationship with the 
account, can identify those changes and obtain appropriate documentation from the 
account holder to either identify the account holder as a U.S. owner or rule the account 
out as being U.S.-owned.1367 
9.3.1.1.5 Due Diligence 
 
Due diligence in an important concept in both Chapters 3 and 4 reporting. It is the 
standard that FFIs are held to when identifying and documenting potential U.S. 
account holders. Identification and documentation are due diligence on the part of the 
FFI. The due diligence obligation that FATCA puts on the FFIs is the process detailed 
above: identification and documentation. The due diligence process is described in 
two places – either the Inter-Governmental Agreement and the attached Annex I or 
relevant U.S. Treasury Regulations.1368  
The Annexes to the Inter-Governmental Agreements (which will be discussed in 
section 9.4) breaks down the due diligence required by the FFIs with respect to 
accounts in a couple of ways. One way it categorizes the due diligence required for 
accounts is by identifying those accounts that need to be reported and those that are 
not required to be reported. Model 2 IGA FFIs are required to use the due diligence 
procedure laid out in the Annex of the Model 2 IGA unless they choose to use the due 
 
1365 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(5)(iv)(D)(2); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, 
Annex I, art. 2, para. D, subsection 4. 
1366 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 56 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1367 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (c)(2)(iii); See also, Intergovernmental Agreements 1 & 2, Annex I, 
art. 2, para. E, subsection 5.  
1368 Inter-governmental Agreement Model 1, Annex I, para. C.  
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diligence procedures that are outlined in the FFI agreement which follows the 
regulations’ due diligence procedures.1369 
The due diligence requirements are vast and extensive. They are reflective of the 
issues and gaps that have been found within the law and other measures taken, like 
the QI, to procure information on the foreign financial institution’s U.S. customers.  
 
9.3.1.2 Reporting  
The starting point is that Americans are supposed to have voluntarily reported their 
non-U.S. accounts but when they have not complied, the reporting from FATCA (and 
other anti-tax evasion measures as well) provides the IRS information that they might 
not otherwise have. Reporting is the main focus of FATCA because FATCA is a 
reporting framework.1370 
The reporting objective of FACTA requires the FFI to relinquish to the IRS certain 
information regarding financial accounts that are held by U.S taxpayers that have 
material ownership in the account.1371 The purpose of this is to create transparency 
where there might not be any or to make it easier for the IRS to procure information 
that would not be easily attainable otherwise. In order to achieve this goal of 
transparency via forced compliance, three types of business structures enter into 
disclosure agreements with the IRS. These three types are foreign financial 
institutions, foreign companies with substantial U.S. ownership and pass-thru 
companies.1372 This agreement requires three actions of the FFIs once they enter into 
 
1369 Marin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.05 (September 2018).  
 
1370 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 177 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1371 David Gannaway, Key Provisions of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 39 Est. 
Plan. 35 (September 2012).  
1372 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 743 (2014). 
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an FFI agreement with the IRS.1373 Those actions consist of due diligence 
(identification and documentation), annual reporting to the IRS and withholding 30% 
on non-compliant FFIs.1374 
 
9.3.1.2.1 Reportable Accounts  
 
After the information on U.S. owners is collected and the FFIs realize they have 
reportable accounts, how the information1375 gets from the FFI to the IRS depends 
upon whether they are under a Model 1 or Model 2 agreement or the final regulations.  
The first question is what information must be reported? It depends on whether the 
account holder is a specified U.S. person or a U.S. entity.1376 For an individual account, 
the following needs to be reported:  
a) Name, address and TIN of each Account holder; 
b) Account number;  
c) Account balance or value; 
d) Payments made to the account during the calendar year; and 
e) Other information required under the regulations.1377 
 
1373 David Gannaway, Key Provisions of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 39 Est. 
Plan. 35 (September 2012); See also, Joshua D. Odintz, Michelle R. Phillips, Rodney W. 
Read & Mireille R. Zuckerman, FATCA and Nonfinancial Entities: Practical Questions with 
Practical Answers, 119 J. Tax’n 252 (December 2013). 
1374 David Gannaway, Key Provisions of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 39 Est. 
Plan. 35 (September 2012); See also, Joshua D. Odintz, Michelle R. Phillips, Rodney W. 
Read & Mireille R. Zuckerman, FATCA and Nonfinancial Entities: Practical Questions with 
Practical Answers, 119 J. Tax’n 252 (December 2013); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding 
Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1375 26 U.S.C. §1471(b). 
1376 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(d)(3)(ii)-(iii).  
1377 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(d)(3)(ii)-(iii). 
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The information required for U.S.-owned entities is the same except one requirement. 
The name of the entity is required to be reported.1378 
FFIs, after they document and identify the reportable accounts, the information must 
be reported annually to the IRS on its account holders who are classified as U.S. 
persons and foreign entities with substantial U.S. ownership.1379  
Once it is understood what information must be reported to the IRS, the next question 
is how does the FFI transfer the information to the IRS? A Model 1 FFI, under the 
Model 1 IGA, does not have to send their reportable information directly to the IRS, 
but instead sends it to their government (most likely the tax authority) who, in turn, 
hands the information over to the IRS.1380   
Under a Model 2 IGA, the FFIs are required to report the information directly to the 
IRS and consent is needed from each account holder to do so.1381 If the account holder 
refuses to give consent, then they are considered a recalcitrant owner. FFIs who have 
recalcitrant owners are then required to report the aggregate number of recalcitrant 
accounts and the value of those accounts but the FFI is not required to close the 
account.1382 This latter benefit – not having to close recalcitrant accounts – hinges 
upon the FFI entering into the FFI Agreement, complying with the requirements under 
the Agreement and the FATCA Partner government fulfilling their end when requests 
for information come from the IRS within 6 months of the request.1383 These accounts 
are then subject to group requests from the IRS to the FATCA Partner.1384 The FATCA 
Partner, under the Model 2 IGA, will have six months to respond by providing the 
requested information and, if not, the FFI will be required to treat the account as a 
 
1378 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(d)(3)(ii)-(iii). 
1379 David Gannaway, Key Provisions of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 39 Est. 
Plan. 34, 35 (September 2012).  
1380 Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement. 
1381 Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement.  
1382 Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement, art. 2, para. 2, subsections 1 &2. 
1383 Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement; See also¸ International Adviser, FATCA Model 2 
Agreement Explained (Nov. 20, 2012), found at https://international-adviser.com/fatca-model-
agreement-explained/ 
1384 Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement, art. 2, para. 2, subsections 1 &2.  
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recalcitrant account holder which includes withholding tax where required by the 
regs.1385 
For those FFIs that fall under the regulations (FFI Agreement) and not an IGA, they 
are to report the information they gather directly to the IRS.1386 If the nation’s law 
prevents the reporting of the information, then the FFI needs to get a waiver from its 
U.S. account holders.1387 If the account holder refuses, the FFI should identify them 
as a recalcitrant owner and the FFI is required to close the account.1388 A valid waiver 
is a waiver that “permits the participating FFI to report to the IRS all of the 
information” required with respect to the U.S. account.1389 
9.3.1.2.2 Individual Taxpayer Reporting  
 
While it seems that 26 U.S.C. §1471 is the cornerstone of FATCA, there is actually a 
second aspect to it that also imposes a burden on individual taxpayers to report certain 
information.1390 This second aspect addresses what Douglas J. Workman noted as a 
problem even back in 1982: voluntary compliance by U.S. taxpayers.1391 Chapter 3 of 
this thesis reflects and supports the fact that voluntary compliance by taxpayers was 
both a problem and a concern held by the U.S. government  in the 1980s. 26 U.S.C. 
§6038D, added to the tax code by the Hire Act and which expanded the categories of 
information on foreign assets that must be reported, requires that any U.S. taxpayer 
who has interest in a “specified foreign financial asset” to report information 
regarding the foreign account if the aggregate amount of the assets is over $50,000.1392  
 
1385 Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement, art. 2, para. 2, subsections 1 &2 and art. 3, para. 
2, subsection b.  
1386 26 U.S.C. §1471; See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4 (a)(3) 
1387 26 U.S.C. §1471(b)(F). 
1388 26 U.S.C. §1471(b)(F); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(i)(1)-(2). 
1389 26 U.S.C. §1471(b)(F); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(i)(1)-(2). 
1390 26 U.S.C. §6038D 
1391 Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally 
Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 675, 704 (Summer 1982).  
1392 26 U.S.C. §6038D(a). 
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A specified foreign financial asset is defined as any financial account held by an 
individual with any interest and managed by an FFI and specific assets1393 that are not 
held by a financial institution but are issued by non-U.S. persons or interest in a 
foreign entity1394. For example, interest in a foreign entity, a contract held for 
investment or stock are considered “specified foreign financial assets.”1395  
The penalty for failure to disclose the assets is $10,000 unless it continues for more 
than ninety days and then the penalty becomes $10,000 for each 30-day period that 
the failure continues.1396 The withholding penalty statute §1471 put the requirement 
on the foreign financial institution to report a U.S. taxpayer’s foreign accounts and the 
penalty is against the FFI. However, with this additional statute, the responsibility is 
put on the taxpayer to report the foreign asset and if the taxpayer fails to comply, then 
the taxpayer is the one who pays the penalty. 
John Paul argues that the burden of FATCA was placed on both the Americans living 
abroad and the foreign financial institutions but the Americans residing in the United 
States do not bear any part of that burden. However, in the next sentence he states that 
FATCA affects all U.S. citizens who hold a foreign account.1397 As the Crawford 
Court discussed correctly, FATCA applies to all U.S. citizens both abroad and resident 
in the U.S. when they hold a foreign account.1398 There is no discrimination when both 
the taxpayer at home and the taxpayer living abroad are held to the same standard. If 
they both have foreign accounts, they both are required to report them. If they fail to 
report then they are both subject to the same penalties.  
 
1393 26 U.S.C. §6038D(b)(2)(A)-(B) 
1394 26 U.S.C. §6038D(b)(2)(C) 
1395 26 U.S.C. §6038D(b)(1)-(2) 
1396 26 U.S.C. §6038D(d).  
1397 John Paul, The Future of FATCA: Concerns and Issues, 37 N. E. J. Legal Stud. 52, 53 
(Spring/Fall 2018). 
1398 Crawford v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 2016 WL 1642968 (S.D. Ohio, 2016), aff’d in 
Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 838 F.3d 438 (6th Cir., 2017), certiorari denied, Crawford 
v. Dep’t of Treasury, 138 S.Ct. 1441 (2018). 
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The hope of the IRS is that an international withholding regime will be created – via 
the FATCA reporting requirements and enforced by the 30% penalty – which will 
reflect the domestic system in the U.S.1399 
9.3.1.3 Withholding – Enforcement Mechanism 
Withholding is the third main objective and enforcement mechanism of FATCA.1400 
There is only one withholding rate under FATCA – 30% - which is the penalty that is 
the enforcement mechanism.1401 
Penalizing and incentivizing recalcitrant owners1402 and non-participating FFIs 
(NPFFIs1403) into producing the information and documentation needed to identify and 
report on U.S. persons is the main purpose behind the withholding section of 
FATCA.1404 The IRS has reiterated it would rather have tax compliance than have to 
enforce the 30% withholding penalty.1405 This supports the IRS’ assertion that the 
main focus of FATCA is reporting.1406 The accuracy, or better, truthfulness, of the 
statement is in question among academics considering the large amount of money to 
 
1399 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 743 (2014). 
1400 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1401 26 C.F.R. §1471; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications 
of QI and FATCA, 164 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1402 A recalcitrant owner is an account holder that has not provided the FFI with the 
information that it requested so that the FFI can determine the owner’s Chapter 4 (FATCA) 
status – U.S. Person or not.  
1403 A non-participating FFI is usually a financial institution that has not signed an FFI 
agreement and is resident in a jurisdiction that has executed an IGA.  
1404 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1405 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1406 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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be recouped through FATCA.1407 The IRS probably wants a lot of both – money and 
compliance. However, the more FATCA incentivizes the compliance, the less of need 
for the enforcement mechanism.  
A note here about whether this withholding is a penalty or a tax because there is a 
disagreement among scholars.1408 Ross McGill argues, persuasively so, that the 30% 
withholding is a penalty and not a tax because despite being administered through the 
tax system, it is not an tax on income but a penalty for failure to comply with the 
documentation procedures required.1409 This is the correct interpretation. The 
confusion between whether it is a tax, or a penalty might stem from the legislative 
history. Senator Levin, when describing what has become known as FATCA, he 
described the withholding in one sentence as a 30% withholding tax and in the next 
sentence described it as a “steep penalty”.1410 Then he continues to call it a tax in the 
rest of his statement.1411 Senator Levin’s use of the word “penalty” though is supported 
by what he explains the FFI will have to do to avoid the 30% withholding.1412 He states 
that an FFI will have to “….obtain and verify information which will make it possible 
for them to determine which of their accounts belong to U.S. accountholders, report 
key information about those U.S. account holders and comply with any request by the 
Treasury Secretary related to those U.S. accounts.”1413 A tax, as defined by Black’s 
law, is a “monetary charge imposed by the government on persons, entities, or 
 
1407 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1408 Joanna Heiberg, FATCA: Toward a Multilateral Automatic Information Reporting 
Regime, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1685, 1700 (2012); See also, William Byrnes & Robert J. 
Munro,  Background and Current Status of FATCA, Legal Research Studies Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 17-31, §1.03[1] (March 1st, 2017) found at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926119; Crawford v. U.S. Department 
of Treasury, 2016 WL 1642968 (S.D. Ohio, 2916), aff’d in Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 838 F.3d 438 ( 6th Cir., 2017), certiorari denied, Crawford v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
138 S.Ct. 1441 (2018); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI 
and FATCA, 150 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 219 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1409 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 219 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1410 156 Cong. Rec. S1745 (March 18, 2010).  
1411 156 Cong. Rec. S1745 (March 18, 2010). 
1412 156 Cong. Rec. S1745 (March 18, 2010). 
1413 156 Cong. Rec. S1745 (March 18, 2010). 
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property to yield public revenue.”1414 A penalty, on the other hand, is defined as 
“punishment imposed on a wrong-doer, especially in the form of imprisonment or 
fine.”1415 The 30% is not the government charging a tax to raise public revenue but, 
instead, and based on Senator Levin’s own explanation, it is to punish the FFIs for not 
complying with the requirement to obtain information on U.S. accounts and to provide 
that information to the Treasury (IRS).1416  
The 30% withholding penalty is only applied to U.S.-sourced FDAP income that is 
paid to certain categories of account holders.1417 Just as Chapter 3 (QI – Chapter 7) 
withholding affected FDAP income payments, Chapter 4 (FATCA) withholding 
affects FDAP and gross proceeds1418 income.1419 FATCA affects a broader swath of 
income under Chapter 4 withholding in order to make the “stick” have a bigger impact 
when it lands.1420 In order to apply this withholding, an account holder must have 
received US-sourced FDAP income and either be recalcitrant or a NPFFI.1421 The 30% 
withholding penalty can also be applied against a non-financial foreign entity (NFFE) 
where the NFFE is a beneficial owner and they do not provide certification that they 
have no substantial U.S. owners or, if they do have U.S. owners, do not provide the 
 
1414 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Bryan A. Garner, editor 1999).  
1415 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Bryan A. Garner, editor 1999). 
1416 156 Cong. Rec. S1745 (March 18, 2010). 
1417 26 U.S.C. §1471 (b)(1)(D); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013); Ross K. McGill, U.S. 
Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1418 As of 19 Feb. 2019, the Treasury was looking at complaints made by FFIs about the 
burden of withholding on gross proceeds and has proposed removing gross proceeds from the 
definition of withholdable payments under 26 C.F.R. §1.1473-1(a)(1) found at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/18/2018-27290/regulations-reducing-
burden-under-fatca-and-chapter-3 
1419 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1420 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 165 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1421 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 164 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 175 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
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name, address and tax identification number of each substantial U.S. owner.1422 This 
is how FATCA ensures that the IRS will receive information on U.S. taxpayers and 
their foreign accounts.  
There are two situations in which FATCA withholding can occur. The first happens 
when an FFI directly withholds on a recalcitrant owner whose account is held by said 
FFI.1423 The second occurs where the withholding on the payment happens further up 
the chain – possibly at the highest level which is at the U.S. Withholding Agent’s 
level. 1424 This election, whether there is direct withholding or not, occurs when the 
FFI registers with the IRS.1425  The second option, the pass-thru payment, occurs from 
the eagle’s point of view: the payment is from an upstream entity who does not 
directly make the payment to the recalcitrant owner who passes the payment through 
to its customers minus the 30% penalty.1426 This establishes the problem of how to 
determine what proportion of any payment originally upstream in the payment chain 
is allocable to a given downstream, recalcitrant owner.1427 This situation has been on 
hold until the IRS determines1428 how to correctly handle the issues and complaints.1429 
 
1422 26 U.S.C. §1472 (a)-(b); See also, 26 U.S.C. 1471(b)(1); Sean Deneault, Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 729, 745 
(2014); Joshua D. Odintz, Michelle R. Phillips, Rodney W. Read & Mireille R. Zuckerman, 
FATCA and Nonfinancial Entities: Practical Questions With Practical Answers, 119 J. Tax’n 
252, 253 (December 2013). 
 
1423 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 166 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1424 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 166 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1425 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 166 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1426 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 166 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1427 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 167 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
1428 The last update was dated 1 January 2019. 
1429 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 167 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
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Because of the uncertainty of this, no further discussion will be taken in this thesis 
regarding this specific topic (pass-thru payments).1430 
There is a difference between the withholding responsibilities of the FFIs under the 
Model IGAs and the regulations. Under the IGAs, there is no requirement for the FFIs 
to withhold the 30% unless there is non-compliance.1431 For Model 1 IGAs, this means 
that as long as they deliver the U.S. accountholder information to the IRS they do not 
need to withhold the 30%, however, if there is significant non-compliance, then the 
partner country is to apply its own domestic laws to address the non-compliance.1432 
If the issue is not resolved within 18 months then the IRS may treat the FFI as non-
compliant and can then require withholding the 30% penalty.1433 Under Model 2 IGAs, 
there is no requirement to withhold the 30% unless the partner country fails to respond 
to a request by the U.S. on non-consenting accounts within six months. If that occurs, 
the FFI is required to withhold on the non-consenting accounts.1434 If the issue is not 
resolved within one year, however, then the IRS may treat the FFI as non-compliant 
also.1435   
In contrast to the IGAs, under the final regulations withholding is required on NPFFIs 
and recalcitrant owners.1436 The identification of the payee of a payment determines 
whether withholding is actually required under the regulations by associating it with 
valid documentation obtained in the above sections.1437 If the account is held by more 
than one individual, then each account holder is an individual payee that the 
 
1430 See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/18/2018-27290/regulations-
reducing-burden-under-fatca-and-chapter-3 
1431 Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement; See also, Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement 
1432 Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement 
1433 Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement 
1434 Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement 
1435 Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement 
1436 26 U.S.C. §1471(a); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(a)(1). 
1437 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(a)(1). 
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withholding determination needs to be made on.1438 If the payment is made to an 
entity, then the payee is considered the account holder.1439 
This part of FATCA leaves non-compliant FFIs at a great disadvantage when trying 
to compete within the U.S. financial markets. FFIs that want to comply but may be 
held back from complying because of local regulations (secrecy or privacy rules) 
can choose to either seek a waiver from the American account holder or, if this 
cannot be accomplished, close the account.1440 This allows the FFI to avoid having 
the 30% penalty applied and to continue to participate in the U.S. financial markets.  
FATCA implements this very harsh penalty in order to enforce compliance with the 
U.S. tax laws. Although it does not just enforce U.S. tax laws, it also attempts to 
circumvent foreign jurisdictions’ privacy or secrecy laws in order to procure the 
information the IRS needs to administer the tax law. This club-style1441 penalty has 
been highly criticized by multiple sources, including the FFIs, foreign governments 
and American citizens abroad.  
The compound stipulations of 26 U.S.C. §6038D and 26 U.S.C. §1471, addressing 
both the FFIs that hold the accounts and the U.S. taxpayers themselves, form a nearly 
impenetrable wall of reporting requirements that forces the veil of bank secrecy in 
foreign jurisdictions to be lifted and for the U.S. government to reach into foreign 
accounts of U.S. citizens and procure information needed to administer the tax laws 
correctly and fairly.1442   
 
 
1438 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(b)(2). 
1439 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-4(b)(2). 
1440 Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement; See also, Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement 
1441 David Rosenbloom, Oluyemi Ojutiku & Isabel Munarriz, The Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act and Notice 2010-60, 3 Intern’l Tax 354-355 (December 2010).   
1442 David Gannaway, Key Provisions of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 39 Est. 
Plan. 35 (September 2012); Crawford v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, No. 3:15-CV-00250 
(S.D. Ohio, 2016).   
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9.4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
9.4.1. INTRODUCTION 
When FATCA was first enacted, there were multiple problems that presented 
themselves. First, FATCA does not create a legally enforceable reporting obligation 
on the FFIs since they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.1443 Second, the 
legal requirements of FATCA put the FFIs in conflict with their jurisdiction’s 
banking/privacy laws.1444 They felt they were in the position of having to choose 
between complying with FATCA to avoid the 30% penalty (or being locked out of 
the U.S. financial markets) or violate their jurisdiction’s laws. FATCA does not stand 
on its own as a result of the extra-territorial nature of the law. The U.S. government 
then needed to fix these issues so that they could use FATCA to procure U.S. taxpayer 
information on their foreign accounts. This fix came in the form of Intergovernmental 
Agreements (hereinafter referred to as IGAs).1445 The IGAs help to implement the 
reporting requirements required by FATCA.1446  
The U.S. has multiple agreements, including treaty provisions as seen in Chapter 8, in 
order to help facilitate the exchange of information on U.S. citizens who may possibly 
be noncompliant, with foreign jurisdictions.1447 One type of agreement that the U.S. 
is a party to is a TIEA also discussed in Chapter 8. Even with these types of 
 
1443 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981 (2017).  
1444 Edward Tanenbaum, Here They Come: FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements, 41 Tax 
Mgmt. Int’l  J. 623 (2012); See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical 
Implications of QI and FATCA, 159 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1445 James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA 
Represents Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981 (2017); See also, 
Edward Tanenbaum, Here They Come: FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements, 41 Tax 
Mgmt. Int’l  J. 623 (2012); Erika K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. 
Accounts: Recent Legal Developments, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 (September 
7, 2016); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 
160 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1446 Erika K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 (September 7, 2016). 
1447 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 9 (March 2009. 
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agreements in place, the problem of accessing information still occurs due to the 
structure of those agreements. For example, the IRS was usually required, pre-
FATCA, to know a significant amount of information regarding the noncompliance 
with the tax laws before the foreign jurisdiction would hand over the information 
using the TIEA and treaty avenue.1448 A GAO report gives the example that the TIEA 
does not allow for an across-the-board inquiry into a large group of accounts or 
corporations, but instead, the request for information has to be very narrow and target 
specific in order to identify the taxpayer, it has to state reasonable grounds for the 
belief that the foreign jurisdiction holds the information needed and the tax purpose 
behind the request.1449 The IRS has found that this procedure is both inefficient and 
that it impedes their examination of noncompliance issues. If the TIEA or treaty 
provisions are inefficient, the IRS must find other legal and investigative measures 
such as the other anti-tax evasion measures mentioned in the previous chapters. This 
is why FATCA was enacted and why the IGAs were created to help facilitate 
FATCA.1450  
 
9.4.2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
The U.S. Department of Treasury, in order to simplify FATCA, reduce the costs 
associated with it and to address the conflict that FATCA puts the FFIs at odds with 
the laws of the jurisdiction it is resident in, collaborated with other nations to develop 
proposals that would allow for alternative compliance with FATCA.1451  The 
jurisdictions are categorized into three classes: jurisdictions that have executed IGAs 
 
1448 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 9 (March 2009. 
1449 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 9-10 (March 2009. 
1450 GAO, Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS, 
GAO-09-478T, 10 (March 2009. 
1451 Ehab Farah, FATCA: Recent Developments and the Intergovernmental Model I 
Agreement, 26 J. Tax. & Reg. Fin. Inst. 5, 7 (Jan/Feb 2013); See also, Maryte Somare and 
Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is 
Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 396 (IBFD, August 2014); Marnin 
Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.07 (September 2018). 
CHAPTER 9. FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 
355 
 
with the United States, those that have not yet executed agreements and jurisdictions 
that have agreed in principle to execute an agreement but have not done so yet.1452  
The latter group’s agreement is considered an “in substance” agreement.1453 These 
model agreements are an alternative approach – not an exception – to the final FATCA 
regulations and are meant to simplify the procedure for identifying U.S. accounts and 
complying with the collecting and reporting information that are found within the 
FATCA statues and regulations.1454 In February 2012, the United States signed Joint 
Statements with France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain, Japan and Switzerland in 
order to assist in the implementation of FATCA.1455 The main purpose of the Joint 
Statement between the first five countries was to express the shared motive to build 
bilateral exchanges of information that is the base for the intergovernmental 
 
1452 Department of the Treasury, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, found at 
https://home.treasury.gov/about/offices/tax-policy/foreign-account-tax-compliance-
act; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 160 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1453 Department of the Treasury, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, found at 
https://home.treasury.gov/about/offices/tax-policy/foreign-account-tax-compliance-
act; See also, Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and 
FATCA, 160 (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
1454 Edward Tanenbaum, The FATCA Model 2 Intergovermental Agreement (January 11, 
2013) available at (https://www.bna.com/fatca-model-intergovernmental-n17179871809/; See 
also, Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1455 U.S. Department of Treasury, Joint Statement From the United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving 
International Tax Compliance and Implementing FATCA (Feb. 8, 2012), found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-
Statement-US-Fr-Ger-It-Sp-UK-02-07-2012.pdf; See also, Maryte Somare and Viktoria 
Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, August 2014); D.S. Kerzner and D.W. 
Chodikoff, International Tax Evasion in the Global Information Age, 317 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2016); Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶ 6.07 (Thomson 
Reuters Tax and Accounting, September 2018). 
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framework.1456 This approach would  accomplish a number of goals: 1) to have the 
relevant foreign government enact legislation that would require the FFIs in those 
jurisdictions to collect and report information to its tax authorities, 2) to allow those 
FFIs to apply necessary due diligence procedures to identify U.S. accounts and 3) to 
transmit the information to the IRS through the automatic exchange of information 
procedures.1457  The IGAs would eliminate the need for the FFI agreement between 
the IRS and FFIs because certain categories of FFIs would be “deemed compliant” 
through the Intergovernmental Agreement executed between the U.S. and the FATCA 
Partner.1458 This approach, which led to the Model 1 IGA (discussed in subsection 
9.4.2.1), was seen as a modification to FATCA’s unilateral approach but it was also 
viewed as necessary to address the apparent conflict between FATCA partners’ local 
laws and the requirements of FATCA.1459 
The joint statement between Japan and Switzerland, both Model 2 agreement 
countries (discussed in subsection 9.4.2.2), had the purpose of expressing “bilateral 
intentions for the intergovernmental cooperation in order to overcome the legal 
difficulties which arose from the incompatibility of FATCA with certain provisions of 
 
1456 U.S. Department of Treasury, Joint Statement From the United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving 
International Tax Compliance and Implementing FATCA (Feb. 8, 2012), found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-
Statement-US-Fr-Ger-It-Sp-UK-02-07-2012.pdf; See also, Maryte Somare and Viktoria 
Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, August 2014); Marnin J. Michaels, 
International Taxation: Withholding, ¶ 6.07 (Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting, 
September 2018). 
1457 Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶ 6.07 (Thomson Reuters Tax 
and Accounting, September 2018). 
1458 Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶ 6.07 (Thomson Reuters Tax 
and Accounting, September 2018). 
1459 Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶ 6.07 (Thomson Reuters Tax 
and Accounting, September 2018). 
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national legislation”1460, for example, secrecy laws in Switzerland. As of April 2020, 
more than one hundred IGAs are in effect, either identified as in force, signed or as 
an agreement in substance.1461  
Model 1 and Model 2 are utilized by the Department of the Treasury in order to 
facilitate the exchange of information.1462 The IGAs provide benefits for the financial 
institutions whose jurisdiction enters into an IGA with the U.S.1463 Each model also 
has a sub-model for agreements with countries that do not have tax treaties or TIEAs 
with the U.S.1464 While FATCA’s statutes and regulations detail the procedure 
originally enacted, the IGAs detail the alternative process that allows the FFIs to 
cooperate with FATCA once the foreign jurisdiction enacts FATCA into the domestic 
 
1460 U.S. Department of Treasury, Joint Statement From the United States and Switzerland 
Regarding a Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA (June 
21, 2012), found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-Statement-US-Switzerland-06-21-2012.pdf; See 
also, U.S. Department of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and Japan 
Regarding a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation 
of FATCA and Improve International Compliance (June 21, 2012), found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-
Statement-US-Japan-06-21-2012.pdf; See also, Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two 
Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, August 2014).  
1461 IRS, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act Resource Center, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; See also, 
Marnin J. Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶ 6.07 (Thomson Reuters Tax and 
Accounting, September 2018). 
1462 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also,  Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, 
Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin 
for International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, August 2014); Marnin Michaels, International 
Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.07 (September 2018); Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: 
Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 121 (Palgrave MacMillan 2013); Congressional 
Research Service, Erika K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: 
Recent Legal Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1463 U.S. Department of Treasury, Models 1 and 2 IGA, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Ross 
K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 160 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2019). 
1464 IRS, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act Resource Center, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; ; See also, 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 396 (IBFD, 
August 2014); Marnin Michaels, International Taxation: Withholding, ¶6.07 (September 
2018). 
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legislation.1465 The regulations and code support the application and interpretation of 
the IGAs.1466 When there is an existing treaty or TIEA between the U.S. and the 
FATCA partner, the IGA utilizes the existing treaty or TIEA structure and practices 
and procedures as the authority for the IGA requirements.1467 When there is no pre-
existing treaty or TIEA, then the parties draft their own practices and procedures 
within the agreement based on FATCA’s statues and regulations.1468  
  
9.4.2.1 Model 1 Agreement 
The first type of IGA model agreement, Model 1, has two forms: a reciprocal (1a) and 
non-reciprocal (1b) form.1469 Model 1a is the only agreement that allows for the 
reciprocal exchange of information between the U.S. and its FATCA partners and is 
the most used – most likely due to the reciprocity provision.1470 This autonomous 
 
1465 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, 
August 2014); See also, James F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: 
How FATCA Represents Unsound International Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981 (2017).  
1466 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1467 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1468 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1469 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx;; See also, IRS, Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act Resource Center, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; Ehab Farah, FATCA: Recent Developments and the 
Intergovernmental Model I Agreement, 26 J. Tax. & Reg. Fin. Inst. 5, 8 (Jan/Feb 2013). 
1470 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; See also, U.S. Department of Treasury, 
FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; Congressional Research Service, Erika K. Lunder and Carol 
A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal Developments, Congressional 
Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two 
Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, August 2014).  
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agreement1471, which builds its own scope regarding how to identify reportable 
information but still reflects the FATCA regulations, requires the U.S. to reciprocate 
and provide information to the partner country on financial accounts that the partner 
country’s citizens hold in the U.S.1472 This Model 1a agreement is made with countries 
that the U.S. Treasury Department has confirmed have strong privacy protections in 
place to ensure the confidentiality of the information exchanged.1473  The Model 1a 
created a two-step reporting system.1474 The first step requires, after the FFIs have 
taken the steps of identifying and documenting U.S. accounts, that the FFI reports the 
collected information to their governments which is usually the taxing authority.1475  
The partner country’s taxing authority takes the responsibility of reporting the 
 
1471 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; See also, U.S. Department of Treasury, 
FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; Congressional Research Service, Erika K. Lunder and Carol 
A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal Developments, Congressional 
Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two 
Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 395, 398 (IBFD, August 2014).  
1472 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 1 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Ehab Farah, FATCA: Recent 
Developments and the Intergovernmental Model I Agreement, 26 J. Tax. & Reg. Fin. Inst. 5, 8 
(Jan/Feb 2013); See also, Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model 
Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 
395, 400 (IBFD, August 2014). 
1473 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 1 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); See also,  
Ehab Farah, FATCA: Recent Developments and the Intergovernmental Model I Agreement, 26 
J. Tax. & Reg. Fin. Inst. 5, 8 (Jan/Feb 2013). 
1474 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx;; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1475 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx;; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
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information directly to the IRS and off of the FFIs.1476 This second step is for the 
FATCA partner government to directly relay the information to the IRS.1477 The 
information must be exchanged annually on an automatic basis and there is no 
requirement for the FFI to enter into an FFI agreement with the IRS.1478 The FFI only 
has to comply with the IGA’s reporting requirements and register on the FATCA 
registry on the IRS website.1479 This is one of the benefits that FFIs receive under an 
IGA. Under Model 1, the FFI does not have to withhold on payments to or close the 
accounts of recalcitrant account holders (another benefit) as long as the FATCA 
partner sends the information to the IRS.1480 If there is significant non-compliance by 
the FFI with the IGA, then the FATCA partner has to apply its own domestic laws to 
 
1476 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx;; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1477 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); See also, 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1478 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1479 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); See also, 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1480 U.S. Department of Treasury, FATCA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 4 (September 7, 2016); See also, 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
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address the non-compliance and it has 18 months to resolve it.1481 If it is not resolved 
in the stated timeframe, the FFI may be treated as FATCA non-compliant.1482 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer argue that Model 1a is not a truly reciprocal 
agreement because the FATCA partner is under heavier reporting obligations than the 
United States is.1483 The first reason is that the FFIs in FATCA partner countries have 
a more comprehensive procedure to go through in order to identify the U.S. accounts 
in their institution, however, the U.S. financial institutions do not have to endure the 
same extensive procedure.1484 The second reason that supports their assertion is that 
FFIs in FATCA partner jurisdictions are required to identify U.S. controlling owners 
of foreign entities.1485 There is no parallel requirement of U.S. financial institutions 
that requires them to report controlling foreign owners of U.S. entities.1486 The third, 
and final, reason that FATCA partners are under heavier reporting obligations is that 
the financial information that is to be exchanged is far more extensive for the FATCA 
partner than it is for the U.S.1487 When examining the Model 1a IGA, the analysis 
supports the argument that Model 1a is not truly reciprocal. While the FATCA partner 
does receive some information from the U.S., it is not equal in nature to the what the 
 
1481 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 1 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1482 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 1 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1483 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 398 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1484 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 39 (IBFD, August 
2014).  
1485 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 398 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1486 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 398 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1487 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 398 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
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FATCA partner is required to deliver to the IRS. When comparing the U.S. exchange 
requirements to the information exchange that the FATCA partner is required to 
deliver, the requirements are not proportionate. If the information exchange was truly 
reciprocal, then each partner to the agreement would receive the same level of 
information. The United States undeniably benefits more from this Model form than 
do the FATCA partners.  
Model 1b is the second form used and is the non-reciprocal version which means that 
no information is given to the partner country.1488 This version of the Model 1 IGA 
can be entered into whether or not there is an existence of a TIEA or tax treaty between 
the United States and its FATCA partner.1489 There are roughly thirty jurisdictions that 
have signed Model 1b IGAs with the United States and among those jurisdictions are 
countries like Algeria, Cayman Islands and the UAE.1490  
The key difference between Model 1b and Model 1a can be found in the Article 2 of 
both agreements.1491 Article 2 in both Models lays out the information in paragraph 2 
that the FATCA partner has to exchange.1492 Model 1a has a second subsection to 
paragraph 2 that lays out the information the U.S. has to give to the FATCA partner – 
Model 1b, para. 2 does not have this subsection.1493 
 
 
1488 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1b, art. 2 found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Ehab 
Farah, FATCA: Recent Developments and the Intergovernmental Model I Agreement, 26 J. 
Tax. & Reg. Fin. Inst. 5, 8 (Jan/Feb 2013). 
1489 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1b, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, James F. Kelly, International Tax 
Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents Unsound International Tax 
Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 989 (2016-2017). 
1490 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1b, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx 
1491 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1a and Model 1b, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx;. 
1492 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1a and Model 1b, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx 
1493 Intergovernmental Agreement Model 1a and Model 1b, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx 
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9.4.2.2 Model 2 Agreement  
Parallel agreements with both Switzerland and Japan led to the creation of Model 2 
which is more limited in scope than is Model 1 and is based almost entirely on the 
FATCA statutes and regulations.1494 This version of the Model agreement has been 
chosen by countries that have strong privacy and banking secrecy laws such as 
Bermuda and Switzerland, both of whom have Model 2 agreements with the U.S.1495 
The list of countries that have executed a Model 2 agreement is relatively short.1496  
The purpose of the Model 2 agreement is to give the FFIs in Model 2 jurisdictions the 
legal framework for the FFIs to directly relay the information on U.S. account holders 
to the IRS.1497 Model 2 agreements are wholly different than Model 1 in that this 
agreement is between the IRS and the FFI and not the government of the jurisdiction 
 
1494 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); 
Jane G. Song, The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S. Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore Accounts, 35 
Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 687, 703 (2015); Edward Tannenbaum, https://www.bna.com/fatca-
model-intergovernmental-n17179871809/; Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two 
Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 395, 396 (IBFD, August 2014).  
1495 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 397 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1496 Model 2 countries as of June 2019: Armenia, Austria, Bermuda, Chile, Hong Kong, Iraq, 
Japan, Macao, Moldova, Nicaragua, Paraguay, San Marino, Switzerland and Taiwan, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, James 
F. Kelly, International Tax Regulation By United States Fiat: How FATCA Represents 
Unsound International Tax Policy, 34 Wis. Int’l L. J. 981, 985 (2016-2017).  
1497 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 396 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
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the FFI is found in.1498 Instead of reporting to the competent authority as in Model 1, 
FFIs instead sign a Foreign Financial Institution Agreement with the IRS, register on 
the IRS’ website1499 and deal directly with the IRS.1500 The FFI collects and reports 
the information - based on the requirements of the FFI agreement and Treasury 
regulations - on U.S. accounts after requesting consent from each U.S. account holder 
which allows the FFI to report the information to the IRS.1501 If the U.S. account 
holder refuses to give consent, the FFIs then report the aggregate information on the 
account.1502 This is a benefit to the Model 2 agreement. Instead of having to claim that 
those account holders who refuse are recalcitrant and potentially shutting down the 
accounts as the regulations require, they are allowed to report aggregate information 
on the accounts. Based on the information that the United States receives from the 
FFIs in the foreign jurisdiction regarding non-consenting accounts, the US then makes 
a request for an exchange of information from that government who then has six 
 
1498 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); 
Edward Tanenbaum, The FATCA Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement (January 11, 2013) 
available at (https://www.bna.com/fatca-model-intergovernmental-n17179871809/ 
1499U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-16; Congressional 
Research Service, Erika K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: 
Recent Legal Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1500 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); 
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, 
August 2014).  
1501 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); Maryte 
Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: 
Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399-400 (IBFD, August 2014).  
1502 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); Maryte 
Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: 
Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, August 2014).  
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months to provide the information sought.1503 The only role the foreign government 
plays under Model 2 is to enable the FFIs to comply with FATCA and to respond to 
requests by the U.S. when the U.S. makes a request for an exchange of information.1504 
If the FFI is noncompliant, then the FFI has twelve months to resolve the 
noncompliance or the FFI will be treated as FATCA noncompliant.1505  
The FFI agreement that is used with Model 2 does not detail the information that is to 
be collected and reported and, instead, references the FATCA regulations.1506 Section 
6 of the Revenue Procedure 2017-16 provides the text of the 54-page FFI 
agreement.1507  
One key distinction between Model 1 and Model 2 is that Model 1 is the form where 
the foreign government is involved and agrees to be the transmitter of the information 
on U.S. account holders collected by the FFIs.1508 In this scenario, consent does not 
have to be given for the information to be delivered from the government to the 
IRS.1509 This reflects the automatic exchange of information that the U.S. government 
 
1503 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016); Maryte 
Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: 
Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, August 2014).  
1504 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, 
Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin 
for International Taxation, 395, 399 (IBFD, August 2014).  
1505 U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 IGA, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx; See also, Congressional Research Service, Erika 
K. Lunder and Carol A. Pettit, FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal 
Developments, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 (September 7, 2016). 
1506 Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1507 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-16 found at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-17-16.pdf  
1508 Crawford v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 2016 WL 1642968 (S.D. Ohio, 2916), aff’d in 
Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 838 F.3d 438 (6th Cir., 2017), certiorari denied, Crawford 
v. Dep’t of Treasury, 138 S.Ct. 1441 (2018); See also, Intergovernmental Agreement Model 
1a and Model 2, found at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx. 
1509 Edward Tanenbaum, The FATCA Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement (January 11, 
2013), available at https://www.bna.com/fatca-model-intergovernmental-n17179871809   
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
366
 
has wanted to achieve with art. 26 in the Income Tax Treaties and the TIEAs (Chapter 
8). Model 2 governments, on the other hand, agree to modify their laws in order to 
allow their FFIs to report their information directly to the IRS. Under Model 2 
agreements, consent is from the account holders is required since the FFI deals directly 
with the FFI.1510 Another distinction is how both Models treat recalcitrant owners.1511 
The definition of recalcitrant owner is defined as any account holder that fails to 
comply with reasonable requests for the information or fails to provide a waiver upon 
request.1512 Model 1a does not require the FFI to withhold payments or close accounts 
on recalcitrant owners if they have specific information – name, address and tax 
identification number - on U.S. account holders and controlling U.S. persons of 
foreign entities.1513 In contrast, Model 2 is not required to withhold taxes or close 
accounts as long the FFI reports the aggregate number and value of all accounts held 
by recalcitrant owners.1514 
 
1510 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 and 2, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx,; See also, 
Edward Tanenbaum, The FATCA Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreement (January 11, 2013), 
available at https://www.bna.com/fatca-model-intergovernmental-n17179871809 
1511 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 and 2, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx, See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1512 26 U.S.C. §1471 (d)(6).  
1513 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 and 2, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx, See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1514 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 and 2, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx, See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
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In both Models, however, Annex I deals with the due diligence procedures and 
obligations and Annex II deals with exempt beneficial owners and compliant FFIs.1515 
Both Models also allow for the use of Treasury Regulations instead of the IGA 
provisions.1516  
 
9.5. CONCLUSION 
The anti-tax evasion withholding framework known as FATCA is a complicated, 
technical piece of legislation that created a foreign third-party reporting system that 
would hopefully incentivize FFIs into reporting on U.S. taxpayer foreign accounts. 
The key to FATCA is the identification and documentation of U.S. accounts so that 
the FFI can report the required information back to the U.S. government. For those 
FFIs that are non-compliant or for recalcitrant account holders, a 30% penalty is to be 
applied to certain types of payments made to those accounts. 
The question facing this chapter is whether FATCA, as implemented, allows the U.S. 
government to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts? The answer 
to that question is complicated and multi-faceted and depends upon the parameters 
used to evaluate FATCA. First, if the evaluation is based on how FATCA has 
performed since it came into effect, the answer is it is hard to evaluate because 
information on data of repatriated revenue is nonexistent.1517 There is also no 
information on how many accounts they have received information on that the author 
 
1515 Intergovernmental Agreement Annexes for Models 1 and 2, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx, See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1516 Intergovernmental Agreement Models 1 and 2, found at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx, See also,  
Maryte Somare and Viktoria Woehrer, Two Different FATCA Model Intergovernmental 
Agreements: Which is Preferable? Bulletin for International Taxation, 395, 400 (IBFD, 
August 2014). 
1517 Ross McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA, 259-260 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2019).  
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has been able to locate on either the IRS or the Department of the Treasury website. 
A reason for this could be that while the other measures examined in the thesis have 
been around for decades FATCA has been in effect for less than a decade.  
If the evaluation of the effectiveness of FATCA is based on how it is implemented on 
paper, then the answer is no and yes. The answer is no, FATCA, as enacted, does not 
allow for the U.S. government to procure the information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts because many FFIs could not provide that information to the U.S. 
government based on the secrecy and privacy rules that exist in many foreign 
jurisdictions. To address those issues, the Department of the Treasury and the IRS 
created the Intergovernmental Agreements to assist in implementing FATCA. 
Through the IGAs, governments have agreed to work with the U.S. through either 
Model 1 (reciprocal information), Model 2 or through the regulations. For those 
governments that have not agreed, the U.S. has left an option open for the financial 
institutions of those countries to choose to comply with the U.S. if they decide to do 
so (regulations).  
If the evaluation of the effectiveness of FATCA is based on how it is implemented on 
paper, the answer is yes, with the IGAs, it is an effective way – at least more effective 
than the other measures – to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. 
The 30% penalty is a bull-in-the-china shop approach, but it is an effective incentive 
as 113 countries (out of 195) have executed IGAs with the U.S. government. This 
number does not account for the FFIs in non-IGA jurisdictions that have signed FFI 
agreements with the IRS.  
One big problem that presents itself that is almost identical to that of the QI is that 
FATCA is extremely complicated and is written in highly technical legal language 
that if one is not a native English speaker, it would be extremely difficult to understand 
the obligations and responsibilities that one has. The suggestions here would be the 
same as the suggestions in the QI Chapter: utilize social media and technology in the 
form of video courses, explanatory (plain English) videos, podcasts and possibly, even 
diagrams to show how the system works. Addressing the cultural and linguistic issues 
CHAPTER 9. FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 
369 
 
that exist could help non-U.S. persons, entities and FFIs to better understand the law 
which could increase compliance rates. 
Another major issue that is not as easy to solve is the oversight and control over 
FFIs that are not in jurisdictions where there are IGAs in place. Similar to the IRS 
believing that NQIs in chapter 7 are instigators of tax evasion because they are 
believed to be assisting in tax evasion when they refuse to share their customers’ 
information with the IRS, it is not a stretch to believe that those FFIs that are in 
jurisdictions that have no IGA and do not execute an FFI agreement under the 
regulations are could possibly be facilitating tax evasion. However, the lack of 
understanding based on the highly technical legal language could account for why 
some FFIs do not want to participate. There is still the problem of oversight and 
control of those FFIs that have U.S. accounts but do not agree to the FFI agreement. 
Because FATCA is so “young”, it is hard to know if the 30% penalty and the 
inability to participate in the U.S. financial markets will eventually have an effect on 
those FFIs or whether they will simply continue to opt out and either take the hit of 
30% or choose not to maintain U.S. accounts. This is another place, however, the 
U.S. might consider using a well-reasoned tax haven definition or blacklist (see 
Chapter 3, subsection 3.4) as suggested in the Qualified Intermediary Chapter (7). 
The IRS – in creating the QI program – noted that the jurisdictions that refused to 
cooperate with the program and were considered tax haven jurisdictions (or bank 
secrecy jurisdictions) needed more stringent oversight over the FFIs or their 
branches located in those jurisdictions.1518 This could be applied to FATCA as well. 
For this scenario, a tax haven definition or a blacklist could help in identifying those 
jurisdictions where the FFIs need more oversight and which also might provide 
some incentive for the FFIs to fully cooperate with the program if they know they 
will be under more scrutiny because of the secrecy their jurisdiction provides to 
 
1518 IRS Rev. Proc. 2017-15; See also, IRS Announcement 2000-48, 2000-1 C.B. 1243; Marc 
D. Shepsman, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives to Prevent 
International Tax Arbitrage, 36 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1767, 1788 (2013); Stephen Troiano, The 
U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and  the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 New Eng. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 317, 333 (2011). 
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those looking for it. It would also be a warning for taxpayers who are looking to 
open accounts in those jurisdictions that the IRS will be looking very closely at 
financial institutions in those jurisdictions. The IRS should consider raising penalties 
on U.S. taxpayers that have accounts in those jurisdictions and do not declare them, 
if they are discovered through measures other than voluntary disclosure.  
 
The United States Congress should also increase the funding to the IRS. They 
enacted this extremely complicated law targeted at foreign financial institutions, 
most of whom do not have English as a first language. Then, over the last ten years, 
they have allowed the IRS’ budget to decline1519 which has resulted in the IRS being 
understaffed and has led to eroded enforcement. If Congress wants FATCA, the QI 
and the other measures to succeed in procuring taxpayer information on foreign 
accounts and to help in preventing tax evasion, Congress should fund the IRS so that 
enforcement of the laws they have enacted can occur.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1519 Tax Policy Center, Budge Blueshttps://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/budget-
blues-tax-administration 
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CHAPTER 10. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
10.1. CONCLUSIONS 
The dissertation poses four questions. The first question asked what measures the U.S. 
government has taken to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial 
accounts despite bank secrecy laws that prohibit the IRS from administering the tax 
laws correctly and fairly? The second question posited is how the anti-tax evasion 
measures are implemented in order to address the inability to procure information on 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts? The third question examines whether the measures, 
when implemented, enable the IRS to procure formerly inaccessible taxpayer 
information on foreign accounts so that the IRS has all the facts to administer the U.S. 
tax laws correctly and fairly? If the answer to the third question is no, then a fourth 
question is proffered. If the measures do not permit the U.S. government to procure 
the information needed on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts, then what needs 
to be done to improve the measures, so it increases the IRS’ chances of obtaining 
information on U.S taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts?  
To answer those questions, the thesis examines six anti-evasion measures that the U.S. 
government enacted because the U.S. government has had difficulty in procuring 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign financial accounts. Two methodologies are 
used in answering the questions. The first, legal dogmatics, uses the law itself to 
answer what measures are used by the U.S. government to try to procure the 
information needed and how the law (measures) itself is implemented in order to 
fulfill that purpose. The second method, the socio-legal method, focuses on whether 
the anti-tax evasion measures work and how to improve the measures if they do not 
work so that the IRS has increased chances of procuring information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts.  
The first two measures examined were the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial 
Accounts (FBAR – Chapter 4) and the Voluntary Disclosure programs (Chapter 5) 
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both of which depend on taxpayers’ voluntarily disclosing their foreign financial 
accounts. The research demonstrated that while these programs were able to obtain 
some information on taxpayers’ foreign accounts, the numbers of taxpayers involved 
compared to the numbers of U.S. taxpayers who hold foreign accounts was small. The 
U.S. government is still missing millions of taxpayers and their information and 
billions in lost revenue. The effectiveness of these two measures is lost when the 
penalties are not high enough that those that are intentionally evading their tax 
obligations do not feel the risk is high enough. The increase in both monetary penalties 
and jail time should increase the risk enough that those that intentionally evade choose 
to comply instead of evading. A reasonable cause exception should be made for those 
taxpayers that were unaware or made an innocent mistake to avoid applying harsh 
penalties and create untenable situations.  
The next measure (Chapter 6) explored whether the U.S. government could obtain the 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts by obtaining the information from 
third parties via the use of the John Doe summons, a legal process that occurs through 
the judicial branch of the U.S. government. This measure is limited by the discovery 
of groups of unknown taxpayers when investigating other cases or when taxpayers 
voluntarily comply and disclose information that leads the IRS to believe there are 
other U.S. taxpayers taking advantage of the same types of schemes as the ones 
disclosed through the voluntary disclosure program. Without the other measures, the 
John Doe summons is severely limited as a way to procure information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts.  
The chapter on art. 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty and tax information 
exchange agreements scrutinized whether this type of measure (exchange of 
information) can procure the information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts that the 
IRS needs through agreements with foreign governments. The examination of art. 26 
in the income tax treaty found that it can be effective in obtaining information but how 
effective depends on a few conditions: 1) the  ability of the U.S. to negotiate broad 
language that encompasses the U.S.’ definition of tax evasion, 2) the cultural 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
374
 
differences between the U.S. and its treaty partner and 3) the willingness of the U.S. 
to trade information at the same level they expect from their treaty partners. 
Chapters 7 and 9 explored whether the information the IRS needs on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts can be obtained through the Qualified Intermediary Program (QI) 
and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) both of which focus on 
foreign financial institutions as the source of that information. The QI program and 
FATCA are both tax withholding regimes. The QI program uses FFIs to document, 
withhold, deposit tax and report on certain types of income payments made to non-
U.S. persons. FATCA, on the other hand, is a withholding regime that uses FFIs to 
identify and document U.S. persons who have accounts with the FFI and to report on 
those accounts or subject themselves to a 30% penalty. Both the QI and FATCA are 
severely limited by their highly technical language and the fact that a majority of the 
FFIs are not native English speakers. In both withholding regimes control and 
oversight over those FFIs that are not participating is problematic and does not allow 
for information on U.S. taxpayers’ accounts held in those institutions to be verified. 
Many of these measures would be more effective if several things occur. First, if 
Congress increased the IRS’ funding more agents could be hired which in turn means 
that enforcement will be more consistent and effective. Without funding and a large 
number of agents, the IRS simply cannot track down tax evaders. Second, having an 
educational campaign for U.S. taxpayers – especially those living outside the U.S. – 
allows them to understand their tax obligations and should increase compliance 
among those not intentionally evading. Third, using an educational campaign for 
foreign financial institutions that is in plain English could increase compliance with 
the QI program and FATCA because as a non-native English speaker it is probably 
incredibly difficult to comprehend the highly technical language of both the QI and 
FATCA.  
The evidence from the research on each measure suggests that the anti-tax evasion 
measures, taken independently, are not wholly effective in procuring information on 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. FATCA is the most effective because it forces the 
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FFIs to come to the table and share the information the U.S. is seeking. If they do not, 
then they are subject to a 30% penalty and are then locked out of the U.S. financial 
markets. However, even FATCA was not wholly effective because many of the FFIs 
could not meet FATCA’s obligations without breaking their own jurisdiction’s 
secrecy laws and, thus, the U.S. government had to draft the Intergovernmental 
Agreements to effectuate FATCA. FATCA, considered a major win, is also limited 
by the fact that many FFIs who do not want to hassle with the law either do not agree 
to become FFIs or they just refuse to maintain U.S. accounts (or conceal those 
accounts) which means the U.S. is not receiving information on those U.S. accounts.  
The research ultimately supports the view that Richard A. Gordon expressed in his 
1981 report on U.S. taxpayers who were using tax haven jurisdictions to evade taxes. 
He asserted, and this thesis supports the assertion, that there should be a coordinated 
federal attack. However, while Gordon argued for a coordinated attack on tax havens, 
it is actually secrecy that should be the target of the coordinated federal attack. The 
measures examined within these pages fulfill that coordinated attack because they 
work in concert together to assault the problem from different fronts. The first front 
focuses on who the U.S. government will obtain their information from. The measures 
examined in this dissertation obtain their information from the taxpayer themselves, 
third parties, foreign governments and foreign financial institutions (FFIs). The 
second front of the coordinated attack reaches across multiple federal agencies and 
their sub-agencies and all three branches of government to provide enforcement of 
those measures to ensure the information is procured. For example, the Judicial branch 
is involved in court cases that develop from these measures but also in approving the 
issuance of John Doe summons. The Executive branch is involved in negotiating tax 
treaties with foreign governments that try to procure information on taxpayer 
information on foreign accounts through exchange of information provisions while 
the Legislative branch ratifies those treaties. The Department of the Treasury and its 
sub-agency, the IRS, are the main agencies involved but other agencies such as the 
Department of Justice who prosecutes certain types of cases and conducts 
investigations on tax evasion are also involved. Congress does not just ratify treaties, 
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but they also hold hearings on issues relevant to this dissertation – for example, 
secrecy – and then draft and enact anti-tax evasion legislation. This weaving together 
of the different measures to attack secrecy from the different fronts should continue 
to be the approach of the U.S. government because secrecy and the ways to use it to 
obscure taxpayers’ foreign accounts is constantly evolving and changing.  
This dissertation contributes to the academic work by discussing in-depth the 
measures that make up the U.S. government’s anti-tax evasion framework (federal 
coordinated attack) which is in place to allow the U.S. government to procure 
information on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts. Most literature that discusses the 
measures examined in this thesis do one of two things: 1) it either addresses most of 
the measures briefly while focusing mainly on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) or 2) it addresses one or two of the measures individually. This 
dissertation, on the other hand, explores all of the measures comprehensively while 
focusing on how they enable the U.S. government to procure information on U.S. 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. This dissertation also supports Richard A. Gordon’s 
position that the U.S. needs a coordinated federal attack – found in the anti-tax evasion 
framework – only differing in the opinion that the attack should be on secrecy and not 
on tax havens.  
The findings of the dissertation could be of interest to multiple persons or groups of 
people. First, the findings could be of interest to those in the international tax 
community who might be interested in how the U.S. handles secrecy and procuring 
information on their taxpayers’ foreign accounts including those that represent U.S. 
taxpayers. This could include the tax authorities of foreign governments who may be 
trying to decide how to tackle secrecy and procure information on their own 
taxpayers’ foreign accounts. This dissertation could also be of interest to those 
members in the U.S. Congress who are interested in drafting legislation that addresses 
secrecy and the continuing issue of trying to procure information on U.S. taxpayers’ 
foreign accounts so that the tax laws are administered correctly and fairly. A broad 
overview of how these measure work together to procure information could help 
Congress change existing legislation or enact new legislation that continues the 
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coordinated federal attack while addressing the changes that happen in secrecy 
jurisdictions.  
As a result of the research done within in this thesis further research could be 
considered in a couple of areas. First, further research could be done on FATCA and 
its effect on secrecy and its ability to procure taxpayer information. FATCA is the 
most forceful of the anti-tax evasion measures and the “older” FATCA gets the more 
data the U.S. government will have on its effectiveness. That data should be released 
so that academics and others can evaluate the effectiveness of FATCA. Additionally, 
exploring the effect of an educational campaign on U.S. taxpayers has on the 
compliance numbers and whether they would increase or decrease could be of interest 
to the U.S. government who should pursue the educational campaigns suggested in 
this dissertation. Another area that could be researched is how a tax haven definition 
or blacklist (See Chapter 3, subsection 3.4) could be effective within the QI Program 
and FATCA. A tax haven definition or blacklist could potentially be effective where 
FFIs who are in jurisdictions that either have stringent secrecy or refuse to cooperate 
with either the QI program or FATCA need more oversight. It would also be of 
academic interest to explore how the anti-tax evasion framework is effective (or not 
effective) on cryptocurrency, the new secrecy “jurisdiction”, and if it is not effective, 
then how the different measures could be amended so as to be effective.  
Bank and financial secrecy will never fully disappear. There will always be a 
jurisdiction somewhere that offers secrecy as a way for taxpayers to conceal their 
accounts and some taxpayers will always be looking for ways to conceal their 
accounts from the U.S. government. In order for the U.S. to procure information on 
U.S. taxpayers who hold accounts in those jurisdictions, the U.S. should continue to 
evaluate the changing secrecy landscape and continue to use the coordinated federal 
attack via the anti-tax evasion framework that exists to procure that information. 
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Appendix A. Timeline of the Anti-Tax 
Evasion Measures 
 
1970 Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Account (Bank Secrecy Act) 
2000 Qualified Intermediary Program  
2003 Limited three month Offshore Voluntary Disclosure initiative  
2007 John Doe Summons served on UBS 
2009 1st Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program 
2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act  
2011 2nd Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program 
2012 3rd (and final) Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program  
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Appendix B. Definitions for FATCA 
Chapter (Chapter 9)  
 
Documentation and Identification definitions:  
AML/KYC Procedures: the customer due diligence procedures of a financial 
institution pursuant to the anti-money laundering or similar requirements to which the 
financial institution, or branch thereof, is subject. This includes identifying the 
customer (including the owners of the customer), understanding the nature and 
purpose of the account, and ongoing monitoring.1520 
Beneficial Owner: the owner of the income for tax purposes and who beneficially 
owns that income.”1521 When the person would include the amount paid in their gross 
income under U.S. tax law then they are the beneficial owners.1522 Persons who are 
not considered beneficial owners despite receiving income are working in a capacity 
such as  a nominee, agent or custodian for another person.1523 
Foreign Entity: any entity that does not fall under the definition of a U.S. Person.1524 
Substantial U.S. Owner: with respect to any partnership or corporation, any specified 
U.S. person that owns (directly or indirectly) more than 10% of the stock in the case 
of the corporation and profits interests or capitals interests in the case of a partnership. 
In the case of a trust, any specified U.S. person that is treated as an owner of any part 
 
1520 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-1 (b)(4).  
1521 26 U.S.C. §1473(2); See also, 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-1 (c)(6)(i). 
1522 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-1 (c)(6)(i).  
1523 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-1 (c)(6)(i). 
1524 26 U.S.C. §1473 (5). 
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of a trust or a U.S. person who holds (directly or indirectly) more than 10% of the 
beneficial interests. 1525 
U.S. Account:  any financial account that is maintained by an FFI that is held by 
(owned) one or more U.S. persons or U.S.-owned foreign entities.1526  
U.S. Person: a citizen or resident of the U.S., a domestic partnership, a domestic 
corporation, any estate other than a foreign estate, and any trust if a court within the 
U.S is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust and 
one or more United States persons have the authority to control all substantial 
decisions of the trust.1527 
 
Reporting Definitions:  
FATCA Partner Reportable Account: a Financial Account maintained by a 
Reporting U.S. Financial Institution if: (i) in the case of a Depository Account, the 
account is held by an individual resident in [FATCA Partner] and more than $10 of 
interest is paid to such account in any given calendar year; or (ii) in the case of a 
Financial Account other than a Depository Account, the Account Holder is a resident 
of [FATCA Partner], including an Entity that certifies that it is resident in [FATCA 
Partner] for tax purposes, with respect to which U.S. source income that is subject to 
reporting under chapter 3 of subtitle A or chapter 61 of subtitle F of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code is paid or credited.”1528   
Financial Account: this includes depository accounts, custodial accounts, equity or 
debt interests and insurance and annuity contracts.1529 
 
1525 26 U.S.C. §1473 (2).  
1526 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5 (a).  
1527 26 U.S.C. §7701 (a)(30).  
1528 Inter-governmental Agreement Model 1, art. 1 (bb) 
1529  
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Recalcitrant Owner: Under the regulations, a recalcitrant owner is an account holder 
that fails to comply with reasonable requests for the information requested or fails to 
provide a waiver.1530 
Reportable Account: A reportable account is one of two types of accounts: a U.S. 
reportable account or a FATCA Partner Reportable Account.1531 
Substantial United States: any U.S. person that owns, directly or indirectly more 
than 10% of the stock or profits of a foreign corporation or a foreign partnership.1532 
In the case of the ownership of a foreign trust, a specified U.S. person is considered 
an owner of any portion of such a trust under 26 U.S.C. §671-679 and holds directly 
or indirectly, more than 10 percent of the beneficial interests of the trust.1533 
U.S. Reportable Account: A U.S. reportable account is a “Financial Account 
maintained by a Reporting [FATCA Partner] Financial Institution and held by one or 
more Specified U.S. Persons or by a Non-U.S. Entity with one or more Controlling 
Persons that is a Specified U.S. Person.”1534 
Withholding Definitions:  
Withholding Agent: this is any person in the position of having control, receipt, 
custody, disposal, or payment of any withholdable payments.1535  
Withholdable Payment: a U.S.-source payment of interest, dividends, rents, salaries, 
wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other 
FDAP gains, profits and income (FDAP as discussed in Chapter 7 QI).1536 Also, any 
 
1530 26 U.S.C. §1471(d)(6)(A)-(B). 
1531 Inter-govermental Agreement Model 1, art. 1 (aa) 
1532 26 U.S.C. §1473 (2)(A)(i)-(ii); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1473-1 (b)(1)(i)-(ii). 
1533 26 U.S.C. §1473 (2)(A)(iii); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1473-1 (b)(1)(iii). 
1534 Inter-govermental Agreement Model 1, art. 1 (cc) 
1535 26 U.S.C. §1473 (4).  
1536 26 U.S.C. §1473 (1).  
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gross proceeds from the sale or disposition of any property that  can produce interest 
or dividend U.S.-source payments.1537 
Definitions for the various intermediaries (these can also 
apply to the QI Chapter): 
FFI: as a foreign entity1538 that engages in accepting deposits in the ordinary course 
of banking or similar business, holds financial assets for the account of others that is 
a substantial part of its business or is in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading 
in securities, partnership interests, commodities or any interest in such securities, 
partnership interests or commodities.1539  1540 
Participating FFI: the term participating FFI means an FFI that has agreed to comply 
with the requirements of an FFI agreement with respect to all branches of the FFI, 
other than a branch that is a reporting Model 1 FFI or a U.S. branch. The term 
participating FFI also includes an FFI described in a Model 2 IGA that has agreed to 
comply with the requirements of an FFI agreement with respect to a branch (a 
reporting Model 2 FFI), and a QI branch of a U.S. financial institution, unless such 
branch is a reporting Model 1 FFI.1541 
Non-Participating FFI: The term nonparticipating FFI means an FFI other than a 
participating FFI, a deemed-compliant FFI, or an exempt beneficial owner.1542 
Deemed-Compliant FFI: the term deemed-compliant FFI means an FFI that is 
treated, pursuant to section 1471(b)(2) and 1.1471-5(f), as meeting the requirements 
of section 1471(b). This means that as long as the FFI complies with any procedures 
set out by the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that the institution does not maintain 
 
1537 26 U.S.C. §1473 (1)(A)(i)-(ii); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1473-1 (a)(1).  
1538 26 U.S.C. §1471 (d)(4). 
1539 26 U.S.C. §1471 (d)(5); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5(d).  
1540 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5(d). 
1541 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-1 (b)(91). 
1542 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-1 (b)(82).  
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U.S. accounts. This also applies to institutions that this specific section (26 U.S.C. 
§1471 (b)(2) does not apply to as determined by the Secretary. The term deemed-
compliant FFI also includes a QI branch of a U.S. financial institution that is a 
reporting Model 1 FFI.1543 Boiled down, a deemed-compliant institution is one that is 
determined to already be in compliance based on the way it functions and exists in the 
financial services framework.1544 This status can be applied for with the IRS, receives 
an FFI number and certifies to the IRS every three years that it meets the requirements 
for deemed compliant status.1545 
Registered Deemed Compliant FFI: this is an FFI that meets the procedural 
requirements set out in 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5(f)(1)(ii).1546 In order to meet this status, 
the FFI must register with the IRS and complies with the agreement made between 
the U.S. and its own government. 
Certified Deemed Compliant FFI: this is an FFI that has certified its status to a 
withholding agent by providing the documentation required in 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-
3(d)(5).1547 The certified deemed-compliant FFI is not required to register with the 
IRS in contrast to the registered deemed-compliant FFI who does.  
NFFE: the term NFFE or non-financial foreign entity means a foreign entity that is 
not a financial institution (including a territory NFFE). The term also means a foreign 
entity treated as an NFFE pursuant to a Model 1 IGA or Model 2 IGA.1548  
 
 
 
1543 26 U.S.C. §1472 (2); 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-1 (b)(27); IRS Notice 2011-34 (April 8, 2011).  
1544 Ross K. McGill, U.S. Withholding Tax: Practical Implications of QI and FATCA,  
1545 IRS Notice 2011-34 (April 8, 2011).  
1546 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5(f)(1).  
1547 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-5 (f)(2); See also, 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-3(d)(5) (describing the 
documentation that the Cert. deemed-compliant FFI should give to the withholding agent).  
1548 26 C.F.R. §1.1471-1 (b)(80).  
APPENDIX C. ALLEGED TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES & INTERNATIONAL & U.S. AGREEMENTS 
419 
 
Appendix C. Alleged Tax Haven 
Countries & International & U.S. 
Agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
420
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C. ALLEGED TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES & INTERNATIONAL & U.S. AGREEMENTS 
421 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
422
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C. ALLEGED TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES & INTERNATIONAL & U.S. AGREEMENTS 
423 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
424
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C. ALLEGED TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES & INTERNATIONAL & U.S. AGREEMENTS 
425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE U.S.’ HANDLING OF TAX SECRECY: ANTI-EVASION MEASURES 
426
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TH
E U
.S.’ H
A
N
D
LIN
G
 O
F TA
X SEC
R
EC
Y
K
R
ISTEN
 SU
E C
H
R
ISTIA
N
SENISSN (online): 2246-1256
ISBN (online): 978-87-7210-457-7
